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M.A Khan v. Khodaija Begum
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Ramaswami, J.; Full Bench)
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion sets out a contested chain of title and multiple suits relating to a tenure recorded under Khewat no. 4, Tauzi no. 3309 of village Babhnaul (about 83 acres). Hamid Ali and Mahmood Ali were the recorded tenants. In 1926 the Maharaja of Dumraon obtained a decree for rent against them; in execution Latafat (son of Sheikh Asghar Ali) purchased and took possession. Sheikh Asghar Ali was the son of Ahmad Ali by a different wife.
In 1939 Mosammat Najma sued (Title Suit No. 127 of 1939) seeking a declaration that the Maharaja's decree was merely a money decree and that the execution sale had only divested the interest of Hamid and Mahmood Ali — Najma asserted her share was unaffected and sought partition. While that suit was pending the Maharaja obtained a rent decree against Latafat; in execution Mostt. Khodaija purchased Latafat's interest and was made a party to Title Suit No. 127 of 1939.
Najma ultimately obtained a decree in Title Suit No. 127 of 1939 and execution resulted in partition; Najma was given delivery of possession of her share. In 1944 Mostt. Khodaija brought Title Suit No. 126 of 1944 seeking to set aside the decree obtained against her; the trial court dismissed, the appellate court decreed in her favour, and in the High Court the parties compromised. Under the compromise Khodaija's name was expunged from the category of defendants in Title Suit No. 127 of 1939, although "the decree will stand in other respects".
Khodaija then applied to the Munsif for restitution, alleging that by virtue of the compromise the earlier decree was reversed so far as she was concerned. The Munsif applied section 144, Civil Procedure Code, held that section 144 applied, ordered restoration to possession and granted mesne profits. The heirs of Mostt. Najma obtained a rule in this Court under section 115 Civil Procedure Code challenging that order. The principal legal question was whether the High Court was competent to revise the Munsif's restitution order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court is competent to revise the order of the Munsif directing restitution under section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code.
- What is the proper construction of section 144, Civil Procedure Code — in particular, whether the phrase "where and in so far as a decree is varied or reversed" is confined to variation or reversal by a superior court in the same proceeding or whether it extends to variation/reversal by other means (including by co-ordinate courts, separate suits, compromise, or subsequent proceedings).
Arguments of the Parties
Opposite Party's Arguments (as described in the opinion)
- Relied upon the Full Bench decision in Jogendra Nath Singh v. Hira Sahu to contend that where an order of a Munsif is made under section 144, an appeal lies to the District Judge and the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere by revision.
- In the Munsif's proceedings the opposite party asserted (in the application) that the compromise in Title Suit No. 126 of 1944 had the effect of reversing the earlier decree in Title Suit No. 127 of 1939 so far as Khodaija was concerned, and sought restoration of possession (schedule B) from which Khodaija had been dispossessed by execution of the earlier decree.
Applicant's Arguments (as described in the opinion)
- Relied on Ram Tahal Singh v. Sukeswar Reyain to argue that section 144 is confined to cases where a decree has been varied or reversed by a superior court (i.e., in the same proceedings by appeal/revision) and that the Munsif therefore lacked jurisdiction to order restitution in the present circumstances.
- Advanced the narrower/technical construction that the phrase "varied or reversed" should be read as meaning variation or reversal by a superior court in the same proceeding, and that courts of co-ordinate or subsequent jurisdiction could not be treated as having "varied or reversed" the decree for the purposes of section 144.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jogendra Nath Singh v. Hira Sahu (Full Bench) | Discussed in relation to the scope of section 144 and the appellate route from Munsif's orders (appeal to District Judge); also cited as adopting a construction that section 144 applies where decree is varied or reversed regardless of how reversal was effected. | The court treated the decision as supporting the broader construction of section 144 and as authority that restitution under section 144 may be ordered and that the proper appellate remedy from a Munsif's order is to the District Judge. |
| Ram Tahal Singh v. Sukeswar Reyain | Invoked by applicant to contend section 144 was confined to variation/reversal by a superior court. | The court rejected the narrow construction urged by reliance on this authority, holding the section must be given its natural comprehensive meaning. |
| R v. Liverpool Justices (Bowen L.J.) | Principle that words of limitation should not be read into a statute; avoid narrow constructions that limit a statute's prima facie operation. | Quoted to support the approach that section 144 should not be given a limited technical construction by reading in words of restriction. |
| Sharp v. Dawes; Nuth v. Tamplin; Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Gribble | Principle that when a word can be construed in popular or technical (word-of-art) senses, those who assert a technical meaning must establish it. | Relied upon to reject the contention that "varied or reversed" must be read in a restricted technical sense applying only to appeal in the same proceeding. |
| Rodger v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris (Lord Cairns) | Principle that courts must ensure the act of the court does no injury to suitors; "act of the court" includes acts of the court as a whole up the hierarchy. | Used to underline the court's duty to order restitution when a decree has been reversed or varied, and that this duty is not limited to acts of a single court only. |
| Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath Marwari (Judicial Committee) | Authority for holding section 144 should not be narrowly construed; duty to place parties in the position they would have occupied but for the varied/reversed decree; restitution jurisdiction also arises from the court's general jurisdiction. | The court relied on this authority to support that section 144 imposes a duty to order restitution and that restitution may be conditioned (e.g., payment to auction purchaser) as appropriate. |
| Tangatur Subbarayudu v. Yerrant Setti Seshasani (Madras) | Held section 144 was not confined to reversal in first/second appeal; provided that a decree was varied or reversed however that reversal was effected, section 144 applied. | Adopted as direct support for the view that section 144 applies even where reversal/variation is effected by co-ordinate courts or subsequent proceedings. |
| Shama Purshad Roy Chowdhery v. Hurro Purshad Roy Chowdery (Judicial Committee) | Statement that original decree remains valid until reversed or superseded; if reversed, money recovered under it ought to be refunded — central to the question whether a decree has been reversed or superseded. | Quoted to support the proposition that the true question is whether the original decree has been reversed or superseded, regardless of how that reversal took place. |
| Raghu Singh v. Skew Prosad Rai (Calcutta High Court) | Held section 144 was enacted to shorten litigation and provide speedy relief; narrow construction should not be adopted; applied where possession was obtained by force rather than by execution. | Cited to support the broad, purposive construction of section 144 and to reject technical limits on its scope. |
| Brijlal v. Damodar Das | Held section 144 is wide; includes matters beyond ordinary execution or appellate competence; word "party" can include assignees of the decree. | Quoted and treated as supportive authority for a broad reading of "party" and the wide sweep of section 144. |
| Kadiravelu v. Kempu | Mockett, J. construed the word "party" as including persons who subsequently became concerned (i.e., not limited to original parties). | Relied upon to support inclusive meaning of "party" in section 144. |
| Chintaman Singh v. Chuni Sahu | Division Bench discussion where it was held (per that Court) that section 144 need not be confined to reversal by superior court; some aspects of that decision were criticised by Ramaswami, J. | The present Court noted the view taken in that case but expressly considered the contrary interpretation (pressed by applicant) to be incorrect. |
| Ashotosh Nandi v. Kundalkamini Dasi | Ghose, J. observed that a decree could only be varied or reversed by appeal, review or revision and not by a decree in a subsequent suit; Court here said that point was not the ratio of that case and the question before this Bench did not arise there. | Distinguished: the present Court held that the observation in that case was not the ratio and did not control the present question. |
| Rameshwar Lal v. Ramcharan Pd | Rowland, J. considered a case where section 144 did not apply and opined that for application of section 144 there must be variation/reversal by a court of appeal; the Court here called that statement a dictum not necessary for decision. | Regarded the cited statement as dictum and not binding; used to show that a narrow view has been expressed but was not necessary for that case's decision. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying that the decisive question required construing section 144(1) of the Civil Procedure Code, which directs that where and in so far as a decree is varied or reversed the Court of first instance shall, on application of any party entitled to benefit, cause restitution to be made so far as may be to place the parties in the position they would have occupied but for such decree or part thereof.
The applicant urged a narrow technical construction: that "varied or reversed" meant variation or reversal only by a superior court in the same proceedings (appeal/revision) and that courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction or subsequent suits could not be regarded as having varied or reversed a decree for section 144 purposes.
The Court rejected this limited construction for several reasons stated in the opinion:
- Textual and purposive approach: the phrase "varied or reversed" is unqualified and should be given full, ordinary force rather than a restricted technical sense.
- Principle against reading words of limitation into statutes: the Court quoted R v. Liverpool Justices (Bowen L.J.) to emphasise that one should not readily construe a remedial provision more narrowly than its language warrants.
- When a term can be read in a popular or a technical sense, those who assert a technical meaning bear the burden of establishing that choice (authority cited: Sharp v. Dawes, etc.).
- Doctrine and purpose of restitution: section 144 aims to rectify what was originally an error of the court and to restore parties to their rightful positions; this duty is fundamental and not to be curtailed by narrow constructions.
- Support from authorities: the Court reviewed a line of authorities (including the Judicial Committee in Jai Berham, Madras decision in Tangatur Subbarayudu, the Full Bench decision in Jogendra Nath, and Calcutta High Court decisions) that favour a broad reading of section 144 and confirm that reversal or variation may be effected by different processes and still trigger restitution obligations.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court noted that (a) the compromise recorded in the High Court expressly expunged Khodaija's name from the defendants in the earlier Title Suit No. 127 of 1939 so far as she was concerned; (b) the Munsif found that the decree of 1939 had been executed (partition effected) and Najma had been granted delivery of possession of her share; and (c) on the allegations in the application and the findings made, the Munsif had jurisdiction to entertain the application under section 144 and to order restitution (including mesne profits).
The Court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the Munsif's restitution order; its conclusion was limited to jurisdictional and procedural competence under section 144.
Finally, because the Munsif's order was one under section 144, the Court held that the correct remedy was an appeal to the District Judge (from the Munsif) and that the present application in revision to the High Court was incompetent.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Full Bench held that the Munsif had jurisdiction under section 144, Civil Procedure Code, to entertain the restitution application on the facts alleged and found, and that the High Court was not competent to entertain the present revision application against the Munsif's order. Accordingly, the application in revision is incompetent and must be dismissed. The Court ordered that there would be no order as to costs. Chiefs Meredith, J., and Sinha, J., concurred.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the rule in revision obtained by Mostt. Najma's heirs was discharged; the Munsif's jurisdiction to proceed under section 144 was upheld on the found facts; and the proper remedy from the Munsif's order is an appeal to the District Judge rather than revision before the High Court in the manner attempted.
- Legal scope: the Court reaffirmed a broad, purposive construction of section 144 — that restitution obligations arise where a decree has been varied or reversed "however the reversal or variance had been effected" (including by compromise or subsequent proceedings affecting the operation of an earlier decree) — and relied on the surveyed precedents to support that approach.
- Limitation of decision: the Court did not decide the substantive merits of the Munsif's restitution order; its ruling addressed jurisdictional competence and the proper appellate/revisional route only.
Final formal disposition in the opinion: "Rule, discharged." (i.e., the rule in revision was dismissed.)
Ramaswami, J.:— Before formulating the question of law involved in this reference it is necessary to set out the material facts which though complicated are not in dispute. Hamid Ali and Mahmood Ali (sons of Ahmad Ali by his first wife) were recorded as holders of a tenure of 83 acres and odd under Khewat no. 4, Tauzi no. 3309 of village Babhnaul. In 1926 the Maharaja of Dumraon obtained a decree for rent against the recorded tenants. In execution of the decree, Latafat son of Sheikh Asghar Ali purchased the tenure and obtained delivery of possession over it. Sheikh Asghar Ali was the son of Ahmad Ali through his second wife Elahijan. In 1939 Mosammat Najma, wife of Sh. Amanat Ali, brother of Sk. Asghar Ali brought a title suit (no. 127 of 1939) for declaration that the decree obtained by Maharaja Bahadur of Dumraon was merely a money decree, that Latafat obtained only the right and interest, of Hamid Ali and Mahmood Ali by the execution sale. Mosammat Najma alleged that her share was unaffected, and asked for partition. While this suit was pending the Maharaja Bahadur brought a rent suit against Latafat and obtained a decree in execution of which Latafat's interest was purchased by Mostt. Khodaija. At the instance of Mostt. Najma Khodaija was made a party in Title Suit no. 127 of 1939. In this suit Najma ultimately obtained a decree, in execution of which the tenure was partitioned and Najma was given delivery of possession of her share. But in 1944 Mostt. Khodaija brought a title suit (no. 126 of 1944) for setting aside the decree obtained against her Title Suit no. 127 of 1939. The suit was dismissed in the trial court but decreed in appeal. A second appeal was preferred to the High Court, but the parties effected a compromise and the Court allowed the appeal in terms thereof. According to this compromise the name of Khodaija was expunged from the category of defendants in Title Suit no. 127 of 1939; though “the decree will stand in other respects”. Mostt. Khodaija then applied to the Munsif for restitution alleging that on account of the compromise the decree in Title Suit no. 127 of 1939 was reversed so far as she was concerned. The application was contested by Mostt. Najma's heirs. But the Munsif held that section 144 applied and ordered that Mostt. Khodaija ought to be restored to possession and to be granted mesne profits.
Against this order Mostt. Najma's heirs have obtained a rule from this Court under section 115 Civil Procedure Code.
The question which presents itself on the threshold of this case is whether High Court is competent to revise the order of the Munsif directing, that restitution should be made.
For the opposite party learned advocate relied upon the Full Bench case Jogendra Nath Singh v. Hira Sahu and contended that the order of the; Munsif being made under section 144 an appeal lay to the District Judge and the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere. On the contrary, learned advocate for the applicant referred to Ram Tahal Singh v. Sukeswar Reyain and maintained that section 144 was confined to cases in which the decree had been varied or reversed by a superior court, that the Munsif had no jurisdiction to order restitution in the present case.
The answer to the problem depends upon the proper construction of section 144 Civil Procedure Code.
Section 144(1) enacts:
“Where and in so far as a decree is varied or reversed the Court of first instance shall on the application of any party, entitled to any benefit; by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be I made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position) which they would have occupied but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed.”
For the applicant it was argued that courts of concurrent jurisdiction could not “reverse” or “vary”, each other's decree, that a decree was reversed or varied only when it is modified or set aside in the same proceedings by a superior court. It was urged that the phrase “court of first instance” contemplated that the variation or reversal of the decree should be made by a superior court.
In my view, there is no warrant for construing the section in this limited sense. The phrase “varied or reversed” in the present section is unqualified and ought to receive its full force and effect. It is an established rule that words of limitation are not to be read into a statute if it can be avoided; In R v. Liverpool justices Bowen L.J emphasised this cardinal point. “One objection, which is to my mind almost conclusive evidence-against it (the decision in ex p. Todd) is this that so to construe the section is reading into it words; which limit its prima facie operation, and make it something different and smaller than what it terms express. Now certainly, we should not readily; acquiesce in a construction which limits the operation of the section so as to make the remedy given by it not commensurate with the mischief which it was intended to cure”
For the applicant it was suggested that the phrase “varied or reversed” was used in a technical sense, that the phrase exclusively meant that variation or reversal of decree should be by appeal in the same proceeding. In my opinion, this argument is unfounded and there is no reason to hold that the phrase was used in such a restricted technical sense. A decree may be varied or reversed not only by an appeal but by revision to a superior court which may either affirm, set aside or modify the decree. A court may review its own decree and set it aside. If a decree is obtained by fraud or granted by a court that has no jurisdiction, such a decree may doubtless be varied or reversed by a suit brought in different court. When a word is capable of being construed either in its popular sense or as a word of art, it is for those, who assert that it is used in a technical and not in a popular sense to establish the fact [Sharp v. Dawes, Nuth v. Tamplin, Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Gribble].
In my opinion section 144 is worded in very comprehensive terms, and ought not to be narrowly construed. Its object is to put right what was originally an error of the court and to restore the parties to the position they would have occupied but for the court's erroneous decree. The principle of the doctrine of restitution is that on the reversal of, a judgment the law raises an obligation in the party to the record who received the benefit of the erroneous, judgment to make restitution to the other party for what he had lost. This obligation it is the duty of courts to enforce.
In Rodger v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Parish Lord Cairns laid stress on this principle. “One of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care that the act of the court does no injury to any of the suitors and when the expression ‘the act of the court is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary court, or of any intermediate court of appeal, but the act of the court as a whole from the last court which enjoys jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest court, which finally disposes of the case”.
The decision of the Judicial Committee in Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath Marwari is authority for the view that section 144 ought not to be narrowly construed. In that case a sale in execution of a decree was set aside against a purchaser who was stranger to the decree. The Subordinate Judge ordered restoration of the property with mesne profits but made no order as to the purchase price. On appeal the High Court modified the order of the Subordinate Judge to the effect that before properties were restored to the judgment-debtor they ought to pay the auction purchasers the price paid into court. The judgment-debtors then appealed to the Judicial Committee who held that the Court's duty to order restitution arose under section 144 as also under its general jurisdiction. Lord Carson observed: “On the main question—namely, whether the auction purchasers are entitled to repayment of the deposit paid into Court as a condition precedent to their handing over possession to the judgment-debtors, their Lordships are in agreement with the judgment of the High Court, and think the order already referred to should on this point be affirmed. It is the duty of the Court under section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code to ‘place the parties in the position which they would have occupied, but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed.’ Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved”.
The construction I have adopted finds direct support in the Madras decision Tangatur Subbarayudu v. Yerrant Setti Seshasani. In that case an order in execution proceedings recognized the transfer of a decree and allowed the proceedings to proceed. But in a subsequent suit the transfer was declared, invalid and the decree-holder was restrained from receiving the decretal amount. The High Court; held that the judgment-debtor was entitled to restitution, that section 144 was not confined to cases where restitution was claimed on the reversal of a decree in first or second appeal. Provided the decree was varied or reversed, the section applied, however the reversal or variance had been effected. The High Court referred to Shama Purshad Roy Chowdhery v. Hurro Purshad Roy Chowdery in which the Judicial Committee stated: “The original decree or judgment must be taken to be subsisting; and valid until it has been reversed or superseded by some ulterior proceeding. If it has been so reversed or superseded the money recovered under, it ought certainly to be refunded. The true question, therefore, in such cases is, whether the decree or judgment under which the money was originally recovered has been reversed or superseded”.
This construction is also adopted in the Full Bench decision, Jogendra Nath Singh. In that case one Jogendra Nath was in possession of some properties as a member of joint Hindu family. He was dispossessed by Nandan Sahu who had obtained a decree against Fateh Bahadur Singh, father of Jogendra Nath. Nandan Sahu had put the properties to sale and purchased it himself. Jogendra Nath then instituted a suit. It was dismissed in the first court. On appeal the High Court allowed the appeal and ordered that the auction sale should be set aside on the ground that the decree in the first suit was not binding on the joint family of Fateh Bahadur. Singh and his son Jogendra Nath. As a result Jogendra Nath was restored to the possession of the properties. He then filed an application asking that he should obtain the mesne profits. The Subordinate Judge held that the application could not be entertained under section 144. The High Court reversed the order, held that Jogendra Nath was entitled to restitution and sent the case back to the Subordinate Judge for determination of the amount of mesne profits.
In Raghu Singh v. Skew Prosad Rai the Calcutta High Court (Mookerjee and Beachcroft, JJ.) observed that section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code was enacted with a view to shorten litigation and afford speedy relief, that a narrow construction of the section so as to restrict its application should not be adopted. In that case a successful plaintiff in a suit for possession took possession of the property by force and not by execution of the decree. The decree was set aside on appeal and defendant applied for restitution for the property with mesne profits. It was objected that section 144 could not apply since the respondent did not obtain delivery of possession by execution of the decree. The High Court rejected this argument holding that section 144 ought not to be narrowly construed.
In Brijlal v. Damodar Das Walsh, J., reiterated that section 144 was very wide in its terms, that it included matters which an execution court or appellate court could not ordinarily deal with, that the word “party” was not used in the section in the limited sense of “party to suit” but may include assignees of the decree. The Allahabad case was quoted with approval by Mockett, J., in Kadiravelu v. Kempu where the learned Judge construed, the word “party” as including persons who were subsequently concerned.
For the applicant learned advocate referred to Chintaman Singh…Defendant v. Chuni Sahu…Plaintiff .. In that case the appellants had obtained an ex parte decree for rent against the respondent in execution of which they caused the respondent's holding to be put up for sale and purchased it themselves. Subsequently the ex parte decree was set aside and in the meantime the appellants had been placed in possession and they had reaped the crops. The respondent then instituted a suit claiming restitution on account of the value of the crops taken by the appellant. The respondent obtained a decree. In second appeal in the High Court it was argued that the suit was barred by section 144 clause (2). The Division Bench negatived this argument and remarked that section 144 was intended to be confined to a case in which the decree had been varied or reversed by some superior court and not to a case of an ex parte decree being varied or set aside by the same court. When Order IX gives the court a right to set aside its own ex parte decree for sufficient cause, there appears to be no sufficient reason why the phrase “set aside” in section 144 must be construed as “set aside by a superior court”. For the reasons already discussed, I consider (with greatest respect) that this decision is not correct.
On behalf of the applicant reference was made to Ashotosh Nandi v. Kundalkamini Dasi. In that case the facts were unusual. Defendant no. 3 filed a suit for arrears of rent against defendant no. 4 and obtained a decree and in execution of the decree he purchased the holding. Defendants 1 and 2 filed a suit against defendants 3 and 4 and obtained a decree that they were the owners and not defendant 3. They then filed an application under section 144 against defendants 3, and 4 that the holding of which defendant 3 had taken possession should be given to them. In that case it cannot be said there was any variation or reversal of the decree and section 144 could not be applied. Ghose, J. observed that “a decree could only be varied or reversed within the meaning of section 144 by an appeal, review, or revision but not by a decree in a subsequent suit”. But this is not the ratio of the case and the question at present in debate did not arise.
In Rameshwar Lal v. Ramcharan Pd. an application had been filed by the auction purchaser for refund of the amount, paid by him after a suit under Order 21 rule 63, Civil Procedure Code, had been decreed and it had been held that the property did not belong to the judgment-debtor. Rowland, J. considered that it was a case to which section 144 did not apply but section 151 did. In that case no decree had been ordered to be set aside and the statement of Rowland, J. that for the application of section 144 there must be variation or reversal of a decree by a court of appeal was a dictum not necessary for decision of that case.
From this review of the authorities emerges the answer to the question involved in the reference to the Full Bench.
In my opinion the Court had jurisdiction to order restitution under section 144 even if the decree is modified or reversed by a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction in a separate suit. The section does not provide for an order of restitution to be made in any particular form or proceeding or by any particular court. In the present case it is alleged that by virtue of the compromise in Title Suit no. 126 of 1944 the decree in Title Suit no. 127 of 1939 so far as Khodaija was concerned was varied. According to the compromise recorded in the High Court the name of Khodaija was expunged from the category of defendant in Title Suit no. 127 of 1939. For the applicant it was contended that there was no variation or reversal of the decree of the previous title suit by, reason of the compromise. But in his application to the Munsif the opposite party alleged that by virtue of the compromise the decree of the title suit of 1939 was reversed with respect to Mostt. Khodaija. In paragraph 12 of the application the opposite party asserted that on the basis of the partition decree in the previous title suit Mostt. Najma had obtained delivery of possession of the property entered in schedule A inclusive of the property in schedule B which belonged to the share of Mostt. Khodaija. The opposite party asked for being restored to the possession of property in schedule B. from which he had been dispossessed, by execution of the previous decree. On the allegations made there is no doubt that the Munsif had jurisdiction to entertain the application under section 144. In his order the Munsif held that the compromise in the High Court had the effect of reversing the decree of the title suit of 1939 with respect to Mostt. Khodaija. He also found that the decree of 1939 had been executed, that partition had been, effected and Najma was granted delivery of possession of her share. It is right to state that I do not wish to express any opinion whether the Munsif's order of restitution is justified on merits. But it is patent that on the facts alleged and found by the Munsif to be established, the Munsif had jurisdiction to proceed under section 144, Civil Procedure Code.
It follows that an appeal lay to the District Judge from the order of the Munsif.
In my opinion this application in revision is incompetent and: must be dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.
Meredith, J.:— I agree.
Sinha, J.:— I am also of the same opinion.
K.D
Rule, discharged.
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