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Tarapada Bhattacharji v. Emperor Opposite Party.
1. The Rule must be made absolute. In the proceeding of 9th August, 1919, the Magistrates states that the parties
“are likely to disturb public tranqullity by disputing the possession of a plot of land at Kantapahari,”
as a reason for his starting a proceeding under Section 144 of the Cr PC. In the order absolute dated 23rd December, 1919 under revision, also the Magistrate sets out practically the words quoted above as justification for his taking action under Section 144 of the Cr PC. The words quoted exactly correspond with those stated in Section 145 of the Cr PC as a ground for instituting proceedings under this section.
2. The dispute in this case was one that clearly concerned land and as such should have been enquired into and disposed of under Section 145 of the Cr PC, the only effective way in which the disputes between the parties could be settled once for all so far as the criminal Court is concerned. The order under S. 144 lasts only for two months. The order in question passed on 23rd December, 1919 will therefore expire on the 22nd of this month. The parties are seriously in dispute with regard to the plot in question and after the 22nd February the danger of the breach of the peace will again revert. Instead of saving time the Magistrate has, by adopting the course he has taken, perhaps led to future institution of proceedinga under the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereas upon the same inquiry and upon the same evidence that was recorded in this case, the Magistrate could have passed a final order under S. 145 of the Code, thus saving the time and trouble of himself and of this Court and of the parties concerned, and obviating any future danger of the breach of the peace.
3. The view of the High Court upon this point has been more than once stated: sea Gouri Dutt v. Gobind Singh(1). In the case of Parkar Mahton v. Ram Khelwan(2) the learned Judges in clear terms denounced the practice of instituting proceedings under S. 144 when there is a dispute concerning land. Still more emphatially was it pointed out by this Court in the case of Kaniz Amina v. Emperor(3) that to institute proceedings under S. 144 in a case of this nature is shirking the responsibility of deciding once for all the dispute under Section 145 of the Cr PC. In that case, in setting aside the order under S. 144 of the Code, and in directing the proceeding to be instituted under S. 145, the Court observed:
“It would have been but little less ridiculous to issue a notice in the form required by S. 488 of the Cods, and deal with it under S. 144 on the ground that prompt payment of maintenance would tend to prevent danger of starvation to human life. In the exercise of our power of superintendence we are required to prohibit this innovation and by quickening the negligence of the inferior Court to obviate a denial of justice.”
4. I have quoted this passage with a view to bring home to the mind of the lower Court the absurdity of persisting in resorting to S. 144, when it would have been to the interest of the parties and the Court itself to proceed under Section 145 of the Cr PC. The order under Section 144 of the Cr PC, is set aside. If there be still any danger of a breach of the peace, the Magistrate can institute proceedings under S. 145 of the Code.
V.S/R.K
5. Rule made absolute.
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