Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Emperor v. Annika Lakshmudu & Others.

Madras High Court
Mar 11, 1941
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mockett, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Five appellants were convicted and sentenced to death by the sessions judge of East Godavari for the murder on 25 September 1940 of Chinki Asahayudu. The deceased and the accused lived in the village of Siddavaripalem. To reach the village shandy (market) villagers must pass through a forest and the village Erakapuram; the attacked party was returning from that shandy by this route.

A prior village quarrel arose because the deceased had taken two women from the household of P.W.7, resulting in a panchayat award directing the deceased to pay money to caste elders (initially Rs. 116, reduced to Rs. 40). This background was invoked in the case as a possible motive for the killing.

The principal ocular witness, P.W.4 (the deceased's wife), stated that while she and the deceased were returning they were ambushed at a tree in a jungle. She described accused 1 cutting the deceased with a knife and accused 2–5 beating him with sticks. P.W.4 received injuries; the postmortem by P.W.3 described multiple severe injuries to the deceased consistent with attack by a knife and blunt instruments (sticks). P.W.5 (the son-in-law) reported the incident to the village munsif (P.W.10) the next day. Statements by P.W.4 and P.W.5 were recorded as Ex. F and Ex. G respectively.

The accused were arrested on 29 September. At the time of arrest the Sub-Inspector asked them, "Did you commit the offence? Produce the sticks and knives used by you. You need not be afraid if you do so." The accused then produced weapons and made statements said to be confessional, which were admitted at trial. The trial judge convicted all five of murder and sentenced them to death. On appeal, the court examined the admissibility of those confessions, the reliability of the witnesses, and appropriate sentences.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether statements made by the accused at the time of arrest (producing weapons after an assurance) were admissible in evidence in view of S.24 of the Evidence Act concerning confessions induced by inducement, threat or promise.
  2. Whether the evidence (excluding the inadmissible confessions) was sufficient to sustain convictions for murder for all five accused.
  3. Whether the acts were done with common intention under S.34 of the Code (or whether S.302 read with S.149 IPC would be the appropriate charge) and the consequent effect on sentence.
  4. What sentence was appropriate for each accused, in particular whether the death sentence should be confirmed for all, some, or substituted.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' / Defence Arguments

  • The accused denied the charges at both the magistrate's and the sessions court and contended that the case had been fabricated by the police.
  • Defense counsel (Miss Chockammal) criticised Ex. G (the statement taken from P.W.5) for omitting any reference to a dying declaration allegedly made by the deceased, suggesting potential issues with the account.

Prosecution's Arguments

  • The Public Prosecutor raised the question whether the evidence established common intention under S.34 of the Code and whether conviction under S.302 read with S.149 IPC might alternatively be appropriate; this issue was primarily treated as one relevant to sentence.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Admissibility of statements at arrest:

  1. The court examined the account given by P.W.10 (village munsif) describing the Sub-Inspector's words to the accused at arrest: an inquiry whether they had committed the offence followed by a request to produce the sticks and knives and an assurance ("You need not be afraid if you do so"). The munsif stated that "All the five said, 'We admit the offence.'" The accused then produced the weapons and made statements of a confessional nature which were admitted at trial.
  2. The appellate court held that, on the ground of inducement alone, these statements were inadmissible under S.24 of the Evidence Act, which the opinion quotes: "A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant ... if the making of the confession appears to the court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise." The court found the promise that "nothing would happen to them if they produced the sticks and knives" to be a clear inducement, rendering the statements irrelevant and inadmissible.
  3. The court further observed that the recorded statements appeared to have been made at the moment the accused produced the material objects and therefore were not statements leading to discovery of facts (i.e., not falling within the exception of statements made in consequence of which a fact was discovered). Practical problems were also noted in the trial judge's recording: answers were recorded in Telugu without translations into English.

Evaluation of the remaining evidence (after excluding the inadmissible confessions):

  1. With the confessional statements excluded, the court found the case against the accused rested on P.W.4 and P.W.5 and their contemporaneous statements (Ex. F and Ex. G) together with medical evidence (P.W.3) corroborating injuries described by P.W.4 and the injuries she herself sustained.
  2. The medical evidence described five major injuries to the deceased, including a cut exposing the skull bone consistent with a sharp weapon and multiple fractures consistent with blows by blunt instruments (sticks). These corresponded with P.W.4's description: accused 1 cutting the deceased and accused 2–5 striking him with sticks. P.W.4's and P.W.5's conduct (immediate flight, summoning P.W.5, reporting promptly to the munsif and recording of Exs. F & G the next day) were accepted as supporting their credibility.
  3. The court considered criticisms of P.W.5 based on omission of a dying declaration from Ex. G. It noted Ex. G did record that the deceased was able to speak ("He asked me to take him home") and concluded that the omission did not seriously affect P.W.5's overall credibility; the probability that the deceased had described the attack to P.W.5 was regarded as strong.
  4. The accused offered only denials and no alternative narrative or alibi. The court found no circumstances of suspicion undermining the simple story presented by the prosecution witnesses and accepted P.W.4's and P.W.5's evidence as reliable and properly accepted by the sessions judge.

Mens rea / common intention and sentencing:

  1. The court acknowledged the issue raised by the Public Prosecutor as to whether the murder was committed with common intention under S.34 or whether S.302 read with S.149 IPC would be more appropriate, but treated this primarily as a matter affecting sentence rather than the correctness of the convictions.
  2. The court concluded that all five accused were "undoubtedly waiting with the intention of committing the most violent assault upon the deceased." It further held that accused 1 had used "an obviously deadly weapon" (referred to as M.O.1, the knife) and that, despite defence contentions, the use of that deadly weapon justified confirmation of the death sentence for accused 1.
  3. As to accused 2–5, the court took into account their character and circumstances and concluded that, in the interests of justice, the death sentences imposed on them should be set aside and replaced by transportation for life.

Holding and Implications

Holding (final disposition):

The court held that the convictions for murder of all five persons were correct and accordingly dismissed their appeals. The court confirmed the death sentence of the first accused. For accused 2 to 5 inclusive, the court set aside the death sentences and substituted in their place sentences of transportation for life.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: Appeals dismissed; accused 1 remains under a death sentence; accused 2–5 have their death sentences substituted with transportation for life.
  • Evidence law consequence emphasized: The opinion applies S.24 of the Evidence Act to exclude confessions obtained after an inducement or promise by police officials. The court remarked upon proper procedure for recording statements in the language used and supplying translations when necessary.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion does not announce or purport to establish a new legal principle beyond application of existing statutory provisions (the opinion contains no cited case precedents and does not indicate the setting of a novel precedent).
N.T.R. Appeal dismissed.

Judge: Mockett, J. (as stated in the provided opinion)

Show all summary ...

(Mockett, J.) The five appellants have been convicted and sentenced to death by the learned sessions judge of East Godavari for the murder on the 25th September 1940 of Chinki Asahayudu. The deceased and the accused lived in the village of Siddavaripalem which is shown on the plan and all that it is necessary to note on the plan is that, as is in evidence, any one who wishes to visit the shandy which is used by the people of this village must pass through a forest and later through a village called Erakapuram to reach that shandy and consequently on returning from the shandy they will take the same way in the opposite direction.

There is a history of the parties in this case which may be shortly noticed although it is of no very great importance. The deceased was the husband of P.W 4 who had been married when she was young but had not joined her husband. Then P.W 4 lived with P.W 7 and married him but remained with him only for a year. She then left him and went to live with the deceased. P.W 7 married again one Chinnammi who bore him two children and then this Chinnammi joined Asahayudu. Naturally this action of the deceased in attracting two women from the house of P.W 7 into his own caused trouble in the village and a panchayat was held and Asahayudu was directed to pay Rs. 116 to the caste elders for distribution to the aggrieved parties. The amount was reduced to Rs. 40 of which P.W 7 received Rs. 20 and the rest of his castemen the other Rs. 20 between them. We mention this narrative because it is suggested in this case that the relations of Annika Nukayya were much aggrieved because of the action of the deceased who had taken two women from P.W 7 and it was thought the particular caste was thrown into disrepute. That is alleged to be the reason why Asahayudu was murdered by accused 1 to 5. Naturally to attach any great importance to this circumstance would be to attach importance to matters which must be purely conjectural. But they do at any rate make intelligible what did happen on that evening as was found by the trial court. P.W 4 was returning from the shandy to the village of Siddavaripalem and she had reached a tadi tree marked on the plan which is in a jungle. P.W 4 was walking in front carrying the shandy purchase and the deceased was walking behind. She heard a rustling sound and turning round states that she saw the following scene which we reproduce in her own words: “I saw accused 1, Annika Lakshmudu, cutting Asahayudu on the leg. Accused 1 next cut Asahayudu on the left side of the forehead. The other four accused belaboured and thrashed Asahayudu with sticks. The knife used by accused 1, Lakshmudu, was like M.O 1. The sticks held and used by accused 2, 3, 4 and 5 were like M.Os 2, 4, 6 and 7. I bowed and clasped hands crying, ‘Babu, Babu,’ and then accused 3. Tenke Bennayya hit me on the right .thumb and accused 2, Masara Venkanna, hit me on the left shoulder.” That is her statement and description of what happened.

It is convenient now to pause for a moment and see what were the wounds found upon this man. The doctor Venkataraman, P.W 3, held the postmortem examination on the 29th September, He said he found five injuries on the body; (1) a cut exposing the skull bone 2½ in by 3/4 in. (2) a simple fracture of the middle third of the left upper arm: (3) a compound fracture of upper third of right upper arm; (4) a simple comminuted fracture of lower third of left radius and a simple fracture of lower end of the shaft of left ulna bone; and (5) a compound comminuted fracture of lower third of left tibia with the lower end of the upper fragment protruding through a wound. There was also a fracture of the middle third of the shaft of left fibula. On an examination of the head he found a cross shaped fracture on the left side of the frontal bone and on opening the skull bone he found that the left three-fourths of the horizontal fracture and the lower three-fourths of the vertical fracture were visible inside also. He states that injuries 2, 3, 4 and 5 could have been caused by a blunt instrument like a stick and No. 1 could have been caused by a sharp instrument like M.O 1. He thinks that the sticks could have caused the fractures. So, it will be seen that the injuries found upon the deceased correspond with the account of the attack upon him as described by P.W 4. She herself had two injuries on her which are described by the doctor as follows: (1) a swelling on the other part of dorsum of right hand with swelling of the upper part of the thumb, and (2) a contused swelling on the lower portion of front of left shoulder. So it will also be seen that both as regards the injuries which she describes she saw inflicted on the deceased and the injuries that she states she herself actually received she is corroborated by the medical testimony.

It is naturally of great importance in a case of this sort to examine the subsequent conduct of the principal witness who is P.W 4. She was described by the learned sessions judge quite rightly as “a frightened ambushed woman”. She threw down her basket and ran away home and she sent word through one Kesavayya who has been described as a boy. He called her son-in-law, P.W 5, and when he came, which he did according to P.Ws 4 and 5, she told him what had happened and in much the same words as have been set out above. P.W 5, according to her, went to the spot and what happened there will be described when dealing with his evidence. Now the village of Siddavaripalem is a lonely place and the inhabitants do not venture out at night for fear of wild animals and so no message was sent to the authorities until the next day The next day P.W 5 went to the village munsif at a village called Peda Mallapuram and he came to Siddavaripalem about noon. He examined P.W 4 and she made a statement to him which is marked Ex. F in this case An examination of that statement shows that she described consistently with her evidence in the court the incidents of the night before. She assigns to the various accused the weapons and the use of the particular weapons in each case. P.W 5, the son-in-law, tells how he was summoned by being told that he was urgently required and he went home and then P.W 4 told him again in similar terms to those which we have already set out how her husband had been attacked by these five accused and with those weapons and in that manner. But he adds that P.W 4 asked him, ‘Go and fetch the deceased home.’ This he did. He states that the deceased said to him,

“Annika Lakshmayya cut me with a knife. Mosara Venkanna, Tenke Bennayya, Tenke Butchayya, Annika Injappa, beat me with sticks. I do not hope to survive.”

There has been some criticism of this witness with regard to whether he can be believed when he says this statement was made for reasons which we will deal with presently. P.W 5 proceeded to the village of Peda Mallapuram and he made a report to the village munsif. The village munsif came back to Siddavaripalem and at the village he recorded from P.W 5 Ex. G. Ex G gives an account which is similar to that which has already been given by P.W 4, but the statement which P.W 5 made to the munsif does not mention that the deceased made the dying declaration which we have set out. It does however say that the deceased said “He (the deceased) asked me to take him home,” and that with the assistance of villagers he was brought home. It is not suggested that any other statement was made by the deceased who died soon after. At this point we may deal with the criticism which Miss Chockammal levelled at Ex. G, namely, the omission to refer to the dying declaration. There is this to be said about it. It is quite clear from Ex. G that P.W 5 told the village munsif that the deceased was able to speak because he said “He asked me to take him home.” That being so the probabilities that he also told him what had happened are great. Of course it may be said that knowing already from P.W 4 what had happened he may have at the trial thought fit to add it to his evidence but we do not consider that the omission from Ex. G. of the statement seriously affects the credibility of P.W 5 as a whole.

The accused were arrested on the 29th of September and P.W 10, the village munsif, describes what happened. This witness describes how he was summoned to Siddavaripalam and saw the dead man and he also describes how he took the statement Ex. G from P.W 5 and Ex. F from P.W 4. He seems to have sent this report promptly and in this case there has been no cross-examination to suggest that there was any manipulation or preparation of the evidence at Siddavaripalam. When the police arrested the accused the munsif states that the following occurred: “Accused I Lakshmudu first was questioned by the Sub-Inspector in these words, ‘Did you commit the offence? Produce the sticks and knives used by you. You need not be afraid if you do so.’ All the five said, ‘We admit the offence.” Thereupon the Sub-Inspector took them to the house of the first accused and they made statements, A-1 producing a knife and A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-5 sticks. These statements which are of a confessional nature were received in evidence and used by the learned sessions judge. Now it is obvious that on one ground alone they are inadmissible. S. 24 of the Evidence Act states, “A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant” and therefore inadmissible in evidence “in a criminal proceeding if the making of the confession appears to the court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise.” It is quite obvious that it must have appeared to the court as it does to us that these statements as proved by P.W 10 were made in answer to a direct inducement, namely, that a promise that nothing would happen to them if they produced the sticks and knives which were used and that request was preceded by the words ‘Did you commit the offence’. The learned sessions judge while recognising that there was an inducement as proved by the village munsif expresses the quite incomprehensible view that such inducement “will not take away from the essential truth of the statements made by them and their production of the weapons used by them.” The statements are of course not receivable in evidence at all and therefore their truth could not be the subject of enquiry. Mr. Ethiraj has quite rightly conceded that on this ground alone the statements should have been excluded but in addition an examination of them shows that they were, as far as can be gathered, statements made whilst producing the material objects concerned and therefore not statements in consequence of which a fact was discovered. We use the expression ‘as far as can be gathered’ because we have been put to some inconvenience in this case by the learned judge recording in Telugu characters the precise statements. The learned judge is entitled to record answers in English and the proper and usual course is to do so. If the learned judge considers that it is necessary for any particular purpose to record the statements in the language spoken a translation should be added. But in the case of A-1 who brought out the knife there is a record of what he said in Telugu but no translation. Excluding these statements, the result is that the case against these men rests on the evidence of P.W 4 as corroborated by Ex. F and her conduct and by P.W 5 and in the case of P.W 5 by his conduct and his statement Ex. G. No serious criticism can be levelled at the conduct of either of these witnesses. The woman having seen her husband murdered says she immediately went home, sought the aid of the most obvious person, her son-in-law, told him what had happened, sent him to fetch the injured man. The son-in-law in his turn at the earliest opportunity ran and reported to the village munsif what had happened and immediately the munsif came to the spot, the statements Exs. F and G were recorded and apart from the omission in Ex. G. to which reference has been made no criticism worth the name has been launched against him.

The accused in this case who are men of primitive character give no assistance. They content themselves with a denial both at the magistrate's court and at the sessions court, saying that the case has been fabricated by the police. We have therefore no opportunity of judging whether there is any question of considering their whereabouts that night or any alternative story. We are satisfied that the evidence of P.Ws 4 and 5 is reliable and was properly accepted by the learned sessions judge. There is no circumstance of suspicion in this case at all to suggest that this story — really a very simple story when one comes to examine it — was not the entire truth.

The learned Public Prosecutor has quite rightly touched on an aspect of the case, namely as to whether the evidence in this case is sufficient to prove the intention under S. 34 of the Code, namely, whether murder was the common intention of all these five people or whether a conviction would not be more appropriate under S. 302 read with S. 149 I.P.C We do not consider it necessary to pursue this topic further because the result will be academic for the following reasons. It relates to a matter of sentence. The accused were all undoubtedly waiting with the intention of committing the most violent assault upon the deceased and it has been proved that one of them used a weapon which, in spite of the contentions of the defence, we regard as an obviously deadly weapon, namely, M.O 1. We consider that in his case the sentence of death should be confirmed. In the case of the others having, as we have already indicated, regard to the sort of people they are we think it will be enough in the interests of justice if, instead of the sentence of death, a sentence of transportation for life is substituted.

The result will therefore be that we consider the conviction of all these five persons for murder was correct and so far as their appeals are concerned they are dismissed. We confirm the sentence of death in the case of the first accused but we set aside the sentence of death in the case of accused 2 to 5 inclusive and instead sentence them to transportation for life.

N.T.RAppeal dismissed.