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Kedar Nath Mitter v. Denobandhu Shaha
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal concerns whether a cheque given in part-payment of principal is sufficient to take the case out of the Indian statute of limitation with reference to section 20 of the Act. The facts were undisputed: a cheque was delivered to the payee by way of payment, received as such, presented and was paid on presentation. The Court below reached a conclusion adverse to the Appellant; this appeal challenges the legal effect of the cheque under section 20.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a cheque given in part-payment of principal operates as a payment under section 20 of the Indian Limitation Act and thereby interrupts or restarts the period of limitation.
- Whether the proviso to section 20 (requiring the fact of part-payment to appear in the handwriting of the person making the same) is complied with where payment is made by cheque.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The proviso to section 20 was not complied with: part-payment must appear in the handwriting of the person making it, and a cheque does not satisfy this requirement.
Additional Points Raised
- A point was made before the Court regarding appropriation of payment and the nature of the Plaintiffs' claim (continuous account vs. separate causes of action). This was not made a ground of appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mackenzie v. Tiruvengadathan | This decision was referenced in relation to the effect of payments under section 20. | The Court treated Mackenzie v. Tiruvengadathan as distinguishable from the present case. |
| Bonsey v. Wordsworth | Principle that where items in a tradesman's account are so connected as to form a continuous dealing, the whole forms one cause of action and cannot be divided. | The Court applied this principle to reject the notion that continuous-account items constitute separate causes of action for limitation purposes. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court reasoned that when a cheque is delivered to a payee as payment and received as such, it operates as a payment and extinguishes the debt to that extent, subject to the conditional possibility that if the cheque is dishonoured the original debt would revive. In the present case the cheque was presented and paid, so the part of the principal represented by the cheque was paid before the expiration of the prescribed period.
Regarding the proviso to section 20 requiring the fact of part-payment to appear in the handwriting of the person making it, the Court held that if the cheque operated as a payment, the payment itself was in the handwriting of the person making it (i.e., the drawer's signature on the cheque) and thus satisfied the proviso. The Court declined to treat the proviso as a trap enabling debtors to escape liability for payments they had in fact made. The Court noted Mackenzie v. Tiruvengadathan but found it distinguishable on the facts or law.
On the point about appropriation and the plaintiffs' claim, the Court observed that where there is a continuous account the items together form one cause of action, citing Bonsey v. Wordsworth, and therefore the suggestion that each item gave rise to a separate cause of action was rejected.
Holding and Implications
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Direct effect: the decision below was affirmed and the Appellant's challenge failed; the part-payment by cheque was held to satisfy section 20 and its proviso in the circumstances of this case. The opinion does not purport to establish a broader new precedent beyond its application to the facts before the Court.
Jenkins, C.J:— The only question that arises in this appeal is whether a cheque given in part-payment of principal is sufficient to take the case out of the Indian statute of limitation having regard to the terms of sec. 20 of that Act.
The facts are not in dispute. And if the cheque is sufficient for the purpose of sec. 20, then this appeal must fail.
It seems to me clear that if a cheque be delivered to a payee by way of payment and is received as such by him, it operates as payment and is an extinguishment to that extent of the debt, though this is no doubt subject to a condition subsequent that if upon due presentation the cheque is not paid the original debt revives. There is no suggestion in this case that the cheque upon presentation was not paid. In fact, it was: and so there was payment in the fullest sense of the term, and thus a part of the principal of the debt has, before expiration of the prescribed period, been paid by the debtor to the creditor.
Then it is said that the proviso to the section has not been complied with. That proviso is that in the case of a part-payment of the principal of a debt the fact of the payment must appear in the handwriting of the person making the same. If I am right in the view that the cheque actually was a payment, the very payment was in the handwriting of the person making the same. I cannot for a moment suppose that this proviso was inserted as a sort of a trap to enable debtors to escape from the result of what they have done, and yet that would be the practical result of the argument advanced on behalf of the Appellant. It seems to me that the words of the Act are amply satisfied by the circumstances of this case and I say this notwithstanding the decision in the case of Mackenzie v. Tiruvengadathan which is capable of distinction from the present.
A point was made before us as to the appropriation of payment and the nature of the Plaintiffs' claim. This has not been made a ground of appeal. But even if it had been, it seems to me that it is valueless. It rests upon the supposition that where, as here, there is a continuous account, there is a separate cause of action in respect of each item. That seems to me to be quite opposed to the proper character of such accounts. In Bonsey v. Wordsworth, it is said on the strength of the previous authorities that “where a tradesman has a bill against a party for any amount in which the items are so connected together, that it appears that the dealing is not intended to terminate with one contract, but to be continuous, so that one item, if not paid, shall be united with another and form one continuous demand, the whole together forms but one cause of action and cannot be divided.”
In my opinion the learned Judge was right in the conclusion at which he arrived. This appeal is dismissed with costs.
Woodroffe, J.:— I agree.
Solicitor: Babu Hirendra Nath Dutta for the Appellant.
Solicitor: Mr. W.G Rose for the Respondents.
A.K.G
Appeal dismissed.
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