Sadasiva Aiyar, J.:— The relevant facts may be shortly stated thus: One Pachakanni had two children, a son and a daughter by his first wife Vellayammal. The son's name was Mira Moideen and the daughter's name is Nagoor Ammal. Pachakanni married two other wives. About 25 years after her marriage, Vellftyammal and her son Mira Moideen executed a release deed, Ex. I, on 28th April 1902 in favour of Pachakanni. The daughter Nagoor Ammal did not join in this release deed, Ex. 1. Under, this release deed, Ex. 1, Vellayammal and her son Mira Moideen received Rs. 500 from Pachakanni. The operative portion of the deed is:

“as we have received the said Rs. 500 we make a release of the rights and connections of ourselves and our heirs to all the properties or liabilities of yours and your heirs.”

2. It is not denied that, on the true construction of this document, the mother and the son released their rights of inheritance also to Pachakanni. Pachakanni died about the middle of 1908. Shortly afterwards, his son Mira Moideen and his daughter Nagoor Ammal by his first wife sold their father's properties to the plaintiff as if they were the sole heirs of their father, ignoring the release deed, Ex. 1, by which one of them had relinquished his interest in the inheritance and ignoring also the fact that the father had left a widow at his death. Defendants 5, 6 and 7 represent the heirs of the second wife of Pachakanni, who was the only heir left by him at his death (besides his daughter and his son by his first wife). Defendant 4 is the alienee from one of the heirs of the widow. Defendants 1 to 3 disclaimed allinterest. The District Munsif found (a) that Nagoor Ammal, one of the plaintiff' svendors, was not proved to be the legitimate daughter of Pachakanni by his first wife Vellayammal; (b) that the other vendor of the plaintiff had given up all rights of inheritance in his father's properties by Ex. 1 and to) that the plaintiff, therefore, got no title under his saledeed, Ex. R. On these findings the District Munsif dismissed the suit with costs.

3. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge held (a) that Nagoor Ammal was the legitimate daughter of Pachakanni, (b) that the release-deed, Ex. 1, was legally inoperative both under the Mahomedan law and by and on the analogy of Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, and that, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to ⅞ths share under the Mahomedan law in Pachakanni's estate, such ⅞ths (7/12ths and 7/24ths) being the sum of the fraotional shares belonging to his two vendors in that estate. The contentions in second appeal are as follows: 1. The lower appellate Court is wrong in holding that a renunciation by an heir of a right to inherit is a trans for within the meaning of Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, 2. The lower appellate Court ought to have held that under the Mahomedan law there is nothing illegal in an heir renouncing his right of valuable inheritance for consideration. 3. The lower appellate Court failed to notice that the Transfer of Property Act does in no way affect the right of an heir to renounce his right of inheritance under the Mahomedan law. 4. The lower appellate Court ought to have held that even if a renunciation is invalid as a present transfer, the law will give effect to it immediately on death of the propositus and that the right in property becomes by operation of law transferred to the other heirs. It will be seen that none of these four grounds raises the question of Nagoor Animal's right to inherit her share, nor does any of them state that the release made by Vallayammal and her son is binding on Nagoor Ammal. Thus though the second appeal is valued at the whole ⅞ths share decreed to the plaintiff, it is clearly unsustainable so far as Nagoor Ammal's share in the inheritance is concerned.

4. Confining it then to Kadir Moideen's 7/12ths share, his relinquishment, if valid, will enure for the benefit of the other heirs including Nagoor Ammal and hence the plaintiff will be entitled not only to 7/24ths share but to the share which belonged to the only daughter of a Mahomedan intestate who left only a widow. (Probably the share will be ½). The short question of law therefore is whether by the execution of the release deed, Ex. 1, Mira Moideen forfeited his right of inheritance. Mr. A. Krishnasmi Aiyar, who argued the case for the appellant with his usual ability and lucidity, contended that the Transfer of Property Act, S. 6, could not govern this case and oven if it did, its operation was excluded by Section 2 of the Transfer of Property Act. S. 6 says that property of any kind may be transferred, but Cl. (a) provides:

“The chance of an heir apparent succeeding to an estate …. or any other more possibility of a like nature cannot be transferred.”

5. The learned vakil argued that Ex. 1 executed to the father Pachakanni by the son Mira Moideen was not a transfer or release (though it is called a release) but it is in law a relinquishment. Speaking for myself, I do not like too fine distinctions. Though there is such a distinction between the relinquishment of such a right as that of an easement by the owner of the dominant tenement so as to relieve the servient tenement (or the right of forfeiture given up by a landlord in the tenant's favour) and the transfer of such a right to a third person, the distinction becomes too fine in the case of most of the other classes of rights usually coming before Courts: see Dhoorjeti Subbaya v. Dhoorjeti Venkayya,(1). In this case, the document, Ex. 1, clearly recites that it is executed in favour of the father and that it releases the son's rights and claims. If S. 6, Act 4 of 1882, could apply, I am clear that Ex. I is wholly invalid. Section 2 of the Transfer of Property Act, however says:

“Nothing in the second chapter of this Act shall be deemed to affect any rule of Hindu, Mahomedan or Buddhist Law.”

6. Section 6 occurs in Ch. 2. Hence if the chance of an heir-apparent can be validly transferred or released or relinquished by Mahomedan law, S. 6 will not affect such a transferor relinquishment. Mr. Krishna, swami Aiyar therefore contended that under the Mahomsdan law, it can be validly relinquished. I shall therefore deal shortly with that point. Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar relied upon a passage in the judgment of the Privy Council in Mt. Hurmutoolnissa Begum v. Allahdia Khan(2) for his contention. In that case, as a Mahomedan as residuary heir of an intestate sued to recover from the widow ¾ths of the intestate's property nearly 12 years after the death of the testator. The Privy Council held, on the question of fact, that the plaintiff (respondent before the Privy Council) had failed to establish his alleged relationship to the intestate and the right he consequently claimed as residuary heir. They also said casually that according to the Mahomedan law, there may be a renunciation of the right to inherit and that such renunciation may be implied from the ceasing or refraining from prosecuting a claim maintainable against another.

7. The facts are not fully set out and it does not appear whether their Lordships of the Privy Council intended to find that the plaintiff had by his “conducts and acts” relinquished the possible inheritance before the intestate's death or whether he relinquished an actual” inheritance by his conducts and acts after the intestate's death. At p. 109 of the report it appears that the widow evidently after her husband's death procured two papers called “general testimonials” of her right to enjoy the whole of her husband's property and that one of these testimonials was signed by the respondent-plaintiff and that after this recognition of her title by the plaintiff, she got mutation of names in the Collector's register in her favour. It seems to me, therefore, that the renunciation of a “right to inherit” which is referred to by their Lordships at p. 112 is a renunciation by “conducts” and “acts” and “abstinence from suing for eleven years.” all of which took place after the plaintiff acquired the vested right to inherit, that is, after the intestate's death and not before. I am, therefore, also of opinion that the cases of Nasirul Haq v. Fyazul Rahman(3) and Mohammad Hasmat Ali v. Kaniz Fatima(4), which rely upon the rather obscure passages above referred to in the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mt. Hurmutoolnissa Begum v. Allahdia Khan in support of their view that a future right of inheritance can be validly relinquished by a Mahomedan, have misconstrued the said decision of their Lordships.

8. I now come to Kunhi Mamod v. Kunhi Moidin(5) decided by Collins, C.J, and Parker. J. In that case the respondent was not represented and that fact naturally detracts somewhat from the weight to be given to its authority. Then at p. 177, it is said that the right relinquished in that case was not a mere contingent right but that it was a vested right. The property in dispute in that case was, according to the judgment, property which belonged to a Mussulman mother who retained that property for maintenance for her life, having given other properties of hers and the reversionary interest after her lifetime in the plaint properties to her two sons. This vested right in half the reversion was afterwards given up by the plaintiff (one of the two sons) in favour of his mother for a consideration of Rs. 150. The question was whether this document of release or relinquishment was valid. The learned Judges held that as it was a vested right, it could be released and that, therefore, that case could be distinguished from the case of Mt. Khanum Jan v. Mt. Jan Beebee(6), which was relied on by the lower Courts in support of their view that by Mahomedan law the right of an heir-apparent could not legally be dealt with before it becomes a vested right. Though the learned Judges were thus able to distinguish Mt. Khanum Jan v. Mt. Jan Beebee they state in the beginning of their judgment that case of Mt. Khanum Jan v. Mt. Jan Beebee was not one of any great authority, that though it was true that the majority of the Mahomedan law officers consulted in that case expressed the opinion that the renunciation was not valid on the ground that the right had not vested, the opinion was not unanimous and that a decision on that point was not necessary to support the conclusion come to in that case.

9. I need not say that if the dictum in Mt. Khanum Jan v. Mt. Jan Beebee is obiter, the dictum in Kunhi Mamod v. Kunhi Moidin doubting the former dictum is also obiter. I might also say that the learned Judges in Kunhi Mamod v. Kunhi Moidin, while stating that Mt. Khanum Jan v. Mt. Jan Beebee is not of great authority, do not say expressly that the relinquishment of the right of an heir-apparent is valid under the Mahomedan law. On the other hand in Meerangani Rowther v. Karupathi Nagur Meera Lubbai(7) Benson and Sundara Aiyar, JJ., referred to Mt. Khanum Jan v. Mt. Jan Beebee as a good authority. They also referred to the decision of Abdul Wahid Khan v. Nuran Bibi(8), where their Lordships of the Privy Council held that it would be opposed to Mahomedan law to hold “that a compromise could validly limit an estate to take effect after the determination, on the death of the owner, of a prior estate by way of what is known to English law as a vested remainder so as to create an interest which can pass to a third person before the determination of the prior estate.”

10. This case of Kunhi Mamod v. Kunhi Moidin is noted in Tyabji's Mahomedan Law, p. 568 (note 4) thus:

“This decision seems to be opposed to principle and would probably not be followed.

11. Again chances of succession are not rights of property under the Mahomedan law, as there can be no heir to a living person either under the English law or under the Mahomedan law. There can be no such being as an heir to a living person. The whole matter was fully considered in the case reported as Sumsuddin v. Abdul Husein(9) by two very learned Judges Jenkins, C.J, and Beaman, J. They held that under the Mahomedan law such relinquishments were totally invalid. This case of Sumsuddin v. Abdul Husein is also approved of in Meerangani Rowther v. Karupathi Nagur Meera Lubbai. The Allahabad High Court in Nasirul Haq v. Fyazul Rahman admit that there is a conflict of decisions of the High Courts in India on this question and at the end say that they will not decide the question (see p. 462 of 33 All.) and then proceed upon the footing and decide that case on the validity of a family settlement. On the whole I am inclined to express my entire agreement with the opinions expressed in Meerangani Rowther v. Karupathi Nagur Meera Lubbai and Sumsuddin v. Abdul Husain and to hold that the release deed Ex. 1 is invalid under the Mahomedan law. After I had prepared the draft of this judgment as above, my learned brother suggested to me that there was a question of estoppel raised in the case which should be considered in our judgments.

12. Now, the plea of estoppel has not been raised in any of the grounds contained in the memorandum of second appeal, nor was it argued before us when the second appeal was first heard by us and we reserved our judgment, nor, so far as I could find, had it been taken in the written statement or argued in the lower Courts. But if it was a question of law which could be disposed of on the facts as found, I thought that it might be considered. However, I wished to have the appeal argued further on that point and the case was again posted to day for arguments on this new point and we heard the further arguments. Having now considered the further arguments, I do not think that under Section 115 of the Evidence Act, any question of estoppel arises on the facts as found in this case. It seems to me that there is on the record as it stands no evidence of Pachakanni having acted on any belief created by the execution of this release deed. In the case of Mt. Oodey Koowar v. Mt. Ladoo(10), though the question of consideration is also referred to, their Lordships proceed to observe as follows:

“Neither does Oodey Koowar act on any representation made by her, or alter her position in anyway.”

13. There is no evidence in this case that Pachakanni or any of the heirs of Pachakanni was induced by any representation of fact to do any act which has prejudiced the interest of any such heir owing to the release deed Ex. 1. I am therefore inclined to hold that the question of estoppel, which depends upon appropriate allegations in the pleadings and upon proof of such allegations, even if it is allowed to be raised at this stage in second appeal, could not be decided in the defendants' favour on the materials on the record. Further, Section 115 of the Evidence Act does not estop any person from denying the legal effect of a transaction to which he is a party, but only the truth of a “thing” which he intentionally caused the other party to believe. What is the thing which the plaintiff's vendor Mira Mohidin caused Pachaknni to believe by his obtaining (along with his mother) the consideration money (Rs. 500) for the release deed? If the “thing” be the legal validity of the agreement under Ex. 1 to relinquish the spes succession is when it actuates, both the parties to the release-deed seem to have been ignorant of the law as to the validity of the release and Pachkanni was not persuaded by any representation of his wife or his young son on a point of law to make the payment and obtain the release-dead. If the “thing” be the son's intention not to claim his share of the inheritance when it falls due in future this would only estop him from denying that at the time of Ex. 1, Mira Mohidin (the son) had no intention of claiming the future inheritance. I do not think a man could deny at the present moment the truth of any intention of his at a future time; for such intention which has to come to existence in the future, that is, when the inheritance opens, is a mere possibility not recognized by law and is not an existing “thing” (assuming that “thing” includes a mental state and has the same significance as the word “fact” defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act). The illustration to Section 115 of the (Evidence Act) would also show that the intentional misleading refers to the present existence of a right or fact and not to a future metaphysical possibility. As said in Ameer Ali's Law of Evidence:

“the boundary line between estoppel and breach of contract is often act to be obscured, but must not be confounded. * * * a proposition of law is not “a thing” within the meaning of the section and this expression refers to a belief the fact. So also an admission on a point of law is not an admission of a thing within the meaning of the section. The representation in order to work an estoppel must be a material statement of fact. The rule excluding statements of opinion and statements of law has been said to be based upon the ground that the truth is uncertain, or that the person to whom the statement is made knows as much about the matter as the other.? * * The fact must be a fact alleged to be at the time actually in existence or past and executed. The representation must have reference to a present or past state of things; for, if a party make a representation concerning something in the future, it must generally be either a mere statement of intention or opinion uncertain to the knowledge of both parties. The intent of a party it necessarily uncertain as to its fulfilment. A person cannot be bound not to change his intention, nor can he be precluded from showing such a change merely because he has previously represented that his intentions were once different from those which he eventually executed * * The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied to an Act of the legislature. * * * It is an absolutely fundamental limitation on the application of the doctrine of estoppel that it cannot be applied with the object or result of altering the law of the land * * It is not allowed to enlarge the status or capacity of parties nor to be a cloak for illegality, nor to alter the incidents of property * * The admission exacted must always be of something which can legally be done by the party from whom it is exacted: (see pp. 757, 758, 780, 781 and 764).”

14. If the Mahomedan law prohibits relinquishment of rights of future inheritance, whether for consideration or not, a declaration as to a present or future intention about such reliquishment cannot be relied upon as estoppel. In the result I would dismiss the second appeal with costs.

Spencer, J.:— It has been found that the plaintiff, who is respondent in this Court, purchased, by a sale-deed of 1908, the rights of one Mira Mohidin and his sister, Nagoor Ammal, in the plaint land. The District Munsif dismissed the suit on the ground that Nagoor Ammal was not the legitimate daughter of the original owner Pachakanni and that Mira Mohidin had prior to the sale to plaintiff released his right to succeed Pachakanni's property. The lower appellate Court reversed the first of these findings on the evidence, and on the second point held that the relinquishment by Mira Mohidin was invalid, as being a transfer of a spes successionis. In second appeal the correctness of the Subordinate Judge's decision of the point of law has been questioned. The document (Ex. I) executed on 28th April 1902 by Mira Mohidin and his mother Vellaiammal in favour of Pachakanni is termed a release-deed, and runs as follows:

“We having no ancestral property and you divorcing the person No. 2 and marrying Pathmabibi and S. Pathmabibi as 2nd and 3rd wives and going to places like Colombo have acquired property of your own and living with your 2nd and 8rd wives and your children by them, and we are living as a separate family from you and without your protection in Alangampatti for the last 25 years, I, number 1, asked for my share of your self-acquired property and No. 2 for her mahar and importuned you therefore and we then received in cash Rs. 600 from you, as decided by arbitrators and as we have received the said Rs. 500, we make a release of the rights end connexion of ourselves and our heirs to all the properties or liabilities of yours or your heirs.”

(Signed) Ayyadurai alias Mira Mohidin.

(Mark) Vellaiammal alias Thayamuthammal.

15. The effect of this transaction is that Mira Mohidin and his mother, who was Pachakanni's first wife, took Rs. 500 paid in cash in satisfaction of their claims to the shares in the property of Pachakanni that would devolve on them at Pachakanni's death. The question for decision is whether this arrangement violated the principles of Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, or was contrary to any rule of Mahomedan law. Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, prohibits the transfer of the chance of an heir apparent succeeding to an estate, and “transfer” has been defined in S. 5 as an act whereby a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more living persons. In Sumsuddin v. Abdul Husein, Sir Lawrence Jenkins held on the authority of Kemp v. Kelsey(11), that the same reasons which prevent a chance of succession being the subject of a valid transfer would also prevent it being the subject of a valid release, a view accepted by a Bench of this Court in Meerangani Rowther v. Karupathi Nagur Meera Lubbai although in Kaharalapudi Lakshmi Narayana v. Kandukuri Veera Sarabha(12), Tyabji, J., in view of the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Durga Dutt v. Gita(13), which proceeded on different lines from the Bombay decision, preferred to leave the question open whether releases or relinquishments ought not to be governed by a different rule from that applicable to transfers.

16. If a relinquishment of a right of succession is permissible under Mahomedan law, then it is not necessary to consider the effect of the Transfer of Property Act for Section 2 of that Act distinctly provides that nothing in the second chapter of this Act shall be deemed to affect any rule of Hindu, Mahomedan or Buddhist law. In Mt. Hurmutoolnissa Begum v. Allahdia Khan, the Privy Council recognized the existence of a right of renunciation by an heir-apparent according to Mahomedan law, and this decision has not, as observed by the learned Judges who decided Durga Dutt v. Gita, been since questioned by that Tribunal, though they observe that being a decision prior to the passing of the Transfer of Property Act it may be that Act has some bearing on the question. The learned pleader, who appeared for the respondents before us, attempted to distinguish the case on this ground, but in the face of S. 2 of the Act it does not seem justifiable to do so.

17. A similar renunciation by a Mahomedan in consideration of a sum of Rs. 150 was held to be valid by this Court in Kunhi Mamod v. Kunhi Moidin, an authority which we have been asked to reject on the ground that it was an exparte decision and to distinguish on the ground that in that case the right was considered to have already vested. The decision in Sumsuddin v. Abdul Husein, certainly favours the respondent's contention, and the decision in Nasirul Haq v. Fyaz-ul-Rahman, decidedly supports the appellants in the case before us. In the former case Sir Lawrence Jenkins, overruling the opinion of Chandavarkar, J., from whose decision it was an appeal, held that the relinquishment of the chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate was not only invalid under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, but was opposed to the principles of Mahomedan law, in support of which he quoted Mt. Khanum Jan v. Mt. Jan Beebee and Abdul Wahid Khan v. Nuran Bibi.

18. The learned Judge does not seem to have had his attention directed to the case of Mt. Hurmat-odl-nissa Begum v. Allahdia Khan. He admitted that there was no direct authority that a Mahomedan cannot bind his chance as an heir-apparent, but he thought that on the analogy of Hindu reversioners, it should be held that he could not. He declined to apply principles of equity to the circumstances of that case. It may be noted that the defence to Fathmaboo's action to establish her rights as an heir to her deceased father failed upon another point, which was that Fathmaboo was a pardanashin lady who was not shown to have received independent legal advice when she executed the deed of release in question. The compromise in Nasirul Haq v. Fayzul Rahman was held to be valid as being of the nature of a family settlement not amounting to a transfer or renunciation of an expectant interest or of a mere possibility. It may be partially distinguished from the facts of the present case by the circumstance that the relinquishment there was embodied in a decree. It was held that this decree prevented the defendant or any one claiming under him from successfully asserting a title to any interest in the property over and above the life-interest reserved to him, especially after he had received the benefits under the compromise.

19. In Muthuraman Chettiar v. Ponnuswamy Vdayar(14), this case was cited with approval as an authority for holding that a settlement whereby parties at partition bind themselves as to the disposal of their property after death, so long as there is no attempt to create a new line of succession unknown to Hindu Law, is not invalid. In Mohammad Hashmat Ali v. Kaniz Fatima a similar contract not to claim on becoming entitled to inherit, when embodied in a decree of Court, was considered to be legal. In Meerangani Rowther v. Karupathi Nagur Meera Lubbai, it was held by a Bench of this Court that the release of a right of inheritance was not a good consideration among Mahomedans for the transfer of a life-estate, and the decision of Jenkins, C.J, in Sumsuddin v. Abdul Husein was followed.

20. In Thattoli Kothilan Aliyamma v. Kunhammed(15), the surrender by a guardian of a right to division when it related to a mere spes successionis was held to be invalid, not on account of the words of Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, as it was considered that was not applicable to an agreement merely not to divide, but mainly on the ground that clear benefit to the minors who were concerned had not been shown. The case of Maniclcam Pillai v. Rama-lingam Pillai(16), quoted by Jenkins, C.J, was a simple case of the transfer by a Hindu presumptive reversionary heir of his expectancy, which was obviously obnoxious to Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, and that of Abdul Wahid Khan v. Nuran Bibi, also quoted by the same learned Judge, is merely an authority for the principle that Mahomedan law does not recognize vested estates in remainder. The case of Mt. Khanum Jan v. Mt. Jan Beebee was a case of daughters renouncing a right of inheritance to their mother's property, which during their mother's lifetime did not exist and might never come into existence. It was also found that the deed of gift upon which the deed of renunciation depended was void and that consequently both deeds were void. In Kemp v. Kelsey the question whether a release, if made by a person competent to contract, of his or her future right would be good according to custom was left undecided.

21. Baslkrishna Trimbak Tendulkar v. Savitribal(17) was a case of relinquishment by a Hindu son of his right to succeed to a share in the property of his father for a money consideration. It was held to be invalid and of no effect, because it was an attempt to alter the natural course of devolution of property by a private arrangement. Where it was otherwise, an agreement by expect ants to divide a particular property in a certain way was upheld in Ram Nirunjun Singh v. Prayag Singh(18). Courts in India will not enforce contracts to transfer expectancies when they are forbidden by law: vide Kakaralapudi Lakshmi Narayan v. Kandukuri Veer a Sarabha, but parties who have taken a benefit under a transaction whereby they relinquish their interest in property and those who claim under them may be estopped from afterwards impugning the validity of the transaction: vide Nasirul Haq v. Fyazul Raman.

22. In this conflict of authority I think I am bound to follow the authority of the highest Court and adopt the view taken in Mt. Hurmut-ool-nissa Begam v. Allahdia Khan that a mere renunciation of a right of succession is not repugnant to the principles of Mahomedan Law, and I further hold that the plaintiff is estopped from asserting a title to Mira Mohidin's share by reason of the arrangement come to by his vendor on 28th April, 1902 under which the latter took a benefit and compounded for his share of his father's property. In Mt. Oodey Koowar v. Mt. Ladoo, the Privy Council bad before them a document renouncing all interest in an estate, executed by a person who had then only an expectant right to the estate but to which she afterwards became absolutely entitled. They propounded two questions to test the legal position of the executant. First, they asked—Did the document operate as a conveyance of A's rights? The answer was—no, because at the date of execution A had not in fact any interest in the property at all and so had nothing to convey and secondly, because she did not then contemplate a conveyance of the right to which she subsequently became entitled. The next question was—Did the document operate by way of estoppel? The answer was—no, because A received no consideration for the conveyance of her particular interest and because she did not by misrepresentation cause the person in favour of whom she resigned to alter her position in any way. In the present case if we apply the same tests, let us see what the answers will be. It may be said that Ex. 1 will not operate as a transfer because at the date of execution Mira Mohidin had no present right to share in the property acquired by his father, and because the transfer of a non-existent thing would be in itself null and void. Next, as regards estoppel, Ex. 1 embodies an agreement, arranged by arbitrators, whereby an adult son agreed with his father to compound for the chance of a certain event happening in the future, namely, his father predeceasing him and leaving property. The consideration for the agreement was a lump sum of Rs. 500 paid down at the time. The contingency provided for having now occurred by the death of Pachakanni during the lifetime of Mira Mohidin (P.W 1), I fail to see by what right the recipients of the money or those claiming under them can be allowed to repudiate the transaction by which they benefited and act as if they had not induced the money to be paid. Mira Mohidin caused Pachakanni to believe a thing to be true and to act upon that belief, that thing being his intention not to make any further claim to Pachakanni's property: see Sections 115 and 3(2), Illus. (d) of the Evidence Act. Both as a family settlement by arbitrators and on the ground of estoppel, I am inclined to uphold the transaction evidenced by Ex. 1 and I would allow the second appeal so far as Mira Mohidin's share is concerned and in modification of the lower Court's decree direct that plaintiff do recover ⅞—½=⅜ths of Pachakanni's estate with proportionate costs throughout.

23. By the Court.— Under Section 98 of the CPC, the second appeal is dismissed with costs.

S.N/R.K

24. Appeal dismissed.