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Ajodhya Roy v. Hardwar Roy And Ors.

Calcutta High Court
Feb 18, 1909
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Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1899 Baburam Sahu obtained a mortgage decree against Raja Roy and his three sons Ram Logan Roy, Ramtohal Roy and Deodhary Roy, members of a joint Mitakshara family. By the time present execution proceedings were taken out, all the original judgment-debtors except Deodhari Roy had died. The decree-holder brought on the record all members of the joint family, including the appellant, an infant son of Deodhari.

The infant, represented by his mother and guardian Rambati Koer, objected that he could not be made a party to execution proceedings and that the application as to him was barred by limitation. The learned Munsiff found the appellant had been born after the mortgage decree and held that because his father Deodhari was still alive the infant could not be made a party; the Court of First Instance also held the application was barred by limitation as the infant had been born more than three years before 23 July 1906.

On appeal the District Judge reversed, holding that the real judgment-debtor was the joint family (which, he said, can never die) and that the members of the family then in existence might be called into Court; he concluded that Ajodhya Roy (one of the members) was a proper party. The infant appealed to the present Court and the decree-holder defended bringing the infant into the execution proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an infant born after a mortgage decree (and after the decree-holder's interest vested in the original judgment-debtors) can be made a party to execution proceedings.
  2. Whether such an infant, by virtue of birth, becomes a "representative" of an original judgment-debtor within the meaning of Section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882.
  3. Whether the application against the infant is barred by limitation.
  4. Whether the District Judge's view that the joint family is the real judgment-debtor and therefore the proper object of execution proceedings can be supported.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The infant (through his mother and guardian) contended he could not be made a party to the execution proceedings because his father, one of the original judgment-debtors, was still alive; thus the infant could not be regarded as a representative of any party to the suit.
  • It was also contended on his behalf that the application as against him was barred by limitation.

Decree-holder's Arguments

  • The decree-holder argued that on birth the appellant acquired an interest in the mortgaged property which had been owned and possessed by other members of the family, and that by this acquisition of interest he became bound by the mortgage decree.
  • Consequently, the decree-holder argued, the infant is a representative in interest of his father for purposes of execution proceedings and could therefore be brought before the Court even though his father remained alive.

Position Adopted by the District Judge (as described)

  • The District Judge held that no particular person was the judgment-debtor and that the joint family itself was the real judgment-debtor (a body which "can never die"), so that members of the family then in existence might be called into court; on that basis he concluded that Ajodhya Roy was a proper party to the execution proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ishan Chunder v. Beni Madhub, 24 C. 62 Definition of "representative" in Section 244 of the CPC as including representative in interest (not limited to heir/executor/administrator). Used to show that "representative" embraces transferees of interest who are bound by the decree, supporting the view that the infant may be a representative in interest.
Gulzari Lal v. Madho Ram, 26 A. 447 Same proposition as above: the term "representative" includes representative in interest; also cited in support of purchaser of equity-of-redemption being a representative. Applied as authority that a purchaser of part of the equity of redemption after decree is a representative of the judgment-debtor; by analogy the infant who acquired part interest by birth is similarly a representative.
Debi Parshad v. Thakur Dial, 1 A. 105 Illustration of Mitakshara principles concerning partition shares and how birth affects division of interests. Relied on to explain how the birth of the infant resulted in transference/devolution of interest among joint-family members (illustrating fractional shares after birth).
Bhimul Doss v. Choonee Lall, 2 C. 379 (F.B.) Followed the Mitakshara partition principle (as in Debi Parshad). Used to support the conclusion that the infant acquired an enforceable fractional interest by birth (one-eighth in the example given).
Madho Das v. Ranji Patak, 16 A. 286 (at p. 291) Example that purchaser of a fragment of the equity of redemption after decree is a representative of the judgment-debtor. Used analogically to show that acquisition of part interest (whether by sale or by birth) renders the acquirer a representative bound by the decree.
Radha Kissen v. Hem Chandra, 11 C.W.N. 495 Authority that purchasers of equity of redemption post-decree are representatives (supporting the general rule). Applied by analogy to the infant's acquisition by birth, to conclude he is a representative of his father as to the portion he acquired.
Raja Ram Tewary v. Luchmun Pershad, 8 W.R. 15 (Full Bench) Principle that a son cannot object to alienations validly made by his father before the son was born or begotten. Relied upon to support the proposition that the infant is bound by the mortgage-decree made before his birth as to the interest he subsequently acquired.
Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall, L.R. 1 I.A. 321; 22 W.R. 56; 14 B.L.R. 187 (Judicial Committee) Same principle: a post-birth descendant cannot contest prior alienations by ancestors relating to property then existing. Applied as further authority that the infant, having acquired an interest by birth, is bound by antecedent alienations and decrees.
Madho Singh v. Hurmut Ally, 3 Agra H.C.R. 432; Jado Singh v. Musammat Ranee, 5 N.W.P.H.C.R. 113 High Court decisions holding that alienations of immovable property by a joint Mitakshara family member cannot be contested by his son if the son was neither born nor begotten at time of alienation. Used to corroborate the proposition that the infant is bound by antecedent alienations/decrees and thus is a representative as to the interest he acquired by birth.
Surjiram Marwari v. Barhamdeo Persad, 2 C.L.J. 288 Doctrine that in a mortgage suit the lis continues after decree nisi and lis pendens applies to proceedings to realise the mortgage after decree for sale. Invoked to indicate that, even if the infant were not formally made a party, he would still be bound by execution proceedings; but the decree-holder was entitled to bring him in to avoid future disputes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed a two-part test (derived from the meaning of "representative" in Section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882 and the cited authorities) to decide whether the infant was a representative of a party to the suit:

  1. Whether any portion of the interest of the decree-holder or the judgment-debtor, originally vested in a party to the suit, had by act of parties or by operation of law vested in the person sought to be treated as a representative; and
  2. If there had been such a devolution of interest, whether that person was bound by the decree so far as such interest was concerned.

Applying the first test, the Court observed that the birth of the appellant (P) resulted in a legal transference/devolution of interest: before his birth the aggregate rights were vested in the grandfather, father and two uncles; upon his birth the aggregate vested in them jointly with P. The Court illustrated how, for partition purposes under Mitakshara principles, the shares would change (the father's share being divided between father and child). Citing Debi Parshad and Bhimul Doss, the Court concluded that by birth the appellant acquired a definite fractional interest and therefore, to that extent, was a representative of his father.

Applying the second test, the Court held that the appellant was bound by the mortgage decree as to the interest he acquired by birth. The Court relied on authorities (including Full Bench and Judicial Committee decisions) that a son cannot object to alienations validly made by his father before the son was born or begotten. This established that the appellant could not escape the effect of the earlier decree on the property from which he later derived an interest.

The Court rejected the District Judge's theoretical proposition that the "real judgment-debtor was the joint family which can never die" as unsupportable in principle, but nonetheless concluded that the District Judge's ultimate conclusion (that the infant was a proper party) was correct. The Court explained it reached that conclusion on the basis that the infant, by birth, acquired an interest and was bound by the decree, and thus was a representative within Section 244.

The Court also observed that it might not have been strictly necessary for the decree-holder to bring the infant before the Court because lis pendens in a mortgage suit may render such persons bound by the execution proceedings even if not formally made parties (citing Surjiram Marwari). Nevertheless, the decree-holder was entitled to bring the infant in to avoid future disputes.

On limitation, the Court held that under "Article 1.79 Clause 4 of the Limitation Act" no question of limitation arose as to the infant; the contrary view taken by the first Court had apparently relied on Article 178, which the Court said had no bearing.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED — the Court affirmed the conclusion reached by the learned District Judge that the infant was a proper party to the execution proceedings, and dismissed the appeal with costs (hearing fee assessed at one gold mohur).

Direct Consequences for the Parties

  • The appellant (the infant) is to be treated as a representative of his father, to the extent of the interest he acquired by birth, and is bound by the earlier mortgage decree as to that interest.
  • The decree-holder was entitled to bring the infant before the Court in the execution proceedings and the infant's presence as a party is proper to avoid future disputes.
  • The Court found no obstacle in limitation under the provision cited from the Limitation Act (Article 1.79 Clause 4) as applied to these facts.

Broader Legal Implications

The opinion applies existing principles (as articulated in the authorities cited) concerning: (a) the meaning of "representative" under Section 244 CPC to include representatives in interest; (b) the effect of birth within a Mitakshara joint family on the devolution of share and acquisition of interest; and (c) the rule that descendants born after an alienation or decree cannot contest antecedent alienations affecting property from which they derive an interest. The Court did not purport to announce a novel rule beyond applying these precedents to the facts before it.

Case Outcome (final words of the opinion): The conclusion of the learned District Judge was affirmed; the appeal was dismissed with costs (hearing fee one gold mohur).

Show all summary ...

1. The substantial question of law, which calls for decision in this appeal, is one of some nicety and novelty. In 1899, Baburam Sahu, now represented by the respondents, obtained a mortgage decree against one Raja Roy and his three sons Ram Logan Roy, Ramtohal Roy and Deodhary Roy, members of a joint Mitakshara family. All the original judgment-debtors except Deodhari Roy had died before the present execution was taken out. The decree-holder brought on the record all the members of the joint family, amongst whom was the appellant, an infant son of Deodhari. It was objected on behalf of the infant represented by his mother and guardian, Rambati Koer, that he could not be made a party to the execution proceedings, and further that the application as against him was barred by limitation. The learned Munsiff found on the evidence that the appellant was born subsequent to the mortgage-decree and held that as his father Deodhari was still alive, he could not be made a party to the execution proceedings. The Court of First Instance also held that, as the appellant had been born more than three years before the 23rd July 1906, the application, so far as he is concerned, must be taken to have been barred by limitation. Upon appeal, the learned District Judge reversed this order. He held that no particular person was the judgment-debtor, that the real judgment-debtor was the joint-family, which can never die, and that at any time the members of the family, then in existence, might be called into Court. In this view of the matter, he concluded that Ajodhya Roy was a proper party to the execution proceedings. The infant has now appealed to this Court, and on his behalf it has been contended that the only persons against whom the decree-holder could proceed in execution are either the parties to the suit or their representatives, and that, as the father of the appellant, one of the original judgment-debtors, was still alive, the appellant could not in any sense be treated as the representative of any party to the suit. In answer to this argument, it has been contended on behalf of the decree-holders that, as soon as the appellant was born, he acquired by birth an interest in the mortgaged property, which up to that time had been owned and possessed by the other members of the family in which he was born, that he is consequently bound by the decree in the mortgage suit and is the representative of his father for the purposes of the execution proceedings, although his father may still be alive. No attempt has been made in the arguments addressed to us to support the view taken by the learned District Judge that the real judgment-debtor was the joint family, which could never die, and in our opinion that theory cannot be supported. But after a careful examination of the arguments addressed to us and of the principles of law applicable to cases of this description, we are of opinion that the conclusion at which the Court of appeal below arrived is correct and must be affirmed.

2. It has been found by the Courts below, and for the purposes of this decision that finding cannot be challenged by any of the parties, that the appellant was born after the mortgage-decree had been made. Before his birth the entire interest, in the mortgaged properties was vested in the original judgment-debtors who were parties to the mortgage suit. The immediate effect of his birth was that the aggregate of rights then vested in his grand-father, his father and his two uncles, became vested in him conjointly with them. In other words, the interest which was originally vested in A and his sons X.Y. and Z. became, upon the birth of P., as the son of X, vested in A.X.Y.Z. and P. The question, therefore, arises whether by reason of this devolution of interest P. became a representative of any of the parties to the suit. Now, the term representative', as used in Section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882, means, not merely the legal representative in the sense of the heir, executor or administrator, but includes any representative in interest, that is, any transferee of the interest of the decree-holder or judgment-debtor, who so far as such interest is concerned, is bound by the decree, Ishan Chunder v. Beni Madhub 24 C. 62, Gulzari Lal v. Madho Ram 26 A. 447. To determine, therefore, whether a particular person is a representative of a party to the suit, the two tests to be applied are, first, whether any portion of the interest of the decree holder or of the judgment-debtor which was originally vested in one of the parties to the suit, has by act of parties or by operation of law, vested in the person who is sought to be treated as representative, and secondly, if there has been a devolution of interest, whether, so far as such interest is concerned, that person is bound by the decree. Let us consider for a moment the effect of the application of each of these two tests to the case before us.

3. With reference to the first test, we observe that as soon as the appellant, whom we have called P, was born, the aggregate of rights previously vested in A.X.Y. and Z. became vested in P along with A.X.Y. and Z. If, before the birth of P, there had been a definition of the interests of the parties, each of the persons A.X.Y. and Z. would have been entitled to one fourth of the estate. If after the birth of P., there had been a similar definition of the interests of the parties, the result would have been that each of the persons A.Y. and Z. would have been entitled to one-fourth of the estate but the one-fourth share which would otherwise have been taken by X. would now have to be distributed between X. and P; in other words, the effect of the birth, of P. was that, if a partition was called for, X. would be entitled to only one-eighth and P. to another one-eighth (Mitakshara) Chap. I Section 5, Debi Parshad v. Thakur Dial, 1 A. 105 followed in Bhimul Doss v. Choonee Lall 2 C. 379 (F.B.). It is manifest, therefore, that by reason of the birth of P. there has been a transference of interest in the eye of the law. To the extent of this interest, P. is a representative of one of the parties to the suit, namely his father. The case is on principle strictly analogous to that of the transfer of the equity of redemption of the judgment-debtor, in whole or in part, after the mortgage decree has been made. It cannot be disputed that the purchaser of a fragment of the equity of redemption after the decree is a representative of the judgment-debtor, whether he acquired his interest under a private alienation, as in Madho Das v. Ranji Patak 16 A. 286 at P. 291 or by a judicial sale as in Gulzari Lal v. Madho Ram 26 A. 447. and Radha Kissen v. Hem Chandra 11 C.W.N. 495. On principle, therefore, it is impossible to say that the appellant, who has by his birth, acquired an interest in the equity of redemption, is not a representative of his father who was one of the original parties to the suit, within the meaning of section 244 of the code.

4. As regards the second test, it is manifest that the appellant is, to the extent of the interest acquired by him by birth, bound by the mortgage-decree made before his birth. It is well settled that a son cannot object to alienations validly made by his father before he was born or begotten, because he could only by birth obtain an interest in property which was then existing in his ancestors. In support of this proposition it is sufficient to refer to the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Raja Ram Tewary v. Luchmun Pershad 8 W.R. 15, to the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall L.R. 1 I.A. 321; 22 W.R. 56; 14 B.L.R. 187 and to the decisions of the High Courts at Agra and Allahabad in Madho Singh v. Hurmut Ally 3 Agra H.C.R. 432 and Jado Singh v. Musammat Ranee 5 N.W.P.H.C.R. 113, in which it was ruled that an alienation of immoveable property by a member of a joint Mitakshara family cannot be contested by his son who, at the time of the alienation, was neither born nor begotten. It is not necessary to show that this proposition is supported by the principles laid down in the Mitakshara, as the more important texts applicable to the matter are set out in the judgment of Sir Barnes Peacock in the Full Bench case to which we have just referred. We take it, therefore, that the appellant has by his birth acquired an interest in the mortgaged property directed to be sold by the decree and that so far as such interest is concerned he is bound by the decree. He must consequently be treated as a representative of one of the parties to the suit within the meaning of Section 244 of the Code, and as such he is a proper party to the execution proceedings.

5. It may be doubted, however, whether it was necessary for the decree-holder to bring the appellant before the Court in these execution proceedings, for as in the case of a mortgage suit the lis continues after the decree nisi and the doctrine of lis pendens is applicable to proceedings to realise the mortgage after the decree for sale, Surjiram Marwari v. Barhamdeo Persad 2 C.L.J. 288. The appellant who by reason of his birth subsequent to the mortgage decree, acquired an interest in the mortgaged properties would be bound by the proceedings in execution though not brought before the Court. But even though he may be so bound, the mortgagee decree-holder is entitled to treat him as a representative of one of the parties to the suit and to bring him before the Court with a view to avoid possible disputes and complications in future.

6. Under Article 1.79 Clause 4 of the Limitation Act, no question of limitation arises. The contrary view suggested in the first Court was apparently based upon Article 178 which has obviously no bearing.

7. The result, therefore, is that the conclusion at which the learned District Judge arrived cannot be successfully challenged and this appeal must be dismissed with costs. We assess the hearing fee at one gold mohur.