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Tirumalaisami Naidu v. Subramaniam Chettiar
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff was a purchaser at a Court sale who sued for possession of the property sold. His suit for possession was unsuccessful. The principal procedural question presented was whether a Court-sale purchaser in the plaintiff's position may recover the purchase money by an ordinary suit, or whether recovery is available only by application under Order XXI, Rule 93 of the Civil Procedure Code (the present Code).
The plaintiff made the purchase and instituted his suit for possession while the law then in force was governed by sections 313 and 315 of the earlier Code. His suit, which sought delivery of the land and profits, was decided against him in 1909 after the present Code (containing Order XXI, Rule 93) had come into force. The plaintiff contended that his right to sue had arisen before the change in the law and therefore should not have been taken away by the subsequent enactment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a Court-sale purchaser whose suit for possession has failed may recover the purchase money by an ordinary suit, or whether recovery is confined to an application under Order XXI, Rule 93 of the present Civil Procedure Code.
- Whether the change in the law (replacement of the earlier Code provisions by Order XXI, Rule 93) deprived a purchaser of a right to sue that had already accrued when he purchased and initiated suit under the earlier Code (sections 313 and 315).
- Whether, for the purpose of the repealing and enactment provisions (Section 6(c) and (e), Act X of 1897), the plaintiff's contingent right to repayment had "accrued" before the repeal so as to be preserved.
- As a consequential procedural issue: what rate of interest is payable on any decretal sum (the Sub-Judge had awarded interest at 12% as claimed by the plaintiff).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff purchased at the Court sale and brought suit for possession while sections 313 and 315 of the earlier Code were in force; under that prior law he was originally entitled to sue for recovery of the purchase-money if deprived of the property because the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest.
- The change in the law (introduction of Order XXI, Rule 93) did not deprive him of his pre-existing right to sue because his right had already accrued before the repeal.
- The plaintiff claimed interest at the rate of 12% as pleaded in the plaint.
Defendant's Arguments
- The defendant relied on precedents (for example Nilakanta v. Imamsahib and Mohideen Ibrahim v. Mahamed Meera) to argue that the purchaser's cause of action for repayment accrues only upon the determination of a suit against the person in possession (i.e., when the plaintiff's suit for possession is decided), and therefore the plaintiff's right had not accrued before the repeal.
- Abbott v. Minister for Lands was cited for the proposition that a mere contingent or potential right to take advantage of a repealed statute is not necessarily a 'right accrued' within the saving provision.
- In his written statement the defendant contended that the judgment-debtor should have been made a party (this point was not pressed at trial and therefore not considered further).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mohideen Ibrahim v. Mahamed Merra (1912) | Held that a purchaser's right of suit was dismissed; purchaser had no substantive right to recover and only a statutory remedy by application. | Noted as authority dismissing a general right of suit; the Court aligned with the negative view for general cases but distinguished the present case on accrual grounds. |
| Parvathi Ammal v. Govindasmi Pillai | Confirmed obiter the negative view reached in Mohideen Ibrahim. | Cited as supporting the restrictive view that the purchaser's remedy is statutory. |
| Rustomji Vinayak Gangadhar Bhat | Presented the contrary view that purchaser's right of suit arises from an implied contractual warranty by the decree-holder. | The Court rejected that reasoning and declined to follow it in principle for Court sales. |
| Dorab Ally Khan v. Khajah Moheeooddeen | Showed that, absent fraud, doctrine of warranty of title cannot be applied to Court sales or be the basis of proceedings except those permitted by the law of procession. | Used to support the conclusion that no warranty arises from a Court sale and therefore no contractual basis for suit exists apart from statute. |
| Sundara Gopalan v. Venkatavarada Ayyangar | Similar principle to Dorab Ally Khan regarding the inapplicability of warranty of title to Court sales. | Referred to as corroborative authority that warranty of title does not support an independent action against decree-holder in Court sales. |
| Nilakanta v. Imamsahib | Held that a plaintiff's cause of action for a claim like repayment accrues when a suit against the person in possession has been determined against him. | Relied on by the defendant; the Court considered and distinguished this authority for the purpose of determining accrual under the saving provision. |
| Sidheswari Prasad Narain Singh v. Mayanand Gir | Approved Mohideen Ibrahim (supporting the restrictive view). | Noted as reinforcing the defendant's line of authority; the Court nevertheless analyzed accrual differently. |
| Read v. Brown (1889) | Used for the meaning of 'cause of action'—that every fact necessary to be proved, if traversed, forms part of the cause of action. | Referenced to show distinction between 'cause of action' and 'right' for accrual analysis. |
| Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving (1905) | Held that a contingent right of appeal vested in the suitor before a change in law and was not merely procedural; the right was preserved despite contingent exercise. | Followed as primary authority that a contingent, enforceable right existing at the date of change is preserved by the saving provisions (Section 6(c)). |
| Kalinga Hebbara v. Narasima Hebbara | Followed Colonial Sugar Refining Co. on rights of appeal and contingency. | Cited as an Indian follow-up to support preservation of contingent rights. |
| Salimmamma v. Valli Hussanabha Beari | Applied the Colonial Sugar principle in another Indian context. | Used to support the proposition that contingent remedies vest and are preserved. |
| Madurai Pillai v. Muthu Chetty | Referred to with reference to a consequential and contingent remedy. | Invoked to support that consequential contingent remedies may be preserved by the saving provision. |
| Rajah of Pittapur v. Gani Venkat Subba Row | Applied preservation principles and held a new rule of limitation must be read subject to implied exceptions when its effect would destroy an existing right of suit. | Relied upon to support the rule that a repealing enactment must not be construed to absolutely destroy a right of suit existing when the rule came into force. |
| Abbott v. Minister for Lands (1895) | Held that a mere right to take advantage of statutory provisions, without any individual action towards it, may not be a 'right accrued'. | Cited for the defendant's position but distinguished by the Court on the ground that the plaintiff had already taken steps (sued) and his right was definite and enforceable from origin. |
| Gopeshwar Pal v. Jiban Chandra | Stated that a repealing enactment cannot impose an impossible condition on pain of forfeiture of a vested right. | Applied to support that the present Code should not be construed to deprive the plaintiff of an accrued right where compliance with the new procedure was impossible. |
| Rodger v. Gomptoir D'Escompte de Paris (1871) | Authority cited in respect of the proper rate of interest in Court decrees. | Relied upon when reducing interest from the 12% claimed to the usual Court rate (applied as 6% in this judgment). |
| Ayyavoyyar v. Shastram Ayyar | Authority cited on interest payable under Court decrees. | Invoked to justify awarding interest at the usual Court rate rather than the claimed rate. |
| Arunachellam v. Arunachellam | Authority cited on interest. | Also cited to support the appropriate Court rate of interest to be applied. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by framing the general question whether a Court-sale purchaser whose suit for possession has failed may sue for repayment of purchase money or is confined to the statutory remedy under Order XXI, Rule 93 of the present Code.
The Court reviewed prior authorities that took different views: some decisions denied any right of ordinary suit and confined remedy to statutory application (e.g., Mohideen Ibrahim), while others treated a purchaser's remedy as arising from an implied contractual warranty by the decree-holder. The Court rejected the warranty/contractual basis for an independent suit in Court sales, reasoning that, in a Court sale, nothing passes beyond the debtor's right, title and interest; there is no guarantee of the existence or extent of that interest and therefore no warranty by the decree-holder in the absence of fraud. Consequently, except where statute permits, no substantive cause of action arises against the decree-holder.
Turning to the plaintiff's specific circumstances, the Court distinguished the general rule because the plaintiff had purchased and instituted suit for possession while the earlier Code (sections 313 and 315) was in force. The critical question became whether the plaintiff's right to repayment had "accrued" before repeal so as to be preserved by Section 6(c) and (e) of Act X of 1897 (the saving provisions).
The Court analysed the meaning of "accrued" and contrasted 'cause of action' (as used in authorities like Read v. Brown) with 'right' as used in the saving provision. The Court held that the purchaser's right is primarily a right to the property and secondarily a contingent right to repayment which becomes enforceable upon failure to obtain the property. That contingent branch is nevertheless a part of the purchaser's right from the date of purchase and therefore had accrued prior to the repeal.
To support this view, the Court relied on Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving and subsequent Indian cases which held that contingent rights (e.g., a right of appeal exercisable only if decision goes against a party) vested in the suitor before a change in the law and were preserved. The Court distinguished Abbott v. Minister for Lands on the ground that there the right was merely a general permission to apply for land and required a further act to make it definite, whereas the plaintiff here had already taken an operative step (instituting suit) and possessed a definite enforceable right from the origin.
The Court further applied a rule of construction and limitation law: where a repealing enactment would make compliance with new procedural requirements impossible and thus destroy an existing right, the repealing statute will not be construed so as to effect that destruction. The Court relied on Rajah of Pittapur and Gopeshwar Pal to support that a new rule of limitation must be read subject to an implied exception in cases where its application would absolutely destroy a right of suit existing when the rule came into force.
On the subsidiary points, the Court declined to consider defendant's submission about making the judgment-debtor a party because it was not pressed at trial. On interest, the Court held that the plaintiff was entitled only to interest at the usual Court rate rather than the 12% claimed, and cited relevant authorities for that adjustment.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court restored the Sub-Judge's decree in favour of the plaintiff, subject to modification of the interest awarded.
The direct effects of the decision on the parties are these:
- The plaintiff's decree is restored.
- The rate of interest awarded is reduced to 6% (the usual Court rate) up to the date of the decree, with subsequent interest at 6% on the decretal amount.
- The parties will give and receive proportionate costs.
Implications: The Court concluded that where a purchaser has a primary right to the property and a contingent alternative right to repayment arising from the date of purchase, that contingent right can be treated as having accrued prior to repeal and is preserved by the saving provisions (Section 6(c) and (e), Act X of 1897). The judgment rests on application of established principles and cited authorities; the opinion does not purport to create a novel principle beyond applying those principles to the facts before the Court.
1. The question before us is in its most general form, whether the plaintiff, a Court-sale purchaser, whose suit for possession of the property put up for sale has failed, is entitled to recover the purchase money by suit or whether, as the lower Appellate Court held, he can do so only by petition under Order XXI, Rule 93, of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. Such a right of suit, in cases to which the present Code can be applied without reservation, was dismissed in Mohideen Ibrahim v. Mahamed Merra, Lerrai 17 Ind. Cas. 437 : 23 M.L.J. 487 : 12 M. L T 431 : (1912) M.W.N. 1130, one learned Judge being unwilling to negative it, though expressing no decided opinion, and the other negative it directly, because the purchaser had no longer a substantive right to recover, but only a statutory right to do so by application in special circumstances; and the latter opinion was confirmed obiter in Parvathi Ammal v. Govindasmi Pillai 30 Ind. Cas. 827 : 39 M. 803 : 2 L.W. 861 : 29 M.L.J. 467 : (1915) M.W.N. 797. The contrary view, however, has been taken in Rustomji Vinayak Gangadhar Bhat 7 Ind. Cas. 955 : 35 B. 20 at p. 31; l2 Bom. L.R. 723, the purchaser's right of suit being based on the existence of a contractual relation between him and the decree-holder and of a warranty by the latter of some saleable interest to be implied from the provisions of the Code. With all respect I cannot follow the reasoning. Dorab Ally Khan v. Khajah Moheeooddeen 5 I.A. 116 : 3 C. 806 : 2 C.L.R. 529 : 3 Suth. P.C.J. 519 : 3 Sar. P.C.J. 818 : 2 Ind. Jur. 426 : 1 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 1097 (P.C.). and Sundara. Gopalan v. Venkatavarada Ayyangar 17 M. 228 : 3 M.L.J. 293 6 Ind. Dec.(N.S) 158. are referred to in the judgment, but they show that, in the absence of fraud (and none was referred to there or has been in the present case), the doctrine of warranty of title cannot be applied to Court sales or be the basis of proceedings except those which the procession law permits; and, if there is no warranty between the decree-holder and purchaser, there was no other basis for a contractual relation between them, since the former had no ownership of the property sold. In a Court sale nothing passes beyond the right, title and interest of the debtor, and, as there is no guarantee that it exists or is of any particular extent, the purchaser would have no cause of action apart from the Statute. The former Code accordingly conferred on him a special right, which the present Code has restricted and for the enforcement of which it provides special procedure. Taking this view I am against the plaintiff's general contention.
3. The plaintiff, however, has relied mainly on the special circumstances of his case, that he made his purchase and brought his suit for possession, imp leading the defendant when his right was regulated by sections 313 and 315, of the code then in force. In that suit, he asked for delivery of the suit land and profits. It was decided against him in 1909, after the provisions referred to had been superseded by Order XXI, Rule 93, under which, as I have held, his right is only to apply to the Court for refund. It is not disputed that he was originally entitled to sue. The argument for consideration is only that the change in the law did not deprive him of his right to do so.
4. The effect of the change in the law is to be ascertained, in the absence of special provision, in the new enactment (and section 154 of the present code preserves only existing rights of appeal--not other remedies), by reference to Section 6(c) and (e), Act X of 1897, its material portion being that a repeal.
shall not (c) affect any right or privilege acquired or accrued under the enactment repealed or (e) affect any legal proceeding or remedy, in respect of such right or privilege and any such legal proceeding or remedy may he instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act had not been passed.
5. The first question then is whether the plaintiff's right to re-payment of his purchase-money had accrued to him before the change in the law. Under the former law, Section 315 of the farmer Code, he would have been entitled to receive back the money, when the sale was set aside under Section 312 or 313, the contingency we are concerned with, When it was found that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property and the purchaser (plaintiff) was, for that reason, deprived of it.
6. Was it so found and was the plaintiff deprived as the defendant contends, only when the former's suit failed in 1909, after the present Code came into force? In that event his right had not accrued and his remedy was affected, or did the right accrue earlier before his suit was filed in 1907?
7. To support the former view the defendant has relied on the decision in Nilakanta v. Imamsahib 36 M. 361 : 3 M.L.J. 134 : 5 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 958 and Mohideen Ibrahim v. Mahamed Meera Levvai 17 Ind. Cas. 437 : 23 M.L.J. 487 : 12 M. L T 431 : (1912) M.W.N. 1130, the latter approved in Sidheswari Prasad Narain Singh v. Mayanand Gir 19 Ind. Cas. 986 : 35 A. 419 : 11 A.L.J. 606 in which it was held, that the plaintiff's cause of action for the claim, such as that before us, accrues, when there has been a suit against the person in possession, on its determination, against him. But though such determination may be part of plaintiff's cause of action in the sense in which the term is used in Read v. Brown (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 128 : 58 L.J.Q.B. 120 60 L.T. 250 : 37 W.R. 131. and subsequent Indian cases, Every fact, which, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, to support his right to the judgment of the Court.
it does not follow that it is necessary to the accrual of his 'right', the term used in the enactment under consideration. If it did, it would follow further that his right was dependent on and arose only on his becoming conscious of it in consequence of his discovery that the debtor had no saleable interest and of his deprivation of the properly by reason thereof, although the title opposed to his own must have existed at the date of his purchase an d could not have been affected by any proceedings subsequent to it. It is possible to avoid this anomaly only by holding that his 'right' dates from his purchase and is primarily to the property and secondarily in the alternative and contingently to re-payment, the latter branch of it becoming enforceable only on failure in respect of the former. If this view is correct, the plaintiff's right had accrued before the repeal of Section 315 of the former Code. I refer next to authority for the position that such an alternative and contingent right will be preserved under Section 6(c).
8. In Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving (1905) A.C. 69 : 74 L.J.P.C. 77 : 92 L.T. 738 : 91 T.L.R. 513 the question was to the effect on a right of appeal direct to the Privy Council of a change in the law pending the trial of an action, which would have interposed an appeal to the Local High Court. That right of appeal existed at the date of the change in the law, in the sense that it had been conferred by law on every suitor; it was suspended and contingent in the sense that it would be exerciseable only when and if the decision were given against him. It was held not only that the right was not one merely of procedure, but also that it bad vested in the: suitor, before the change took place. This case was followed in Kalinga Hebbara v. Narasima Hebbara 9 Ind. Cas. 987 : 21 M.L.J. 631 : (1911) 1 M.W.N. 143 : 9 M.L.T. 259 and Salimmamma v. Valli Hussanabha Beari 11 Ind. Cas. 653 : 21 M.L.J. 764 : 10 M.L.T. 78; (1911) 21 M.W.N. 99. with reference to the right of appeal, and in Madurai Pillai v. Muthu Chetty 22 Ind. Cas. 775 : 38 M. 823 : 15 M, L.J. 156 : (1914) M.W.N. 216 : 26 M.L.J. 227 : 1 L.W. 172 with reference to another consequential and contingent remedy. In Rajah of Pittapur v. Gani Vatkat Subba Row 30 Ind. Cas. 94 : 39 M. 645 : 29 M.L.J. 1 : 18 M.L.T. 67 : 2 L.W. 661 : (1915) M.W.N. 547 it was applied even more generally in a manner to which I return. On the other hand, Abbott v. Minister for Lands (1895) A.C. 425 : 64 L.J.P.C.167 : 11 Rule 466 : 72 L.T. 402 was cited for the defendant as deciding that a mere right to take advantage of the provisions of a repealed Statute is not a 'right accrued.' But the judgment runs:
The mere right (assuming it to be properly so called) existing in the members of the community or any class of them to take advantage of an enactment, without any act done by an individual towards availing himself of that right, cannot be properly deemed a 'right accrued' within the meaning of the enactment.
9. And the case can accordingly be distinguished on two grounds.
10. Firstly, if the doing of an act is necessary, the plaintiff before us had done one towards availing himself of his right, when he sued the person in possession. Secondly, the plaintiff's right differed essentially from the right (if it was properly so called) which the Judicial Committee was considering; for the latter was a men option to take up land, enforceable against the Minister for the land only after it had been exercised by the making of an application with the necessary formalities and a specification of the land claimed, whilst the former was definite and enforceable from its origin. This case is, therefore, in no way opposed to the conclusion, which is otherwise adequately supported, that plaintiff's right, including the branch of it, which he is now enforcing, had accrued, before the former Code was repealed.
11. The conclusion has been reached on direct consideration of the law. But it can be supported also by reference to a rule of construction. Although the plaintiff was proceeding in a legal way towards recognition of his right to repairing and could have been met by no objection, if the law had riot changed, in terms the change made his further progress impossible; and in the absence of any specific provision or necessary implication the repealing Statute will, therefore, net be construed against him. His only course under the present Code would have been to move for the setting aside of the sale under Order XXI, Rule 91, and Article 166, Schedule I, of the Limitation Act within 30 days of its confirmation and to apply for re-payment under Order XXI, Rule 93, and Article 181 within 3 years from its being set aside. This course he could not take since his first application would have been out of time at the date of the repeal. A repealing enactment cannot impose an impossible condition on pain of forfeiture of a vested right or be applied to cases, in which its provisions cannot be obeyed Gopeshwar Pal v. Jiban Chandra 24 Ind. Cas. 37 : 41 C. 1125 : 19 C.L.J. 549 : 18 C.W.N. 804 and similarly it was held by a Full Bench of this Court in Rajah of Pittapur v. Gani Venkat Subba Row 30 Ind. Cas. 94 : 39 M. 645 : 29 M.L.J. 1 : 18 M.L.T. 67 : 2 L.W. 661: (1915) M.W.N. 547 that a new rale of limitation must be read subject to an implied exception in cases where its provisions would absolutely destroy the right of suit, which was in existence when that rule came into force. On this ground also the plaintiff is entitled to succeed.
12. Two other points have been referred to in argument. Firstly, the defendant contended in his written statement that the judgment-debtor should be made a party. This cannot be considered since it was not pressed at the trial. Secondly, the Sub-Judge awarded interest up to date of suit at 12 percent., the rate claimed in the plaint. The interest at the usual Court rate is, however, all that plaintiff is entitled to in accordance with the authorities. Rodger v. Gomptoir D'Escompte de Paris (1871), 3 P.C. 465 : 40 L.J.P.C. 1 : 24 L.T. 111 : 19 W.R. 449 : 7 Moo. P.C. (N.S.) 314; Ayyavoyyar v. Shastram Ayyar 9 M. 506 : 3 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 747. and Arunachellam, v. Arunachellam 15 M. 203 : 2 M.L.J. 1 : 5 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 492.
13. The result is that the Sub-Judge's decree is restored, subject to the modification that the plaintiff will be entitled to interest at 6 per cent, instead of 12 per cent, to date of that decree and subsequent interest at 6 per cent, on the amount so decreed. The parties will give and receive proportionate costs.
Phillips, J.
14. I agree.
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