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Gurunarayan Das And Others v. Emperor
Factual and Procedural Background
Gurutahal Das, step-brother of Gurunarayan Das, initiated a suit for partition. On 28th March 1942, the petitioners attempted to forcibly eject Gurutahal Das and his brother Sheotahal Das from the family house, leading to a violent altercation. Gurutahal sustained a fractured right fore-arm, and Jai Narain, brother of Gurunarayan, was killed by a spear blow from someone on Sheotahal's side. A murder case against Kara Sahu ended in acquittal after the High Court set aside his conviction and death sentence. The trial of the petitioners was delayed pending the murder case's resolution. The petitioners were convicted and sentenced under various sections of the Penal Code and related laws, with some sentences reduced by the appellate court. Subsequently, the parties filed a petition for compromise, seeking to compound the offences.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court, exercising its revisionary powers under sub-section (5A) of Section 345 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr PC), may allow the parties to compound offences after conviction and dismissal of appeal.
- Whether offences punishable under Sections 325, 324, and 323 of the Penal Code are compoundable at this stage.
- Whether convictions under Sections 147 and 148 (relating to rioting) are compoundable and if acquittal can be granted based on compromise for these offences.
- The appropriateness of sanctioning a compromise and modifying sentences years after the offences occurred, considering the delay and the settlement between parties.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jumo Sherkhan v. Emperor (36 Cr. L.J 2101) | High Court's power under sub-s. (5A) of Section 345 Cr PC to allow compromise in revision. | Supported the existence of jurisdiction to allow compromise even after conviction and appeal dismissal, but stressed such occasions should be rare. |
| Baburali Sardar v. Kala Chand Bepari (A.I.R 1939 Cal. 728.2) | Compounding offences under Section 345 Cr PC in revision cases. | Reinforced that the High Court may permit compromise but should be cautious to prevent misuse by offenders. |
| Observations from the Sind case (unnamed) | Reluctance to grant leave for compromise where conviction is sound to prevent offenders from evading punishment by bribing complainants. | Guided the court to be cautious in accepting compromises post-conviction unless the appellate findings are disputable. |
| Calcutta case, Edgley, J. | Exceptional use of sub-s. (5A) of Section 345 Cr PC only where attempts at compromise occurred before trial concluded. | Emphasized that compromises after final orders should be exceptional and carefully considered. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court acknowledged the statutory power under sub-section (5A) of Section 345 Cr PC allowing the High Court to permit compounding of offences during revision, even after conviction and dismissal of appeal. However, it emphasized the exceptional nature of such allowance, citing precedents that counsel reluctance to accept compromises post-conviction to avoid misuse by offenders. The Court noted that in the present case, no attempt at compromise was made until after all judicial processes concluded, making it unusual.
Further, the Court distinguished between compoundable offences (Sections 325, 324, and 323) and non-compoundable offences (Sections 147 and 148 related to rioting). It held that while the former could be compounded, the latter could not, and thus acquittal could only be granted partially.
Considering the inordinate delay of nearly four years since the offences, the Court found it impractical to enforce the remaining sentences fully. It also recognized the genuine settlement between parties and the potential to amicably resolve related partition litigation. Balancing these factors, the Court exercised its discretion to allow compounding of the compoundable offences and reduce the sentences under the non-compoundable sections to the time already served, while refusing to remit the fine imposed on the principal offender, Gurunarayan Das, due to the seriousness of his conduct.
Another judge concurred, highlighting the importance of the appearance of justice and agreeing that the statutory provision was intended for such exceptional cases, thus supporting the sanctioning of the compromise and sentence modifications.
Holding and Implications
The Court allowed the application to compound the offences punishable under Sections 325, 324, and 323 of the Penal Code and directed acquittal of the petitioners on those counts. For the convictions under Sections 147 and 148, the Court reduced the sentences to the period of imprisonment already undergone by the petitioners, except that the fine imposed on Gurunarayan Das was to stand and not be refunded.
The decision directly affects the petitioners by relieving them from serving the remainder of their sentences for compoundable offences and mitigating their sentences for non-compoundable offences due to the exceptional delay and genuine compromise. No new precedent was established; rather, the ruling applied existing legal principles and statutory provisions to the unique facts of this case.
Meredith, J.:— The convictions of and sentences upon the petitioners, as reduced by the appellate Court, are as follows:
2. Gurunarayan Das—Nine months and a fine of Rs. 100 under S. 325, Penal Code, and six months, to run concurrently, under 9.147 Bhagwat Mahto and Jagamath Singh—three months under S. 323, and three months, con-currently, under S. 147. Ramjatan Mahto—six months under S. 324, and six months, concurrently, under S. 148.
3. The relevant facts are as follows: Gurutahal Das a step-brother of Gurunarayan Das, had brought a suit for partition. As a result of that, according to the findings of the Courts of fact, on 28th March 1942, the petitioners made an attempt to eject Gurutahal Das and his brother, Sheotahal Das, from the family house by force. A fight ensued in which Gurutahal, in addition to other slight injuries, had both bones of his right fore-arm fractured. Jai Narain, however, a brother of Gurunarayan, was killed by someone on Sheotahal's side by a spear blow.
4. A murder case ensued in which one Kara Sahu was convicted and condemned to death; but the conviction and sentence were set aside by the High Court, so that the case eventually ended in acquittal. The trial of the case against the petitioners was held up pending the disposal of the murder case. Hence the long delay.
5. The only point which has been urged in revision is that the parties have arrived at a compromise, and a petition of compromise has been filed on behalf of both sides. It is urged that the offences under Ss. 325, 324 and 323 are compoundable with the permission of the Court, and under sub-s. (5A) of Section 345 of the Cr PC, a High Court acting in the exercise of its powers of revision under S. 439 may allow any person to compound any offence which he is competent to compound under the section.
6. The jurisdiction to allow a compromise in suitable cases in revision, even after the conviction, and dismissal of the appeal, is undoubtedly there, and there are rulings to that effect, of which I may refer to Jumo Sherkhan v. Emperor (36 Cr. L.J 2101) and Baburali Sardar v. Kala Chand Bepari (A.I.R 1939 Cal. 728.2) At the same time, it seems to me that the occasions when the Court may properly allow a compromise and set aside convictions at this stage must be rare indeed. In the Sind case, the learned Judges said:
“The Court will always be reluctant to grant leave where it finds that an accused person has been rightly convicted. To allow compronrses in such cases would Slave the effect of enabling offenders, and particularly convicted persons, to obtain their release from jail by bribing the complainant.”
7. And they went on to observe,
“Had we been satisfied that the findings given by the appellate Court were findings of fact which could not be disturbed in revision, we would surely have refused to accept the compromise in this case.”
8. In the Calcutta case, Edgley, J. said:
“The exceptional power which has been conferred upon the High Court by sub-s. (5 A) of S. 345, should not be used except in a case in which the record indicates that the parties made some attempt to compromise their differences while the matter was still before the trial Court and before the Court passed final orders in the case.”
9. I respectfully agree with these observations. In the present case it is not suggested that there was any attempt at compromise until after the accused had not only been convicted, but their appeal had been dismissed except for a reduction of the sentences.
10. There is another difficulty with regard to the application before us. The convictions are not only for grievous hurt and hurt, but also under the rioting Sections 147 and 148. The offences under these sections are not compoundable at all, and, therefore, no acquittal could be allowed by reason of the compromise in regard to the convictions under these sections. To allow acquittals under the hurt sections would make no difference if the rioting convictions and sentences stand, except with regard to Gurunarayan Das, petitioner 1.
11. There is, however, one feature of the present case which cannot be lost sight of, and that is the inordinate delay in the case. The offences took place as far back as March, 1942. It would be somewhat unreal to send the petitioners back to jail now to serve out their sentences, nearly four years after the offences. There seems to be no doubt that the parties have settled their differences, and it is stated that, if the compromise is allowed, there is some hope that the partition suit may also be amicably settled, and further litigation may be avoided. Taking these circumstances together, I am of opinion that this case may be regarded as exceptional, and in the circumstances I would allow the application to compound the offences under Ss. 325,324 and 323 and direct that the petitioners' be acquitted so far as those convictions are concerned. With regard, to the convictions under Ss. 147 and 148, I would, in Gurunarayan Das's case, reduce the sentence of six months to the period of imprisonment already undergone, which I am informed is ten days, plus a fine of Rs. 100. I understand that this fine has already been paid, and we are asked to make an order that it should be refunded. The petitioner Gurunarayan has been found to have been the aggressor and he, certainly, inflicted a very serious injury, and I do not think any sufficient cause has been made out for remitting the fine. In the case of the remaining three petitioners, while maintaining the convictions: under Ss. 147 and 148, I would reduce the sentence to the period of imprisonment already undergone.
Bennett, J.:— I agree. It is as important that justice should appear to be done as that it should be done. In sending these petitioners to prison now to serve out short sentences of 3, 6 and 9 months, four years after the date of the offences, in the circumstances, where the aggrieved persons are not only willing but have arrived at an agreement to compromise, the whole position appears to me to contain a large element of incongruity. I think that sub-s. (5A) of Section 345 of the Cr PC, was designed to meet just the kind of exceptional case as is presented in this revision. I, therefore agree that the compromise should be sanctioned and that the sentences under Ss. 147 and 148 should be reduced and altered as suggested by my learned brother.
D.S/D.H
12. Order accordingly.
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