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In Re: P. Venkata Reddy

Madras High Court
Mar 15, 1911
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Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses the legal question whether a statement made by a person charged with an offence in answer to the court's question "What have you to say" is absolutely privileged, thereby protecting the person from liability under Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code for defamation arising from that statement. The court examines the nature of privilege in judicial proceedings and its applicability under Indian law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the statement made by an accused person in answer to a question by the court during judicial proceedings is an absolutely privileged statement under Indian law.
  2. Whether the English common law doctrine of absolute privilege applies in India in relation to statements made in judicial proceedings or whether Section 499 IPC excludes this doctrine.
  3. Whether the privilege in judicial proceedings under Indian law is absolute or qualified, requiring good faith under the exceptions to Section 499 IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Mr. Rozario's Arguments

  • Under English law, the occasion of a statement made in answer to the court's question is absolutely privileged.
  • Under Indian law, the statement is not privileged unless the accused proves it was made in good faith within the meaning of the ninth exception to Section 499 IPC, implying only qualified privilege.
  • The absence of explicit reference to absolute privilege in Section 499 IPC indicates the legislature did not intend to adopt the English common law doctrine of absolute privilege.
  • The plea of privilege in judicial proceedings is limited to counsel, parties, witnesses, or prisoners who prove good faith under Section 499 exceptions.
  • The proviso to Section 132 of the Evidence Act does not protect witnesses from civil suits arising from incriminating statements, only from criminal prosecution.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby L.R., 7 H.L., 744; S.C., (1878) L.R., 8 Q.B., 255 Established absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings under English law. Referenced to illustrate the principle of absolute privilege in judicial proceedings as recognized in English law.
Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society v. Parkinson (1892) 1 Q.B., 431 at 451 Confirmed that no civil or criminal action lies for words spoken in the course of judicial proceedings, even if malicious. Used to demonstrate the scope of absolute privilege in English judicial proceedings.
Baboo Gunnesh Dutt Singh v. Mugneeram Chowdhry (1873) 11 Beng. L.R., 321 (P.C.) Recognized the English common law rule that witnesses cannot be sued for evidence given on oath due to public policy. Affirmed the applicability of the English common law doctrine of absolute privilege in India.
Murugesa Pillai v. Papathi Ammal (1897) 1 Weir's Criminal Rulings, 612 Held a prisoner's statement privileged because it was true and fell within exception IX to Section 499 IPC. Illustrated application of good faith exception under Section 499 IPC.
Nadu Gounden v. Nadu Gounden (1889) 1 Weir's Criminal Rulings, 589 Conflicting views on privilege; some judges held the occasion absolutely privileged, others required good faith under Section 499 IPC. Showed judicial divergence on the nature of privilege in judicial proceedings under Indian law.
Manjaya v. Sesha Shetti (1888) I.L.R., 11 Mad., 477 Held statements of a witness under cross-examination before a Criminal Court to be absolutely privileged. Supported the view of absolute privilege in judicial proceedings within Indian jurisdiction.
Hayes v. Christian (1892) I.L.R., 15 Mad., 414 Held defamatory statements made by a defendant interfering in witness examination were not privileged. Distinguished between statements made in the ordinary course of proceedings and others, emphasizing limits of privilege.
Pudmarazu Pantulu v. Venkatramana Aiyar (1909) 19 M.L.J., 217 Held questions put in cross-examination by counsel to be absolutely privileged. Reinforced absolute privilege for statements in judicial proceedings.
Adapala Adivaramma v. Rabala Ramachendra Reddy (1910) M.W.N., 155 Held statements in affidavits to be absolutely privileged. Extended absolute privilege to statements made in judicial affidavits.
Golap Jan v. Bhola Nath Khetry (1911) I.L.R., 38 Calc., 880 Held that complaints to magistrates, even if defamatory, are absolutely privileged in judicial proceedings. Supported absolute privilege for statements made in judicial contexts beyond trials.
Queen v. Pursoram Doss (1865) 3 W.R. (Cr. R.), 45 Held defamatory statements in pleadings are not absolutely privileged. Indicated limits to absolute privilege in judicial proceedings.
Augada Ram Shaha v. Nemai Chand and Shaha (1896) I.L.R., 23 Calc., 867 Held defamatory pleadings are not absolutely privileged. Supported the view that privilege in pleadings is qualified, not absolute.
Nathji Muleshvar v. Lalbhai Ravidat (1890) I.L.R., 14 Bom., 97 Held no action for slander lies on statements in pleadings or conduct of suit. Applied English common law principle of absolute privilege in Bombay jurisdiction.
Queen Empress v. Sabaji (1893) I.L.R., 17 Bom., 127 Held that witness prosecution for defamation was barred by absolute privilege. Reinforced absolute privilege for witnesses in judicial proceedings.
Emperor v. Ganga Prasad (1907) I.L.R., 29 All., 685 Held that occasion of statements in judicial proceedings is not absolutely privileged. Represented the contrary view in Allahabad jurisdiction, rejecting absolute privilege.
Isuri Prasad Singh v. Umrao Singh (1900) I.L.R., 22 All, 234 Held occasion of statements in judicial proceedings is not absolutely privileged. Supported the Allahabad High Court's view against absolute privilege.
Bank of England v. Vagliano Brothers (1811) A.C., 107 Principle of statutory construction focusing on natural meaning of statute rather than prior law. Distinguished as inapplicable because Section 499 IPC was not a codification but a creation of new law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by acknowledging that under English law, statements made in judicial proceedings enjoy absolute privilege, protecting the speaker from defamation liability regardless of malice or bad faith. The court then examined whether this doctrine applies under Indian law, particularly in light of Section 499 IPC, which defines defamation and its exceptions.

The court rejected the argument that the absence of explicit reference to absolute privilege in Section 499 IPC implies its exclusion. It noted that the Indian Penal Code and the Evidence Act are largely based on English law, and where the legislature intended to depart from English principles, it did so expressly. The court found no such clear exclusion regarding absolute privilege.

The court analyzed the exceptions to Section 499 IPC and found they address only qualified privilege occasions, with no mention of absolute privilege for judicial proceedings. This omission was interpreted as a legislative intention not to exclude the English common law doctrine.

It further reasoned that limiting protection to qualified privilege would produce unreasonable results, such as exposing prisoners and witnesses to civil and criminal liability for statements made in court, which would conflict with principles of public policy and the administration of justice.

The court reviewed conflicting judicial opinions across Indian jurisdictions, noting that Madras and Bombay High Courts generally favored absolute privilege, while Allahabad and Calcutta High Courts leaned towards qualified privilege. It gave particular weight to the Privy Council decision in Baboo Gunnesh Dutt Singh v. Mugneeram Chowdhry, which recognized absolute privilege based on public policy considerations.

After considering these authorities and principles, the court agreed with the view that statements made in answer to the court's question in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged under Indian law, consistent with the English common law doctrine and public policy.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the statement of a person charged with an offence, made in answer to the court's question "What have you to say," is an absolutely privileged statement under Indian law and does not render the person liable for an offence under Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code.

The direct effect of this decision is that accused persons, witnesses, counsel, and others involved in judicial proceedings enjoy absolute immunity from defamation liability for statements made in the course of those proceedings, irrespective of malice or good faith. This ruling affirms the applicability of the English common law doctrine of absolute privilege in India, emphasizing the importance of protecting the administration of justice and public policy. The court did not establish any new precedent but clarified the existing legal position in alignment with prior authoritative decisions.

Show all summary ...

1. The question which has been referred to us is this--

"Is the statement of a person charged with an offence in answer to a question by the Court trying him 'What have you to say,' an absolutely privileged statement so as to make him not liable to be punished for an offence under Section 499, Indian Penal Code, in respect of the statement?"
There can be no question that under the law of England the occasion would have been absolutely privileged. Mr. Rozario, who argued in support of the view that under the law of this country the statement was not privileged unless the prisoner could show that it was made in good faith within the meaning of the ninth exception to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, has conceded this. The law of England is that there are occasions when it is for the public interest that persons should not be in any way fettered in their statements. In this case the privilege is absolute and no action lies for words spoken. The occasions are (1) Parliamentary Proceedings, (2) Judicial Proceedings and (3) Naval and Military affairs, and the affairs of State generally. See Odgers on 'Libel and Slander,' 5th Edition, page 230.

2. With regard to the absolute privilege in the case of judicial proceedings under the English law, I need only refer to the leading case of Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby L.R., 7 H.L., 744; S.C., (1878) L.R., 8 Q.B., 255, and the judgment of Lopes, L.J., in Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society v. Parkinson (1892) 1 Q.B., 431 at 451, The Lord Justice said

"The authorities established beyond all question this: that neither party, witness, counsel, jury nor judge can be put to answer civilly or criminally for words spoken in office; that no action for libel or slander lies, whether against judges, counsel, witnesses or parties, for words written or spoken in the course of any proceeding before any Court recognised by law, and this though the words written or spoken were written or spoken maliciously, without any justification or excuse, and from personal ill-will and anger against the person defamed."

3. The question we have to determine is whether this Common law doctrine of absolute privilege is part of the law of this country, or whether on the true construction of Section 499, Indian Penal Code, the law of defamation as laid down in that section excludes the application of this doctrine. The contention in support of the latter view was that the law of defamation, so far as this country was concerned, was created by Section 499, and inasmuch as that section contains no reference to this English common law doctrine of absolute privilege, it should be inferred that it was the intention of the legislature that it should form no part of the law of this country. In my opinion, it does not necessarily follow that, because this doctrine is not expressly recognised in the section, it was the intention of the legislature to exclude its application from the law of this country. The provisions of the Indian Penal Code and also those of the Evidence Act of 1872 are mainly based upon the English law and it is to be observed that, whenever the legislature in this country intended to depart from the English law, they made their intention clear by express enactment. As regards the Evidence Act, I may refer to Section 132 and Section 167. As regards Section 499 of the Penal Code, the legislature has made it clear, by express enactment, that in certain respects they intended to depart from the English law of libel and slander. For instance, under the Penal Code, slander of a private person is a criminal offence: it is not so in England. It is not to be supposed that the framers of the Penal Code had not before their minds the doctrine of the English law with regard to the question of absolute privilege; and it seems to me that in dealing with a matter of such importance, if they had intended to exclude its application, they would have made their intention clear and would not have left it to be a matter of negative inference, Mr. Rozario argued that only a qualified privilege existed in connection with the occasion of judicial proceedings and that the plea of privilege was only open to counsel, party, witness; or prisoner subject to the obligation of proving that the imputation conveyed by the defamatory statement was made in good faith within the meaning of the ninth exception to Section 499. If this were so, one would have expected to find amongst the exceptions and illustrations in Section 499 some reference to a case of qualified privilege in connection with a statement made in the course of judicial proceedings. Not only do we find no reference to a case of absolute privilege as recognised by the law of England, but we find no reference to any case of qualified privilege in connection with judicial proceedings. The inference which I should draw from this would be that it was not the intention of the legislature to exclude the application of this doctrine of the English Common law from the law of defamation in India. The exceptions would seem to have been drafted with reference to the occasions of qualified privilege as recognised by the law of England, omitting all reference to the question of privilege in connection with statements made in judicial proceedings or to the other classes of absolute privilege recognised by the law of England. There may be said to be five groups of exceptions to the section, all relating to occasions as to which qualified privilege is recognised. Exception I corresponds to the plea of justification. Exceptions II, III, V and VI correspond to the plea of fair comment, on a matter of public interest. Exceptions VII and VIII cover the cases of censure by a lawful authority passed in good faith, and accusation made to a person in lawful authority in good faith. Exceptions IX and X cover the cases of imputation made in good faith by a person for the protection of his interests or for the public good, and the case of caution intended for the good of the person to whom it is conveyed or for the public good. Exception IV covers the plea of fair report of public proceedings.

4. I do not think that the canons of construction laid down by Lord Herchell in Bank of England v. Vagliano Brothers (1811) A.C., 107 at pp. 144 and 145 are applicable here. His Lordship said

"I think the proper course is in the first instance to examine the language of the statute and to ask what is its natural meaning, uninfluenced by any considerations derived from the previous state of the law, and not to start with enquiring how the law previously stood, and then, assuming that it was probably intended to leave it unaltered, to see if the words of the enactment will bear an interpretation in conformity with this view."
Now the English Bills of Exchange Act, which was the subject of Lord Herchell's observations, was a statute passed with the object of codifying the law as it then stood. The object of section 499 of the code was to constitute defamation a criminal offence on lines which, generally speaking, follow the English law of libel and slander. It was not intended to codify existing law but to create new law so far as this country was concerned.

5. This being so, in considering the intention of the legislature I think we are certainly warranted in taking into consideration what the law of England was at the time the Indian enactment was passed. If we are to seek for protection of witnesses and prisoners only within the four corners of Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code or within the four corners of that enactment and the Provisions of the Evidence Act, it seems to me that rather startling results would follow. In Section 132 of the Evidence Act the legislature departed from the English law and enacted that a witness should not be excused from answering a relevant question on the ground that the answer would tend to criminate him, with the proviso that no such answer which a witness is compelled to give shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution or be proved against him in any criminal proceeding, except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer. The protection given by the proviso is limited to criminal proceedings. If we are to look to the statute law of this country alone, the result would be that, unless a witness could prove good faith he would, if compelled to answer, be protected from a prosecution in respect of an incriminating statement, but he would not be protected against a suit for damages. Mr. Rozario contended that the words of the proviso were wide enough to include civil, as well as criminal, proceedings. But, in my opinion, they are not. Again, if the privilege of a prisoner is to be ascertained by reference, and only by reference, to the provisions of Section 499 of the Penal Code, a prisoner who stated, in answer to a question put to him by the Court, that the witnesses for the prosecution had not spoken the truth, would, unless he could discharge the onus of showing that he made the statement in good faith, be liable to be prosecuted for the statement, and "would also be liable to suits for damages at the hands of all the witnesses to whom he had imputed the giving of false evidence. It might even be said, if the occasion is not absolutely privileged and the question of privilege is to be considered only with reference to the provisions of section 499, a prisoner who pleaded not guilty, unless he could show that his plea was made in good faith, would be subject to criminal or civil proceedings. I cannot bring myself to believe that the legislature in enacting Section 499 intended to bring about such a result as this.

6. As regards the authorities in this country, conflicting views have been taken. Speaking generally, the trend of the decisions in the Madras and Bombay High Courts is that the occasion is absolutely privileged. The trend of the Allahabad and Calcutta decisions is the other way. We have, however, a decision of the Privy Council which is reported in Baboo Gunnesh Dutt Singh v. Mugneeram Chowdhry (1873) 11 Beng. L.R., 321 (P.C.). 21 Mad.--29 which clearly recognises the rule of the English Common law as applicable in this country. In that case their Lordships pointed out that the suit, though called a suit for defamation, was in substance an action for malicious prosecution. The judgment runs:

"Their Lordships are of opinion, with the High Court, that if it had been, strictly speaking, such an action, it could not have been maintained; for they agree with that Court that witnesses cannot be sued in a Civil Court for damages, in respect of evidence given by them upon oath in a judicial proceeding. Their Lordships hold this maxim which certainly has been recognised by all the Courts of this country, to be one based upon principles of public policy. The ground of it is this, that it concerns the public and the administration of justice that witnesses giving their evidence on oath in a Court of Justice should not have before their eyes the fear of being harassed by suits for damages; but that the only penalty which they should incur if they give evidence falsely should be indictment for perjury."

7. It is true that this opinion was expressed with reference to a civil action for damages and there is no reference to criminal proceedings. But as regards the question of principle this, as it seems to me, makes no difference. As to this, see the judgment of Sheppard, J., in Manjaya v. Sesha Shetti (1888) I.L.R., 11 Mad., 477. It is no doubt true that when the trial in which the question arose was held in 1866 the law of evidence had not been codified. But I do not think this has much bearing on the question that we have to decide, since Section 499 of the Penal Code was in existence when this question arose for consideration before the Privy Council. Although their Lordships do not refer to the section, it, of course, cannot be assumed that they did not consider its effect. The passage in the judgment above set out is, to my mind, a clear pronouncement to the effect that the English Common law doctrine applies in India. Their Lordships describe the doctrine as "recognised by all the Courts of this country," and "one based upon principles of public policy." As regards Madras decisions, in Murugesa Pillai v. Papathi Ammal (1897) 1 Weir's Criminal Rulings, 612 a statement made by a prisoner that the complainant was kept by him as his concubine some years and was afterwards in the keeping of another person was held to be privileged. The ground of the decision, however, was that the statement was true and fell within exception IX to Section 499, In Nadu Gounden v. Nadu Gounden (1889) 1 Weir's Criminal Rulings, 589, it was found that the defamatory statement made by the accused in answer to a question if he had anything to say, was false and not made in good faith, Moore, J., was of opinion that the question of privilege must be decided with reference to the provisions of Section 499. Subrahmanai Ayyar, J., was of opinion that the occasion was absolutely privileged. In Manjaya v. Sesha Shetti (1888) I.L.R., 11 Mad., 477, it was held that the statement of a witness while under cross-examination before a Criminal Court was absolutely privileged. In the case of Hayes v. Christian (1892) I.L.R., 15 Mad., 414, this Court held that where a person who was defended by counsel on a criminal charge interfered in the examination of a witness and made a defamatory statement with regard to his character, the occasion was not privileged. The Judge no doubt took the view that the question should be considered with reference to the provisions of section, 499. But they pointed out in connection with the English law that the words complained of could not be said to have been used in the ordinary course of a legal proceeding. In In the matter of Alraja Naidu (1907) I.L.R., 30 Mad., 222, the statement by a prisoner was considered to be absolutely privileged. The same view was taken in Pachaiperumal Chettiar v. Dasi Thangam (1908) I.L.R., 31 Mad., 400, but there, there seems to have been a finding by the Judge who tried the case, that the questions which constituted the defamation were put in good faith. In the case of Pudmarazu Pantulu v. Venkatramana Aiyar (1909) 19 M.L.J., 217, where the questions had been put in cross-examination by a vakil and the client who instructed the vakil was charged with defamation, the privilege was held to be absolute, In Adapala Adivaramma v. Rabala Ramachendra Reddy (1910) M.W.N., 155, where a suit for damages was brought in respect of a statement in an affidavit, the statement was held to be absolutely privileged. In the last reported Calcutta case, Golap Jan v. Bhola Nath Khetry (1911) I.L.R., 38 Calc., 880 at p. 888, the learned Judges with reference to a complaint to a magistrate, held that even if the complaint was defamatory, "the complainant was entitled to protection from suit, and this protection was the absolute privilege accorded in the public interest to those who make statements to the courts in the course of, and in relation to, judicial proceedings." The protection thus described is certainly not to be found within the four corners of Section 499 of the Penal Code. I do not think that this view can be reconciled with the view taken in some of the earlier Calcutta cases. See for instance Queen v. Pursoram Doss (1865) 3 W.R. (Cr. R.), 45, and Augada Ram Shaha v. Nemai Chand and Shaha (1896) I.L.R., 23 Calc., 867 where it was held that a defamatory statement made in the pleadings in an action is not absolutely privileged, and the cases reported in Greene v. Delanney (1870) 14 W.R. (Cr. R.), 27. As regards Bombay, it was held in Nathji Muleshvar v. Lalbhai Ravidat (1890) I.L.R., 14 Bom., 97 at p. 100, that no action for slander lies on any statement in the pleadings or during the conduct of suit against a party or witness. Sargent, C.J., held that the rule of the English Common law was applicable and be observed "we doubt whether there is anything in the circumstances of this country which makes it less desirable from the point of view 'of public policy as concerning the public and administration of justice' as it is expressed by the Privy Council in Baboo Gunnesh Dutt Singh v. Mugneeram Chowdhry (1873) 11 Beng. L.R., 821 (the case above cited), that such statements, though false and malicious, should in no case be made the subject of the civil action quite independently of the question as to their being criminally punishable."

8. The same view was taken by the Bombay High Court where the witness was prosecuted for defamation in the case of Queen Empress v. Sabaji (1893) I.L.R., 17 Bom., 127. In In re Nagarji Tricumji (1895) I.L.R., 19 Bom., 340, the Court would seem to have been of opinion that the question of privilege must be decided with reference to the provisions of the Penal Code. As regards Allahabad, as I have said, the trend of authority is in the direction of holding that the occasion is not absolutely privileged. I may refer to the cases of Abdul Hakim v. Tej Chandar Mukarji (1881) I.L.R., 3 All., 815, Dawn Singh v. Mahip Singh (1888) I.L.R., 10 All., 425, Emperor v. Ganga Prasad (1907) I.L.R., 29 All., 685, and Isuri Prasad Singh v. Umrao Singh (1900) I.L.R., 22 All, 234.

9. I agree with the conclusion arrived at by Mr. Justice Richards (now Richards, C.J.) who dissented from Knox, J., in the case of Emperor v. Ganga Prasad (1907) I.L.R., 29 All., 685. This judgment is in accordance with the Madras authorities and seems to me to be based on sound principles. I would accordingly answer the question which has been referred to us in the affirmative.

Sankaran Nair, J.

10. I concur.

Ayling, J.

11. I concur.