- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Kailash Chandra v. Nanda Kumar
Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This rule challenges an order of the District Delegate of Bagerhat (District of Khulna) dated 8th June 1943, which rejected the petitioner's application for revocation of a probate under Section 263 of the Succession Act.
The material facts as stated in the opinion are:
- The opposite parties, as executors under the will of Prokash Chandra Mandal, applied for and obtained an ex parte grant of probate from the District Delegate at Bagerhat (the grant was recorded in the opinion as made on 2nd February 1988 in the text provided).
- On 22nd December 1938 the petitioner (a brother of the deceased who, but for the will, would have inherited half the estate) presented an application to the same District Delegate for revocation of the grant, alleging inter alia that no citation had been issued on him and that the will was forged.
- Before the opposite parties received any notice of that proceeding, the petitioner’s application was dismissed in his absence on 14th January 1934 by the District Delegate. The recorded order stated: “The pleader of the petitioner called for but not found. It seems to me that the applicant should proceed by a regular suit. The application is therefore summarily rejected.”
- The petitioner then filed a regular suit in the Court of the Munsif at Bagerhat to set aside the ex parte grant; the Munsif returned the plaint, holding that the subject-matter value was beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction.
- Advised that his remedy was an application under Section 263 of the Succession Act, the petitioner filed a fresh application for revocation in the District Delegate’s Court (allegations again included suppression of process/no citation and that the will was forged).
- By the order under challenge (8th June 1943) the District Delegate rejected the later application, holding among other things that (a) the earlier dismissal operated as a bar to the present proceeding, and (b) where the allegation was that the will was forged the proper remedy was a civil suit. The Delegate found on evidence that there was no suppression of process and that notice had been served on the petitioner, but did not inquire into the alleged forgery.
- The petitioner obtained the present rule to challenge that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the District Delegate (appointed under Section 265 of the Succession Act) had jurisdiction to hear and decide an application for revocation of probate (i.e., whether a District Delegate may determine a revocation proceeding).
- Whether, where the petitioner alleges that the will is forged, his proper remedy is to file a civil suit (plaint) rather than to make an application under Section 263 of the Succession Act.
- Whether the earlier order dismissing the petitioner’s first revocation application in his absence operated as a bar (res judicata) to the later proceeding.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The District Delegate had no jurisdiction to hear an application for revocation of probate and ought to have returned the application so it could be presented to the Court of the District Judge.
Opposite Parties' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Guha)
- The District Delegate was correct in holding that the petitioner’s proper remedy, especially on an allegation of forgery, was to file a regular civil suit rather than an application under Section 263.
- Mr. Guha did not strongly press the District Delegate’s alternate ground that the earlier dismissal operated as a bar; he conceded that if the remedy lay by application and not by suit, the Delegate would be bound to investigate the forgery allegation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 5 C.W.N. 3771 (Sale, J.) | Held that to revoke a grant of probate on the ground of forgery the proper course is an application under the Probate and Administration Act (corresponding to Section 263 of the Succession Act). | The Court treated this authority as supporting the proposition that revocation for forgery is properly pursued under the statutory revocation procedure (Section 263) rather than by a regular plaint-suit in ordinary civil jurisdiction. |
| 4 Cal. 360 (observations of Markby, J.) | Observations relied upon in 5 C.W.N. 3771; connected to the procedure for revocation of probate. | The opinion notes that Sale, J. relied on Markby, J.’s observations; the present Court references this as part of the line of authorities favoring statutory revocation procedure. |
| 5 C.W.N. 3833 (Harrington, J.) | Expressed the view that a grant of probate cannot be revoked by a regular suit outside the Probate Court; suggested a regular suit should be instituted in the Probate Court itself. | The Court treated Harrington, J.’s opinion as a solitary authority supporting the opposite parties’ contention; however, the Court distinguished or downplayed it relative to subsequent legislative and judicial developments and did not adopt its restrictive view. |
| 4 C.W.N. 6004 (Banerjee and Stevens, JJ.) | Held that a proceeding instituted for revocation of probate could not be regarded as a regular civil suit (it was a miscellaneous proceeding). | The Court relied on this authority to support the view that revocation proceedings are not ordinary civil suits and that statutory procedure governs them. |
| 12 C.L.J. 915 (Mookherjee and Carnduff, JJ.) | Held that a proceeding for revocation of probate was not a suit within the meaning of Order 23, Rules 1 and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. | The Court cited this decision as further precedent establishing the non-suit character of revocation proceedings and as consistent with treating revocation under the Succession Act as a special statutory remedy. |
| I.L.R. (1940) 1 Cal. 146 (Panckridge, J.) | Reviewed the relevant decisions and held the High Court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction cannot entertain a suit for revocation of a grant of probate made in its testamentary jurisdiction on the ground that the will is not genuine. | The Court agreed with Panckridge, J.’s analysis and endorsed the principle that a judgment in probate is in rem and cannot be set aside by an inter partes civil suit in ordinary original civil jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court’s analysis proceeds in distinct steps, addressing each of the framed points and applying statutory text and the cited authorities:
1. Res judicata / effect of the earlier dismissal
- The Court held that the earlier order dismissing the previous application (made in the absence of both parties) could not operate as a bar by way of res judicata to the subsequent application. The earlier order amounted at best to a dismissal under Order 9, Rule 8 read with Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore did not decide the merits.
- The Court emphasized that the mere expression of an opinion by the lower Court on maintainability did not alter the character of the order actually made (i.e., it remained a procedural dismissal and not a final adjudication on the merits).
2. Jurisdiction of the District Delegate to hear revocation
- Statutory framework relied upon: Sections 264 and 265 of the Succession Act and Section 288 (procedure when proceedings become contentious).
- Section 264 vests jurisdiction to grant and revoke probate in the District Judge (the probate Court). Section 265 authorizes the High Court to appoint Delegates to act for the District Judge to grant probate and letters of administration in non-contentious cases; Section 265 does not mention revocation.
- The Court reasoned that the omission of revocation from Section 265 was deliberate and indicative that revocation proceedings are not to be delegated to District Delegates. An implied power to revoke (simply because a court that grants can revoke) would not suffice to create jurisdiction in a Delegate for contentious matters.
- Because an application for revocation (particularly when contested) is inherently contentious, the District Delegate lacks jurisdiction to decide such a matter; at the least, upon contest and appearance by the opposite side, the Delegate is bound to return the petition in accordance with Section 288 so the matter can be presented to the District Judge.
- The Court rejected the opposite parties’ argument that the Delegate retains power to revoke whenever the original probate proceeding had been non‑contentious, noting such a position would lead to anomalies — e.g., a Delegate pronouncing a will spurious in revocation proceedings when he could not have done so in the original probate grant.
3. Proper remedy where forgery of the will is alleged
- Section 263 of the Succession Act expressly provides that a grant of probate or letters of administration may be revoked or annulled for “just cause.” The explanations and illustrative subclauses of the section include that a grant obtained by fraud, suppression of material facts, untrue allegation of an essential fact, and (by illustration) forgery of the will constitute just cause.
- Therefore, the Court concluded that an allegation of forgery falls squarely within Section 263 and that the statutory remedy for revocation is an application under that provision.
- Although such a revocation proceeding adopts many procedural aspects of civil litigation (the Code of Civil Procedure applies as far as practicable and the proceeding can take a form resembling a suit — see Sections 268 and 295 of the Succession Act), the Court held it is incorrect to say the proceeding must be initiated by a plaint in ordinary civil jurisdiction. The Court treated the revocation application under Section 263 as the exclusive remedy provided by the Act for revocation on grounds such as forgery.
- In support the Court surveyed prior authorities: some earlier judges had held that revocation was to proceed by the statutory procedure rather than by ordinary civil plaint (and the present Court sided with those decisions). The Court also emphasized the conceptual reasoning that a probate judgment is in rem — binding on all the world — whereas a civil suit judgment is inter partes; consequently, it would be anomalous for an inter partes suit to set aside an in rem probate grant.
4. Disposition of contested evidentiary questions
- The Court noted that the District Delegate had found on evidence that there was no suppression of process and that notice had in fact been served. However, because the Delegate did not have jurisdiction to decide the revocation application (and in any event did not investigate the forgery allegation), those factual findings did not justify rejecting the application on the merits in that forum.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The rule is made absolute. The order of the District Delegate dated 8th June 1943 is set aside and the District Delegate is directed to return the application for revocation to the petitioner to be presented to the Court of the District Judge.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The District Delegate's rejection of the petition was quashed; the petitioner may present his revocation application to the District Judge. The District Delegate must return the petition as required by Section 288 when proceedings become contentious.
- Jurisdictional principle affirmed: Revocation of probate, being a contentious matter from the outset and especially where forgery is alleged, falls within the exclusive competence of the probate Court (i.e., the District Judge) and not the District Delegate appointed under Section 265 (whose delegated competence is limited to non‑contentious grants).
- Remedial route clarified: Where forgery is alleged, the proper remedy is an application under Section 263 of the Succession Act (the statutory revocation procedure), not a regular plaint-suit in the ordinary original civil jurisdiction; the procedural rules of the Code of Civil Procedure apply as far as practicable but the statutory route is the exclusive remedy for revocation under the Act.
- Costs: Because the petitioner did not raise the question of jurisdiction in the lower Court, the Court directed that each party bear their own costs in this Court and in the Court below.
R.K — concluding notation in the original opinion.
Final Disposition: Rule made absolute.
1. This rule is directed against an order of the District Delegate of Bagerhat, in the District of Khulna, dated 8th June 1943, rejecting an application of the petitioner for revocation of a probate, under Section 263 of the Succession Act. The facts so far as they are material for our present purposes may be stated as follows: The opposite parties are executors under the will of one Prokash Chandra Mandal applied for and obtained ex parte a grant of probate of the said will from the District Delegate at Bagerhat. The grant was made on 2nd February 1988 and on 22nd December 1938, the petitioner, who is a brother of the deceased and but for the will would have inherited half of the estate left by him, presented an application before the same District Delegate for revocation of the grant, on grounds inter alia that no citation was issued on him and that the will of which probate was obtained was a forged will. Before the opposite party received any notice of this proceeding, the application was dismissed in the absence of the petitioner on 14th January 1934. The order recorded by the District Delegate stands as follows:
“The pleader of the petitioner called for but not found. It seems to me that the applicant should proceed by a regular suit. The application is therefore summarily rejected.”
2. The petitioner thereupon filed a suit in the ordinary way in the Court of the Munsif at Bagerhat, for setting aside the ex parte grant of probate. The Munsif returned the plaint on the ground, that the value of the subject-matter of the suit was beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction. The petitioner says that he was then advised by his pleader, that his proper remedy lay not in a suit, but in an application under Section 263 of the Succession Act, and accordingly he filed a fresh application for revocation of probate under that section in the Court of the District Delegate at Bagerhat. The allegations were practically the same as in the earlier application, viz., (1) that the grant was obtained by suppression of processes and no citation was issued on the petitioner, and (2) that the will which was probated on the application of the opposite parties was a forged one. The District Delegate by his order dated 8th June 1943, rejected this application. It was held inter alia that the order dismissing the previous application for revocation operated as a bar to the present proceeding, and that as the petitioner came with the allegation that the will itself was forged, his proper remedy was to file a suit in the ordinary way. The District Delegate found on evidence that there was no suppression of processes in the probate proceeding, and notice was in fact served on the petitioners. He however did not investigate the point as to whether the will was forged or not. It is against this order that the present rule has been obtained.
3. The learned advocate appearing in support of the rule has contended before us that the District Delegate had no jurisdiction to hear an application for revocation of probate and that his duty was to return the application for being presented to the Court of the District Judge. This proposition was controverted by Mr. Guha who appeared on behalf of the opposite parties and he has contended further, that the District Delegate was right in holding that the proper remedy of the petitioner in a case like this was to file a suit. Mr. Guha made no serious attempt to support the decision of the District Delegate on the other point, viz., the order of dismissal in the previous revocation case operated as a bar to the present proceeding, and he conceded further that if the remedy of the petitioner lay in an application and not a suit, it was incumbent upon the District Delegate to in vestigate the question as to whether the will was a forged one or not. It seems clear to us that the Court below was not right in holding that the order dismissing the previous application for revocation operated as a bar to the present application on the principle of res judicata. The order was made in the absence of both parties and nothing was heard or decided. At best the order of dismissal could be regarded as one made under O. 9, R. 8 read with Section 141 of the CPC, and obviously it could not bar a second proceeding. The fact that the Court expressed an opinion regarding the maintainability of the application is in our opinion quite immaterial and does not alter the character of the order that was actually made. The points which really arise for consideration in this rule are two in number, viz., (1) whether the application for revocation in the present case could be heard and decided by the District Delegate and (2) whether the District Delegate was right in holding that as the petitioner sought revocation inter alia on the ground that the will was a forgery his remedy was to file a suit. So far as the first point is concerned, the relevant provisions of law are to be found in Sections 264 and 265 of the Succession Act. Section 264, states that
“the District Judge shall have jurisdiction in granting, and revoking probate and letters of administration in all cases within his district.”
4. Section 265 then lays down that
“the High Court may appoint such judicial officers within any district as it thinks fit to act for the District Judge as Delegates to grant probate and letters of administration in non-contentious cases, within such local limits as it may prescribe; Provided that, in the case of High Court not established by Royal Charter, such appointment shall not be without the previous-sanction of the Local Government.”
5. Thus it is the District Judge that constitutes the probate Court and as such has the jurisdiction in the matter of granting and revoking probate. It is only in non contentious cases that the power of granting probate and letters of administration can be delegated to the officers appointed under S. 265. Section 288 lays down the procedure that has to be followed by the District Delegate when the proceeding becomes a contentious one. It will be noticed that S. 264 which relates to the powers of the District Judge speaks both of granting and revoking probates and letters of administration whereas S. 265, which deals with District Delegates speaks only of granting probate and letters of administration and says nothing: about revocation of grants. It is quite pertinent to argue that this omission is deliberate and that the intention of the Legislature was that the function of revoking grants could not at all be delegated to District Delegates. Mr. Guha argues that the power of revoking probate is implied in that of granting probate, and a Court which made the grant is alone competent to revoke it. Taking this contention to be sound, a revocation proceeding can be brought within the purview of Section 265 of the Succession Act only as a part or continuation of the probate proceeding. But the District Delegate is not given any jurisdiction to decide a contentious probate matter and unless a proceeding for revocation of a grant is a non-contentious proceeding the District Delegate could exercise no jurisdiction with regard to it. To us it seems, that an application for revocation of probate is a contentious matter from its very inception, and that is probably the reason why it was not included in Section 265 of the Succession Act. But even if there is nothing wrong in filing the application for revocation before the District Delegate when the probate was granted by him, we think that the District Delegate is bound to return the petition in accordance with the provision of Section 288 of the Succession Act, as soon as the other side enters appearance and the proceeding becomes contentious. We cannot accept the argument of Mr. Guha, that whether or not the revocation proceeding is contested, the District Delegate would have jurisdiction to revoke the grant, provided the original probate proceeding was a non-contentious one. This view if accepted would lead to anomalous results and the position would be that the District Delegate would be competent in the revocation case to pronounce a will to be spurious which he could not do in the probate application itself. Our conclusion therefore is that the District Delegate could not, in the present case hear and decide the application for revocation of probate and that the petition ought to have been returned to the petitioner to be presented to the Court of the District Judge.
6. On the other point we have no hesitation in holding that the Court below was not right in saying that as the petitioner wanted to have the probate revoked on the ground that the will was a forgery his remedy was to file a civil suit, and not an application under Section 263 of the Succession Act. Section 263 of the Succession Act, provides that the grant of probate or letters of administration may be revoked or annulled for just cause. The explanation states inter alia that just cause exists where
“(b) the grant was obtained fraudulently by making a false suggestion or by concealing from the Court something material to the case, or (c) the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant”…
7. Illustration (iii) appended to the section makes it quite clear that forgery of the will is a just cause for revocation.
8. Thus even when there is allegation of forgery, the proper remedy would be to file an application under Section 263 of the Succession Act, and that seems to be the exclusive remedy provided by the Act.
9. Of course in all such proceedings the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure will apply as far as practicable and we may go so far as to say that the proceeding takes the form of a suit (vide Sections 268 and 295 of the Succession Act), but it is absolutely incorrect to say that the proceeding must be initiated by a plaint, and it will be a suit under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5 C.W.N 3771 is one of the earliest pronouncements on the point and Sale, J., held, and, in our opinion, quite rightly that to revoke a grant of probate on the ground of forgery, the proper course is to make an application under Section 50 of the Probate and Administration Act (corresponding to Section 263 of the Succession Act). The learned Judge relied in this connection upon the observations of Markby, J. in 4 Cal. 360.2 Harrington, J., however, in a case which came up for decision only a few months after this case was decided: (vide 5 C.W.N 3833) expressed his opinion that the decision in 4 Cal. 360 was no authority for the proposition that a grant of probate cannot be revoked by a regular suit instituted for the purpose.
10. The learned Judge held indeed, that no other Court other than the Probate Court could revoke the grant, and he seemed to be of opinion that a regular suit for revocation ought to be instituted in the Probate Court itself. This is the solitary authority upon which Mr. Guha based his contention regarding this part of the case. It seems to us that Harrington, J. in laying down the law as stated above was influenced to a great extent by the form of plaint, laid down in Form No. 115(2) in Sch. IV, Part E. of the CPC, of 1882. That was the form which was to be used by an executor, legatee or next of kin seeking to obtain revocation of probate in cases in which the claim for revocation was filed on the allegation that the will was not the true will of the testator. The learned Judge however did not consider whether that form could be availed of by the litigant, after the Probate and Administration Act came into force. At any rate this form was omitted from the subsequent Code and cannot now be relied upon as throwing any light on this point. On the other hand Banerjee and Stevens, JJ. held in a still earlier case 4 C.W.N 6004 that a proceeding instituted for revocation of probate could not be regarded as a regular civil suit. It was a miscellaneous proceeding which did not even attract the operation of Section 83 of the Probate Act (S. 295 of the present Succession Act). In 12 C.L.J 915 it was held by Mookherjee and Carnduff, JJ. that a proceeding for revocation of a probate was not a suit within the meaning of O. 23, Rr. 1 and 3 of the CPC. Almost all the relevant decisions on the point have been reviewed by Panckridge, J. in I.L.R (1940) 1 Cal. 146 and it has been held that the High Court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction cannot entertain a suit for revocation of a grant of probate made in its testamentary jurisdiction on the ground that the will is not a genuine will. We are in entire agreement with the learned Judge when he says, that quite apart from authorities the same conclusion is arrived at if we regard it from the point of view of principle. The judgment of a Court of Probate is a judgment in rem and binds all the world. The judgment in a civil suit is operative only between the parties to the suit. It is difficult to see therefore how a judgment in rem can be revoked or set aside by a judgment which is only conclusive inter partes. In our opinion therefore even when there is allegation of forgery, the proper remedy of the party who wants revocation of a grant of probate, is to apply to the Probate Court under Section 263 of the Succession Act, and not to file a civil suit. The result therefore is that the rule is made absolute. The order of the Court below is set aside, and the District delegate is directed to return the application for revocation to the petitioner to be presented to the Court of the District Judge. As the petitioner did not raise the question of jurisdiction in the Court below, we direct that each party would bear his own costs in this Court as well as in the Court below.
R.K
11. Rule made absolute.
Alert