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Chintaman Singh v. Chuni Sahu
1. The appellants obtained an exparte decree for rent against the respondents in execution of which they caused the respondents' holding to be put up for sale and purchased it themselves. Subsequently the exparte decree was set aside but in the meantime the appellants had been placed in possession and they had reaped the drops on the land. The exparte decree having been set aside the suit was restored to the pending file and the appellants have, we are told, obtained another decree for rent against the respondents. In the suit out of which this appeal has arisen the respondents claim a decree for Rs. 723 odd on account of the value of the paddy and other produce of the land taken by the appellants during the time that they had possession of the holding. The Courts below have concurred in decreeing the claim.
2. In second appeal the first point taken is that the suit is barred by the provisions of Section 144 of the CPC. That section provides that where and in so far as a decree is varied or reversed, the Court of first instance shall on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made etc. This section takes the place of Section 583 of the CPC, 1882. The latter section was confined to cases where a party was entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise under a decree passed in an appeal under Ch. 41 of that Code, on the strength of the omission of the words “decree passed in appeal” it is contended in the present case that S. 144 of the present Code applies to the case of a decree being varied or set aside by the Court which passed it. It seems to us however, that the words “Court of first instance” show clearly that S. 144 is intended to be confined to cases in which the decree has been varied or reversed by some superior Court or by reason of some order passed by a superior Court. The words “Court of first instance” seem to be used to distinguish the Court which is to grant the restitution from some other Court which has varied or reversed the decree.
3. In our opinion the suit is not barred by Section 144 of the CPC. Next it is contended that the suit is not maintainable in view of the fact that the execution sale has not yet been set aside and that even if S. 144 does not apply to this case, S. 47 applies and the respondent should have presented an application under that section both to have the sale set aside and to obtain the value of the crops and other produce gathered by the appellants. It is true that there is no formal prayer that the sale may be set aside but it is conceded that the decree having been set aside under which the sale was held and the purchasers at auction being the decree-holders themselves the sale must as a matter of course be set aside at the instance of the judgment-debtors. In these circumstances the absence of a specific prayer that the sale may be set aside cannot be treated as a fatal defect in the suit. If necessary the plaint might be amended so as to include a prayer that the sale may be set aside. The contention that the relief claimed might have been obtained by means of an application under Section 47 of the CPC, may or may not be correct. If such an application should have been presented instead of the present suit being brought, we may treat the plaint in the present suit as an application under S. 47. Previous to the passing of the present Code of Civil Procedure great confusion and much injustice resulted from the difficulty of determining whether a suit should be brought or an application presented under what was then S. 244 of the Code. Sub-S. (2), S. 47 of the present Code was decided to meet cases like the present one. According to the decisions of the Calcutta High Court to which our attention has been drawn, it would appear that the proper course for the plaintiffs in the present suit to pursue was to present an application under S. 47 while according to the Allahabad High Court no such application could have been presented and the proper remedy was by suit. Following the Calcutta decisions we propose to treat the plaint in this suit as an application under S. 47. On the merits there can be no doubt that a decree was rightly passed in favour of the respondents. This appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.
V.B/R.K
4. Appeal dismissed.
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