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Nawab Khajeh Habibullah v. Babu Ananga Mohan Roy
Concise Analytical Summary of the Judgment (Mitter, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit and appeal concerned an eight-annas share of a permanent tenure called Taluk Biswanath Roy, to which the Bengal Tenancy Act applied. The Plaintiffs-Appellants were the superior landlords of that tenure. The tenure-holders were two persons: Abinash Chandra Roy Chowdhury and Kiranbala Chowdhurani.
Abinash executed a Will on 10 July 1909 (disinheriting his only son Abani) and died soon after; his widow Kumudini (childless) was made executrix and beneficial owner in the first instance, with the estate to devolve thereafter to his grandson Ananga. The central dispute was whether Abinash's Will gave Kumudini a life-estate or an absolute estate.
By 1921 Kumudini was in possession of the eight-annas share; the other eight annas belonged to Kiranbala. Rent arrears led the Plaintiffs to file Rent Suit No. 8 of 1921 against Kumudini and Kiranbala on 1 July 1921. Kumudini died on 19 September 1921; on 16 September 1921 she had executed her own Will (appointing five executors and leaving benefits to a deity).
During the rent suit Abani and Ananga were substituted for Kumudini as plaintiffs' appointees (22 Nov 1921). Four of Kumudini's named executors applied (12 Jan 1922) to be substituted as her legal representatives and stated Abani and Ananga were not necessary parties, but probate of Kumudini's Will was not then granted. A decree for rent was granted against the parties on record (Abani, Ananga and Kiranbala) on 23 March 1923, and the tenure was sold in execution on 5 April 1923 and later confirmed. Probate of Kumudini's Will was granted to Ananga on 9 May 1924, after the decree and sale.
The appeal turns on whether all tenure-holders were parties to the rent-decree and execution (so the whole tenure passed to the Plaintiffs), or whether only the interest of Kiranbala passed (if Kumudini's share was not effectively represented).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the estate conferred by Abinash's Will on Kumudini was a life-estate or an absolute estate.
- Whether, at the time of the rent-decree and execution sale, the estate of Kumudini (the eight-annas share) was effectively represented in Rent Suit No. 8 of 1921 so as to bind that estate and cause the whole tenure to pass to the purchasers under Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
- If Kumudini had an absolute estate, whether the executors (or the deity as beneficiary) or other legal representatives were requisite parties and whether their non-substitution at the relevant stages rendered the decree ineffective against Kumudini's estate.
- Related procedural question: whether an executor who has not obtained probate can be effectively substituted or sued as a defendant in representation of the testator's estate.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs / Appellants
- The Plaintiffs proceeded on the footing that Ananga became the tenure-holder of the eight-annas share on Kumudini's death by virtue of Abinash's Will, and therefore that Ananga (with Abani included for caution) properly represented that share in the rent suit.
- They relied on the rent-decree obtained against the parties on record (Abani, Ananga and Kiranbala), and purchased the tenure in the execution sale; they claimed the purchase passed the whole tenure to them under Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
Kumudini's Executors / Other Respondents (as represented in the proceedings)
- Four of the executors named in Kumudini's Will applied during the rent suit (12 Jan 1922) disclosing the Will and sought substitution as her legal representatives, stating that Abani and Ananga were not necessary parties.
- After probate was granted to Ananga he opposed the Plaintiffs' later attempts to collect full (16 annas) rent from subordinate tenants; disputes and multiple rent suits followed, with Ananga asserting rights to eight annas and backing tenants who resisted Plaintiffs' claims.
The opinion does not contain an itemized presentation of counsel submissions beyond the factual and procedural positions summarized above.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Nisar Ali Khan v. Mohammad Ali Khan (Judicial Committee) | Where a testator's scheme manifests a dominant intention inconsistent with a series of absolute interests, successive takers who would otherwise take absolute estates are to be treated as taking successive life-estates so as to effect the scheme. | The court relied on this principle to construe Abinash's Will: despite words that would prima facie confer absolute estates, the testator's dominant scheme required life-estates. This supported the conclusion that Kumudini took only a life-estate. |
| Ananga Mohan Roy Choudhury v. Nawab Khajeh Habibulla | The case before this Court assumed that Kumudini had an absolute estate under her husband's Will and treated representation issues accordingly. | The current Court noted this earlier second-appeal decision assumed an absolute estate; it is not binding on the present Court on the construction point because Abinash's Will was not construed there. |
| Cherag Ali Sarkar v. Nawab Khajeh Habibulla (Division Bench) | Assumed an absolute estate in Kumudini and held that because proper legal representatives had not been brought on record after her death, the whole tenure had not passed to purchasers; as a Division Bench it is binding in respect of representation. | The Court stated that while the Division Bench decision is binding on issues of representation, it disagreed with certain observations therein (notably that the four executors should have been substituted and that the deity should have been made a party) because probate had not been granted at the material times. |
| Mayappa Chetty v. Suprananan Chetty | An executor who has not obtained probate may sue as plaintiff but must obtain probate before the decree or earlier if required to prove representative character. | Used to support the point that an executor without probate cannot obtain a decree binding the estate unless probate is subsequently produced or the executor had intermeddled. Thus the four executors' application without probate could not bind Kumudini's estate. |
| Mahauddin Mohideen v. Pitchey; Lal Behari v. Nagendra Nath; Lakhya Dassya v. Uma Kanta | Principle that an executor who has not obtained probate can be effectively sued as defendant only when he has intermeddled with the estate; and observations on the evidentiary role of probate. | These authorities were cited to justify that where executors had not obtained probate and had not intermeddled, they could not be treated as parties whose presence would bind the estate in the pending rent suit or execution proceedings. |
| Harish Chandra Biswas v. Puridas Das (Division Bench) | Authority supporting limits on bringing an heir-at-law or other person as legal representative when probate of a Will exists or is in prospect. | The Court relied on this decision to support its view that Abani (the heir-at-law) could not be treated as representing Kumudini's estate in the rent suit where a Will existed and probate had not been granted to others. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court divided its analysis into two principal strands: (A) construction of Abinash's Will to determine the nature of Kumudini's interest; and (B) the legal effect of parties' representation in the rent suit and execution proceedings given the probate situation.
A. Construction of Abinash's Will (nature of Kumudini's interest)
- The Court examined the material paragraphs of the Will (notably paras. 3, 5, 6, 7, 11 and 12) and analysed the language: paragraph 5(b) used expressions that by themselves would ordinarily confer an absolute estate, and paragraph 5(c) and 6(d) contained language that would confer an absolute estate on grandchildren.
- Reading the Will as a whole, the Court identified two dominant intentions: (1) to exclude his son Abani from the estate and (2) to have the estate pass intact to the widow and then to grandsons in succession, with substantial ultimate devotional/charitable dispositions if the succession failed (paragraph 12).
- Relying on the principle from Nisar Ali Khan v. Mohammad Ali Khan, the Court held that where a testator's scheme is inconsistent with a series of absolute interests, the Court must construe successive takers as taking life-estates so as to give effect to the testator's dominant scheme. Thus, despite words sufficient to grant absolute estates, the Will should be read to give a life-estate to the widow.
- Accordingly, the Court concluded that Kumudini took only a life-estate under Abinash's Will and therefore she lacked power to make a valid testamentary dedication of the tenure to the deity; on her death Ananga (as provided by Abinash's Will) became owner of the eight-annas share.
- Because Ananga represented that share at the date of the rent decree, the Court held the tenure was fully represented and the rent sale passed the whole tenure to the Plaintiffs under Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
B. Representation and Probate — analytical alternative if Kumudini had taken an absolute estate
- The Court examined whether, if Kumudini had taken an absolute estate, the executors (or deity) should have been substituted in the rent suit prior to decree so that the decree and execution would bind that estate.
- At the critical stages (decree and execution) none of Kumudini's named executors had obtained probate (the four named executors' application in Jan 1922 was unsupported by affidavit and they later renounced; probate was granted to Ananga only on 9 May 1924, after the sale and decree).
- The Court applied authorities establishing that an executor without probate can sue as plaintiff but must obtain probate before decree if called to prove representative character; and that an executor who has not obtained probate can be sued as defendant only if he has intermeddled with the estate. Probate is the effective evidence of executor's title, and sec. 227 of the Indian Succession Act (noted) does not alter the rule on representation in suits (per Lakhya Dassya's case).
- On these grounds the Court held the executors could not validly have been substituted so as to bind Kumudini's estate at the time of the decree, and neither could the deity's right be established without probate and assent of the executors.
- The Court further held that Abani (Kumudini's heir-at-law) could not be substituted as her legal representative while a Will existed and probate to other executors had not been granted — a view supported by Harish Chandra Biswas v. Puridas Das.
- The Court observed two courses the Plaintiffs might have taken when Kumudini died: (i) apply to postpone proceedings until probate was granted and then substitute executors with probate, or (ii) apply for appointment of an administrator-ad-litem under sec. 251 of the Indian Succession Act and substitute that person. Because they did neither, a decree obtained would not bind Kumudini's estate and the eight-annas share would not have passed at the sale.
- Nevertheless, having held on construction that Kumudini took only a life-estate, the Court did not need to treat the alternative analysis as dispositive — the appeal succeeds on the construction point.
Holding and Implications
Disposition: The appeal succeeds on the principal construction point: Kumudini took only a life-estate under Abinash's Will. Consequently, on her death Ananga became owner of the eight-annas share by Abinash's Will, and that share was represented in Rent Suit No. 8 of 1921 at the date of the decree.
Direct effects and relief granted:
- The Plaintiffs' title to the eight-annas share in Taluk Biswanath Roy (as described in Schedule I of the plaint) is declared.
- The Plaintiffs recover possession from the first party Defendant.
- The Plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for mesne profits from the first party Defendant for a period specified by the Court (from three years prior to institution of the suit until recovery of possession or three years from the date of judgment, whichever is earlier); the Court directed an enquiry into mesne profits under Order XX, rule 12(1)(c) of the Civil Procedure Code.
- The Plaintiffs are awarded costs of the appeal and of the lower Court from the first party Defendant.
- Prayer No. (6) of the plaint (not pressed by Appellants' counsel) is refused.
Broader implications and precedent-setting: The Court emphasised that it was following established principles (notably Nisar Ali Khan) in construing testamentary schemes where the testator's dominant intention is inconsistent with a series of absolute interests. The Court also clarified procedural points on representation where probate has not been obtained: executors without probate cannot be treated as representing the estate in pending suits so as to bind it unless they have intermeddled or probate is subsequently produced in the required manner. The Court noted that some earlier decisions assumed an absolute estate and dealt with representation issues; those decisions are not binding on the construction point, though the Division Bench decision in Cherag Ali Sarkar is binding on representation issues — but the present Court differed on certain observations in that case because of the timing and absence of probate.
This summary is strictly confined to the material and conclusions expressed in the provided opinion and does not introduce information beyond that text.
The Judgment of the Court was as follows:
Mitter, J.:— The subject-matter of the suit and the appeal is eight annas share of a permanent gar-mokurari tenure called Taluk Biswanath Roy. The Plaintiffs Appellants are the superior landlords of that tenure to which admittedly the Bengal Tenancy Act applies. Two persons, Abinash Chandra Roy Chowdhury and Kiranbala Chowdhurani were the tenure-holders. Abinash executed a Will (Ex. 11— II— 1) on the 10th July, 1909, and died shortly thereafter. He had married twice. By his first wife, who predeceased him, he had a son named Abani. Anango is the only son of Abani. His second wife who survived him was Kumudini. She was childless. By his Will Abinash disinherited his only son Abani, and made his second wife executrix. He gave the whole of his estate, movable and immovable including his eight annas share in the tenure Taluk Biswanath Roy to her in the first instance and made provisions for the devolution of his whole estate after her death. His grandson, Ananga, was to take that estate, according to the terms of the Will, after Kumudini's death. The most important controversy in the suit and the appeal is about the nature of the estate conferred by the Will on Kumudini,— namely whether it was a life-estate or an absolute estate. The probate of the Will was granted to Kumudini on the 21st February, 1911. Kumudini administered the estate and it is admitted by the parties that in 1921 she was in possession of the eight annas share of the tenure, Taluk Biswanath Roy, in her capacity as beneficial owner under the terms of her husband's Will. The other eight annas share of the tenure was then vested in Kiranbala. That tenure fell into arrears and the Plaintiffs filed a suit to recover the arrears of rent on the 1st July, 1921. This suit which was numbered as Rent Suit No. 8 of 1921 of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tipperah was instituted aganist Kumudini and Kiranbala. During the pendency of this rent suit, Kumudini died on the 19th September, 1921. On the 16th September, 1921, she executed a Will by which she appointed five persons as executors, namely her step-grandson Ananga, her brothers Lalit Mohan Ghosh, Biraj Mohan Ghosh, Bhuban Mohan Ghosh and one Jitendra Mohan Bose. The beneficial interest in all her properties was given to a deity named Kumudeswar Mahadev. The probate of this Will was granted to Ananga only on the 9th May, 1924, the other four executors having in the end renounced. On the application of the Plaintiffs Abani and Ananga were substituted in the place of Kumudini in the rent suit on the 22nd November, 1921. The Plaintiffs proceeded upon the footing the Ananga became the tenure-holder of that tenure to the extent of eight annas on Kumudini's death on the basis of Abinash's Will, but for greater caution they brought Abani on the record also. At that time they had no knowledge of Kumudini's Will. The four other executors of Kumudini's Will however made an application in the rent suit on the 12th January, 1922. In that application they disclosed Kumudini's Will and made a statement that they only were the executors under that Will. They claimed to be substituted in the place of Kumudini as her legal representatives, and prayed for such substitution. In the body of the applicaion (Ex. A — II. 30) they stated that Abani and Ananga were not necessary parties. The Plaintiffs' pleader asked for and obtained time to consider his position in regard to that application. Ultimately, that application was lost sight of and the Court granted a decree for rent against the parties then on record, namely, Abani, Ananga and Kiranbala on the 23rd March, 1923. Abani was admittedly not a necessary party. The tenure was sold in execution of this decree under the procedure of Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act and was purchased by the Plaintiffs on the 5th April, 1923. After an unsuccessful application by Abani and Ananga to set aside that sale, the sale was confirmed on the 21st July, 1924, and the sale-certificate was issued to the Plaintiffs on the 27th September, 1924. The decree in the rent suit and the sale in execution thereof was held before the probate of Kumudini's Will had been granted. The probate of that Will was granted to Ananga on the 9th May, 1924. The question on which this appeal hinges is whether all the tenure-holders of the said tenure were parties to the rent-decree and in the execution proceedings. If that was so the entire tenure has passed to the Plaintiffs by their purchase at the court sale. If not, that rent-decree would not have the effect of a rent-decree in terms of the Bengal Tenancy Act but would have the effect of a money-decree, effective only against Kiranbala and the right, title and interest of that judgment-debtor only would pass to them. If the Will of Kumudini was operative to pass eight annas share of the tenure to the deity Kumudeswar Mahadev, the Plaintiffs would then get by their purchase at the said auction-sale only the eight annas interest of Kiranbala. These positions are admitted by the parties and is also in accordance with law. If, however, by the Will of Abi-nash a life-estate only had been conferred on Kumudini she would have then no power to give the tenure to the said idol and her executors would not be necessary parties to that rent suit on her death. On her death, the same would vest in Ananga by the terms of Abinash's Will and no matter whether Ananga had a life-estate or an absolute estate therein he would represent after Kumudini's death the eight annas share of the tenure which belonged to Abinash. The decree passed in the rent suit would be then effective against the tenure and the court sale held in execution thereof would consequently pass to the purchasers the whole tenure and the Plaintiffs would be entitled to succeed in this suit. If however Kumudini had an absolute estate in that tenure under her husband's Will further questions would arise. We would therefore take up the question of the construction of Abinash's Will.
2. The Will consists of thirteen paragraphs.
3. Paragraph 5 is sub-divided into three parts. We will designate these sub-paragraphs as 5 (a), 5 (b) and 5(c). Paragraph 6 is sub-divided into four sub-paragraphs which we will designate as 6 (a), 6 (b), 6 (c) and 6 (d) and paragraph 12 into two subparagraphs which we designate as 12 (a) and 12 (b). The material paragraphs are 3, 5, 6, 7, 11 and 12. In paragraph 3 the testator expresses his displeasure at the conduct of his son, Abani, and purports to disinherit him. By paragraph 5 (a) and 5 (b) he gives all his properties to his wife Kumudini in the first instance. Paragraph 5 (b) defines her interest. There are three expressions used there, each one of which would ordinarily be sufficient to confer an absolute estate on her. If that sub-paragraph stood alone there could not have been any doubt about the estate she took under her husband's Will. Sub-paragraph 5 (c) states that after the death of his wife his grandson, Ananga, would take all his properties, if he did not forsake his religion. In that paragraph words are also used which would confer an absolute estate on him. Paragraph 6 contemplates other sons being born to Abani. In that event those grandsons of the testator would take equally with Ananga, if they did not forsake their religion. Paragraph 6 (d) states that his grandsons would have an estate of the same nature as was conferred on his wife. Paragraph 7 confers a power on his widow to take sons in adoption. Paragraph 11 deals with his insurance money and his share separately. His wife is to take first and on her death his grandson. Paragraph 12 contemplates the case of the death during the life-time of his widow of his grandson or grandsons or of the son that may be adopted to him. In that event his estate is to be divided into eight equal parts, four of which are to be devoted to the worship of the idol established by him at Benares and to such other purposes as would be of spiritual benefit to the soul of his deceased father and mother. One part is to be given to his spiritual guide and the remaining three parts were to be utilised for establishing and maintaining a charitable dispensary in his village. It is quite clear that if the estate conferred on his wife be an absolute estate the provisions made in paragraph 5 (c) and 6 (b) for his grandsons would be invalid, as also the dispositions made in paragraph 12. On reading the whole of the Will the dominant intention of the testator as expressed therein appear to be two: (1) exclusion of his Son, Abani, from his properties and (2) that his estate in its entirety was to pass intact to his widow and grandsons in succession and on the happening of the event mentioned in paragraph 12 to the objects specified therein, namely ⅞ths of his estate was to be devoted to objects of a permanent nature, the remaining and ⅛th being given to his spiritual guide. The first dominant intention is made effective by the disposition of his entire estate to persons other than his son, Abani. The second dominant intention, as Lord Tomlin observed in Nisar Ali Khan v. Mohammad Ali Khan(1)
“is inconsistent with a series of absolute interests and could only be given effect to with such a series if each taker voluntarily denied himself the exercise of all powers of alienation, inter vivos, and disposed of the property testamentarily to the next taker in accordance with the testator's scheme.”
4. In that case before the Judicial Committee, the testator gave his property first to his nephew Nawab Sir Fateh Ali Khan and used terms which would have been sufficient to confer on him an absolute estate. He further provided that on the death of Nawab Sir Fateh, his (testator's) son Nabab Mohammad Ali Khan and on the latter's death his nephew Nawab Hidayat Ali Khan would take the properties in the same interest in which Nawab Sir Fateh Ali Khan was to take. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that each one of these persons, Nawab Sir Fateh Ali Khan, Nawab Mohammad Ali Khan and Nawab Hidayat Ali Khan took successive life-estates only, though the words of limitation used by the testator would by themselves have conferred on each one of them an absolute estate. Relying on the principle enunciated in Nisar Ali Khan's case we hold that Kumu-dini had only a life-estate notwithstanding the terms of paragraph 5 (b) of the Will. She had therefore no power to make a Will in respect of the tenure, Taluk Biswanath Roy or to dedicate it to the deity. On her death Ananga became the owner of eight annas of that tenure by the terms of his grand-father's Will. He was therefore rightly brought on the records of the rent suit on the death of Kumu-dini. As the tenure was fully represented in the rent suit, at the date of the decree, that is to say, as the rent decree was passed against all the tenure-holders and the execution proceedings were taken against the tenure-holders, the whole tenure passed to the Plaintiffs at the rent sale by reasons of provisions of Chapter XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
5. Shortly after the Plaintiffs' purchase at the rent sale disputes arose as to whether they could get 16 annas rent from the subordinate tenants. At that time Ananga had obtained probate of Kumudini's Will. He backed the tenants who resisted the Plaintiffs' claim to 16 annas of the rent. The result was that many rent suits were brought, some by the Plaintiffs in which they claimed 16 annas rent and some by Ananga in which he claimed 8 annas of the rents from the subordinate tenants. In the Plaintiffs' suits they made Ananga also a Defendant and in Ananga's suits the Plaintiffs were also made Defendants. All these rent suits were instituted in the Court of the Munsifs, who would have had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit which we have before us. In some cases appeals were carried from the Munsifs decisions to the Court of the Subordinate Judge and in some cases second appeals were filed in this Court. Two judgments of two Subordinate Judges passed on appeals have been exhibited. They are Exhibits K and H (II 156 and 164). Two questions were considered by the said Subordinate Judges, namely (1) whether Kumudini got an absolute estate under her husband's Will and (2) whether after Kumudini's death the proper legal representative had been brought on the record of rent suit No. 8 of 1921. Both the learned Subordinate Judges held that the said Will had conferred an absolute estate on Kumudini and that there was no proper substitution in that rent suit on Kumudini's death. Two of the judgments passed by this Court in second appeals (which were not appeals against Ex. H & K, but in other rent suits) are reported. They are Ananga Mohan Roy Choudhury v. Nawab Khajeh Habibulla(2) and Cherag Ali Sarkar v. Nawab Khajeh Habibulla(3). The Will of Abinas was not construed by this Court. It was assumed that an absolute estate had been conferred on Kumudini by her husband's Will. This Court on the sole finding that proper legal representatives had not been brought on the records of Rent Suit No. 8 of 1921 on the death of Kumudini held that the whole tenure had not passed to the Plaintiffs, the Nawab and his co-sharers, but only eight annas thereof, namely the interest of Kiranbala Choudhurani. There is no decision on the question of construction of Abinash's Will which is binding on us. The decision in those two second appeals on the question of representation in the said Rent Suit No. 8 of 1921 after Kumudini's death is not res judicata, on the ground that those rent-suits had been instituted in the Courts of Munsifs who would have had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit which we have before us. But the decision in the case of Cherag Ali Sarkar v. Nawab Khajeh Habibulla being by a Division Bench is binding on us as a precedent. On the view we have taken of the interest that had been conferred on Kumudini by her husband's Will this appeal must succeed. But as the question of representation in Rent Suit No. 8 of 1921 has been argued before us at length on the hypothesis that Kumudini had got an absolute estate by her husband's Will we proceed to express our views on that point on that hypothesis.
6. We have stated before that by her Will Kumudini had appointed five executors. While Rent Suit No. 8 of 1921 was pending, four of her executors, Jitendra Mohan Bose and the Ghoses applied for probate and the other executor, Ananga, was at first opposing the grant. The said four executors ultimately renounced, and probate was granted to Ananga only. This was after the decree had been passed in Rent Suit No. 8 of 1921 and the tenure had been sold in execution thereof. At all material stages of that rent suit and the following rent execution none of the executors named in her Will had obtained probate. Though in their application filed in the rent suit by the four executors Jatindra Nath Bose and the Ghoses on the 12th January, 1922, (Ex. A), they had stated that they were in possession of the estate of Kumudini there was no evidence before the Court in support of that statement, as that application was not supported by an affidavit. The question therefore is whether the executors could at that stage be substituted in that suit as the legal representatives of Kumudini. In our opinion they could not. If they had been substituted and a decree obtained that decree would not have bound the estate of Kumudini as they had not then obtained probate. It is well settled that an executor who has not obtained probate can file a suit as Plaintiff [Mayappa Chetty v. Supra-nanan Chetty(4)] but he must obtain probate before the decree or even earlier if he is called to prove his representative character at an earlier stage (Williams on Executors, Vol. I, p. 192, 12th Edn.). But an executor who has not obtained probate can be effectively sued as Defendant only when he had intermeddled with the estate of the testator [Mahauddin Mohideen v. Pitchey(5), Lal Behari v. Nagendra Nath(6) and Lakhya Dassya v. Uma Kanta(7)]. No doubt an executor derives his title from the Will and probate is the only effective evidence of his title. He can act before probate and subsequent probate validates these intermediate acts. (Sec. 227 of the Indian Succession Act No. XXXIX of 1925). But the provisions of that section do not apply to cases of representation in suits [Lakhya Dassya's case]. For these reasons we can not agree with the observations in Cherag Ali Sarkar's case that the four executors who had made the application Ex. A in the rent suit ought to have been brought by the Plaintiffs on the records of the rent suit on Kumudini's death as her legal representatives. We do not also feel the force of the observations made therein that the deity Kumudeswar Mahadev ought to have been made a party. The right of the deity could not be established without probate, and at all material times in the progress of that rent suit probate had not been granted. Besides that, there was no evidence that the executors had given their assent to the legacy in favour of the deity. The deity was therefore out of the picture at that stage. We cannot therefore hold that the estate of Kumudini was not represented in the rent suit simply because the executors named in her Will had not been substituted in her place in that suit. On her death her son Abani and her grandson Ananga were substituted in her place. Ananga had no status except in his character as her executor and we have already held that not having obtained probate while the rent suit was pending he could not be substituted in that suit in Kumudini's place. The same reasons apply to his being made a party in the resulting execution proceedings. Abani was Kumudini's heir-at-law and would have been her legal representative if she had died intestate. Could he then have been brought on the record of the rent suit as her legal representative seeing that although she had left a Will by which she had appointed other persons as executors, probate of the Will had not been granted then. We are of opinion that he could not, and this view of ours is supported by the decision of a Division Bench in Harish Chandra Biswas v. Puridas Das(8). In these circumstances, two courses were open to the Plaintiffs in the rent suit when Kumudini died, either to apply for postponement of the case till probate was granted to Kumudini's Will and after that event to substitute the executor or executors who obtained pro bate, or if that was not feasible or desirable, to apply for the appointment of an administrator-ad-litem under sec. 251 of the Indian Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925) and to substitute the person so appointed in Kumudini's place. As they did not follow either of these courses the decree obtained by them would not bind the estate of Kumudini and accordingly 8 annas share in the tenure taluk Biswanath Roy would not have passed to them at the court sale. If we had held that the estate taken by Kumudini under her husband's Will was an absolute estate we would have dismissed this appeal, but as on the construction of that Will we have held that she took a life-estate only, the appeal must succeed. The Plaintiffs must have the costs of this appeal and also the costs of the lower Court from the first party Defendant. The result is that the Plaintiffs' title to 8 annas share in Taluk Biswanath Roy as described in Schedule I of the plaint is declared and that they do recover possession from the first party Defendant. The Plaintiffs would also get a decree for mesne profits from the first party Defendant from three years prior to the institution of the suit till recovery of possession or restoration of possession or three years from the date of this judgment, whichever occurs earlier. We direct an enquiry by the Court into mesne profits in terms of Or. 20, r. 12, sub-r. (1), cl (c) of the Civil Procedure Code. As prayer No. (6) of the plaint has not been pressed by the learned Advocate for the Appellants the same is refused.
Khundkar, J.:— I agree.
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