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Bajrangi Lal v. Ghura Rai
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit brought by Ghura Rai against Lala Bajrangi Lal (defendant No. 1) and Chatarpati Ojha (defendant No. 2). The plaintiff alleged that defendant No. 1 had fraudulently obtained a sale-deed from him by misrepresentation and that the sale-deed was void because it purported to transfer part of an occupancy holding. Against defendant No. 2 the plaintiff claimed that a mortgage-deed was void as it concerned an occupancy holding which, by law, could not be validly mortgaged. The plaintiff sought declarations that the sale-deed and the mortgage-deed were void; alternatively, he claimed Rs. 1,600 as unpaid part of the consideration if the documents were held genuine.
There are connected appeals: the present appeal is by defendant No. 1; Second Appeal No. 1354 of 1914 is by the same defendant on costs; and a further appeal by defendant No. 2 contests the lower court's failure to decide whether he should recover Rs. 400 he alleged he paid as consideration for the mortgage.
The court of first instance found many issues in favour of defendant No. 1, concluding the sale-deed had been duly executed for good consideration and without fraud but declaring the sale-deed void because it included transfer of part of an occupancy holding. As to defendant No. 2 the first court held the mortgage of an occupancy holding was bad in law and (apparently) that Rs. 400 was not paid. The lower appellate court also held the mortgage in favour of defendant No. 2 to be void, decided a question of costs contingent on the ultimate result, and held that defendant No. 2 was not entitled to get back the Rs. 400 he alleged he paid; other questions were left undecided.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a sale-deed that purports to transfer both an occupancy holding (which the Tenancy Act prohibits an occupancy tenant from transferring) and a fixed rate holding is void in respect of the transferee's interest in the fixed rate holding so as to permit the transferor to recover the fixed rate holding after receipt of consideration.
- Whether the mortgage of an occupancy holding in favour of defendant No. 2 was void, and if defendant No. 2 was entitled to recover Rs. 400 which he alleged he paid as consideration for the mortgage.
- Whether the plaintiff, having executed the deed and (on the assumption of no fraud) received the consideration, can rely on the illegality of the contract as a ground for defeating a valid transfer of the fixed rate holding.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Allegations
- The plaintiff alleged that defendant No. 1 obtained the sale-deed by fraud and misrepresentation.
- The plaintiff alleged the sale-deed was void because it purported to transfer part of an occupancy holding (transfer of which is prohibited by the Tenancy Act).
- Against defendant No. 2 the plaintiff alleged that the mortgage-deed was a mortgage of an occupancy holding and therefore void by law.
- As alternative relief, the plaintiff sought Rs. 1,600 as unpaid part of the consideration if the documents were held genuine.
Defendants' Positions (as reflected by findings in the courts below)
- The court of first instance found that the sale-deed had been duly executed for good consideration and that there was no fraud — a position supportive of defendant No. 1's case.
- The lower appellate court agreed that the mortgage in favour of defendant No. 2 was void but held that defendant No. 2 was not entitled to recover Rs. 400; the lower court did not decide whether that sum had in fact been paid or whether the mortgage was obtained by fraud.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Indian Contract Act, Section 23 | “Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void.” (Principle that illegality renders agreements void.) | The court introduced the statutory rule as part of the argument that a contract might be void if it purported to transfer an unlawful object (i.e., an occupancy holding which the Tenancy Act bars the tenant from transferring). |
| Indian Contract Act, Section 24 | “If any part of a single consideration... is unlawful the agreement is void.” (Principle about partial illegality affecting an agreement.) | The court considered whether the inclusion of an unlawful part (transfer of occupancy holding) made the whole deed void; it rejected the plaintiff's attempt to set aside the valid transfer of the fixed rate holding on that ground. |
| Transfer of Property Act, Section 5 | Definition of “transfer of property”: an act by which a living person conveys property to another. | Used to distinguish between the contract to sell and the act of transfer; helped the court analyze whether a completed transfer could stand even if part of the transaction was illegal. |
| Transfer of Property Act, Section 8 | “Unless a different intention... a transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing...” | Applied to show that where the transferor was capable of passing the fixed rate holding interest, the deed of transfer vested that interest in the transferee. |
| Transfer of Property Act, Section 54 | Definition of “sale” and the distinction that a contract for sale does not of itself create any interest in the property. | Used to distinguish between unenforceability of a contract and the validity of a completed transfer deed; supported the conclusion that a completed transfer of the fixed rate holding could be valid even if the underlying contract was unenforceable in part. |
| Tenancy Act, Section 21 (referred) | Prohibition on an occupancy tenant transferring his occupancy holding (as relied upon in the opinion). | The court treated the Tenancy Act prohibition as the source of the illegality alleged in respect of the occupancy holding and contrasted that incapacity with the transferability of the fixed rate holding. |
| Infants' Relief Act, 1874, Section 1 | All contracts for repayment of money entered into by infants are void; principle that money paid under void contracts may not be recoverable after partial benefit. | Cited as an analogy and precedent for the principle that money paid under an illegal or void contract, once the recipient has enjoyed benefit, may not be recoverable. |
| Valentini v. Ganali | Where an infant contracted to become a tenant and paid part consideration then had the contract set aside, he could not recover money paid after enjoying the use of furniture. | Relied on to support the idea that money paid under a void contract which has been partially performed or where benefit has been enjoyed is not recoverable. |
| Kearley v. Thomson | Money paid under an illegal contract that has been partially carried into effect cannot be recovered. | Applied as authority for the maxim that a party to an illegal contract who has received benefit cannot seek recovery of money paid; used to deny the plaintiff relief in respect of money when he had enjoyed the contract's benefits. |
| Collins v. Blantem (quoted) | Authority quoted to the effect that a party to an unlawful contract who has paid money shall not have the court's help to recover it. | Quoted (via Fry, L.J.) to reinforce the principle that a litigant cannot use the court to recover money paid in pursuance of an illegal contract after having participated in that “unclean” transaction. |
| Broom's Legal Maxims | Statement of the test for in pari delicto: whether the plaintiff can make out his case otherwise than through the medium of the illegal transaction. | Used to state the relevant test for barring relief on the ground of in pari delicto; the court applied that test and concluded the plaintiff could only succeed by relying on the illegality of his own contract. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a structured analysis focusing on whether the plaintiff, assuming no fraud, could obtain a declaration that the transfer of the fixed rate holding was void simply because the same deed purported to transfer an occupancy holding (which the Tenancy Act prohibited the tenant from transferring).
Key steps in the court's reasoning:
- The court framed the matter on the assumption that it need not enforce any contract; instead it was to decide the declaratory relief claim "without any regard to the allegations of fraud or of non-payment of the consideration." It further assumed, for purposes of analysis, that the plaintiff admitted executing the transfer after receiving the consideration.
- The court held that the plaintiff could not obtain a decree declaring the transfer of the fixed rate holding void unless, had the transferee obtained possession, the transferor would have been entitled to judgment for possession. In other words, a completed transfer of a fixed rate holding, followed by transferee's acquisition of possession, would have been protected.
- The court relied on the Transfer of Property Act (sections 5, 8 and 54) to distinguish a contract for sale from a deed of transfer and to show that a transfer, if effective to pass the interest the transferor was capable of passing, vests that interest in the transferee forthwith. Thus, unenforceability of a contract does not necessarily render a valid transfer void.
- It contrasted the incapacity created by the Tenancy Act (which prevents an occupancy tenant from passing that particular interest) with the transferability of a fixed rate holding. The court observed that the plaintiff could not recover the fixed rate holding merely because he had purportingly included an occupancy holding in the same deed.
- The court applied established equitable and common law principles—relying on the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio and the in pari delicto test (as explained in Broom's Legal Maxims)—to conclude that where the plaintiff seeks to rely on the illegality of his own contract (absent fraud) to recover property or money, relief will be denied. Authorities and examples (including the Infants' Relief Act and the cited cases) were used to illustrate that money or property transferred under a transaction partially carried into effect or benefited from cannot generally be recovered by the party who participated in the illegality.
- The court therefore disagreed with the learned Judge below who had set aside the transfer of the fixed rate holding on the ground that the deed purported to transfer part of an occupancy holding. The appellate court found that, in the absence of fraud, the plaintiff could not set aside the transfer of the fixed rate holding.
- Regarding defendant No. 2 and the Rs. 400, the court noted that the lower appellate court had held defendant No. 2 was not entitled to recover Rs. 400 but had not decided whether that sum had been paid, whether defendant No. 2 obtained possession of the mortgaged occupancy holding, or whether the mortgage had been obtained by fraud. On those unresolved factual issues, and because the plaintiff should have sued for possession if defendant No. 2 had obtained possession, the case had to be remanded for further adjudication.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: THE APPEAL IS ALLOWED; THE DECREE OF THE LOWER APPELLATE COURT IS SET ASIDE; THE CAUSE IS REMANDED.
Immediate consequences and directions given by the court:
- The court reversed the portion of the lower appellate court's decree that had set aside the transfer of the fixed rate holding. The court held that, absent fraud, the plaintiff was not entitled to set aside the valid transfer of the fixed rate holding merely because the same deed purported also to transfer an occupancy holding which the plaintiff could not lawfully transfer.
- The case is remanded to the lower appellate court with directions to re-admit the appeal on its original file number and to proceed to hear and determine the remaining questions according to law, including the unresolved issues concerning whether defendant No. 2 paid Rs. 400, whether he obtained possession of the mortgaged occupancy holding, and whether the mortgage was obtained by fraud.
- Costs “here and heretofore will be costs in the cause” as directed by the court.
Broader implications: The opinion applies and explains established statutory provisions and equitable maxims (including the distinction between contracts and transfers, the effect of partial illegality, and the in pari delicto / ex turpi causa principles) but does not purport to lay down a novel rule of law; the decision's direct effect is to overturn the lower court's decree in respect of the fixed rate holding and to remand unresolved factual and legal questions for further consideration.
Richards, C.J and Muhammad Rafiq, J.:— This appeal is connected with Second Appeals Nos. 1354 of 1914 and 1511 of 1914. The suit out of which the appeals arise was brought by Ghura Rai against Lala Bajrangi Lal and Chatarpati Ojha. The plaintiff alleged that defendant No. 1 had fraudulently obtained from him a sale-deed on misrepresentation. He also alleged that the sale-deed was void because it included a transfer of part of an occupancy holding. As against defendant No. 2 he claimed to have a mortgage-deed set aside on the ground that it was a mortgage of an occupancy holding which was void by law. He claimed accordingly that the sale-deed and the mortgage-deed might be declared void. Alternative relief was claimed that if for any reason the two documents should be held to be genuine, then, he should get Rs. 1,600, part of the consideration which was not paid. The present appeal is the appeal of the defendant No. 1. Second Appeal No. 1354 of 1914 is an appeal by the same defendant on the question of costs. The third appeal is that of defendant No. 2 who complains that the court below has not decided whether or not he should get back the Rs. 400, which heal leges he paid as consideration for the mortgage.
The court of first instance has found many of the issues in favour of defendant No. 1. In his case that court found that the sale-deed was duly executed for good consideration and that there was no fraud. It, however, declared the sale-deed void because it included a transfer of a portion of an occupancy holding. As against defendant No. 2 it held that the mortgage of an occupancy holding was bad in law, and (apparently) that the Rs. 400 was not paid.
The lower appellate court held that the mortgage in favour of defendant No. 2 was void. It also decided a question of costs the correctness of which decision depends on the ultimate result of the case. It also held that defendant No. 2 was not entitled to get back the Rs. 400, he alleged he paid. All other questions were left undecided.
The court of first instance decreed that the sale-deed, dated the 20th of January, 1914, executed in favour of Bajrangi Lal was void, and the learned Judge upheld this part of decree of the first court on the ground that the plaintiff had in the same deed purported to sell part of his occupancy holding. The decision is based on the provisions of sections 23 and 24 of the Indian Contract Act. Section 23 provides that every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void, Section 24 provides that if any part of a single consideration for one or more objects or any part of any one of several considerations for a single object is unlawful the agreement is void. The contention is that under the provisions of the Tenancy Act an occupancy tenant is prohibited from transferring his occupancy holding. It is said that because the sale-deed, included the transfer of part of an occupancy holding the contract was void and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to the decree he sought. In considering the force of the contention we must bear in mind that we are not dealing with a case in which the court is asked to decree specific performances or even to enforce a contract. We must deal with the question without any regard to the allegations of fraud or of non-payment of the consideration. We must assume that the plaintiff comes into court admitting that he duty executed the deed of transfer after receiving the consideration and contending that the mere fact that the deed purported to transfer an occupancy holding as well as a fixed rate holding entitles him to the declaration. Wo think it is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree declaring the transfer of the fixed rate holding void unless he would have been entitled to a decree for possession of the fixed rate holding if the transferee had obtained possession after the transfer. Let us suppose that after the transfer the transferee had entered into possession by receiving profits, collecting rents from the sub-tenants or any other legal way and the transferor had brought a suit for ejectment. Could such a suit be successful the plaintiff's case would be:— “I have received the money I bargained for. I executed a deed of transfer sufficient in law to pass my interest in the fixed rate holding, but because I myself purported at the same time to transfer other property which I could not transfer, the transfer of the interest in the fixed rate holding is also invalid and I can get the holding back.” It may here not be out of place to refer to certain provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. By section 5 the expression “transfer of property” is defined as “an act by which a living person conveys property in present or in future to one or more living persons or to himself and one or more living persons.” The expression “to transfer property” means to perform such an act. Section 8 is as follows:— “Unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied a transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing in the property and the legal incidents thereof.” By section 54 “Sale” is defined to be a “transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part promised.” By the same section it is enacted that a contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. “It does not of itself create any interest in or charge on such property.” It thus appears that a contract for sale is one thing and a deed of transfer another and it does not necessarily follow that because the contract was unenforceable that the transfer is void. In the case we have supposed the transferor would have got all that he bargained for, and every part of the consideration passing from the transferee to the transferor the transfer of the interest in the fixed rate holding was perfectly legal. It may be urged that an occupancy tenant who executes a transfer of his interest can, notwithstanding the transfer, recover the holding. This is so, but the reason is, not because the contract was illegal, but because it was an interest which the transferor, by the express words of the Tenancy Act, was not capable of posing (see section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 21 of the Tenancy Act). In the case of the interest in the fixed rate holding the transferor was capable of passing the interest, and the effect of the deed of transfer was to vest the interest in the transferee. Suppose that in pursuance of a contract for the sale of an interest in a fixed rate holding and of the interest in as occupancy holding for a lump sum of Rs. 1,000 the contract was completed by two separate deeds, one being a transfer of the interest in the fixed rate holding and the other a deed purporting to transfer the other interest. The contract would have been exactly the same, carried out and completed by two deeds instead of one. Could the transferor succeed in a suit in which he asked to have the deed of transfer of the fixed rate interest declared void and delivered up to be cancelled? It seems contrary to justice that the plaintiff should be allowed to set up the illegality of his own contract as a ground for defeating a valid transfer. It seems a violation of the well-known maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio. By section 1 of the Infants' Relief Act, 1874, all contracts whether by specialty or by simple contract henceforth entered into for the repayment of money lent or to be lent or for goods supplied or to be supplied (other than contracts for necessaries) and all accounts stated with infants shall be absolutely void.” In the case of Valentini v. Ganali(1) the plaintiff, an infant, agreed with the defendant to become tenant of a house and to pay a certain sum for the furniture. The plaintiff paid part of the sum in cash and gave a promissory note for the balance. The contract was set aside and the promissory note was ordered to be cancelled, but it was held that the plaintiff could not recover back the money he had paid after he had enjoyed the use of the furniture. In Kearley v. Thomson(2) it was held that where money was paid under an illegal contract which had been partially carried into effect the money could not he recovered. Fry, L.J, quotes the words of the Lord Chief Justice in Collins v. Blantem(3):— “Whoever is a party to an unlawful contract, if he hath once paid the money stipulated to be paid in pursuance thereof he shall not have the help of the court to fetch it back again, you shall not have a right of action when you come into a court of justice in this unclean manner to recover it back.”
There is the maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis. In Broom's Legal Maxims the learned author says:— “Upon the whole, then, it seems that the true test for determining whether or not the objection that the plaintiff and defendant were in pari delicto can be sustained is by considering whether the plaintiff can make out his case otherwise than through the medium and by aid of the illegal transaction to which he himself was a party.” In the present case, on the assumption that there was no fraud, it is only by proving and relying on the illegality of his own contract that the plaintiff can hope to succeed. In our opinion, in the absence of fraud, the plaintiff was not entitled to set aside the transfer of the fixed rate holding and the view taken by the learned Judge was not correct.
We have mentioned that the court below has held that defendant No. 2 was not entitled to get back the Rs. 400 he alleged he paid. The court has not decided the question whether defendant No. 2 paid this sum. Nor has it decided the question whether defendant No. 2 got possession of the occupancy holding mortgaged to him or whether the mortgage was obtained by fraud. We may mention that, if defendant No. 2 got possession, the plaintiff should have sued for possession and not merely for a declaration. In our opinion the case must be remanded.
We allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and remand the case to that court with directions to re-admit the appeal upon its original number on the file and proceed to hear and determine the same according to law. Costs here and heretofore will be costs in the cause.
Appeal decreed and cause remanded.
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