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Khagendra Nath Mookerjee v. Khetra Nath Pal

Calcutta High Court
Jun 2, 1922
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mortgage Suit Appeal)

Factual and Procedural Background

On the nth April 1908 four brothers of the Mookerjee family (Makhanlal, Khagendranath, Kumudindu and Mohanlal) executed a mortgage-bond in favour of the plaintiff to secure a loan of Rs. 15,000 with interest and repayable on 31 March 1912. The family relationship is set out in the pedigree recited in the opinion.

The mortgagee (plaintiff) commenced suit on 15 April 1912 against five defendants: the three surviving mortgagors (first three defendants); two infant sons of a deceased mortgagor represented by their mother as guardian (fourth defendant group); and a trustee appointed by the mortgagors (fifth defendant). The defendants resisted on various grounds; two grounds were pressed to this Court: (1) that one mortgaged property (received as a legacy under the paternal grandmother's Will) was not capable of being validly mortgaged because, at the date of the mortgage, the executor had not assented to the legacy; and (2) that the alleged consideration for the mortgage had not been paid.

Procedurally, the Trial Court initially found for the plaintiff and decreed the suit ex parte on 22 July 1912. Various applications to set aside or vacate ex parte decrees followed over the years; the suit was restored and re-tried at different points, culminating in a decree on 16 September 1919. The present appeal challenges that decree on the two grounds summarized above.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, given that the property mortgaged had been received by the mortgagors as a legacy under their paternal grandmother's Will and the executor had not signified assent at the date of the mortgage, the mortgagors possessed an interest capable of being validly mortgaged.
  2. Whether the consideration for the mortgage had in fact been paid to the mortgagors (i.e., whether there was conclusive evidence of payment).

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' (Appellants') Arguments

  • One ground of defence was that a particular mortgaged property (received under the testatrix's Will) was not capable of being validly mortgaged because, at the date of the mortgage, the executor had not assented to the legacy and therefore the mortgagors' title as legatees was inchoate or incomplete.
  • The second ground was that the alleged consideration for the mortgage had not been paid by the mortgagee to the mortgagors.

Plaintiff's (Respondent's) Position as Appears in the Opinion

  • The mortgage-deed recited payment of the consideration by a cheque drawn on the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China in favour of the mortgagors' solicitor/agent, and evidence was adduced tracing the cashing and subsequent application of those funds in the accounts of the trustee defendant.
  • Implicitly, the plaintiff maintained that the mortgagors had an interest in the legacy property that could be validly mortgaged and that the payment of consideration was established by documentary and ledger evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Duppa v. Mayo (1670) 1 Saunders 275; 85 E.R. 336 Explaining the reason why executor's assent is required to perfect a legatee's title; the historical rationale for the assent rule. Quoted to explain the doctrine that executor's assent perfects but does not create title, and that legatees have an inchoate interest prior to assent.
Eeles v. Lambert (1646) Style 37; Aleyn 38; 82 E.R. 512 Authority for the principle that executor's assent is necessary to complete a legatee's title; cited as repeatedly argued before King's Bench. Relied on as historical authority supporting the description of the assent doctrine and its effects on legatees' rights.
Crist v. Crist (1849) 1 Ind. 570 Support for the proposition that executor's assent perfects title but creates no new title if the legacy is void. Used to demonstrate that assent relates only to perfecting title acquired under the Will and cannot validate a void legacy.
Brock v. Sims (1842) 1 Speers. S.C. 49 Illustrative authority cited in the discussion of the assent doctrine and alienability of interests. Referenced among historical authorities supporting the court's exposition of legatees' interests and assent.
Moore v. Barry (1830) 1 Bailey S.C. 504 Another supporting case in the line of authorities concerning legatees' rights and assent. Referred to as part of the body of decisions underpinning the court's summary of the law on assent and transmissible rights.
Doe v. Sturges (1816) 7 Taunt 217; 2 Marsh. 505; 17 R.R. 491; 129 E.R. 87 Quoted (Gibbs, C.J.) in support of principles around title and assent. Referred to for historical commentary reinforcing the court's account of the assent rule.
Rex v. Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax (1929) 1 K.B. 468 Authority mentioned regarding the doctrine of relation back of executor's assent to the testator's death (not further discussed). The court expressly stated it need not discuss how far the doctrine of relation back applies to residuary bequests; the case was noted but not applied to decide the present points.
Drake v. Page (1891) 127 N.Y. 562 Held that a devisee's undivided interest (subject to executors' power of sale/partition) could be mortgaged; treatise of vested interest subject to executorial powers. Adopted as persuasive authority supporting the view that the legatees' interest could form the subject-matter of a valid mortgage.
Davis v. Wilson (1903) 115 Ky. 639 Holds that interests of legatees may be alienated/mortgaged where substantially any interest in real estate is vendible if subject to sale and assignment. Relied on to support the proposition that the mortgagors' interest could be alienated by mortgage.
Overton v. Means 2 Ky. L.R. 211 Recognized doctrine that an interest by devise in land, whether vested or contingent, is vendible subject to sale for debts. Referred to as part of American jurisprudence illustrating alienability of devisee interests; used to corroborate the court's conclusion about mortgage validity.
Hasanalli Moledina v. Popatlal Parbhudas 17 Ind. Cas. 17; 1 Bom. L.R. 782 Discusses interpretation of the statutory provision corresponding to s.112 Probate and Administration Act; cautions against an extended literal interpretation. Cited to support the view that a strict, extensive construction of Section 112 would be absurd; used in statutory interpretation to justify recognizing a legatee's transmissible interest despite lack of executor assent.
Annada Mohan Roy v. Gour Mohan Mallik 65 Ind. Cas. 271 Series of decisions quoted that affirm that the interest of a Hindu reversioner expectant on death of a limited owner is not vested (a mere spes succession). Distinguished by the court: the court explained that the present case involved a vested interest created by the Will (not a Hindu reversionary expectant interest) and so the authorities on spes succession were not analogously applicable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court approached the first question by examining the legal effect of executor's assent under the statutes and the common-law authorities. It began with the statutory provisions: Section 112 of the Probate and Administration Act (corresponding to Section 292 of the Indian Succession Act) requires the executor's assent to complete a legatee's title; Section 116 (corresponding to Section 296 of the Indian Succession Act) provides that assent gives effect from the testator's death. The court then explained the established rationale for these provisions via historic authorities (e.g., Duppa v. Mayo, Eeles v. Lambert): assent is required to protect the executor, who must administer the estate and pay debts before legacies.

However, the court emphasized the distinction between (a) assent as a perfecting act and (b) the substantive interest created by the Will. The court repeated the principle (from the authorities cited) that assent does not create a new title but perfects a title given by the Will; prior to assent the legatee has an inchoate or transmissible interest (which may be subject to administration). The court rejected an overly literal or extended interpretation of the statutory provision that would deny any interest to the legatee until assent is given, citing Hasanalli Moledina v. Popatlal Parbhudas as authority for a more practical statutory construction.

The court considered and rejected any analogy to the line of Judicial Committee decisions (cited in Annada Mohan Roy) concerning Hindu reversioners' mere expectancies (spes succession). It distinguished those authorities because the Will in the present case created a vested interest in the legatees (the language of the Will made them "absolute owners of the surplus" after specified payments). On that factual and legal basis the court held that the mortgagors' interest in their grandmother's estate could validly form the subject-matter of a mortgage.

To reinforce its conclusion the court relied on foreign authority (Drake v. Page and Davis v. Wilson and related Kentucky decisions) holding that devisees or legatees with vested or transferrable interests may mortgage their undivided shares or interests, subject to the executors' powers and administration. The court applied this principle to conclude that the appellant (one of the mortgagors) could not invalidate the mortgage he himself executed.

On the second question (payment of consideration), the court accepted the Subordinate Judge's factual finding that payment was conclusively established. The mortgage-deed recited payment by cheque drawn on the Chartered Bank in favour of the mortgagors' agent; that cheque was endorsed and cashed and the amount was traced in the trustee defendant's account-books, which bore the defendants' signatures despite their contrary assertions. The court treated this evidence as conclusive and dismissed the defendants' denial of payment as untenable.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The decree of the Subordinate Judge was affirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs.

Implications: The direct effect is that the mortgage-decree stands: the plaintiff is entitled to cut off the equity of redemption and to proceed under the mortgage. The court held that (a) a legatee who has a vested interest under the terms of a Will may validly mortgage that interest even if the executor has not yet signified assent (the executor's assent perfects but does not exclusively create the legatee's interest), and (b) the documentary and ledger evidence produced in this case conclusively established payment of the consideration. The opinion does not purport to create or assert a novel legal rule beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities and statute; no broader new precedent is expressly announced beyond the court's conclusions applied to the facts of this case.

Show all summary ...

1. The facts material for the determination of the questions in controversy in this appeal in a mortgage suit lie in a narrow compass and may be briefly recited. On the nth April 1908 four brothers, Makhanlal, Khagendranath, Kumudindu and Mohanlal, members of the family of Mookerjee's of Janai, in the District of Hoogly, executed a Mortgage-bond in favour of the plaintiff to secure a loan of Es. 15,000 which was to carry interest at Q per cent, per annum with annual rests, and was made re-payable on the 31st March 1912. The relationship of the members of the family of the mortgagors may be gathered from the following pedigree:

CHANDRA KANT MOOKERJEE, | W. Kilanmoyi __________________________|________________ | | Parbati Charan Harendra Krishna, | died 1896 _________|________ | | | | Surendra- Gopal Chandra. | nath. | ___________| ____________|_______ _____________ | | | | Makhan Khagendra Kumu- Mohan Lal Nath, dindn, Lal, W. Sarat Defendent Defendant Defendant Kumari No. 1. No. 2. No. 3 |___________ __________|_________ | | Amaniath Anathnath Defendant, Defendant, No. 4. No. 4a.

2. On the 15th April 1912 the mortgagee commenced this litigation against five defendants; the first three were the three surviving mortgagors; the fourth group included the two infant sons of the deceased mortgagor, represented by their mother as certificated guardian; the fifth defendant was one Bhattacharjya, who had been appointed by the mortgagors on the 12th June 1907 as trustee of their estate. The defendants resisted the claim on a variety of grounds; two of these only have been pressed in this Court and need be mentioned here, namely, first, that the mortgage was void and unenforceable in respect of one of the properties which had been received by the mortgagors as legacy under the Will of their paternal grandmother, inasmuch as, at the date of the mortgage, the executor had not assented to the legacy; secondly, that the alleged consideration had not been paid by the mortgagee to the mortgagors. The Trial Court found in favour of the plaintiff and the suit was decreed ex parte on the 22nd July 1912. The trustee defendant applied to set aside the ex parte decree, but the application was rejected on the 16th February 1914. The second defendant then applied to have the decree vacated, and his effort was successful. The suit was restored on the 18th July 1914, and was ultimately decreed on the 19th June 1915 on contest against the second defendant and ex part, against the other defendants. On the 6th July 1918, the first defendant applied to have the ex parte decree set aside, and the suit was restored on the 31st August 1918. On re-trial, the suit was again decreed on the 16th September 1919. The present appeal is directed against that decree and has been attempted to be supported, on the two grounds previously mentioned.

3. As regards the first point, it is not disputed that Kiranmoyi Debi, the paternal grandmother of the mortgagors, made a testamentary disposition of her properties on the 8th August 1894. The Will was proved in due course in this Court, and on the 13th April 1896 Probate was granted to the sole surviving executor, Parbati Charan Mookerjee. In 1900, a suit was instituted against the executor by the grandsons of the testatrix for construction of the Will, for ascertainment of the rights of the parties there under, for account and administration of the estate, and for incidental reliefs. A preliminary decree was made in this administration suit on the 3rd September, 1902; but no final decree, we were informed, had been made at the date of the commencement of the present litigation. The testatrix by her Will directed the executor to divide her estate in the manner following, namely, six annas in equal halves to the two grandsons by her son Parbati Charan, and ten annas in equal shares to her four grandsons by her son Harendra Krishna. After providing for the payment of annuities to various relations, the testatrix proceeded to direct that the grandsons "shall become the absolute owners of the surplus of my estate left after payment of the moneys in the preceding paragraphs." The proper ties thus received by the grandsons admittedly included Sarasamuri which was given by way of security to the plaintiff on the nth April 1908. The mortgagors now contend that, at the date of the mortgage, their title as legatees was still inchoate as the executor had not assented thereto. Section 112 of the Probate and Administration Act, which corresponds to Section 292 of the Indian Succession Act, provides that the assent of the executor is necessary to complete a legatee's title to his legacy. Section 116 of the Probate and Administration Act, which corresponds to Section 296 of the Indian Succession Act, lays down that the assent of the executor to a legacy gives effect to it from the death of the testator. The reason for this rule is best stated in the words of the fifth note by Serjeant Williams to Duppa v. Mayo (1670) 1 Saunders 275 : 85 E.R. 336; Williams on Saunders, Volume 1, page 427: "if a man devises his chattels, real or personal, or gives any specific legacy, the legatee cannot either enter into the land if it be a chattel real, or take the legacy without the consent of the exedutor. For, the personal estate being liable in the hands of the executor to the payment of the testator's debts, he must take care to satisfy the debts before he pays the legacies. The law, therefore, requires the assent of the executor to such legacies, otherwise he may be guilty of a devastavit and liable de bonis propriis without any fault in him. The legatees have no property in the legacies by the devise until the assent, though they have an interest in them." The authority mentioned in support of these propositions is the case of Eeles v. Lambert (1646) Style 37, 54, 73 : Aleyn 38 : 82 E.R. 512, 525, 540, 904 which was repeatedly argued before the Court of the King's Bench. The essence of the matter is that, as a protection to the executor, the law ordains that every legatee, whether general or specific, and whether of chattels real or personal, must obtain the executor's assent to the legacy before his title as legatee can be complete and perfect; before such assent, however, the legatee has an inchoate right to the legacy such as is transmissible to his own personal representatives in case of his death before it be paid or delivered; and in the case of the outlawry of the legatee it is subject to the forfeiture. This is stated explicitly in the classical work on "Office and Duty of Executors," which bears the name of Thomas Wentworth, but is attributed to Mr. Justice Dodderidge, and was the leading authority on the subject during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (14th Edition, page 69). It was also treated as good law by Sir Samuel Toller in his work on the Law of Executors and Administrators, 5th Edition (1822), page 307. The substance of the matter is put tersely in Bacon's Abridgment (1832),Volume III, p. 520 in the following statement, "and as the law makes it a devastavit in the executor to pay legacies before debts, so it prohibits the legatee from meddling with the legacy without the assent of the executor; and, therefore, it hath been holden, that if a legatee takes possession of the thing devised without the assent of the executor, then he may have an action of trespass against him. But, as it is the Will of the testator which gives the interest to the legatee, so this matter of assent seems only a perfecting act for the security of the executor, and therefore, the law does not require any exact form in which it is to be made." In other words, though on the assent of the executor, the full title passes to the legatee, the assent creates no new title; it merely perfects the title acquired under the Will, and hence if the legacy is void, the assent avails nothing; see Crist v. Crist (1849) 1 Ind. 570 : Am. Dec. 481 and the notes thereon; see also Williams on Executors, Part III, Book III. Chapter IV, section III. Redfield on Wills, Volume II, page 461. The position cannot consequently be maintained that, till the executor has signified his assent, express or implied, the legatee, has no interest whatever in the subject-matter of the legacy, and hence the view was supported by Sir Samuel Toller (Executors, page 311) that the assent of an executor shall have relation to the time of the testator's death and such assent shall by relation confirm an intermediate giant by the legatee of his legacy. The same view was adopted in Brock v. Sims (1842) 1 Speers. S.C. 49, Moore v. Barry (1830) 1 Bailey S.C. 504; see also Wentworth on Office of Executor, 69, 445, and the remark of "Gibbs, C. J. in Doe v. Sturges (1816) 7 Taunt 217 : 2 Marsh. 505 : 17 R.R. 491 : 129 E.R. 87. We need not here discuss the question raised in Rex v. Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax (1929) 1 K.B. 468 : 89 L.J.K.B. 194 : 122 L.T. 389 : 64 S.J. 267 : 36 T.L.R. 123 how far the doctrine of relation back of the executor's assent to the testator's death applies to the case of a residuary bequest. This, at any rate, is plain that where, as in the case before us, the Will creates a vested interest in the legatee in the subject-matter of the legacy (cf. Section 106 of the Succession Act), he has a transmissible interest, subject to the reservation that the legacy, whether in his hands or in the hands of his transferee, may be imperiled to the extent necessary for the due administration of the estate by the executor. A more extended interpretation of Section 112 of the Probate, and Administration Act, as Beaman, J., pointed out in Hasanalli Moledina v. Popatlal Parbhudas 17 Ind. Cas. 17 : 37 B. 211 : 1 Bom. L.R. 782, would be absurd even though it might be defended as strictly logical. When we are invited to interpret Section 112, we cannot overlook that it is a provision inserted in a Statute enacted for the grant of Probate of Wills and letters of Administration to the estate of deceased persons, and that the object of these statutory provisions is to facilitate the performance of their duties by executors and administrators. In such circumstances, it would be an unreasonable construction of the Statute to hold that, notwithstanding the express provisions of the Will, the legatee has no interest in the subject-matter of the legacy. From this standpoint, no ireful analogy can be drawn from the long series of decisions of the Judicial Committee reviewed in Annada Mohan Roy v. Gour Mohan Mallik 65 Ind. Cas. 271 : 48 C. 536 : 25 C.W.N. 496 : 33 C.L.J. 457, which affirm the well known proposition that the interest of a Hindu reversioner expectant on the death of a limited owner is not a vested interest but is a mere spes succession which cannot be sold, mortgaged or otherwise assigned. In our opinion, the interest taken by the mortgagors in the present case in the estate of their paternal grandmother could form the subject-matter of a valid mortgage. This view accords with that adopted by a Full Bench of the Court of Appeals of New York in Drake v. Page (1891) 127 N.Y. 562. In that case, a Will devised the residue of the testator's estate to four persons, share and share alike. A subsequent clause empowered the executors to sell a portion or all of the land for the payment of debts, in case the personally should prove insufficient, and also authorized them to partition the land among the four devisees after the payment of all such debts and expenses. Parker, J., held that the land vested in the devisees, subject to the execution of the power by the executors, and that consequently a mortgage executed by one of the devisees before partition, on the undivided one-fourth interest, was valid. The principle applied was that the assignee would only acquire the right to succeed to that to which his assignors would become entitled on the distribution. To the same effect is the decision in Davis v. Wilson (1903) 115 Ky. 639 where, in similar circumstances, Barker, J., held that the interest of the legatee could be alienated because it was unquestionable that every kind of interest in real estate might be mortgaged, if it was subject to sale and assignment. Reference was made to the decision in Overton v. Means 2 Ky. L.R. 211, where the doctrine had been recognised that " whether an interest by devise in lands was vested or contingent, it was vendible, subject to sale for the satisfaction of debts." We hold accordingly that the appellant cannot successfully impeach the validity of the mortgage created by himself in favour of the plaintiff, who is entitled to cut off the equity of redemption in the present litigation. We are not concerned with the question, how far the mortgagee or the purchaser at the sale in execution of the mortgage-decree, may be affected by orders in the administration suit which was commenced twenty years ago and has not yet resulted in a final judgment.

4. As regards the second question the Subordinate Judge has held that there is conclusive evidence of payment of consideration. The mortgage-deed recites the payment of consideration by means of a cheque drawn on the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China. The cheque was drawn in favour of Babu Taraprosanna Chatterjee, at that time a Vakil of this Court and now a member of the Judicial Service. He acted as the agent of the plaintiff in the transaction. He endorsed the cheque in favour of Babu Monmotha Nath Ganguli who acted as the Solicitor of the mortgagors. The cheque was cashed, and the amount has been traced in the account-books of the trustee defendant, who spent the money on account of the other defendants. These books are proved to bear their signatures, notwithstanding their assertion to the contrary. It is by no means easy to imagine a more idle defence than that put forward by the defendants.

5. The result is that the decree made by the Subordinate Judge is affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.