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Kunhalloor Puthia Veettil Rayarappa Atioti v. Vathukoiloth Parkum Punisseri Kelappa Kurup

Madras High Court
Nov 13, 1916
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Full Bench) — Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements

Factual and Procedural Background

The core dispute addressed in this opinion concerns which rates of compensation for tenants' improvements apply where agreements (demises) were entered into in 1876: (a) whether compensation should be paid at the rates stipulated in those pre‑1886 contracts, or (b) whether compensation should be determined according to the Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Act (including the Acts of 1887 and 1900 and their provisions such as Sects. 5, 6 and 19).

The matter has a complex procedural history: different benches of this Court (including Full Benches and Divisional Benches) have addressed related questions at different times and reached different conclusions. Several earlier Full Bench and divisional decisions were cited and analyzed. Because two lines of Full Bench authority appear to conflict — one holding that pre‑1 January 1886 contracts govern the rate of compensation and another holding that such contracts are not binding if less favourable to the tenant than the statutory rates — the judges referred specific questions for determination by a Full Bench. The case was heard before a Full Bench (a Bench of five Judges) and counsel for the parties addressed the issues in argument before the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether compensation for improvements where a contract was entered into before 1 January 1886 is to be paid at the rates specified in that pre‑1886 contract or in accordance with the provisions of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Acts (including Sects. 5 and 6).
  2. When a pre‑1 January 1886 contract specifies particular rates of compensation, is such a contract valid and binding on the parties irrespective of whether those rates are more or less favourable than the statutory rates provided by the Act?
  3. If the question of the rate of compensation arises after the introduction of the Act, can either party to a contract entered into before 1 January 1886 elect to have the rates fixed according to the Act in preference to the rates mentioned in the contract?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as stated in the opinion)

  • The Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Act (and its 1900 amendment) should be applied retrospectively so as to secure tenants the market value of improvements, and the Act's rates have been applied even to pending suits (citing I.L.R. 13 Mad. 502).
  • Section 19 of the Act (1900) does not govern Section 5; omission of mention of Sect. 19 in Sect. 6 (while other sections are mentioned) is significant in favour of the appellant's view.
  • Section 5 abolishes contracts and custom that would defeat the statutory right (appellant referred to earlier repealed Act's provisions and argued Sect. 5 abrogates contract as well as custom).
  • If contract could prevail against the provisions of the Act, then custom should also prevail by similar logic, which would render the Act ineffective; the absence of any saving clause in the Act indicates the legislature did not intend to protect any contracts.
  • It is the tenant's privilege to choose whether to abide by the contract or to claim under the Act (appellant cited English authorities: (1899) 1 Q.B. 465, (1899) 2 Q.B. 618 and (1911) A.C. 246 — cases under the English Agricultural Holdings Act (1883)).
  • Appellant relied on certain reported decisions (I.L.R. 38 Mad. 589 (F.B.), I.L.R. 34 Mad. 61 and I.L.R. 36 Mad. 410) as supporting the contention that pre‑Act contracts fixing rates alone are not necessarily binding against tenants, and contended that Sect. 19 does not refer to a contract fixing rates alone.
  • Appellant cited further authorities (1913 M.W.N. 52, 29 M.L.J. 316 and 28 I.C. 679) in support of the view that Sect. 19 does not apply to contracts fixing rates alone.

Respondents' Arguments (as stated in the opinion)

  • Section 19 of the Act of 1900 is the re‑enactment of Section 7 of the old Act, and Section 7 had been the subject of judicial consideration in I.L.R. 33 Mad. 218.
  • The legislature, by Section 19, gave effect to the construction put by earlier judgments (I.L.R. 33 Mad. 218) saving contracts prescribing rates; thus Section 19 should not be read as abrogating pre‑1886 contracts that prescribe rates.
  • The earlier Full Bench ruling in I.L.R. 32 Mad. 1 is the correct exposition of the law on the point; other decisions (I.L.R. 34 Mad. 61, I.L.R. 36 Mad. 410 and I.L.R. 38 Mad. 589 (F.B.)) were said by the respondent to be wrong and opposed to the provisions of Section 19, which, the respondent asserted, only abrogates contracts made after the Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as stated in the opinion)
Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan (Full Bench) Held that in the case of a contract made prior to 1 January 1886 the rate of compensation is governed by the terms of the contract. The opinion records this Full Bench ruling as an authoritative precedent and notes it was not dissented from; it figures centrally in the conflict of authorities the Court reviews.
Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman (Full Bench) The Full Bench answered that a prior contract regulating rates is not binding on the tenant if it is less favourable to him than Sects. 5 and 6 of the Act. The Court treats this Full Bench ruling as binding and as creating a direct conflict with Randupurayil; this conflict prompted the present reference and the Court ultimately sides with the view expressed in Kochu Rabia on the enforceability of certain prior contracts.
Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter Obiter (by Benson and Krishnaswami Ayyar, JJ.) suggesting that prior contracts fixing rates only, if unfavourable to tenant, would allow the tenant to claim under the Act. The opinion notes that the case was decided on other grounds and that the obiter suggestion should not be read as inconsistent with the Full Bench ruling in Randupurayil; the Court later views that the obiter does not prevail where Full Bench authority exists.
Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan Held that Section 19 referred only to contracts which took away or limited both the rights to make improvements and to claim compensation, and not to contracts merely regulating the amount of compensation. The opinion records this decision; while earlier benches adopted this narrower view, the Court in the present opinion declines to adopt the restricted construction of Sect. 19 and aligns with the view that the section applies to contracts taking away or limiting either right.
Kerala Varmah Valia Raja v. Ondan Ramunni (Full Bench, 1891) Proceeded on the footing that legislature intended contracts made before the date mentioned to stand unaffected by the Act (i.e., prior contracts to remain valid). Noted by the Court as an earlier Full Bench position; the Court observes later legislative changes and subsequent decisions addressed and moved away from that footing.
Viru Mammad v. Krishnan Decided that the contention that prior contracts should stand unaffected was not in accordance with legislative intention. Cited by the opinion to show that earlier broad contentions about protection of prior contracts were judicially rejected.
I.L.R. 32 Mad. 1 Expounded the proposition that, where there is a prior contract, the contract governs the rate of compensation. The opinion treats this Full Bench ruling as an important precedent in the line of authorities that hold pre‑1886 contracts govern rates; it is part of the conflict considered by the Court.
I.L.R. 34 Mad. 61 Cited in the opinion; described as decided on a quite different point (the opinion notes it was not on the same issue as other cases). The Court observes that I.L.R. 34 Mad. 61 was decided on a different point and therefore does not control the present question in the way some parties asserted.
I.L.R. 36 Mad. 410 Cited and described as relating to a contract of a peculiar nature (not a usual contract regulating the rate of compensation). The Court notes the peculiar factual nature of that decision and does not regard it as generally applicable to ordinary rate‑fixing contracts; the Full Bench in Kochu Rabia held it was not wrongly decided.
I.L.R. 38 Mad. 589 (Full Bench) Cited by appellant as enunciating the correct position favourable to the tenant's option to choose. The Court records that the appellant relied on this Full Bench decision, but in its analysis the Court does not adopt the appellant's expansive reading and ultimately answers the referred questions otherwise.
I.L.R. 33 Mad. 218 Cited as a case in which Section 7 (old Act) was judicially considered and which, respondents contended, supports saving contracts prescribing rates. The Court records that I.L.R. 33 Mad. 218 was relied upon by respondents as the construction applied by their Lordships; the Court engages with that line of authority when construing Sect. 19.
I.L.R. 13 Mad. 502 Cited by appellant for the proposition that the rates mentioned in the Act have been applied even to pending suits. The Court notes the appellant's citation to this report in support of retrospective application but does not adopt the broad retrospective argument.
I.L.R. 20 Mad. 435; I.L.R. 21 Mad. 149 These reports were cited by parties in argument on related points (I.L.R. 21 Mad. 149 described as a case of contract after the Act; I.L.R. 20 Mad. 435 cited for support by appellant). The opinion refers to these reports in the course of surveying authorities but does not treat them as dispositive of the referred questions.
Abdula Rowthan v. Raja Vasudeva Ravivarma Cited to indicate an interpretation by some judges that Kochu Rabia should not be read as negativing a tenant's right to claim under the Act where agreement terms are less favourable — but the present Court could not trace such a ruling in Kochu Rabia. The Court notes the attempted interpretive reliance but states it was unable to find support for that construction in the Kochu Rabia decision itself.
English authorities: (1899) 1 Q.B. 465; (1899) 2 Q.B. 618; (1911) A.C. 246 (cases under the English Agricultural Holdings Act, 1883) Cited by appellant for the proposition that it is the tenant's privilege to choose whether he will abide by the contract or by the statute. The opinion records these citations as part of appellant's argument for tenant's option; the Court does not adopt the appellant's conclusion from those foreign authorities in resolving the referred questions.
Other cited authorities: (1913) M.W.N. 52; 29 M.L.J. 316; 28 I.C. 679 Cited by appellant in support of the contention that Sect. 19 does not refer to contracts fixing rates alone. The opinion records these citations but, after analysis of statute and prior Full Bench authority, proceeds to a construction of Sect. 19 that is broader than the appellant's reliance on these authorities would permit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a sequential review of prior authorities and statutory provisions and proceeded by identifying an apparent conflict between two lines of Full Bench rulings:

  1. The Court first restated the principal conflict: one Full Bench (Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan and related rulings such as I.L.R. 32 Mad. 1) had held that contracts made before 1 January 1886 govern the rate of compensation; another Full Bench (Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman) held that a prior contract regulating rates is not binding if it is less favourable to the tenant than the statutory rates under Sects. 5 and 6.
  2. The Court examined decisions in which judges had attempted to reconcile or distinguish these authorities (for example, obiter remarks in Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter and the decision in Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan which accepted a narrower reading of Sect. 19). The Court observed that some prior decisions involved peculiar facts or were decided on different points and therefore could not be taken as general propositions applicable to all pre‑1886 contracts.
  3. The Court then focused on the proper construction of Section 19 (formerly Section 7) of the Act. It reasoned from the statutory text and legislative purpose that Section 19 deals with future contracts (contracts made after 1 January 1886) and cannot permissibly be read as affecting contracts made before that date. The Court emphasized that Section 19 is not expressed to be retrospective.
  4. Turning to the narrower question whether Section 19 should be confined to contracts that both limit the tenant's right to make improvements and limit his right to claim compensation, the Court rejected the restrictive reading. The Court concluded Section 19 applies equally to contracts that take away or limit either of the rights (to make improvements or to claim compensation). In doing so the Court relied on the established principle that the word "and" in a statute may be read as "or" where required to carry the legislature's obvious intention (the opinion cites Maxwell on Statutes as an authority for this rule).
  5. The Court also noted textual aids supporting a broad reading of Section 19: the existence of a proviso excluding a particular class of contracts and the insertion of the word "to" before "claim" when Section 7 was re‑enacted as Section 19. These indicia were taken as supportive of the view that contracts affecting only the right to claim compensation come within the section.
  6. Having examined the conflicting Full Bench authorities, their factual bases and the statutory language, the Court concluded it was bound by the uniform course of decisions to answer the referred questions in a particular manner (specified below). The Court expressly rejected the narrower approach (ascribed to decisions such as I.L.R. 34 Mad. 61 and I.L.R. 36 Mad. 410 in certain respects) insofar as that approach would treat contracts fixing rates alone as unaffected by the later statutory regime for future contracts.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the referred questions as follows: it answered the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The Court holds that contracts entered into before 1 January 1886 which specify rates of compensation are to be treated as valid and binding in the circumstances described (answer to the first question: affirmative).
  • The Court holds that when the question of rate of compensation arises after the introduction of the Act, neither party to a contract entered into before 1 January 1886 can elect to have the rates fixed according to the Act in preference to the rates mentioned in such a pre‑1886 contract (answer to the second question: negative).

Broader implications and statutory interpretation:

  • The Court interpreted Section 19 as applying to future contracts made after 1 January 1886 and as applying to contracts that take away or limit either the right to make improvements or the right to claim compensation (i.e., "and" may be read as "or" to effectuate the legislature's intention).
  • The opinion clarifies that Section 19 is not retrospective in effect and that prior contracts must be judged by ordinary principles of contract law (including provisions such as Section 28 and other parts of the Contract Act), rather than by Section 19 which is aimed at future contracts.

The Court resolved the referred conflict of authority by rejecting a narrow reading of Section 19 that would confine its operation only to contracts that both remove the tenant's right to make improvements and limit his right to claim compensation. The opinion answers the formal reference by affirming the validity of pre‑1886 contracts and denying the right of parties thereafter to elect statutory rates in place of pre‑existing contract rates.

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ORDER OF REFERENCE TO A FULL BENCH

The question for determination in this case is whether the compensation for improvements is to be paid for at the rates stipulated for in the demises of 1876 or in accordance with the provisions of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Act. In the Full Bench ruling reported in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kantian, it was held that in the case of a contract made prior to 1st January 1886, the rate of compensation is governed by the terms of the contract. In a subsequent case repoted in Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter. Benson and Krishnaswami Ayyar, JJ., expressed an opinion (obiter) that if a contract as to the rate of compensation is unfavourable to the tenant even though it has been entered into before 1st January 1886, he is entitled to claim compensation under Sect. 5 of the Act at the rates prescribed in Sects. 9-18, and remarked that this opinion was not opposed to the Full Bench ruling in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan as the question therein answered was whether the making of the improvements after 1886 disentitled the tenants to the rates fixed by the contract before that date. This, we think, hardly expresses the matter correctly. Although the question in dispute in the suit was as to the rate payable for improvements made after 1886, the question referred to the Full Bench was couched in general terms as follows:

“In the case of a contract made prior to 1st January 1886, is the rate of compensation which a tenant is entitled to receive governed by the terms of the contract or by the provisions of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Acts of 1887 and 1900?”, and the answer given was that in the case of a contract made prior to 1st January 1886, the rate of compensation is governed by the terms of the contract. This being so, we do not think that the facts of the case can warrant us in reading into the answer a modificaton that is not there, for the decision of the Full Bench is merely an answer to the question prounded and is not, unless expressly so stated, to be considered as a decision which must be construed as governed by the facts of the case in which the reference is prounded, when no reference is made to those facts in the question referred to the Full Bench. The same view of the law was followed by another Divisional Bench (Benson and Sundara Aiyar, JJ.) in Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan and it was held that Sect. 19 of the Act referred only to contracts which took away or limited the right of a tenant both to make improvements and to claim compensation for them, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and not to contracts which merely regulated the amount of compensation that they could claim. In Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman, two other learned Judges of this Court (Sadasiva Aiyar and Tyabji, JJ.) thinking that the decisions in Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter and in Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan, were not in accordance with the Full Bench ruling in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan and that the distinction drawn between the right of a tenant to make improvements and to claim compensation for them and his right to claim under an agreement which does not expressly refer to his power to nuke improvements was somewhat hypercritical, referred the following questions to a Full Bench.

(1) “Whether a contract which is made prior to the 1st January 1886 and which regulates the rates of compensation claimable by the tenant for improvements or provides for methods of fixing the amount of compensation due to him (such rates or methods not being in accordance with the provisions in Sects. 5 and 6 of the said Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Act) but which does not expressly refer to the tenant's right to make improvements, is not binding on him if such a contract is less favourable to him than Sects. 5 and 6 of the Act, and whether the tenant is entitled to repudiate the contract and to claim compensation according to the provisions of the Act, and whether Sect. 19 of the Act affects such contracts.”

(2) “Whether Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter and Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan have correctly interpreted the Full Bench decision in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan.”

The reply of the Full Bench to the first question was that the contract mentioned therein was not binding on the tenant if it is less favourable to him than Sects. 5 and 6 of the Act. In reply to the second question, the Court was of opinion that having regard to the question which the Court had to consider in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan there was no inconsistency between the judgments in that case and the judgments in Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter and in Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan and remarked in conclusion “we are not prepared to say that the last two cases were not rightly decideu.” It will thus appear that the prior ruling in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kunnan, was not disssented from, and as regards I.L.R, 34 Mad., 61 and I.L.R, 36 Mad., 410 it was held that they were not wrongly decided. In Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter the case was decided quite apart from the opinion expressed obiter which the learned referring Judges in Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman, considered to be in conflict with the ruling in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan and in Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan the contract under consideration was of a peculiar nature and did not merely regulate the rates of compensation. It would appear therefore that both the Full Bench rulings, i.e, in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan and in Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman, are stiil in force and are binding on us. The question for decision in the case before us now is whether the rate of compensation which the tenans are entitled to receive is to be governed by the contracts of 1876 or by the provisions of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Art. According to the decision in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan the tenants are entitled only to the rate of compensation contained in the contract. The question might however be put in the form of the first question referred to the Full Bench in Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman and according to the opinion expressed in that case the answer must be that the contract is not binding on the tenant, if it is less favourable to him than Sects 5 and 6 of the Act and consequently the tenants would be entitled to the higher rates provided in the Act. These two answers in the present case are directly conflicting, and as both the rulings are binding on us, the latter one not having in any way dissented from the former, we are in doubt as to which ruling to follow and think that the question should be again referred to a Full Bench. No doubt in Abdula Rowthan v. Raja Vasudeva Ravivarma, one of the referring Judges in Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman, Sadasiva Aiyar and Najier, JJ., interpreted the ruling on their reference as holding that the decision in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan should not be construed as negativing the tenant's right to claim compensation according to the Act if the terms of the agreement are less favourable to him but we are unable to trace such a ruling in Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman, where it is only stated that I.L.R 34 Marl. 61 and I.L.R 36 Mad. 410 were not inconsistent with I.L.R 32 Mad. 1, and were rightly decided. As we have pointed out, I.L.R 34. Mad. 61 was decided on quite a different point and I.L.R 36 Mad. 410 related to a contract of a somewhat peculiar nature unlike the usual contract regulatig the rate of compensation. As regards the provisions of Sect. 19 of the Act and the opinion held in Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter and in Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan(5), that the section only refers to contracts limiting the right to make improvements and to claim compensation and not to contracts merely regulating the rate of compensation payable, we would like to identify ourselves with the remarks made by the referring judges in Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman, and would also add a further observation which seems to have escaped notice in the cases referred to above. Sect. 19 of the Act prescribes that contracts of a certain class made after 1st January 1886 shall be inoperative, but it is not apparent that the provisions of the section affect in any way contracts made before that date. Any contracts made before that date whether of the class referred to in Sect. 19 or of any other nature, must be considered and their validity determined according to law apart from any consideration of Sect. 19, which does not purport to be restrospective in effect. In the case therefore of a contract regulating the rate of compensation payable and entered into before 1st January 1886, the question for determination does not seem to us to be, whether it is a contract of the nature contemplated in Sect 19, but whether it is a contract which is valid and binding according to law, and more especially the law as contained in Sect. 28 and other provisions of the Contract Act. If prior contracts of the nature specified in Sect. 19 are rendered invalid by reason of the passing of the Tenants' Improvements Act or are invalid in law for any other reason, Sect, 19 would appear to be superfluous, for contracts after 1st January 1886 would be invalid for the same reason and there is no reason for declaring their invalidity by a special provision of the legislature.

We therefore again refer the following questions for determination by a Full Bench as they are questions which are constantly cropping up and in many cases as in the present one, large sums of money are involved.

1. When a contract his been entered into between a Malabar tenant and his landlord before 1st January 1886, according to which compensation is payable at certain rates therein specified, is such contract valid and binding on them, whether the rates are more or less favourable to either party than the rates prescribed by the Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act?

2 When the question of the rate of compensation comes up for determination at a date after the introduction of the Act, can either party to a contract entered into before 1st January 1886 elect to have the rates fixed according to the Act in preference to the rates mentioned in the contract?

[This Second Appeal came on for hearing on this day pursuant to the above Order of Reference, befor the Full Bench as constituted above]
Mr. C. V. Anantakrishna Aiyar (Mr. P. V. Parameswara Aiyar with him) for the Appellants:—The Malabar Compensation for Tenant's Improvements Act is really retrospective. Act I of 1900, which amended the Act of 1876 and thereby secured to the tenants the market-value of the improvements, cannot be intended to refer only to improvements to be made in future. The rates mentioned in the Act ha\e been applied even to pending suits; see I.L.R, 13 Mad., 502. Sect. 19 of the Act of 1900 does not govern Sect. 5 of the Act. The non-mention of Sect. 19 in Sect. 6 while the other Sects, viz., 8 to 18 are mentioned, is significant. Sect. 5 abrogates contract as well as custom. See Sect. 4 of the repealed Act. If contract can prevail against the provisions, of the Act, then logic would require that custom also can prevail. That would be to make the provisions of the Act wholly nugatory. The absence of any saving clause in the Act shows that the legislature did not intend to protect any contracts whatsoever.
It is the privilege of the tenant always to choose whether he will abide by the contract or by the Act. See (1899) 1 Q. B. 465, (1899) 2 Q.B 618 and (1911) A.C 246, all cases under the English Agricultural Holdings Act (1883). See also I.L.R, 20 Mad., 435.
So far as the decisions of this Court are concerned, the latest ruling in I.L.R, 38 Mad., 589 (F.B) enunciates the correct position. I.L.R, 21 Mad., 149 was a case of contract after the Act and I.L.R, 33 Mad., 218 related to the question of custom. I.L.R, 32 Mad., I (F. B.) is clearly distinguishable. It assumed that the contract was valid and decided only that the contract being valid, the same rates mentioned therein would apply whether the improvements were effected before or after the Act. I.L.R, 34 Mad, 61 and I.L.R, 36 Mad., 410 are clearly in my favour and explain the true scope and import of the decision in I.L.R, 32 Mad., 1. That the explanation given therein is correct is also clear from I L.R 38 Mad., 589 (F.B). It is clear therefore that Sect. 19 does not refer to a contract fixing rates alone. It is only if the tenant's right to improvements is limited or taken away whether with or without a limitation as to the rates that Sect. 19 applies. See also (1913) M.W.N, 52, 29 M.L.J, 316, and 28 I. C. 679.
Mr. C. Madhavan Nair for the Respondents:—Sect. 19 in the Act of 1900, is simply a re-enactment of Sect. 7 of the old Act. Sect. 7 was the subject of judicial consideration in I.L.R 33 Mad., 218. The legislature has in Sect. 19 simply given effect to the construction put by their Lordships in I.L.R, 33 Mad., 218 on the old Sect. 7 as clearly saving contracts prescribing rates. The earlier Full Bench ruling in I.L.R, 32 Mad., 1 is the only correct exposition of the law on the point and the decisions in I.L.R, 34 Mad., 61, I.L.R, 36 Mad., 410 and I.L.R, 38 Mad., 589 (F. B.) are all wrong and are clearly opposed to the provisions of Sect. 19 which only abrogates contracts made after the Act.

OPINION

The decision of the Full Bench of four Judges in 1891 in Kerala Varmah Valia Raja v. Ondan Ramunni proceeded upon the footing that the intention of the legislature was that contracts made before the date mentioned should stand unaffected by the Act, in other words that Sects. 5 and 6 (corresponding to Sects. 4 and 5 of the earlier Act) did not apply to cases governed by such contracts. This was expressly decided in Viru Mammad v. Krishnan. As this contention was not in accordance with the intention of the legislature it would hardly have refrained from putting the matter right when repealing and re-enacting the act with modifications in 1899. In 1908 it was again held by a Full Bench in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan, that Sect. 19 (formerly 7) did not affect the validity of contracts made prior to the 1st of January 1886 whether the improvements were made before or after the coming into force of the Act of 1887. In 1900 Benson and Krishnaswami Aiyar, JJ., in Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter whilst disposing of the case on another ground, suggested that, while prior contracts dealing with right to make improvements and claim compensation for them were saved under the Act, this was not the case with prior contracts dealing only with the rates at which compensation was to be paid. This view was adopted in Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan in 1911 by Benson and Sundara Aiyar, JJ., who refused to give effect to a contract made prior to January 1886 which did not restrict the tenant's right to make improvements but only the rates payable for such improvements. In 1913 Sadasiva Aiyar and Tyabji JJ., referred to a Full Bench the questions whether such contracts were enforceable, and whether the two last mentioned decisions were consistent with the Full Bench decision in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kuhi Kantian The Full Bench answered without assigning reasons that such contracts were not enforceable if less favourable to the tenant than Sects. 5 and 6 of the Act and that the decisions in Kozhikot Sreemana A. Vikraman v. Modathil Ananta Patter, and in Paru Amma v. Kunhikandan were not inconsistent with the Full Bench ruling in Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan. The question has again been referred to a Full Bench by Spencer and Phillips, JJ., on the ground that the Full Bench decision in Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman is inconsistent with the earlier Full Bench decision im Randupurayil Kunhisore v. Neroth Kunhi Kannan and that they are in doubt which to follow and has now come before a Bench of five Judges.

After hearing the whole question re-argued we agree with the referring-Judges in Kochu Rabia v. Abdurahman and in the present case that the view advanced in I.L.R 34 Mad. 61 and adopted in I. L. R. 36 Mad. 410 and accepted by the Full Bench in Kochu Rabia v. Abburahman cannot be supported. Sect. 19 (formerly 7) which deals in terms with future contracts cannot in our opinion he construed as dealing only with contracts which take away or limit the right of a tenant to make improvements and also limit his right to claim compensation for them under the Act, but applies equally to contracts which take away or limit either of these rights. It is we think clear that the legislature intended to prohibit all future contracts taking away or limiting either or both of these rights It is well settled that the word “and” may be read as “or” where it is necessary to do so in order to carry out the obvious intention of the legislature (Maxwell on Statutes 331, 3rd Edition). The existence of a proviso excluding from the operation of the section a particular class of contracts dealing with the compensation payable under the Act, and the insertion of the word “to” before “claim” when the original Sect. 7 was re-enacted as Sect, 19 also support this view. If, as we hold, contracts, affecting only the right to claim compensation come within the section, the suggested distinction fails, and we are bound, following the uniform course of decisions in this Court, to answer the first question referred to us in the affirmative and the second in the negative.

S. S.