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Sree Muthangi Seetharamayya Garu And Others v. Panthan Sathiah And Others
Leach, C.J:— The appellants are the legal representatives of one Sree Mathangi Sitharamayya, who has died since the institution of the appeal. Sitharamayya instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Eajahmundry, to recover a sum of Rs. 7306-2-9 claimed to be due to him on a promissory note dated 30th December 1928, executed by Pantham Venkataratnamma, the mother of the respondents as their guardian. The respondents' father was one Panthan Chinna Venkanna, who on 21st February 1923 borrowed from Sitharamayya Rs. 4000 on a promissory note. This debt had not been discharged at the time of his death in 1925. On 29th January 1926, the widow executed a promissory note in substitution of the note given by her husband, the renewal being for a sum of Rs. 5410, representing the Rs. 4000 and interest. In the body of the promissory note, it was stated that it was executed by her as the mother and guardian of the respondents, and she signed the instrument in that capacity. The promissory note in suit was executed by her in renewal of the last mentioned promissory note for a sum of Rs. 7306-2-9, the difference between Rs. 5410 and Rs. 7306-2-9 representing the interest which had accrued due since 29th January 1926. The promissory note is in the following terms:
Promissory note executed on 30th December 1928, in favour of Sri Mathangi Sitharamayya Garu, resident of Rajahmundry, by Venkataratnamma, as the mother and guardian of the minors (1) Satteyya, (2) Perayya Naidu and Venkatarao, sons of the late Pantham China Venkanna, residents of Vengalpudi. The principal and interest due on the promissory note executed and delivered on 29th January 1926, is Rs. 7306-2-9 (Rupees Seven thousand three hundred and six, annas two and pies nine). On demand I shall pay the same to you or order together with interest thereon from now till payment of the amount at Re. 1 (one rupee) per cent, per mensem, get the payment endorsed on the note and take it back. The consideration of this is received as aforesaid. This promissory note is executed with consent.
2. The signature of Venkataratnamma was appended, but in this case she did not add the words describing herself as the mother and guardian of the minors.
3. The suit was defended on the following grounds: (1) the promissory note executed by the respondents' father represented moneys obtained by him for his own immoral purposes; (2) the signatures on the promissory note in suit and on the promissory note dated 29th January 1926 were not genuine, and (3) the suit could not be maintained against the respondents inasmuch as in signing the promissory note in suit their mother had not described herself as their guardian. The learned trial Judge decided in favour of the plaintiff on the first two points, but held against him on the third point. The questions relating to the father's immorality and the genuine, ness of the mother's signatures have not been raised before us, and we are merely called upon to decide whether the respondents are bound by their mother's signature on the promissory note in suit.
4. This appeal is governed by the decision of a Full Bench of this Court consisting of Beasley C.J, Ramesam and King, JJ. in 58 Mad 7351 which is in the appellant's favour. In passing, I may mention that the judgment in the present case was delivered after the Full Bench had given its decision. The facts are almost identical. In the Full Bench case a promissory note had been executed by the mother of Hindu minors on their behalf and in the body of the note it was stated that they were represented by their mother, but she signed the note without any description following the signature. She had executed an earlier promissory note which itself was in renewal of a promissory note executed by her deceased husband. It was held that the surrounding circumstances should be looked into in order to find out whether the maker of the note intended to exclude her personal liability as guardian but to make the wards liable. Seeing that the promissory note was in renewal of earlier promissory notes, ultimately leading up to the father's liability, it was held that it was a proper inference to draw that she did intend to exclude her personal liability. It was also held that in a proper case it was within the competence of a guardian by executing a promissory note to make a minor liable to the extent of the joint family property in his hands.
5. The learned advocate for the respondents has not asked us to hold that the mother did not sign the instrument sued upon on behalf of the minors. He could not contend to the contrary because the note itself shows this, as does the earlier promissory note executed by the mother, and we know that the two instruments executed by her were renewals of the father's promissory note. The learned advocate however wishes us to regard 58 Mad 735 as being wrongly decided, his reason being that a Hindu minor cannot be made liable on a promissory note executed by his mother as his guardian. He does not ask us to disregard the decision, but suggests that we should refer the question to another Full Bench. To justify this course, we must be convinced that there are grounds for doubting the correctness of the judgment. The learned advocate has advanced no reasons why we should doubt its correctness. In holding that a Hindu guardian can bind a minor in respect of a promissory note in proper circumstances the learned Judges followed 42 Mad 185,2 which was decided by a Full Bench consisting of Wallis C.J, and Ayling and Seshagiri Ayyar, JJ., who held that the judgment of the Privy Council in 11 Bom 551,3 did not throw doubts on the correctness of the opinion that a Hindu guardian can make a minor liable on a promissory note. A similar opinion has also been expressed by other High Courts and this Court has regarded it as being settled law. Consequently we see no reason to refer the present appeal to a Full Bench. The appeal being governed by 58 Mad 735, it must be allowed with costs here and in the Court below. The liability of the respondents will, of course, be limited to the assets of the estate in their hands. There is a memorandum of cross objections, but these cross-objections have not been pressed and will be dismissed without costs.
C.R.K/D.S
6. Appeal allowed.
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