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Rani Shashi Mukei (Debi) Chaudhurani And Ors. v. Sarat Chandra Chakraverty And Ors. Opposite Party.

Calcutta High Court
Aug 24, 1926
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Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This Rule challenges an order dated 16th April 1926 made in proceedings under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code by a Deputy Magistrate of Faridpur concerning a chur (river island) of about 2,500 bighas in the Padma River near Goalundo Ghat Railway Station. Three parties claimed portions of the chur, which were mapped into Blocks A, B and C. The Sub-Inspector of Goalundo Ghat Thana visited the chur on 29th January 1925 and prepared a sketch (Ex. 6) showing the three parties in possession respectively of Blocks A, B and C; he submitted a police report dated 8th February 1925.

Proceedings under section 145 Cr.P.C. were initiated on or about 12th February 1925; on 27th March 1925 proceedings were dropped and an order under section 144 Cr.P.C. was passed confining the parties to the three blocks; pegs were posted on 9th April 1925. Disturbances occurred on 13th April 1925 leading to criminal prosecutions (some resulting in acquittals). A subsequent police report (26th April 1925) led to fresh section 145 proceedings started on 28th April 1925, terminating in the impugned order of 16th April 1926. The second party obtained the present Rule challenging that order on four grounds (grounds Nos. 2, 4, 5 and 8 of the petition of motion).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether three maps (Exs. L, B and 8) had admissibility or evidentiary value on the question of possession such that they could be treated as determinative in the section 145 proceedings.
  2. Whether certain documentary materials favourable to the second party (Exs. 7, P, Z6, T and X) were improperly disregarded by the Magistrate and should have been given decisive weight on the question of possession.
  3. Whether the Police report dated 8th February 1925 and the sketch Ex. 6 were improperly used as evidence of possession by the Magistrate.
  4. Whether, because of the prohibitory order issued on 27th March 1925, the Magistrate should have determined possession as at 27th March 1925 rather than as at the date of the section 145 proceedings.
  5. Whether the Magistrate's order (16th April 1926) should be interfered with by this Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Second Party (Rule Petitioner)

  • Challenged the impugned order on the grounds numbered 2, 4, 5 and 8 in the petition of motion (the Rule was issued upon these grounds).
  • Contended that certain documentary evidence favourable to the second party (Exs. 7, P, Z6, T and X) had not been duly considered by the Magistrate and were material on the question of possession.
  • Contended that the Police report of 8th February 1925 and the Sub-Inspector's sketch (Ex. 6) were wrongly used as evidence of possession.
  • Contended that because a prohibitory order under section 144 Cr.P.C. was in force on 27th March 1925, the enquiry should have fixed possession as at that earlier date rather than at the date of the section 145 proceedings.

First and Third Parties (Respondents)

  • Contended that the maps and other materials relied upon by the Magistrate were admissible and that the Magistrate was justified in treating the sketch and police report as "landmarks" alongside other evidence.
  • Argued that documents admitted without objection could not be challenged for admissibility at this stage (i.e., that the admissibility could not now be attacked), and maintained that there were sufficient other materials on the record to justify the Magistrate's conclusion as to possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court (Mukerji, J.) examined the contentions grouped around the admissibility and weight of maps and documents, the use of the police report/sketch, and the appropriate temporal point for assessing possession.

On the maps (Exs. L, B and 8): the Court described the provenance and purpose of each map: Ex. L — a map prepared by a pleader-Commissioner under orders of the Magistrate to show the chur and the blocks depicted in the Sub-Inspector's sketch; it was used for identifying the blocks but not introduced as evidence of factual matters beyond identification. Ex. 8 — prepared by an amin in August 1924 in connection with demarcation under the Survey Act and explanatory of an order in those proceedings (Ex. 9), and therefore relevant to those proceedings. Ex. B — prepared by a kanungoo at the instance of the first and second parties and largely showed thak and survey lines re-laid on the Commissioner's map. The Court concluded these contentions about the maps were unsubstantial in relation to the impugned order.

On the documentary materials (Exs. 7, P, Z6, T and X): the Court analysed each briefly: - Ex. 7 was an order-sheet of a previous section 144 proceeding (dated 31st April 1924) in which the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had opined that the principal members of the present second party were in possession and had issued an injunction restraining the first party. - Ex. P was the High Court order (18th March 1924) refusing to interfere with that injunction and indicating agreement with the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's view on possession. - Ex. Z6 related to earlier section 145 proceedings of 23rd December 1925 that were dropped and revived; the later section 144 order was referred to in the Magistrate's judgment. - Exs. T and X were criminal judgments (29th June 1925 and 31st August 1925) in rioting/mischief cases ending in acquittal of men of the second party with incidental observations about possession. The Court observed that, even where favorable to the second party, these materials had limited evidentiary value for establishing possession at the particular date relevant to the section 145 proceedings. Orders under section 144 reflect the situation only at the time they were made and cannot by themselves show possession at the termination of the statutory period during which those orders remained operative; criminal judgments showing acquittal do not translate their incidental findings on possession into decisive evidence for the section 145 inquiry.

On the use of the police report (8th February 1925) and the Sub-Inspector's sketch (Ex. 6): the Magistrate had relied on them as "landmarks" indicating that on 29th January 1925 the three parties were in possession of the respective blocks and, because an armed guard had been posted until early April 1925, there was unlikely to have been any change of possession prior to the date of the section 145 proceedings. The Magistrate thus concluded possession at the date of the proceedings was the same as on 29th January 1925.

The Court agreed with the form of the Magistrate's reasoning and its soundness generally but rejected the assumption that the police report and sketch could be treated as evidence establishing possession. The Court held that the only legitimate use of the police report and sketch was to serve as materials for starting the proceedings, identifying the subject-matter and disputing parties, and as a "land-mark" guiding inquiry — but they were not proper evidence of possession and should be excluded for that purpose. The Court rejected the contention that admissibility once unobjected-to could not be challenged at this stage because the issue was the evidentiary value of the documents' contents, not merely the mode of proof.

Having excluded reliance upon Ex. 6 and the police report as evidence of possession, the Court nonetheless examined the remainder of the record. It found a body of clear, definite and unambiguous oral evidence establishing four facts relied upon in the judgment:

  • (a) The blocks lie within certain defined boundaries;
  • (b) Possession of tenants holding lands on the border between contiguous blocks did not extend beyond the separating lines;
  • (c) There was definite evidence showing the blocks were in the possession of one or other of the parties at the time of the Sub-Inspector's visit on 29th January 1925;
  • (d) It was more than improbable that any change of possession occurred while the armed guard remained on the spot (i.e., until well within two months before the date of the section 145 proceedings).

On this basis the Court concluded that, even excluding the police report/sketch as evidence of possession, the remaining materials adequately supported the Magistrate's conclusion about possession and did not warrant interference with the impugned order.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Rule is DISCHARGED. The Court declined to interfere with the Magistrate's order dated 16th April 1926.

Immediate consequence: the impugned order confining the three parties to possession of the three blocks shown in the map (Ex. 6) remains in effect; the Court found no reason to set aside or modify that order.

The opinion does not develop any broader legal principle as a new precedent; its determination rests on exclusion of the police report and sketch as evidence of possession while upholding the Magistrate's conclusion on the basis of the remaining material on the record.

Judges

Mukerji, J. (delivered the principal judgment). Roy, J. agreed.


This summary is strictly limited to the information contained in the provided court opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

Mukerji, J.:— This Rule relates to an order passed under sec. 145, Cr. P.C, by a Deputy Magistrate of Faridpur. The proceedings were in respect of a chur about 2,500 bighas in area in, the river Padma, near the Goalundo Ghat Railway Station. There, were three parties to the proceedings. The area has been divided into three portions, marked as Blocks A, B and C in the same map. Block A has been declared to be in possession of the first party, Block C of the second party and Block B of the third party. The second party have moved this Court and obtained this Rule.

In order to deal with the contentions urged in support of this Rule it is necessary to state a few facts. The dispute relating to this chur has a long history at its back. For our present purposes it is not necessary to go beyond the 29th January 1925, when the Sub-Inspector of Goalundp Ghat Thana visited the chur on information received about an apprehended breach of the peace. On that occasion the said Sub-Inspector prepared a sketch (Ex. 6) dividing the chur into three portions marked thereon as Blocks A, B and C as representing the lands of which he found the three parties, namely, the first, third and second, parties respectively in possession. This sketch (Ex. 6) he submitted along with a report, dated the 8th February 1925. To prevent a breach of the peace he posted constables and also an armed guard on the chur. On the basis of the aforesaid Police report proceedings under sec. 145, Cr. P.C, were started on or about the 12th February 1925 but eventually on the 27th March 1925 the said proceedings were propped and an order under sec. 144, Cr. P.C, was passed confining the possession of the three parties to the three blocks aforesaid. On the 9th April 1925 the said blocks were demarcated by the posting of pegs. The armed guard was withdrawn and only a few constables were left on the chur. With this relaxation of watch on the part of the Police, certain disturbances took place on the 13th April 1925. These led to the institution of two criminal cases against the men of the second party. One of these cases ended in the acquittal of the men concerned therein, before the order complained of in the present Rule was passed. It is said that the other case also had the same fate though at the date of the said order it was yet pending. The Sub-Inspector of Goalundo Ghat Thana then submitted a further report in continuation of the report, of the 8th February 1925, on the 26th April 1925, and thereupon on the 28th April 1925 the present proceedings under sec. 145, Cr. P.C, were started. These proceedings terminated in the order, dated the 16th April 1926, against, which this Rule is directed.

The Rule has been issued upon four grounds, being grounds Nos. 2, 4, 5 and 8 of the petition of motion. The contentions involved, in these grounds have to be grouped in a somewhat different way for the sake of convenience.

The first contention relates to the admissibility or rather the evidentiary value of three maps, Exs. L, B and 8. Ex. L is the map of the chur prepared by a pleader Commissioner. Babu Hem Chandra Majumdar under the orders of the Magistrate for use in these proceedings. It was considered necessary to have an accurate map prepared by a trained surveyor showing the whole chur as well as the blocks which appeared in the sketch Ex. 6, and that is why this map was prepared. It does not appear that it has been used in evidence in respect of any matter which it purports to depict and the only use that has been made of it is to refer to it for identifying the blocks in respect of which the final, order has been made. Ex. 8 is the map prepared in August 1924 by an amin Gopal Chandra Das in connection with certain demarcation proceedings under the Survey Act that took place at the time. This map is explanatory of Ex. 9 the order passed in these proceedings and is therefore relevant. As regards Ex. B which is a map prepared by a kanungoo at the instance of two of the parties, viz., the first and the second parties, it only shows the thak and the survey lines relaid on the Commissioner's map, Ex. L, and it is difficult to imagine how it is irrelevant and in any case no reliance appears to have been placed on it in the order which is complained against in this Rule. This contention therefore is of no substance.

The next contention is to the effect that certain pieces of documentary evidence which are very material on the question of possession and are in favour of the second party have not been duly considered by the Magistrate. This contention relates to the documents marked Exs. 7, P. Z6, T and X. Ex. 7 is an order in the order-sheet of a previous case under sec. 144, Cr. P.C, dated 31st April 1924, in which the then Sub-Divisional Magistrate on a visit to the locality expressed the opinion that the present second party or rather the principal members of it were in possession of the chur and issued an injunction on the first party in those proceedings restraining them under sec. 144, Cr. P.C, from entering on the lands of the chur. Ex. P, is the order of the High Court, dated 18th March 1924, refusing to interfere with the injunction, Ex. 7, and the learned Judges who passed that order were of opinion that the view as to possession which the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had taken was right. Ex. Z6 is the order-sheet of certain proceedings under sec. 145, Cr. P.C, which were drawn up on the 23rd December 1925 but were dropped on the same day, and which on the submission of the Police report of the 8th February 1925 were revived but were again dropped on the 27th March 1925, an order under sec. 144, Cr. P.C, being passed instead as has been already stated. This last mentioned order under sec. 144, Cr. P.C, has been referred to in the Magistrate's judgment. Exs. X and T are judgments, dated 29th June 1925 and 31st August 1925, in certain criminal cases of rioting and mischief (one of these relating to one of the two cases which arose out of the occurrences of the 13th April 1925), which ended in the acquittal of men of the second party and in which there are some observations showing that the accused concerned therein were in possession of the lands involved in those occurrences. Apart from the fact that some of these documents are not inter partes, the evidentiary value of the findings on the question of possession, such as they are contained in these documents, at the date with which we are concerned, is practically nil. The orders under sec. 144 could only refer to a point of time when they were passed and assuming that what was stated therein on the question of possession was anything more than the opinion of the Courts which passed those orders, these orders cannot show who came to be in possession when the statutory period during which these orders remained operative was at an end. The judgments of the Criminal Courts, in which the men of the second party were acquitted and in which it was incidentally found that they were in possession, can only be evidence of the fact that there were those cases and that they ended in such acquittal, but the finding on the question of possession which is a ground of such acquittal can hardly be any evidence in the present proceedings.

The third contention urged in support of the Rule is to the effect that the Police report, dated the 8th February 1925, and the sketch Ex. 6 have been wrongly used as evidence on the question of possession. Along with this contention it will be convenient to deal with the fourth one, namely, that as because of the prohibitory order passed on the 27th March 1925 the parties were precluded from giving evidence of their possession in the entire chur, the Magistrate should have directed his enquiry on the question of possession not as at the date of the proceedings but as on 27th March 1925.

The process of reasoning by which the learned Magistrate has arrived at his conclusion is as follows:—To quote his own words he was of opinion that “the oral evidence of the tenants and other witnesses as regards facts of actual possession by the respective parties is not only of a partisan kind but lacks definiteness on most essential points.” He found, however, that there were certain “landmarks” in the evidence which were practically admitted by the parties and on which he could safely rely. He found that the sketch prepared by the Sub-Inspector of Goalundo Ghat Thana showed the possession of three parties in different portions of the chur which he depicted in the Blocks A, B and C. This possession in his opinion remained intact till the 9th April 1925 when pegs were posted demarcating the blocks, as already stated. He was further of opinion that there could not have been any change in the possession of the parties during this period because the armed guard remained on the spot from the beginning of February to the first part of April 1925. Accordingly he held that the possession of the parties at the date of the proceedings—unless there was a forcible and wrongful change on the 13th April 1925 which for the purpose of sec. 145 is of no avail as being within two months from the date of the proceedings—was the same as it was on the 29th January 1925 and as shown by the Sub-Inspector in his report, dated 8th February 1925, and the sketch Ex. 6. Despite the very ingenious arguments advanced on behalf of the first and the third parties this is what seems to me to be substance of the reasoning of the learned Magistrate. This reasoning to my mind is perfectly sound, but for the assumption which it makes, namely, that the sketch Ex. 6 and, the statement in the Police report of the 8th February 1925 correctly represent the state of affairs as they stood at the time. If this assumption is correct, then no objection can he taken to the Magistrate having found possession at the date of the proceedings and not on the 27th March 1925, for in that case there was no change of possession from the 29th February 1925 at any time forward. The only legitimate use to which the sketch and the report could be put is to treat them as the basis of the proceedings and as affording materials for determining the question of likelihood of a breach of the peace and of the identity of the subject-matter of the dispute and of the disputing parties. The use that has been made of these documents is to treat the fact, evidenced thereby, of the Sub-Inspector having seen the parties in possession of the respective blocks as a “land-mark”—the word being used figuratively—which serves as a guide leading to the conclusions at which the learned Magistrate has arrived. The other evidence on the record has been only treated as corroborative of this map and Ex. 6 so far as this matter is concerned. I am therefore clearly of opinion that the use that has been made of these two documents is not a proper one, and that they should be excluded from consideration as evidence of possession. I am unable to accept as well-founded the arguments of the first and the third parties that when these documents were admitted without objection their admissibility cannot be challenged now, because the question here is not a mere question of mode of proof but a question of the evidentiary value of their contents on the question of possession.

The learned Sessions Judge in his order refusing to make a reference to this Court against the order appears to have taken the same view of this matter. He has, however, observed in his order that there are other materials on the record sufficient to justify the learned Magistrate in arriving at the conclusion that the three parties are entitled to retain possession of the three blocks shown in the map Ex. 6. This also is the argument that has been addressed to us by the first and the third parties in this Rule. We have accordingly examined the evidence that is on the record and we note below our conclusions on that evidence.

The observations of the learned Magistrate as to the character of the oral evidence which have been quoted above are in our opinion too general and while they are correct in so far as the question of possession in respect of particular plots of the different tenants is concerned, there is a body of evidence which is clear, definite and unambiguous. That evidence establishes the following facts: (a) That the blocks lie within certain defined boundaries, (b) that the possession of the different tenants who hold lands on the border between two contiguous blocks does, not extend beyond the line separating one block from another, (c) that there is definite evidence showing that the blocks were in the possession of one or other of the parties at the date of the Sub-Inspector's visit to the chur on the 29th January 1925, and (d) that it is more than improbable that there could have been any change of possession in respect of these blocks so long as the armed guard remained on the spot, that is to say, until well within two months before the date of the proceedings. It is reasonable to suppose that if after the removal of the armed guard there was any change of possession it must have been by wrongful and forcible dispossession, of which no notice need be taken for our present purposes. The evidence referred to above appears also to have been relied upon by the learned Magistrate and we see no reason why we should not accept it.

We are therefore of opinion that there is no reason to interfere with the order complained of in this Rule and the Rule must accordingly be discharged.

Roy, J.:— I agree.

S.C.M