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Jaques v. Narendra Lal Das

Calcutta High Court
Jun 22, 1936
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, a man of Habigunj, brought a suit for damages of Rs. 509 against three police officers: Defendant 1 (Assistant Superintendent of Police, Sylhet), Defendant 2 (Deputy Superintendent of Police, Habigunj), and Defendant 3 (Sub-Inspector in charge of Habigunj Police Station). The plaintiff alleged that he was in a motor lorry marked with red cross badges to give first aid to nine Satyagrahis who were marching in procession on 1 July 1930. The police, under instructions of the three defendants, assaulted the Satyagrahis and then advanced on the lorry, where the plaintiff was assaulted; he fell unconscious and suffered a dislocation of the left elbow joint said to be permanent.

Procedurally, the trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff and that decree was affirmed on appeal (to the Court of appeal below). The defendants then appealed to the court giving this opinion. The Subordinate Judge (author of a long judgment referred to in the opinion) had found that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's order under Section 144 CrPC was invalid for non-compliance with clause (3) of that section.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's order under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) — prohibiting meetings and processions throughout the Habigunj sub-division — was legally valid.
  2. Whether the nine marching Satyagrahis and the occupants of the lorry (including the plaintiff) formed one and the same assembly such that the police were entitled to treat them as an unlawful assembly under Sections 127 and 128 CrPC and use force to disperse them.
  3. Whether the police action in dispersing the assembly (including striking the sides of the lorry and physical blows to occupants) exceeded lawful authority and made the defendants liable for the plaintiff's injury.
  4. Which Article of the Limitation Act applies to a suit for compensation for injury allegedly caused by police acting in the course of dispersal of an assembly — Article 2 (90 days) or Article 22 (one year) — and whether the plaintiff's claim is barred by limitation.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • From April 1930, Indian National Congress programme meetings and processions were occurring peacefully in Habigunj.
  • On 18 June 1930 a Sub-Divisional Magistrate issued an order under Section 144 CrPC prohibiting such meetings and processions without justification; the people regarded the order as illegal and determined to disobey it.
  • On 1 July 1930 nine civil resisters (Satyagrahis) marched in procession; a motor lorry carrying the plaintiff and two others wore red cross badges and intended to render first aid to any wounded Satyagrahis.
  • The civil and military police, under the defendants' instructions, assaulted the Satyagrahis and then unjustifiably assaulted the plaintiff in the lorry; Defendant 3 struck the plaintiff and other constables assaulted him, resulting in unconsciousness and permanent injury to the left elbow joint.
  • Plaintiff sought Rs. 509 in damages for the injuries suffered.

Defendants' (Appellants') Arguments

  • The Sub-Divisional Magistrate was justified in issuing the Section 144 order due to intense public excitement during the Civil Disobedience Movement and the attendant risk of disturbance.
  • The procession of Satyagrahis together with the ambulance lorry and people following formed a single assembly in violation of the Section 144 order; the defendants were entitled under Section 127 CrPC to declare the assembly unlawful and to command dispersal under Section 128 CrPC.
  • Only minimum force was used to disperse the assembly; Defendant 1 commanded that no blows be struck above the waist; the policemen merely beat the sides of the lorry and used lathis (and defendant 1 used fists); no firearms were used and there was a scramble where occupants fell.
  • The lorry men had no legal right to use the red cross emblem.
  • It was contended that if the officers acted bona fide in pursuance of their duty and did not act mala fide, Article 2 of the Limitation Act (90 days) should apply, which would bar the suit because it was not brought within 90 days.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through several distinct steps in its reasoning, applying statutory provisions and factual findings stated in the record:

  1. Validity of the Section 144 order:

    The Subordinate Judge had found the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's order under Section 144 CrPC invalid because it did not comply with clause (3) of Section 144. Clause (3) contemplates an order directed to a particular individual or to the public generally "when frequenting or visiting a particular place." The magistrate's order forbade meetings and processions throughout the entire Habigunj sub-division, a breadth the Subordinate Judge (and the Court of appeal below) held was not contemplated by clause (3).

  2. Whether the marching group and the lorry occupants formed a single assembly:

    The court accepted the view that, on a proper view of the facts, the nine Satyagrahis and the lorry occupants formed one and the same assembly. The front men were openly defying the Magistrate's order while the men in the lorry followed to aid and abet them (to give first aid). They were followed by about 1,000 people. Although the lorry was some distance behind the nine men, when the nine were stopped the crowd filled the space between them and the lorry, uniting them into a common assembly.

  3. Character of police action in dispersal:

    The Court corrected an error it perceived in the Court of appeal below's criticism that the defendants used armed police. The opinion states that defendant 1 used only fists and constables used only lathis; no firearms were used. Given the large number of men and the leadership openly defying the law, it could not be said the defendants were wrong to hold the assembly unlawful under Section 127 and to direct dispersal.

    The Court also accepted that when the order to disperse was given, most of the assembly dispersed rapidly but the men with red cross badges in the lorry did not get down and refused to move; the driver attempted to back and then to drive forward but was prevented by the police. The policemen then beat the sides of the lorry and struck at occupants to command dispersal. The court concluded that, in the circumstances, it could not be said the police exceeded their rights in striking the sides of the lorry and commanding the men to disperse.

  4. Liability for the plaintiff's injury:

    The plaintiff proved a dislocation of his left elbow joint. He testified that Defendant 3 struck him; the Court of appeal below disbelieved that specific accusation, casting doubt on the plaintiff's credibility. It appeared the plaintiff's arm was broken either by a direct stroke or in falling from the lorry after receiving a lathi blow. In any event, the court concluded the policemen who struck him must be held responsible for the severe hurt; the injury was not within the policemen's rights and, absent limitation considerations, the plaintiff would be entitled to damages.

  5. Limitation question:

    The pivotal legal analysis concerned which limitation provision applied. The defendants argued that Article 2, Schedule 1 of the Limitation Act (90 days) applied because the injury was suffered in the course of an act done in pursuance of an enactment (i.e., dispersal under the CrPC), and thus the suit was time-barred. The courts below had applied Article 22 (one year), which covers compensation for "any other injury to the person."

    The court reviewed the relevant principle: Article 2 is intended to protect public officers who have acted bona fide in the exercise of their duties but it will not protect a public officer who has acted mala fide under colour of office. The court found the three defendants acted bona fide in what they understood to be their duty under the CrPC but, in causing the plaintiff's hurt, they exceeded their lawful authority (they acted bona fide yet negligently or heedlessly exceeded their authority). The opinion explained that where a public officer acts bona fide in exercise of lawful authority but exceeds that authority, Article 2 applies.

    Given that Article 2 prescribes a 90-day limitation period and the suit was brought more than three months after the injury, the court concluded the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation.

  6. Remedy and appellate disposition:

    Because the suit was time-barred under Article 2, the court held that the plaintiff could not recover despite the finding that the police had exceeded their lawful authority in causing the injury. Accordingly, the appeal by the defendants was allowed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal by the defendants is ALLOWED. The plaintiff's suit is dismissed as barred by limitation; costs were awarded against the plaintiff in all Courts. Leave to appeal under Section 15 of the Letters Patent was refused.

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties: the plaintiff's claim for damages (Rs. 509) fails because it was commenced outside the 90-day limitation period applicable under Article 2 of the Limitation Act, even though the court found that the police had exceeded their lawful authority in causing the injury.
  • The court applied the principle that when public officers act bona fide under colour of their duties but exceed their authority heedlessly, a tort action lies against them but is subject to the shorter limitation period of Article 2. The opinion notes that Article 2 does not protect officers acting mala fide, but it was held here that the officers acted bona fide and yet exceeded authority.
  • No new judicial precedent (reported cases) is cited or established in this opinion; the decision turns on statutory interpretation and application of Sections 127–128 and Section 144 CrPC, together with Articles 2 and 22 of the Limitation Act, to the particular facts.
D.S/R.K

Final line of the opinion: "Appeal allowed."

Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal by the defendants in a suit for damages. The plaintiff is a man of Habigunj. Defendant 1 was the Assistant Superintendent of Police of Sylhet. Defendant 2 was the Deputy Superintendent of Police at Habigunj. Defendant 3 was the Sub-Inspector in charge of Habigunj Police Station.

2. The plaintiff's case is that from April 1930 peaceful and well-regulated processions and meetings were held in Habigunj Sub-Division according to the programme of the Indian National Congress; that on, 18th June 1930 the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Habigunj without any justification issued an order under Section 144 of the Cr PC, prohibiting such meetings and processions and that the people of Habigunj considered the order to be illegal and unjustifiable and were determined to disobey the same.

3. Accordingly at 3-30 p.m, on 1st July 1930, nine civil resisters called Satyagrahis started in procession through the principal street of Habigunj town, followed by a motor lorry in which there were three men including the plaintiff with red cross badges on their dress. They meant to render first aid to the Satyagrahis who might be wounded or injured by the Police; that the civil and military Police under the instructions of the three defendants assaulted the nine Satyagrahis and then advanced towards the lorry in which the plaintiff and two other members of the ambulance were and without justification assaulted the plaintiff. Defendant 3 struck him a blow and other constables assaulted him with the result that he fell down unconscious, his left elbow joint was dislocated and it has been permanently injured. The plaintiff claimed damages of Rs. 509.

4. The defence was that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was justified in issuing the order under S. 144, having regard to the intense excitement of the people during the period of propaganda of the Civil Disobedience Movement by meetings and processions and that the procession of the Satyagrahis together with the so-called ambulance lorry carrying the plaintiff and others and the people following the lorry formed one and the same assembly in violation of the order under Section 144 of the Cr PC, and that defendant 1 judging the assembly to be an unlawful assembly in exercise of the authority vested in him under Section 127 of the Cr PC, commanded the assembly to disperse and when his command was disobeyed, he ordered his constables to disperse the assembly by force; that the lorry men had no legal right to make use of the red cross and that only minimum force was used in dispersing the crowd; that defendant 1 had ordered the policemen that no blows would be struck above the waist and that when the men in the lorry refused to disperse, the policemen only struck the sides of the lorry and there was a scramble amongst the occupants who jumped off and fell one upon another but that the defendants were not aware of any injury received by the plaintiff. The trial Court decreed the Suit and the decree was affirmed in appeal. The learned Subordinate Judge in a long and careful judgment has found that the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under Section 144 of the Cr PC, was invalid and illegal. He found that from January 1930 there was a great agitation in the whole of the sub-division and meetings and processions were organized throughout the sub-division. Civil disobedience was launched with the result that the people were excited to break the salt laws and forest laws, not to pay Chowkidary tax, to abandon schools and to burn foreign cloths, Lectures were delivered asking the people to go to jail and even to sacrifice their lives and that they should not be afraid of bloodshed; that the Government Officers were molested in various ways and on a certain day of a Hartal the Magistrates had a great difficulty in reaching their offices. The learned Subordinate Judge found that the Magistrate could reasonably be of opinion that the situation prevailing at the time was sufficiently urgent to call for an order under Section 144 of the Cr PC, but that the order was invalid and illegal, inasmuch as it did not comply with the provisions of Cl. (3), Section 144 of the Cr PC, which runs as follows:

An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place.

5. The order of the Magistrate was to forbid the meetings and processions throughout the sub-division of Habigunj. The Court of appeal below held that such a wide order was not contemplated by Cl. (3), Section 144 of the Cr PC which meant a particular place which the public would be asked not to visit. On the question whether the nine volunteers and four lorry men formed one and the same assembly, the learned Subordinate Judge held that their common object was not the same. The object of the nine Satyagrahis was to defy the Magistrate's order and the object of the red cross men including the plaintiff was not to defy the Magistrate's order but to give first aid to the nine Satyagrahis in case they were wounded by the police. It is urged by the learned Standing Counsel that the Court of appeal below has not taken a correct view. These men all came from the camp of the Civil Disobedience Movement. Nine of them dressed up as Satyagrahis who offered themselves to be injured by the police and their friends, the plaintiff and others put on red cross badges on their dress and followed in a lorry to give them first aid when they were wounded by the police.

6. On a proper view, it is clear they formed one and the same assembly; the front men were out to defy the orders of the Government and the men in the lorry were behind them to aid and abet them. They were followed by a crowd of about 1,000 people. The lorry was at some distance behind the nine men who were marching ahead. But when in front of the local Treasury Office the policemen stopped the nine men, a large number of men gathered between them and the lorry. The Court of appeal below has criticised the defendants because they took the aid of the armed police. In this the Court committed an error. Actually defendant 1 used only his fists and the constables used only lathis. No firearms were used. The order under S. 144 being found to be illegal the question is whether the defendants acted bona fide in the exercise of their rights under Sections 127 and 128 of the Cr PC, in declaring the assembly unlawful and in commanding it to disperse. Considering the large number of men who were led by the persons who were openly defying the law, it cannot be said that the defendants who were in charge of the peace of the sub-division were wrong to hold that the assembly was unlawful.

7. Defendant 1 who was the Police Officer in charge was right to declare the assembly to be unlawful under S. 127 and was right to direct his policemen to disperse the assembly. The learned Subordinate Judge considers that the lorry men did not disobey the order to disperse; when they were ordered to disperse the driver of the lorry tried to back, but he was prevented by the police. He tried to drive forward; from that also he was prevented by the police. Then the policemen beat on the sides of the lorry and struck at the occupants. The Court of appeal below has held that in assaulting the occupants of the lorry the police acted wrongly. It is urged by the learned Standing Counsel that the view taken by the Court of appeal below is not correct. When the order was given for the assembly to disperse, apparently the greater number of the assembly quickly dispersed. The men dressed with red cross badges stayed in the lorry. It was clearly their duty to get down from the lorry, but instead of doing that they kept their seats on the lorry and refused to move. In the circumstances it cannot be said that the police exceeded their rights in striking the sides of the lorry and commanding the men to disperse.

8. As to the actual injury which happened to the plaintiff it has been proved that his left elbow joint was dislocated. He says that he was struck on the left arm by the constables and by such injury his left arm was dislocated. He stated in evidence that defendant 3 struck him. That story has been disbelieved by the Court of appeal below. It would appear from that the plaintiff is not a witness of truth. It appears that he got his arm broken either by a direct stroke or in falling down from the footboard of the lorry after receiving a lathi blow. In any case the police who struck him must be held responsible for the severe hurt which was caused and it cannot be said that in causing the hurt to the plaintiff the policemen were within their rights. The plaintiff would therefore be entitled to damages if his claim be not barred by limitation.

9. It is urged that the suit is barred by limitation, that the proper Article to apply is Article 2, Sch. 1, Lim. Act. That article applies to a suit for compensation for doing or for omitting to do an act alleged to be in pursuance of any enactment in force for the time being in British India. The period of limitation is 90 days from the time when the act complained of takes place. It is urged that here the plaintiff claimed compensation from the Police Officers for doing an injury to him which they did in the coarse of the dispersal of an unlawful assembly under the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore this is the proper Article and as the suit was not brought within 90 days, the plaintiff cannot succeed. The Courts below have held that the Article applicable is Article 22 for compensation for any other injury to the person. The period of limitation is one year from the time the injury is committed. It is urged by the learned Standing Counsel that Article 22 would apply in the case of tort against a private person or against a public officer acting mala fide. But when a public officer is acting bona fide in pursuance of the law and commits a tort Article 2 is the proper Article to apply. That Article which lays down a short period of 90 days for a suit is for the protection of public officers who have acted bona fide in the exercise of their duties.

10. It has been held in many cases that Article 2 will not protect a public officer who has acted mala fide under colour of his office. In this case it is clear that the three defendants acted bona fide in exercise of what they understood to be their duty under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The injury that was caused to the plaintiff was done in the exercise of that duty, but in doing the injury they exceeded their lawful authority. If the act complained of is believed to be actually authorised by law, then no question of limitation would arise, as in that case the action itself would not be maintainable. It is when a public officer acted bona fide in the exercise of his lawful authority but heedlessly exceeded his authority, then a suit would lie and the limitation prescribed by Article 2 would apply. The present is such a case, and as the suit was brought more than three months after the injury was received by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's claim is barred by limitation. In the result the appeal is allowed and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs in all the Courts. Leave to appeal under S. 15 of the Letters Patent is refused.

D.S/R.K

11. Appeal allowed.