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Paul De Flondor v. Emperor Opposite Party.

Calcutta High Court
Mar 24, 1931
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Summary of Opinion (Lort-Williams, J.; S.K. Ghose, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion.

The case arises from a contract between the Kashmir State and Messrs E.D. Sassoon & Company for the supply of large quantities of a root called "kuth," to be delivered in Kashmir. The accused was the firm’s representative in Kashmir, whose duties included taking delivery and arranging and paying for transport to Calcutta. He drew funds for expenses on an Imperial Bank account in Srinagar that stood in his name as representative of the firm. Payment for the kuth was to be made on delivery.

On 16 September 1929 the accused wired that he had arranged delivery of 2,260 maunds. The firm sent a cheque to the Kashmir State for the contract price for 2,260 maunds. A statement by a Kashmir official (Biswas) later reported delivery of only 2,040 maunds and a refund due of Rs. 53,446; by order of the Kashmir State that sum was credited to the accused’s Srinagar bank account and he received it as "Resident Representative of Messrs E.D. Sassoon and Company at Srinagar." The accused subsequently withdrew large sums from the account. Reweighment later showed 2,143 maunds had been delivered, and discrepancies suggested tampering with Biswas's books. The firm was not given the refunded money; the accused allegedly stated he had paid 75% of the money to the Deputy Forest Officer as his perquisite. The accused fled abroad, was extradited to Calcutta, and was tried there.

At the trial before the Chief Presidency Magistrate the accused was convicted alternatively under Sections 408 and 420, I.P.C., for one portion of the sum alleged to have been embezzled and under Section 408 alone for another portion. The present opinion is from the appellate court reviewing that conviction. The primary procedural issue addressed by the court is whether the Magistrate had jurisdiction to try the accused in Calcutta rather than in Kashmir (Srinagar).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Magistrate erred in convicting the accused alternatively under Sections 408 and 420, I.P.C., and whether Section 236 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr. P.C.) was misconstrued or misapplied in that respect.
  2. Whether, on the facts as proved, the accused was guilty of criminal breach of trust (and if so, under which specific provision of the Penal Code), or whether alternative factual theories (including collusion and fraud upon the Kashmir State) made the ownership of the refunded money doubtful.
  3. Whether the Presidency Magistrate in Calcutta had jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure (in particular S. 181(2)) to try offences of misappropriation or criminal breach of trust where the relevant property was received or retained in Srinagar.
  4. Whether decisions of certain High Courts and English authorities (and their interpretations) justify laying venue at Calcutta on the basis that the accused ought to have accounted there.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution's Arguments

  • It was argued (as the opinion reports) that the refunded money belonged to the firm and that the accused had a duty to account for it in Calcutta; on that basis the prosecution contended he could be tried in Calcutta. This contention relied on a line of Calcutta High Court decisions (set out in the opinion).
  • The Magistrate's judgment, and the prosecution's case at the trial, apparently treated alternative convictions as permissible under Section 236 Cr. P.C.; the prosecution did not, according to the appellate court, satisfactorily justify one part of the alternative conviction.

Defense's Position

  • The accused denied receipt of the information attributed to a Kashmir official (that fewer maunds were in stock) and argued facts inconsistent with the firm’s ownership of the refunded money. Counsel for the accused declined to engage on irrelevant hypotheses and maintained a defence constrained by the evidence.
  • The defence raised the factual possibility (supported by evidence of reweighment and the condition of Biswas's books) that more kuth had been delivered and that the refund claim might be a fraud on the Kashmir State, possibly in collusion with Biswas; this theory, if true, would displace any claim that the refunded money belonged to the firm and would place venue in Kashmir.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
W.B. Colville v. Kristo Kishore Bose ([1899] 26 Cal. 746) Dealt with cheating under Ss. 417 and 418 (rendering false accounts) and was held triable in Calcutta. The court observed this decision is not a case of embezzlement and thus has no application to the present facts of alleged embezzlement/embezzlement-like misappropriation.
Abdul Latiff Yusuff v. Abu Mahamed Kassim (A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 46) Decision treated as a criminal breach of trust case and followed the Colville approach to venue based on accounting obligations. The court criticized this decision as wrongly applying Colville to criminal breach of trust; it held that the judges failed to recognize the inapplicability of Colville to embezzlement.
Gunanada Dhone v. Santi Prahash Nandy (A.I.R. 1925 Cal. 613) Considered the earlier decisions and addressed venue where accused ought to render account; Mukerji, J. treated the place where duty to account arose as an alternative venue. The present court noted Mukerji, J.'s acknowledgment of the error in prior cases but criticized his conclusion that the place of accounting is an alternative venue even where there is clear evidence of embezzlement elsewhere.
G.N. Pascal…Accused v. Raj Kishore Mathur… (A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 521) Critical engagement with the Calcutta line of cases concerning venue and accounting duties. The court noted Rankin, C.J. doubted the soundness of the prior Calcutta decisions.
In re Jivandas v. Savchand (A.I.R. 1930 Bom. 490) Bombay Full Bench dissent from the Calcutta line of authorities on venue based on place of accounting. The appellate court cited this Full Bench dissent as supporting doubt about the Calcutta decisions' approach.
R. v. Davidson and Gordon ([1855] 7 Cox. C.C. 158) Where the only evidence of fraudulent embezzlement is non-accounting, venue may be laid where the non-accounting occurred because the jury may presume misappropriation there; but this cannot apply where there is distinct evidence of misappropriation elsewhere. The court relied on this decision to distinguish cases where venue can be laid at the place of non-accounting from cases where there is distinct evidence of misappropriation at another place; it criticized a misquotation/extension of this decision by Mukerji, J.
R. v. Murdoch ([1851] 5 Cox. C.C. 360) English authority cited among cases showing embezzlement may be tried where misappropriation occurred. Listed with other English authorities to show where embezzlement may be tried; used to contrast English rules with the Indian Code provisions.
R. v. Hobson ([1803] R. & R. 56) English authority on where embezzlement is committed and triable. Listed as part of the English jurisprudence on venue for embezzlement; the court ultimately treated English authorities as not decisive for India where the Code governs.
R. v. Taylor ([1803] R. & R. 63) English authority on embezzlement venue. Listed among English cases illustrating where embezzlement may be tried; used illustratively in comparing English law to the Indian Code provisions.
R. v. Rogers ([1877] 3 Q.B.D. 28) English authority on embezzlement venue. Listed with other English authorities to support general principles about where embezzlement is triable under English law.
R. v. Tredgold ([1878] 14 Cox. C.C. 220) English authority on embezzlement venue. Listed with other English cases; the court observed that English law and statutes provide certain venues but emphasized that Indian Code provisions (Ss. 177–189) are controlling in India.
Simhachalam v. Emperor ([1917] 44 Cal. 912) Indian authority holding S. 179 Cr. P.C. does not apply to charges of misappropriation; S. 181(2) is the appropriate provision for venue in such cases. The court cited this decision as settling that S.179 is inapplicable to misappropriation and that S.181(2) governs venue for criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in distinct stages and is grounded on the evidence, statutory provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and evaluation of relevant authorities.

1. Critique of the Magistrate's approach. The appellate judge began by severely criticizing the Chief Presidency Magistrate for ignoring elementary judicial method: instead of focusing on essential facts proved, the Magistrate entertained guesses and irrelevant hypotheses, producing a long judgment that the appellate court found unintelligible and confused. The Magistrate's adverse remarks about the accused's counsel (suggesting counsel attempted to "bluff" the Court) were described as improper and unsupported.

2. Misapplication of Section 236 Cr. P.C. The Magistrate convicted the accused in the alternative under Sections 408 and 420, I.P.C., which the appellate court attributed to a misunderstanding of Section 236 Cr. P.C. The appellate court explained the correct application: Section 236 sanctions alternative charges only "where the facts being ascertained, it is doubtful which of two or more offences those facts constitute." If the facts themselves are in doubt (i.e., not ascertained), Section 236 does not apply. In this case, the appellate court found that doubt arose because essential facts had not been ascertained and the Crown did not justify part of the conviction on appeal.

3. Factual analysis of ownership and misappropriation. The court examined two alternative factual scenarios based on the evidence in the trial record:

  • If only 2,040 maunds had been delivered (as Biswas's original statement claimed), then the refund of Rs. 53,446 belonged to Messrs E.D. Sassoon & Co., and the accused—who had no express authority to receive such payments—would have misappropriated firm money. In that scenario, the accused committed criminal breach of trust under Section 406 (not under the provision applicable to clerks/servants under Section 438), because he acted outside the scope of his authority and was obliged to hold the money in trust for the firm.
  • However, reweighment showed 2,143 maunds had been delivered. The court found evidence that Biswas's books had been tampered with and that the books might originally have shown deliveries consistent with 2,260 maunds. This evidence supported an alternative theory (one suggested by the Magistrate) that the refund claim might have been fraudulent—possibly perpetrated by Biswas in collusion with the accused—so that the refund would not have belonged to the firm at all. If that were the true state of facts, the accused could not be charged with misappropriating the firm's money; any offence might instead be against the Kashmir State (e.g., cheating or misappropriation vis-à-vis the State), and the proper venue for such offences would be in Kashmir.

4. Venue governed by the Code (S. 181(2)) rather than the Calcutta cases. The court analyzed the law of venue. It rejected the contention—derived from a line of Calcutta authorities—that the place where the accused ought to render an account (e.g., Calcutta) always provides an alternative venue for misappropriation prosecutions. The court observed that some of those Calcutta decisions misapplied earlier authorities and extended English law improperly. The appellate court emphasized that, for India, the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ss. 177–189) governs venue: specifically, S. 181(2) provides that "The offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be enquired in to or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained by the accused person or the offence was committed."

Applying S. 181(2) to the facts before it, the appellate court concluded that the refunded money was received and retained by the accused in Srinagar (Srinagar being where the bank account was and where the accused drew the money). There was no evidence the accused received or retained the money in Calcutta; the accused had not been to Calcutta between withdrawing the sums in Srinagar and being brought to Calcutta for trial. Therefore, under S. 181(2), Calcutta was not a proper venue to try the accused for the alleged misappropriation.

5. Treatment of English authorities. The court reviewed English cases (including R. v. Davidson and Gordon) and English statutory provisions, acknowledging their rules but holding them not decisive for India when the Code provides specific rules. The court stressed the correct, narrow reading of R. v. Davidson and Gordon: only when non-accounting is the sole evidence of fraudulent misappropriation may venue be laid at the place of non-accounting; where distinct evidence shows misappropriation elsewhere, that reasoning does not apply. The court criticized Mukerji, J.'s extension or misquotation of Davidson and Gordon and cautioned against reliance on secondhand quotes (referring to an incorrect addition in Halsbury's note).

6. Conclusion from the combined analysis. Because the evidence pointed to receipt and retention of the money in Srinagar and because there was considerable doubt whether, on the true facts, the money belonged to the firm at all (and thus whether any offence against the firm occurred), the appellate court concluded the Magistrate in Calcutta had no jurisdiction to try the accused for the alleged misappropriation of the firm's money. The consequence is that the conviction and sentence imposed in Calcutta could not stand.

Holding and Implications

Holding: CONVICTION SET ASIDE. The appellate court set aside the conviction and sentence imposed by the Chief Presidency Magistrate and directed that the accused be discharged from his bail bonds. (The opinion records that S.K. Ghose, J. agreed with the judgment.)

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The conviction and sentence imposed in Calcutta were quashed and the accused was discharged from bail bonds; the accused is relieved of the conviction recorded in that trial court.
  • The court clarified the proper application of Section 236 Cr. P.C. (alternative charges): it applies only where facts have been ascertained and it is doubtful which offence they constitute; it does not apply where the facts themselves remain in doubt. The appellate court faulted the Magistrate for misapplying that provision.
  • The court reaffirmed that for offences of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust in India the governing venue provision is S. 181(2) Cr. P.C., and not the earlier reasoning in some Calcutta decisions that treated the place where one ought to account as an automatic alternative venue, particularly where there is evidence of misappropriation at another location.
  • The opinion criticizes and distinguishes a line of Calcutta authorities and certain English authorities where they were treated as incompatible with the Code; the court emphasized reading English authorities narrowly and following the Code's express venue rules for India.
  • The opinion does not purport to create a novel rule beyond these interpretive clarifications; it applies existing Code provisions and case law to the facts and reverses the trial conviction for lack of jurisdiction in the circumstances described.

Disposition: Conviction set aside.

Reported judgment excerpted: Lort-Williams, J.; S.K. Ghose, J. concurred. (Text reproduced only as provided to the summarizer.)

Show all summary ...

Lort-Williams, J.:— A great deal of time has been wasted on this case, both here and in the Court below. This has been due to the fact that the Chief Presidency Magistrate has disregarded those elementary principles which ought to be observed by every Judge when trying a case. Instead of rivetting his attention on the essential facts proved, he pursued vainly a number of guesses, assumptions and what he called “insoluble equations,” which had not any connexion with facts disclosed by the evidence. The result is that his long judgment is unintelligible to anyone who was not present at the trial, and he has drifted into most regrettable confusion while trying to apply the law to the facts.

2. When criticising the defence put forward by the accused he remarked that “an ounce of fact is worth considerable quantities of fiction”—a maxim with which, after reading his judgment, we find ourselves in complete agreement. He complained that

“the learned counsel who appeared for the accused took a very inelastic view of the scope of his defence, and with the assistance of the accused trying to “bluff” the Court as to the facts considered the matter from only one point of view.”

3. If the Magistrate intended to say that counsel tried to bluff the Court, this was a most improper observation to make and in the present case had no foundation in fact. Quite rightly counsel refused to be drawn into unnecessary discussion of irrelevant hypotheses. It may be however that the Magistrate only intended to suggest that the accused had tried to bluff the Court. Finally he convicted the accused in the alternative of offences under Ss. 408 and 420, I.P.C This result is due to the fact that the Magistrate misunderstood the effect of Section 236 of the Cr PC, which in certain cases sanctions alternative charges. The provisions of this section cannot be applied where the facts are in doubt. But only where the facts being ascertained, it is doubtful which of two or more offences those facts constitute. If the facts are in doubt, or if the ascertained facts are consistent with innocence, the section does not apply. In this case doubt arises because the essential facts have not been ascertained, and the learned advocate who appears for the Crown has not attempted to justify this part of the conviction.

4. But in addition to convicting the accused under Ss. 408 and 420 in the alternative, with reference to one portion of the sum alleged to have been embezzled, the Magistrate convicted him under S. 408 alone with regard to another portion. The only point to be decided in this case is whether the Magistrate had jurisdiction to try it.

5. The Kashmir State had contracted to supply the firm of Messrs E.D Sassoon and Company with large quantities of a root called ‘kuth,’ which grows in the forests of Kashmir, is made into a drug and finds a ready sale at high prices. Delivery was to be made in Kashmir. The accused was the firm's representative in Kashmir. It was his duty to take delivery, and arrange and pay for transport to Calcutta. For his expenses he drew upon an account, standing in his own name as representative of the firm, with a branch of the Imperial Bank at Srinagar in Kashmir. For this account sums were remitted from time to time through the head office of the Imperial Bank in Calcutta. He had no express authority, and it was no part of his ordinary duty to receive large sums on account of the firm or to remit such sums to them. These contingencies were not contemplated by the terms of his service. Payment for the kuth was to be made on delivery.

6. On 16th September 1929, the accused wired to the firm that he had arranged for delivery in October of 2260 maunds. It was alleged that the next day he was informed by an official of the Kashmir State that there were only 2,081 maunds in stock. He denied the receipt of this information and proved by cross-examination of Mr. Benjamin who was manager of the firm in Calcutta that there were probably more than 3,000 maunds at that time available for delivery. On the same day the firm sent direct to the Kashmir State a cheque for Rs. 6,48,620 being the contract price for 2,260 maunds. On 1st October the accused wrote to the Accountant-General of Kashmir saying, that as soon as the delivery of kuth had been completed they would know the exact sum due, and that he intended to apply in due course for a refund arising out of excess payment. On 18th October one Biswas, the Deputy Forest Officer of the Kashmir State sent to his Government a statement showing a delivery of 2,040 maunds only, and a refund due of Rs. 53,446. On the 20th the accused wrote to the Accountant-General asking for a cheque for this sum. On the 24th this amount, by order of the Kashmir State, was credited to the account of the accused with the Imperial Bank at Srinagar and he gave a receipt as “Resident Representative of Messrs E.D Sassoon and Company at Srinagar.” The next day the accused drew out Rs. 30,000 and by 20th December only Rs. 38-1-6 remained in the account.

7. Meanwhile the Kashmir State became suspicious and reweighed the kuth already delivered. It totalled 2,143 maunds instead of 2,040 maunds. Thereupon the Kashmir State took back the excess, and told Messrs Sassoon and Co. about the refund, of which the accused had not given them any information. The firm wired to the accused for an explanation, and he stated (Ex. 23) that he had paid 75 per cent of the money to the Deputy Forest Officer as his perquisite. Presumably he intended to imply that he kept the rest for himself. He was recalled to Calcutta but filed abroad via Japan to America and finally to Italy, whence he was extradited and brought to Calcutta for trial.

8. No part of the money refunded ever reached the hands of the firm. Assuming that only 2,040 maunds were delivered the money obviously belonged to the firm, and the accused as obviously misappropriated it. It was paid by the Kashmir State to the accused, for and on behalf of the firm, and not otherwise. It was a refund of part of the firm's money which they had paid to the Kashmir State in September. The Kashmir State were not authorized by the firm to pay this or any sum to the accused, nor had the accused any express authority from the firm to receive it. It was no part of his duty to do so, and in doing so he was acting without the scope of his authority. But having received it he was under an obligation to hold it in trust for the firm to whom it belonged. He had no right to use it or any part of it for any purpose. Still less had he any right to hand it over as a perquisite to any official of the Kashmir State, for which he had no authority either express or implied. Directly he drew it out of the bank at Srinagar with the intention of sharing it between the official of the Kashmir State and himself, he committed an offence. Still more so when he shared the money between himself and the official. The offence committed was that of criminal breach of trust under S. 406, not of criminal breach of trust as a clerk or servant under S. 438, because in receiving the money he was not acting within the scope of his authority.

9. All this rests upon the assumption that only 2,040 maunds were delivered to the accused. The only evidence of this was the statement sent by Biswas to his government, and the application the accused for a refund on the basis of this statement. It is belied by the fact that upon reweighment 2,143 maunds were found to have been delivered. This sum was shown on Biswas's books, but it was apparent that the books had been tampered with, probably in an effort to reduce the totals, which may have coincided originally with actual deliveries of 2,260 maunds, to the total of 2,040 maunds which Biswas had stated to his government. Th evidence is consistent with one of the theories suggested by the Magistrate, viz. that 2,260 maunds had been delivered and the claim for the refund was a fraud upon the Kashmir State perpetrated by Biswas in collusion with the accused.

10. If these were the true facts, the refund did not belong to the firm at all, and the accused could not be charged with misappropriating it from them. The property in the kuth would have passed, and the Kashmir State would have had no right to seize it. They could not make the accused into a criminal offender against the firm by their own illegal act. Their remedy against the firm would have been a suit for the recovery of the money refunded. But he might be charged with misappropriation or with cheating so far as the Kashmir State was concerned. But with regard to all these suggested offences, the only possible venue would be in Kashmir.

11. Nevertheless it has been argued that there was evidence that this money belonged to the firm, and that it was the duty of the accused to account for it to the firm in Calcutta, and because he failed to do so he could be tried here. As I have already shown there is no evidence that he had any duty to render any account in Calcutta. But assuming that he had the contention is based upon decisions in the following three cases, W.B Colville v. Kristo Kishore Bose . [1899] 26 Cal. 746; Abdul Latiff Yusuff v. Abu Mahamed Kassim . A.I.R 1922 Cal. 46; Gunanada Dhone v. Santi Prahash Nandy . A.I.R 1925 Cal. 613, and cases in other High Courts which have followed these decisions. The first decision is not a case of embezzlement at all; it deals with offences under Ss. 417 and 418, I.P.C for cheating by rendering false accounts in Calcutta; obviously it was triable in Calcutta. But it has no application to the facts of the present case. In the second case which was a case of criminal breach of trust under S. 406 the learned Judges simply followed the decision in the first case saying that it was directly in point, which obviously it was not. They failed to realize that it had no application to a case of criminal breach of trust. In the third case Mukerji, J., points out their error, but nevertheless comes to the conclusion that the place where it is the duty of the accused servant to render an account is an alternative venue, even where there is clear evidence of embezzlement elsewhere.

12. The soundness of this decision has been doubted by Rankin, C.J, in the case of G.N Pascal…Accused v. Raj Kishore Mathur…Complainant Opposite Party. . A.I.R 1931 Cal. 521, and has been dissented from recently by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in In re Jivandas v. Savchand . A.I.R 1930 Bom. 490. It seems to be based upon a somewhat curious mistake. The learned Judge in the course of a careful review of the law points out that it is sometimes difficult to prove exactly where misappropriation takes place, because misappropriation depends upon intention, and it is not always clear where the intention to misappropriate was formed. In some cases the only evidence of intention to misappropriate is the failure of the accused to render an account and make payment ab a particular place according to the terms of his contract of service. In such cases the venue may be laid at the place where the account ought to have been rendered. This was decided in R. v. Davidson and Gordon . [1855] 7 Cox. C.C 158., where Baron Alderson said:

“Where there is no evidence of fraudulent embezzlement, except the nonaccounting, the venue may be laid in the place where the non-accounting occurred, because the jury may presume that there the fraudulent misappropriation was made, but this cannot apply where there is distinct evidence of the misappropriation elsewhere.”

13. Mukerji, J., quotes this passage in his judgment but adds the following phrase “for then the offence is triable in either place” and seems to be under the impression that these words were uttered by Baron Alderson, because he quotes them as such. But these words are not in the report and are the direct antithesis of what Baron Alderson said. A reference to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 9, para 583, will show that they have been taken from note (r) to that para, and have been added by the authors of that work. This is an example of the danger of quoting from decisions secondhand instead of consulting the original report. The note is most misleading.

14. Embezzlement according to English common law is committed, and can be tried in the place where the accused misappropriated the money, or if there is no evidence of embezzlement except the non-accounting, then in the places where he ought to have accounted and failed to do so, or accounted falsely, or refused to account, or denied the receipt of the money: R. v. Davidson and Gordon, R. v. Murdoch . [1851] 5 Cox. C.C 360., R. v. Hobson . [1803] R. & R. 56., R. v. Taylor . [1803] R. & R. 63., R. v. Rogers . [1877] 3 Q.B.D 28.; and R. v. Tredgold . [1878] 14 Cox. C.C 220. and by statute it has been provided that the accused may be tried in any place where he has the property in his possession, or where he receives it, or where he was apprehended, or is in custody, or has appeared in answer to a summons; Larceny Act 1916, Section 39(2) and (3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1925. S. 11(1). Therefore the decision of Mukerji, J., is founded partly on this erroneous impression and partly on Abdul Latif's case which, as I have already shown is, itself founded upon error.

15. But whatever be the effect of the English decisions and statutes they are not in point. So far as India is concerned—the Code of Criminal Procedure in Ss. 177-189 provides the appropriate venue. It has been settled law for many years that S. 179 does not apply to charges of misappropriation, Simhachalam v. Emperor . [1917] 44 Cal. 912, S. 181(2) is the appropriate section. It runs thus:

“The offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be enquired in to or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained by the accused person or the offence was committed.”

16. It is clear that the money in the present case was not either received or retained by the accused in Calcutta. So far as we know he had never been in Calcutta between the time when he drew the money from the Bank at Srinagar and the date upon which he was brought to Calcutta for trial.

17. There is therefore no authority either in the English or the Indian decisions or in the language of the Code itself for the proposition suggested by Mukerji, J., and I am unable to agree with the decision. Nor do I agree with his suggestion that the provision that the accused may be tried where the offence is committed is superfluous. If omitted, the section would have been read as meaning that the places where the property was received or retained were the only venues. If there is evidence apart from the fact of nonaccounting to show where the misappropriation was committed, the venue must be laid either in that place or in the place where the property was received or retained. If there is no evidence to show where the misappropriation was committed other than the fact of nonaccounting, then the venue may be laid in the place where the accused failed to account, because that is where the offence was committed within the meaning of S. 181(2): R. v. Davison and Gordon. In the present case, assuming that it has been proved that the accused is guilty of embezzlement, which in our opinion is open to considerable doubt, the evidence is that he embezzled the money at Srinagar. Consequently the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try him in Calcutta. Therefore the conviction and sentence must be set aside and the accused discharged from his bail bonds.

S.K Ghose, J.:— I agree.

K.N/R.K

18. Conviction set aside.