This is an appeal by the first nine Defendants in a suit by a Hindu reversioner for declaration that certain alienations, made by a widow in possession of the estate of her husband, were in excess of her authority and do not bind the inheritance. The properties, in dispute belonged to the father of the Plaintiff, Rakhal Chandra Mookerjee, and his brother Bagal Chandra Mookerjee. Rakhal Chandra Mookerjee died in 1883, leaving a widow Sukhoda Sundari Debi, and an unmarried daughter by her, Provabati Debi, now Plaintiff-Respondent before us. On the 25th November 1885, Sukhoda Sundari Debi and her brother-in-law Bagal Chandra borrowed a sum of Rs. 399 from Rameswar Mondal, the first Defendant in this suit. The creditor sued on the money bond, and obtained an ex parte decree on the 6th April 1888. The decree was executed in due course, and the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtors in the disputed properties were sold on the 2nd July 1888, when the decree-holder, now represented by the Appellants, became the purchaser for Rs. 745, in the name of one Moheswar Bhattacharji. The sale was confirmed on the 7th January 1889, and the sale-certificate was issued in the name of the ostensible purchaser on the 12th February 1889. Meanwhile on the 22nd November 1888, Sukhoda Sundari had sold the same properties again to the Defendants other than the Appellants. Sukhoda Sundari died on the 21st November 1901, when the succession opened out to the Plaintiff as the reversionary heir to the estate of her father. On the 18th November 1904, the Plaintiff commenced the present action for declaration that the execution sale as also the private alienation were without legal necessity and were not operative after the death of her mother. She further impeached the validity of the execution sale on the ground that the decree-holder held a mortgage on the property sold and has acted in contravention of the provisions of sec. 99 of the Transfer of Property Act. She did not sue for recovery of possession, as the estate was in the hands of an under-tenure-holder who had saved it from a sale under the Putni Regulation and had obtained possession which would continue till his advance was repaid or satisfied from the profits. The Defendants resisted the claim of the Plaintiff on the ground, amongst others, that the sales had taken place for legal necessity. The Subordinate Judge found this point in favour of the purchaser at the execution sale, but against the purchasers at the private sale. In this view, he gave the Plaintiff a conditional decree against the former, who became entitled to receive a proportionate share of the purchase money, and an unconditional decree against the latter, whose conveyance was declared to be wholly inoperative. On appeal by the Defendants, the District Judge reversed this decree and dismissed the suit on the ground that it was bad for misjoinder of parties and of causes of action. On appeal to this Court, Brett and Sharf-uddin, JJ., held on the authority of the decisions in Ishan Chandra v. Rameswar(1), Nanda Kumar v. Banamali(2), and Lala Rupnarain v. Gopal Devi(3), that there was no misjoinder of parties or of causes of action and that the Plaintiff was competent; to maintain one suit against all the transferees in respect of the estate of her father to which she had become entitled on the death of her mother. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the case remanded, so that the appeal preferred to the District Judge might be heard on the merits. In so far as the private sale is concerned, no attempt appears to have been made to assail the conclusion of the Subordinate Judge that it was bad for want of consideration and legal necessity, and his decision upon the point must be taken to have become final. We are concerned, at this stage, only with the effect of the execution sale of the 2nd July, 1888. As regards this sale, the Subordinate Judge found, first, that the money had been borrowed by the widow for payment of rent to the Zamindar and was applied for that purpose; secondly, that the sale was void, because held in contravention of sec. 99 of the Transfer of Property Act and, thirdly, that a declaratory decree should be made in favour of the Plaintiff, conditional on payment by her of a sum of Rs. 309-1-6 to the first nine Defendants, as such money had been applied by the widow for the benefit of the estate. Upon appeal the District Judge has found, first, that the loan was taken by the widow and the money borrowed was applied by her for payment of rent due to the superior landlord; secondly, that as laid down in Asutosh Sikdar v. Beharilal Kirtania(4), the sale was not void but melrely voidable because held contrary to the provisions of sec. 99 of the Transfer of Property Act, and, thirdly, that it was unnecessary to avoid the sale, because it had passed to the purchaser nothing beyond the limited estate of the widow, as laid down in the cases of Mohima Chandra v. Ramkishore and Brajalal v. Jibankrishna, which was confirmed on appeal to the Judicial Committee: Jibankrishna v. Brajalal. The District Judge has also overruled the contentions that the suit was not maintainable for a pure declaratory decree without consequential relief, and was, in any view, barred by limitation. In this view the District Judge has modified the decree of the primary Court and has given the Plaintiff an unconditional declaration that the execution sale does not bind the estate in her hands. On the present appeal, besides the two subordinate points last mentioned, namely, the grant of a declaratory decree without consequential relief and the bar of limitation, the substantial question which has emerged for consideration is, what was the true nature of the debt created by the bond, of the decree in the bond suit and of the proceedings, thereon, and what was the legal effect of the execution sale on the estate in the hands of the widow?

It has been found by the District Judge, in concurrence with the Subordinate Judge, that the money was raised and was applied by the widow, for payment of rent to the superior landlord. On this basis, it has been argued that the loan was taken for legal necessity. This contention, in our opinion, is not well founded. The powers of a Hindu widow, in respect of alienation of the estate of her husband, are similar to those of a guardian of an infant, as defined by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Hunoomanpersad v. Babooee Moonraj, Kameswar v. Run Bahadur, Lala Amarnath v. Achhan Kuer, Bhagwat Dyal v. Debi Dyal. Consequently a person who claims title under an alienation from her must prove that there was legal necessity for it, that is, such pressure on the estate at the time the loan was taken or the alienation made as justified the act of the widow; he can also protect himself by proof of bonâ fide enquiry, and if the fact of such enquiry is established, the real existence of an alleged sufficient and reasonably credited necessity is not a condition-precedent to the validity of his title. In the case before us, there is no proof of bonâ fide enquiry by the creditor, and further reference need not consequently be made to this possible aspect of the matter. The question then reduces to this—was there legal necessity for the lean? The mere fact that the loan was taken to pay rent and the money raised was applied for that purpose, is clearly not sufficient. It may be conceded that the extreme view taken in Matiulla v. Radhabinodi(12), and Radhamohun v. Giridhari Lal(13), namely, that the creditor must not only show that the money was borrowed or required for a necessary purpose, but also that the necessity was attributable to causes beyond the control of the widow, is unsound and cannot be supported on principle; for, as their Lordships of the Judicial Committee pointed out in Hunoomanpersad v. Babooee Moonraj, the creditor is not affected by any precedent mismanagement of the estate, provided that he has not been a party to the misconduct which has produced the danger he helps to avert by his loan. On the other hand, the opposite extreme view that the creditor is protected if the money raised has been applied for the benefit of the estate, is equally untenable. The true rule is that the creditor, to protect himself, where he is not shown to have made a bonâ fide enquiry, must prove that there was an actual pressure on the estate, such as an outstanding decree, or an impending sale which the widow had no funds capable of meeting. [Lola Amarnath v. Achhan Kuer, Dharamchand v. Bhaoani Misrain, Sreenath v. Rutunmala, Srimohun v. Brij Behary, Lala Byjnath v. Bissen, Mata Pershad v. Bhageeruthee, Ghanshyam v. Badiyala, Lakshman v. Radha Bai.] Tested from this point of view the creditor in the case before us has laid no solid foundation for his claim. We know nothing about the state of the family at the time of the loan, and no explanation has been offered why the widow in possession of a valuable putni should have found herself unable to pay even the current rent to the superior landlord. We must hold accordingly that the creditor has not proved legal necessity for the transaction.

Even if we assume, however, that there was legal necessity for the loan, the position of the creditor is beset with inextricable difficulties. Where a Hindu widow obtains a loan, she is at liberty to bind herself personally, or, when the purpose for which she borrowed is a necessary one, she is equally entitled to bind her husband's estate. Whether, in a particular case, the widow intended to bind herself alone or to bind the estate as well, must be gathered from the statement, if any in the deed, or from the surrounding circumstances: Damodar v. Jankibai, Prosunna v. Umedar Raja. In this respect there is no real distinction in principle between a case where a charge is formally created by the widow, and another where she executes a bond for the money advanced: Hurry Mohun v. Gonesh(23), Ramcoomar v. Ichamoyi(24), Veera v. Errappa(25), Regalia Jogayya v. Venkata(26), Yeerabadra v. Marudaga(27), Sakrabhai v. Manganlal(28), Umrootram v. Narayandas(29), Devji v. Shambhu(30), although the contrary view has sometimes been maintained, Ramaswami v. Sollatommul(31), Narana v. Vastern(32), Ginbala v. Srinath, Prosunna v. Umedar Raja, Gadgeppa v. Appaji(34), Dhiraj v. Mangan(35), Kallu v. Faiyaz(36). It is possible, however, that where a charge has been created by the widow on the estate, there may be surer indication of her intention to make the estate liable than where she has executed a promissory note; but once the intention is established, the effect of her act must depend upon the nature of the debt, which is recoverable from the estate in the hands of the reversioner, if it has been incurred for necessary purposes. Tested in the light of these principles, the creditor here is in a precarious position, as there is nothing to indicate that the widow intended to make the estate liable for the loan. The rent was primarily payable out of the income as it accrued, and if by reason of any temporary difficulty, the widow was driven to raise a loan, there is no reason why one should assume, in the absence of clear indication to that effect, that she intended to throw a permanent burden upon the inheritance rather than to repay the loan out of the income for subsequent years which would be absolutely at her disposal. In this connection, we must bear in mind, that as laid down by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Jibankrishna v. Brajalal, and by this Court in Kristo Gobind v. Hem Chandra, Mohammed Sadat Ali v. Harasundari, and Bireswar v. Kamal Kumar, a decree for rent, which has accrued due after the death of her husband, is primâ fade a personal decree against the widow; although when such a decree has been obtained by the entire body of landlords under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the tenure itself may pass into the hands of the purchaser as the result of a sale in execution. Apart from this initial difficulty, there is a graver obstacle in the path of the creditor in the case before us. It is not enough to show that the widow intended to create a liability upon the estate in her hands The creditor has further to establish that he intended to enforce such liability. The real question in fact is, what was liable to be sold and what in fact was actually sold. In the investigation of this question, the frame of the suit, the judgment, the decree, the execution proceedings, the sale-proclamation, the amount of purchase-money, and the conduct of the parties must all be taken into account; the sale-certificate is by no means conclusive. As the proceeding may be against the widow personally or against the widow as representing her husband's estate, the true test is to see whether the proceedings in which the sale was directed was brought against the widow personally or with a view to affect the whole inheritance. [Jugal v. Jotendra, Court of Wards v. Ramaput Singh, Srinath v. Hari, Ramlal v. Akhoy, Radhakishen v. Naurotan Lal, Bmja v. Joggeswar, Kistomoyee v. Prosunno, Bisto Beharee v. Byjnath, Baijun v. Brij Bhookan, Bireswar v. Kamal Kumari, Sadat Ali v. Harasundari, Trilochan v. Bakkeswar.] It is not necessary that the reversioner should be joined as party to the suit, but if he is so joined, the fact would afford clear indication that the creditor intended to make the inheritance liable and not to restrict his remedy to the qualified interest of the widow. [Bhagarathi Das v. Baleswar Bagerti, Mohhna Chandra v. Ramkishore, Srinath Dass v. Haripada, Nugendra v. Kanuni, Lloyd v. Johnes; Story on Equity Pleadings, Article 144.] Tested in the light of these principles what is the position of the creditor in the case before us? There is no indication whatever that in the suit on the money bond he intended to obtain a decree which would operate against the inheritance. The claim was, in form, personally against the widow. The decree, on the face of it, was personally against her. In the execution proceeding, her right, title and interest were put up to sale and were purchased by the decree-holder, who paid for the share of the property now in dispute, one-half of Rs. 745, though the value thereof was according to the Plaintiff not less than Rs. 2,100. What was sold, was, primâ facie, her limited interest, and it is impossible for us to hold that the entire inheritance was intended to be and was actually brought to sale. Consequently, the interest acquired by the purchaser terminated on the death of the widow. In this view, it is immaterial that the sale, though voidable because held in contravention of sec. 99 of the Transfer of Property Act, was not avoided by the widow; her omission to do so could not give the sale greater efficacy than it possessed or enlarge the interest acquired by the purchaser thereunder. We hold accordingly that the Plaintiff became entitled to the property on the death of her mother.

It is plain that no question of limitation arises. Whether we apply Article 120 or Article 141, the suit is obviously in time. Nor can objection be taken to the grant of a declaratory decree under sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The property is not in the possession of the Defendants and the Plaintiff could not ask for ejectment as against them: Subramaniya v. Paramaswaran, Malaiyya v. Perumal. Nor could she join in this suit the undef-tenure-holder who has obtained possession under the Putni Regulation for the satisfaction of his lien; his possession is rightful and the Plaintiff has no cause of action against him. The only question in controversy is, whether on the death of the Plaintiff's mother the property vested in her, or still continues in the hands of the execution purchaser: for the reasons assigned, it has been rightly declared that the property vested in the Plaintiff.

The result is that the decree of the District Judge must be affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.