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Rukmani Ammal v. T.S.P.L Palaniappa Chettiar Respt.
Factual and Procedural Background
This Letters Patent Appeal arises from an order refusing a stay in C.M.A. No. 108 of 1928, which challenged an order of the Subordinate Judge made while settling a sale proclamation in execution proceedings under Order XXI, Rule 66.
At the stage of fixing the sale proclamation several contentions were raised: two encumbrances were alleged on the property — (1) a mortgage in favour of Subramania Sastri and (2) a security in favour of the District Court arising from the Tanjore Palace Estate suit (in which certain parties had withdrawn money from Court). One side contended that the Tanjore Palace security did not subsist; as to the Subramania Sastri mortgage it was contended that it was a charge for a running account rather than a mortgage for cash, that no amount was due under it, and that Subramania Sastri together with the plaintiff had consented to sell the property free of encumbrances.
The Subordinate Judge held that the Tanjore Palace security was not discharged because there was no order cancelling the security bond; he further held that because the consent of the encumbrancers had not been obtained he could not make the property free of encumbrances in those proceedings. For purposes of fixing the upset price he treated the encumbrances as being one-half of the amount alleged (a method he adopted to ascertain an appropriate upset price). He directed that the competing contentions be mentioned in the sale proclamation so that prospective purchasers would have the material facts.
The central procedural question before the Court was whether a civil miscellaneous appeal lay against the Subordinate Judge's order under Order XXI, Rule 66, and, if not, whether a Letters Patent Appeal would lie from the refusal to grant a stay.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a civil miscellaneous appeal lies against an order made by a Judge under Order XXI, Rule 66 of the Code (i.e., whether such an order is appealable).
- Whether Orders passed under Order XXI, Rule 66 are administrative in character as opposed to judicial, and the consequence of that classification for the right of appeal.
- Whether an order purporting to be under Order XXI, Rule 66 but which in substance decides questions falling within Section 47 (or other appealable provisions of the Code) is nonetheless appealable.
- Whether the particular order passed by the Subordinate Judge (fixing upset price and directing contents of the proclamation) amounted to a substantive adjudication of parties' rights that would bring the case within Section 47.
Arguments of the Parties
Contentions raised at the stage of settling the sale proclamation
- One set of parties contended that the Tanjore Palace Estate security did not subsist (i.e., that the alleged encumbrance arising from that security was not in effect).
- Other contentions focused on the Subramania Sastri mortgage: that it was not a mortgage arising from a cash consideration but was merely a charge for a running account; that no mortgage amount was actually due; and that Subramania Sastri together with the plaintiff had consented to sell the property free of encumbrances.
- It was also submitted (during proceedings) that there could be no sale because the attachment had 'fallen through' — an objection said to have been raised while the Judge settled the proclamation (the Judge did not decide that objection under Rule 66).
- One party (identified in the record as defendant No. 5 and later as the appellant) argued that the sale proclamation did not carry out the Judge's order in sufficiently noting the contentions of both parties for the guidance of prospective purchasers.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sivagami Achi v. Subrahmania Ayyar, 27 M. 259 : 14 M.L.J. 57 (F.B.) | Held that an order under Section 287 (old Code) is administrative and not subject to an appeal. | Relied upon as establishing the principle that an administrative order of the character made under the predecessor provision is not appealable; the Court applied this principle to Rule 66 where appropriate. |
| Rama Naidu v. Ramakrishna Naidu, 78 Ind. Cas. 829 : 46 M.L.J. 192 : A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 527 | Held that the alteration in the new Code does not change the administrative character of an order settling a proclamation under the corresponding rule. | Followed as authority that the change in wording in Order XXI, Rule 66 did not convert the Rule into a source of appealable judicial decisions; the Court applied it to characterise the Subordinate Judge's order as administrative. |
| Ramanathan Chettiar v. Venkatachallam Chettiar, 72 Ind. Cas. 836 : 44 M.L.J. 599 : A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 619 | Established that an order fixing the upset price is administrative and not appealable. | Used to support the conclusion that fixing upset price by itself does not give rise to an appealable order. |
| Tawker & Sons v. Harsookdoss Chonghmull, 76 Ind. Cas. 124 : 45 M.L.J. 611 : A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 386 | Referenced in the line of authorities treating Rule 66/Section 287 matters as administrative. | Referred to as part of the authorities indicating the administrative character of fixing proclamations and upset prices. |
| Ramanathan Chetty v. Somasundaram Chettiar, 37 Ind. Cas. 897 | Referenced among authorities on the administrative nature of similar orders. | Relied upon as supporting the administrative classification. |
| Avudainayagappa Pillai v. Sundaranandam Pillai, 76 Ind. Cas. 173 : 19 L.W. 585 : A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 767 | Referenced as part of the body of case law on orders fixing sales and proclamations. | Used to reinforce the view that these orders are administrative and not appealable. |
| Kaveribai Ammal v. Mehta & Sons, 75 Ind. Cas. 901 : 46 M.L.J. 71 : A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 234 | Noted that two judges (Schwabe, C.J., and Coleridge, J.) considered that the alteration in Order XXI, Rule 66 might render the authority of Sivagami Achi doubtful and were inclined to refer the question to a Full Bench. | The Court acknowledged this view but observed that the case proceeded on other grounds; it treated Kaveribai as indicating a differing judicial inclination on the effect of the amendment, without displacing the general rule where no Section 47 issues arise. |
| Arukapalli Narasimha Rao v. Arumilli Subbarayudu, 96 Ind. Cas. 492 : 51 M.L.J. 135 : A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 834 | Reportedly showed that Phillips and Madhavan Nair, JJ., were inclined to the view taken in Kaveribai (i.e., that the amendment might affect the earlier authority). | Referred to as further judicial material indicating some difference of view; the Court nevertheless confined its holding to the distinction between purely administrative Rule 66 matters and those which in substance decide execution rights under Section 47. |
| Grant v. Suraj Mal, 72 Ind. Cas. 860 : (1923) Pat. 76 : 1 Pat. L.R. 53 : A.I.R. 1923 Pat. 134 | Illustrates the principle that the true question is the substance of the order — whether it in effect decides matters of execution (bringing it within Section 47) even if labelled under a procedural rule. | Applied to frame the test adopted by the Court: examine the substance of the order to determine whether it is merely administrative or in effect an appealable judicial adjudication. |
| Basanta Kumar Choudhury v. Baikunta Nath Chakravarty, 91 Ind. Cas. 819 : A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 610 | Referred to on the same point — substance over form in deciding appealability. | Relied upon to support the proposition that if an order under Rule 66 in substance decides appealable execution questions (e.g., under Section 47), an appeal would lie. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by identifying the central procedural issue — whether a civil miscellaneous appeal lay against the Subordinate Judge's order made while settling a sale proclamation under Order XXI, Rule 66. The Court observed that Order XXI, Rule 66 corresponds to Section 287 of the old Code (with the chief modification being notice to both parties).
The Court reviewed prior authorities beginning with Sivagami Achi v. Subrahmania Ayyar, which treated the corresponding provision as creating administrative orders not subject to appeal. Subsequent decisions (including Rama Naidu and Ramanathan Chettiar) were cited as supporting the continued administrative character of orders settling sale proclamations and fixing upset prices despite the amendments in the newer Code. The Court acknowledged that some judges in Kaveribai Ammal and Arukapalli expressed doubt whether the amendment altered that position, but treated those views as not displacing the general rule where only administrative matters are decided.
The Court articulated a clear analytical test drawn from the cited authorities: determine the substance of the order. If, in substance, the Judge by purporting to act under Rule 66 decides questions that fall within Section 47 (or otherwise constitute appealable adjudications in execution), then an appeal lies; if the Judge only exercises administrative functions (fixing upset price, determining details of proclamation, noting competing contentions for bidder information), the order remains administrative and not appealable.
Applying that test to the facts, the Court concluded that the Subordinate Judge did not decide the substantive rights of the parties. His actions were limited to fixing an upset price (treating encumbrances at one-half the alleged amount for calculation), directing that competing contentions be noted in the proclamation, and leaving unresolved factual and legal disputes to be addressed in appropriate proceedings or by the purchaser. The Judge had not purported to calculate or determine the market value of the property as a binding adjudication; he had not resolved the question of the existence or extent of encumbrances in a manner equivalent to a Section 47 decision.
The Court also noted that an objection that the attachment had fallen through was raised but not dealt with under Rule 66; the Court recommended that the appropriate course for that objection was an application objecting to further execution or sale, on which an order could be passed (from which the right of appeal would depend on the nature of that subsequent order).
Finally, the Court addressed a procedural defect alleged in the sale proclamation (that it did not faithfully reproduce the contentions as directed) and observed that this was readily remediable by reissuing a proclamation conforming to the Judge's order.
Holding and Implications
Core Rulings:
- The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed.
- The Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed (since the original civil miscellaneous appeal was held to be incompetent).
Direct consequences for the parties:
- A fresh sale proclamation is to be issued, so that the directions given by the Subordinate Judge as to including parties' contentions can be implemented.
- One set of costs is awarded to cover all three proceedings mentioned in the record: the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal, the Letters Patent Appeal, and the Civil Miscellaneous Petition.
The Court's decision was grounded on application of existing authorities and the distinction between administrative acts under Order XXI, Rule 66 and appealable adjudications under Section 47; the opinion does not purport to create a new legal precedent beyond applying that established framework.
1. This Letters Patent Appeal arises out of an order refusing stay in C.M.A. No. 108 of 1928 filed against the order of the Subordinate Judge in execution under Order XXI, Rule 66, while settling the sale proclamation. Various contentions were raised when the sale proclamation was fixed. One was as regards the value of the property and the other was as regards certain encumbrances. There were two encumbrances, one wasa mortgage to one Subramania Sastri and the other was the security given to the District Court in the Tanjore Palace Estate suit, where certain parties withdrew money from Court. As regards the security the contention on one side was that the Tanjore Palace suit encumbrances did not subsist and as regards Subramania Sastri's mortgage the contention was that it was not for a cash consideration but as a charge for some running account. It was also contended that there was no mortgage amount due to him and that Subramania Sastri and the plaintiff consented to sell the property free of encumbrances. This question had to be decided in fixing the proclamation of sale. The Subordinate Judge said that the Tanjore Palace security was not discharged because there was no order cancelling the security bond. He also said that, as the consent of encumbrancers had not been obtained, he could not in this suit make the property free of encumbrances, and he in determining the value of the encumbrances assumed it to be only half the amount alleged. This was necessary in his opinion in order to ascertain what the upset price ought to be, and he fixed the upset price having regard to this method of calculation. He also stated that the contentions of both the parties should be mentioned in the sale proclamation so that the purchaser might be in possession of all the material facts which would guide him in purchasing the property. He did not decide any question, because the fact that he directed the notification of what the parties contended rather suggests that what he did was to fix the method of ascertaining what the upset price ought to be, leaving the other questions to the discretion of the purchaser. Again it seems to me that, in order to fix the upset price it is not necessary to find out and decide the market value of the property. Very often the upset price is the price at which the auctioneer has to begin and the Judge is not bound to (Sick) the sale because the bid exceeds (Sick) is a little higher than the upset price. In the present case the fact that the Judge was of opinion that it was unnecessary to find out the market value of the property rather suggests that he took the amount fixed in the previous proclamation only as a tentative price at the beginning and he did not determine that the market value of the property was the value which should be fixed in the sale proclamation.
2. On these facts the question is whether a civil miscellaneous appeal would lie and if the civil miscellaneous appeal would not lie, it is clear that the Letters Patent Appeal also would not lie. Order XXI, Rule 66, corresponds to Section 287 of the old Code of Civil Procedure with certain modifications. The chief modification is that notice should be given to both parties. It has been held in Sivagami Achi v. Subrahmania Ayyar 27 M. 259 : 14 M.L.J. 57 (F.B.) by a Pull Bench of this Court that an order under Section 287 is an administrative order and an appeal would not lie against such an order. The question again arose under Order XXI, Rule 66, and it was held by a Bench of this Court in Rama Naidu v. Ramakrishna Naidu 78 Ind. Cas. 829 : 46 M.L.J. 192 : 19 L.W. 235 : (1924) M.W.N. 220 : A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 527, that the change in the new Code does not alter the character of the proceedings and though the Judge settles the proclamation it is still an administrative order. In Ramanathan Chettiar v. Venkatachallam Chettiar 72 Ind. Cas. 836 : 44 M.L.J. 599 : (1923) M.W.N. 297 : 17 L.W. 635 : 32 M.L.T. 401 : A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 619 it was held that an order fixing the upset price is not appealable as it is an administrative and not a judicial order. In this connection I may also refer to Tawker & Sons v. Harsookdoss Chonghmull 76 Ind. Cas. 124 : 45 M.L.J. 611 : 18 L.W. 647 : (1923) M.W.N. 834 : 33 M.L.T. 72 : A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 386, Ramanathan Chetty v. Somasundaram Chettiar 37 Ind. Cas. 897 : (1917) M.W.N. 141 and Avudainayagappa Pillai v. Sundaranandam Pillai 76 Ind. Cas. 173 : 19 L.W. 585 : A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 767. It is, no doubt, true that in Kaveribai Ammal v. Mehta & Sons 75 Ind. Cas. 901 : 46 M.L.J. 71 : 18 L.W. 615 : (1923) M.W.N. 894 : A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 234. Schwabe, C.J., and Coleridge, J, were of opinion that the alteration in Order XXI, Rule 66, was a circumstance which in their opinion rendered the authority of Sivagami Achi v. Subramania Ayyar 27 M. 259 : 14 M.L.J. 57 (F.B.) doubtful and both the learned Judges were of opinion that, if necessary, they would refer the question to a Full Bench. As the decision proceeded upon Clause 15 of the Letters Patent they did not think a reference necessary. In Arukapalli Narasimha Rao v. Arumilli Subbarayudu 96 Ind. Cas. 492 : 23 L.W. 765 : 51 M.L.J. 135 : (1926) M.W.N. 566 : A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 834, Phillips and Madhavan Nair, JJ., were inclined to take the same view as was taken by Schwabe, C.J., and Coleridge, J. I think that so far as Order XXI, Rule 66, requires decision as to matters which are purely administrative in nature such as fixing the upset price and the details of the sale proclamation the matter is administrative. But where the Judge in addition to deciding such matters in settling the sale proclamation, decides questions which would come under Section 47, he cannot by merely purporting to act under Order XXI, Rule 66 bar an appeal. There is no appeal under the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 against orders passed under Order XXI, Rule 66 so that from the point of view as to whether an appeal lies or not it does not matter if the orders passed under the section are judicial or administrative. I think the real question in each case is what is in substance the order passed by the Judge, whether the order purporting to be under Order XXI, Rule 66, really decides questions in execution so as to bring the case under Section 47 or any other appealable rule of the Code, I may in this connection refer to Grant v. Suraj Mal 72 Ind. Cas. 860 : (1923) Pat. 76 : 1 Pat. L.R. 53 : A.I.R. 1923 Pat. 134 and Basanta Kumar Choudhury v. Baikunta Nath Chakravarty 91 Ind. Cas. 819 : A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 610. In the present case it is difficult to see how the order passed can be brought under Section 47. I have already set out what in effect was the order passed by the Subordinate Judge. He in fact decided no question settling the rights of the parties. All he did was to fix the upset price and to deal with the various objections which all the parties raised to the upset price. In these circumstances, I think the case comes clearly within the principle of Sivagami Achi v. Subramania Ayyar 27 M. 259 : 14 M.L.J. 57 (F.B.) where it was held that an administrative order as such could not be appealed against. It has been argued that the Subordinate Judge has not dealt with the objection that there can be no sale because the attachment has fallen through. This was an objection raised while the Judge was settling the proclamation. He has not dealt with it in his order evidently because the matter was not one which he could deal with under Order XXI, Rule 66. I think the proper course would be for the petitioner, if so advised, to put in an application, objecting to the further, execution of the decree or the sale because of there being no attachment and on that an order can be passed from which there may or may not be a right of appeal.
3. It is also urged that the sale proclamation does not carry out the terms of the order passed by the Judge, in that, it does not note the contentions of both the parties so as to enable the purchaser to be in possession of the necessary information. It is a matter which, if brought to the notice of the Court, can be easily remedied by bringing the proclamation in conformity with the order passed by the learned Judge. I think if a fresh proclamation is issued this defect can easily be remedied. But it does not in any way affect the order passed by the Subordinate Judge under Rule 66 which is nothing more than an administrative order.
4. I do not think the civil miscellaneous appeal lies and so it should be dismissed. It follows that the Letters Patent Appeal should also be dismissed as the original civil miscellaneous appeal was incompetent. There will be a fresh proclamation. One set of costs for all the three Civil Miscellaneous Appeal, Letters Patent Appeal and the Civil Miscellaneous Petition.
Reilly, J.
5. Whether an order made under Rule 66 of Order XXI of the Code as it now stands, is purely an administrative order, or has anything judicial in its nature, it is clear that there is no appeal under the Code against an order made under Rule 66 as such. But I agree that, if a Judge under the guise of making an order under that rule or in the course of proceedings under that rule, makes an order which comes within the scope of section 47 of the code, then there is an appeal against his order. Now, in this case, the learned Subordinate Judge has fixed certain upest prices. His order does not purport to determine, or to give his estimate of, the market value of the property. He has fixed certain prices, which he describes as the upset prices and which appear to be the prices at which the auctioneer is to start the bids and he has mentioned that, if those prices are not reached they will have to be lowered on a future occasion. That, I think, makes it quite clear that the upset prices he mentions were not fixed by him as representing any definite estimate of the market value of the property. It was his duty under Rule 66 to give in the, proclamation everything which he considered "material for a purchaser to know in order to judge of the nature and value of the property." It was a very difficult thing in this case for him to give any definite indication of the value of the property as one party contended that it was subject to heavy encumbrances and the other party that it was subject to no encumbrance at all. The learned Subordinate Judge has directed in his order that it should be made clear that one party contends that there are these encumbrances and that the other party maintains that the property is clear of them. The last sentence of his order dated 14th December, 1927, in which he directed that the memorandum last filed by defendant No. 2 should be copied out in the proclamation, makes it quite clear that he intended to put all possible information before the bidders and he was acting reasonably in this particular case. In doing that he arrived at no finding whether the encumbrances were binding or not. It would have been improper for him to attempt to do so in such proceedings. But defendant No. 5, who is now the appellant here, has nothing to complain of on the ground that her representations have not been brought to the notice of the bidders. I agree that the Subordinate Judge has not purported to make, nor in fact made, any order between the parties which would come within the scope of section 47 of the code and that, therefore, there is no appeal against his order.
6. I agree with my learned brother that the Letters Patent Appeal also should be dismissed.
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