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Muhammad Azam Khan v. Hamid Shah
Structured Summary of the Court Opinion (Mathur, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, Raja Mohammad Azam Khan, instituted a suit seeking a declaration that a deed of Waqf dated 17 July 1920 was invalid and for possession of the zamindari property and house subject to that Waqf. The deed was executed by the appellant's father, Raja Mohammad Shah, in favour of his nephews Babu Hamid Shah and Babu Maqbool Ahmad Shah (the respondents). The deed recited that Mahmud Khan (the father of the defendants) had died by drowning and left the defendants unprovided, and the stated object of the Waqf was to provide maintenance for the defendants and their heirs. Out of the income of the dedicated property Rs. 120 annually was specifically earmarked for the expenses of Ashra Moharram, Majlisses in commemoration of Karbala, and feeding the poor in Ramzan.
The plaintiff's case was that the Waqf was invalid because (a) the settlor never intended to create a permanent Waqf under Muhammadan law, (b) there was no residuary gift in favour of charity, and (c) the Waqf had never been acted upon; he therefore claimed the property remained part of his father's assets and sought declaration and possession. The defendants contended that the deed created a valid Muhammadan Waqf, that it had been acted upon, and that the suit was barred by limitation.
The learned Civil Judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit, holding the deed valid and operative, divesting Raja Mohammad Shah of ownership, finding that the Waqf had been acted upon, and that the claim was barred by time. The present appeal challenges that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the deed of Waqf dated 17 July 1920 was valid under Muhammadan law.
- Whether the deed complied with the requirements of section 3 of Act VI of 1913 (Mussalman Waqf Validating Act), including issues arising if the instrument constituted a Waqf ala-ul-aulad.
- Whether there was an implied or express residuary gift in favour of charitable purposes (i.e., whether the ultimate benefit was reserved for charity).
- Whether the Waqf had been acted upon in practice.
- Whether the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The settlor (Raja Mohammad Shah) never intended to create a permanent Waqf under Muhammadan law; therefore the deed is invalid.
- The deed did not fulfil the requirements of section 3 of Act VI of 1913 (Mussalman Waqf Validating Act).
- There was no residuary gift reserved expressly or by implication for charitable purposes after extinction of the family; hence the Waqf was not valid as an ala-ul-aulad Waqf.
- The Waqf had never been acted upon; therefore it should be treated as part of the settlor's assets.
- The claim was not barred by the statutory periods of limitation relied upon by respondents.
Respondents' Arguments
- The deed of Waqf created a real, valid Muhammadan Waqf.
- The Waqf has been acted upon continuously.
- The plaintiff's claim is barred by limitation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mukarram v. Anjuman-un-nissa | Establishes that maintenance of poor relations and dependents is a valid object of a Waqf under Muhammadan law. | The court relied on this authority (and on Sir Dinshaw Mulla's text) to support the proposition that part of income set apart for maintenance of family members does not invalidate a Waqf when a substantial portion is dedicated to charitable uses. |
| Ghazanfar Husain v. Ahmadi Bibi | Interprets the word "family" in section 3(a) of the Mussalman Waqf Validating Act broadly to include persons descended from a common progenitor (e.g., nephews and their descendants), not only those residing in the settlor's house or for whom the settlor had direct maintenance responsibility. | The court followed this bench decision to reject the contention that nephews could not be beneficiaries within the meaning of "family" under section 3(a) of the Act. |
| Baqa Ullah Khan v. Ghulam Siddique Khan | Holds that where a deed uses the words "waqf fi sabilillah", creates a perpetual waqf, provides for appointment of mutwallis for all time, reserves a portion of the usufruct for pious and charitable purposes, and the waqif contemplated possible extinction of his line, it can be implied that the ultimate benefit was reserved for charitable purposes. | The court applied this reasoning by analogizing: the present deed uses language equivalent to "waqf fi sabilillah", is perpetual, and reserves a portion of income for charity, so an implication of residuary gift for charitable purposes can be drawn even without explicit proviso about mutwallis. |
| Masuda Khatun Bibi v. Mohammad Ibrahim | Supports the view that when a Waqf is made in the name of God, created in perpetuity, and a portion of property is reserved for pious and charitable purposes, an inference arises that the ultimate benefit is so reserved. | The court invoked this authority to reinforce the conclusion that the deed in question should be treated as valid and that a residuary charitable intent may be implied from the terms used. |
| Ruqia Begam v. Suraj Mal | Holds that where a waqif indicates an intention to benefit both family and charitable purposes and has applied part of the income to charitable objects in his lifetime, it may be implied that an ultimate reservation for charitable purposes exists; if one object fails, the remaining object may take the whole income. | The court quoted this observation to support application of the doctrine of cy-près: if the line of beneficiaries fails, the income (after specified charitable payments) should be applied for charitable objects or as close to them as possible. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by examining the appellant's contentions and the legal framework. It observed that although arguments were presented on the assumption that Act VI of 1913 applied, if a deed is valid under Muhammadan law as previously interpreted (i.e., before the Act), it is unnecessary to determine compliance with the Act's formal provisions.
The court found that the deed of 17 July 1920 did not expressly state that it was a Waqf ala-ul-aulad or that it was created according to the provisions of Act VI of 1913. Nonetheless, the court concluded the instrument was both for the benefit of the settlor's family and for charitable purposes. Relying on previous judicial interpretation (including Privy Council authority as described in the opinion), the court stated that such dual-purpose gifts are valid so long as there is a substantial dedication to charitable uses at some time and the charitable element is not illusory by reason of amount, uncertainty or remoteness.
Applying that principle to the facts, the court emphasized that a definite sum (Rs. 120 annually) was specifically earmarked for clearly charitable and religious purposes (Ashra Moharram, Majlisses, feeding the poor during Ramzan). The court held that this specific allocation constituted a substantial dedication sufficient to uphold the Waqf even though part of the income was reserved for the maintenance of family members; further, maintenance of poor relations is itself a recognised Waqf object.
Considering the alternative that the instrument might constitute a Waqf ala-ul-aulad under section 3 of the Mussalman Waqf Validating Act, the court addressed the crucial objections: (a) whether nephews fall within "family" under the Act, and (b) whether there was a residuary gift to charity. The court accepted the bench decision in Ghazanfar Husain v. Ahmadi Bibi that "family" is to be read broadly to include nephews and their descendants. On residuary gift, though no express clause provided for post-extinction disposition or appointment of an external mutwalli, the court relied on precedents (notably Baqa Ullah Khan and Masuda Khatun Bibi) to infer that where a waqf is created in the name of God, is perpetual, and reserves a portion of the usufruct for pious and charitable purposes, the ultimate benefit may be impliedly reserved for charity.
The court acknowledged the deed's statement that mutwalliship "shall never be out of the family", and noted a difference from precedent where an express provision for appointment of mutwallis was present. Although the learned Civil Judge had interpreted the expression as not precluding a mutwalli after extinction, Mathur, J. considered such an interpretation untenable but ultimately held that absence of an express post-extinction mutwalli appointment did not prevent an implication of residuary charitable intent. If in the future both the grantor's and grantees' lines were extinct, the court held that the doctrine of cy-près would apply to devote the remaining income (after the expressly provided Rs. 120) to charitable objects as near as possible to the objects which failed.
On limitation, the court observed that it was not necessary to express any opinion and therefore refrained from deciding that issue.
Concluding from the foregoing analysis, the court found the Waqf deed valid either under pre-Act Muhammadan law or, if treated as a Waqf ala-ul-aulad, within the scope of the validating principles discussed; accordingly, the appellant's suit was bound to fail.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED and the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit is upheld; the appellant must bear the costs (the judgment records that the appeal is dismissed with costs and Allsop, J. concurred).
Implications:
- Direct effect: The decree of the learned Civil Judge dismissing the plaintiff's suit is affirmed; the deed of Waqf dated 17 July 1920 is treated as a valid Waqf under the legal analyses set out in the opinion.
- The court accepted that the instrument effected a valid dedication both for family maintenance and for charitable purposes, and that a specific reserved annual sum for religious/charitable purposes supports validity.
- The court indicated that, should the lines of beneficiaries and grantor become extinct, the doctrine of cy-près would apply so as to devote remaining income (after the Rs. 120) to charitable objects as near as possible to the original objects.
- The opinion does not express any conclusion on the question of limitation; the court stated it was unnecessary to decide that issue.
- No broader or novel legal principle was announced beyond application of existing authorities; the decision affirms the validity of the particular deed on the facts and authorities cited.
Mathur, J.:— The suit out of which this appeal was brought by the plaintiff appellant Raja Mohammad Azam Khan for a declaration that the deed of Waqf dated the 17th of July, 1920, was invalid. There was also a prayer for possession over the zamindari property and the house which were the subject matter of the Waqf. The said deed of Waqf was executed by the father of the plaintiff Raja Mohammad Shah in favour of his nephews Babu Hamid Shah and Babu Maqbool Ahmad Shah, the defen-dants-respondents. It was mentioned in the deed of Waqf that as Mahmud Khan the father of the defendants met his death by drowning and left the defendants unprovided the object of the Waqf was to provide maintenance for the defendants and their heirs. Out of the income of the dedicated property Rs. 120 annually was to be spent for the expenses of Ashra Moharram and the Majlisses held in commemoration of the martyrs of Karbala and also for feeding of the poor in the month of Ramzan. The plaintiff's claim was that the said deed of Waqf was invalid, because the Waqif Raja Mohammad Shah never had any intention of making and did not in fact make a permanent Waqf under the Muhammadan law, because there was no residuary gift in favour of charity, and because the Waqf had never been acted upon. The plaintiff claimed that the property was still a part of the assets of his father, Raja Mohammad Shah, and he was entitled to the declaration sought for and to the possession of the property in dispute.
The defence was that the deed of Waqf dated the 17th of July, 1920, created a real Waqf and was perfectly valid according to Muhammadan law, that it has all along been acted upon, and that the suit was barred by limitation.
The learned Civil Judge has dismissed the suit holding that the deed was valid and operative and divested the creator of the Waqf Raja Mohammad Shah of the ownership of the property in dispute, that the Waqf was acted upon, and that the claim was barred by time.
It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff appellant that the Waqf in question did not fulfil the requirements of section 3 of Act VI of 1913 (Mussalman Waqf Validating Act) and therefore it was invalid, that the waqif never seems to have contemplated the contingency of the extinction of his family, and therefore there was no reservation of the income of the property for pious and charitable purposes, that the lower court has wrongly applied the doctrine of cypres in the case of a Muhammadan Waqf, and that the claim was not barred either by twelve years or three years limitation.
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I have come to the conclusion that this appeal has got no force, and must be dismissed. The arguments addressed to us are based on the assumption that Act VI of 1939 applied to the present case, and if the provisions of that Act were not complied with the Waqf would be invalid. It must howrever be noted that if a deed of Waqf is valid according to Muhammadan law as it stood and was being interpreted before the passing of Act VI of 1913, there would be no necessity to investigate whether the provisions of that Act had been complied with or not. The deed of Waqf dated the 17th of July, 1920, which is in dispute in this case does not mention anywhere in the body of the document that it was Waqf Ala-ul-aulad, or that it was executed according to the provisions of Act VI of 1913. There can be no doubt that the Waqf in dispute is both for the benefit of the settlor's family and for charity. Such a gift according to Muhammadan law as interpreted by the Privy Council would be valid if there was a substantial dedication of the property to charitable uses at some period of time or other, and that it was not for the aggrandizement of the family or that the gift to charity was illusory having regard to the small amount reserved for that purpose or from its uncertainty or remoteness. In my estimation when out of an income of a few hundred rupees a substantial sum was specifically earmarked for charitable purposes the Waqf would not be invalid even when a part of the income was set apart for the maintenance of the members of the family. In this connection it will be right to point out that the maintenance of poor relations and dependents is also a valid object of Waqf, vide Mukarram v. Anjuman-un-nissa(1) and the Principles of Mohammedan Law by Sir Dinshaw Mulla, page 156, Twelfth Edition. In this view of the matter, the deed of Waqf dated the 17th of July 1920 was a valid Waqf and the plaintiff's suit was bound to fail.
If, however, it is found that the document in dispute constituted a Waqf Ala-ul-aulad, it will have to be considered whether the provisions of Act VI of 1913 which validated such a Waqf had been complied with. It has been argued that by the said Act it was made lawful for a person professing the Mussalman faith to-create a Waqf which in all other respects was in accordance with the provisions of the Mussalman law for the maintenance and support wholly or partially of his family, children or descendants; and that no Waqf could be created in favour of the nephews as they did not come within the description of the family, children or descendants. The matter is however concluded by a Bench decision of this Court in Ghazanfar Husain v. Ahmadi Bibi, where it was held that the word “family” in section 3(a) of the Mussalman Waqf Validating Act was not restricted to only those persons residing in the house of the settlor for whose maintenance he was mainly responsible, but that the word was intended to be used in its broad popular sense; persons descended from one common progenitor and having a common lineage, e.g nephews of the settlor and their descendants, were included in the term, irrespective of whether they lived in the settlor's house, or whether the settlor was responsible for their maintenance. I am in full agreement with the view that is expressed and do not find any force in this argument. The next contention is that there was no residuary gift in favour of charity. It is no doubt true that it is nowhere expressly mentioned that after the extinction of the family of the grantees and the grantor the income from the property will be spent for the purposes of the charity. It is however clear from the wordings of the proviso to section 3 of the Mussalman Waqf Validating Act (Act VI of 1913) that the ultimate benefit must in each case be expressly or impliedly reserved for the poor or for any other purpose recognised by the Mussalman law as is religious, pious, or charitable purpose of a permanent character. In the case of Baqa Ullah Khan v. Gkulam Siddique Khan(2), it was held that where the words “waqf fi sabilillah” have been used and a waqf has been created in perpetuity, and there is provision for the appointment of the mutwallis for all time to come, and a portion of the usufruct of the waqf property has been reserved for pious and charitable purposes, and the waqif had in contemplation the possible extinction of the line of his descendants who were to be the principal recipients of the profits of the Waqf property, the irresistible conclusion is that the waqif intended by implication to reserve the ultimate benefit for the purposes enumerated in the proviso. It may be mentioned that the deed of Waqf in the prevent case also provides “dawam ke liye rahe khuda men sadkatan wa hash atan Ullah waqf kar diya” which is the same thing as creating a waqf fi sabilillah in perpetuity. A portion of the usufruct of the property has also been reserved for pious and charitable purposes. The only difference is that no provision has expressly been made for the appointment of a mutwalli if the lines of both the grantor and the grantee were extinct, because it has been laid down in the deed of Waqf that the mutwalliship of the Waqf property shall never be out of the family of the executant. The learned Civil Judge has no doubt Temarked that this expression does not mean that there will be no mutwalli after the family of the grantor was extinct. But I do not think that interpretation can be rightly put. It also appears that the grantor never contemplated the possibility of the extinction of the line of the beneficiaries. But I do not think that it was ever contemplated by that Bench to lay down that these were the essential conditions in order to justify an inference that the waqif intended by implication to reserve the ultimate benefit for the purposes of charity etc. In my judgment when the Waqf has been made in the name of God, has been created in perpetuity, and a portion of the Waqf property has been reserved for pious and charitable purposes the same result should follow, vide Masuda Khatun Bibi v. Mohammad Ibrahim. In the event of the line of the beneficiaries and the grantor both being extinct a question would certainly arise as to how the income of the property after deducting the amount of Rs. 120 which has been expressly provided for charitable purposes should be devoted. In my judgment the doctrine of cypres would then apply and the income will be applied for the benefit of the poor or to objects or as near as possible to the objects which failed. In the case of Ruqia Begam v. Suraj Mal, Sir Shah Sulaiman, C.J observed:
Where the Waqif has indicated his intention that his object is to benefit his family, and also religious, pious, or charitable purposes, it can be implied that there is an ultimate reservation for such purposes, particularly so when he has provided, that a part of the income should be applied to such purposes during his own lifetime. If one object, namely, the maintenance of his descendants, fails, there is no reason why the other object should also fail, and no reason whatsoever why the whole income should not be devoted to the remaining object as indicated.”
I am thus prepared to hold that even as a Waqf Ala-ul-aulad under the provisions of Act VI of 1913, the Waqf deed in question would not be invalid. In any view of the case, the plaintiff's suit was rightly dismissed. I do not think it is necessary to express any opinion on the question of limitation. The appeal fails and I would dismiss it with costs.
Allsop, J.:— I concur.
By the Court—The appeal is dismissed with costs.
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