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Azizur Rahman Choudhury And Ors. Judgment-Debtors v. Aliraja Choudhury And Ors. Decree-Holders

Calcutta High Court
Mar 23, 1927
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Factual and Procedural Background

A decree was passed on 23 November 1921 in a suit instituted by Aliraja Choudhury and Elim Miah Chowdhury (plaintiffs / decree-holders) against Mansur Miah, Abdul Jalil and Azizur Rahman (defendants / judgment-debtors). The decree declared the plaintiffs' right of easement over a pathway, directed removal of obstructions and granted a perpetual injunction restraining future obstructions.

The defendants appealed to the Subordinate Judge of Cachar. During the appeal Mansur Miah died. On 7 May 1923 the defendants' pleader told the appellate Court that he would not proceed because his clients had compromised out of Court; the appeal was dismissed for default. The certified copy of that order shows two pleaders (Babu R.R. Dutt and Babu B.L. Dhar) endorsed the order with "Seen."

On 15 September 1923 the decree-holders applied for execution of the decree. On 13 November 1923 the surviving judgment-debtors (Abdul Jalil and Azizur Rahman) objected to execution, alleging that the decree had been adjusted out of Court by giving the decree-holders a different pathway and by the decree-holders abandoning decretal costs.

The learned Munsif heard evidence: five witnesses were examined (record shows depositions dated 8 December 1923 though the order-sheet does not reflect that entry). One witness, Elim Miah (a decree-holder), supported the judgment-debtors' account, stating an adjustment had occurred and that his name had been signed in execution proceedings by his son while he did not wish to proceed.

The judgment-debtors filed a petition (5 January 1924) asserting that a local inspection revealed a compromise on the spot and filed a draft agreement. The executing Court conducted a local investigation (24 December 1923 is the date mentioned elsewhere in the papers but not recorded on the order-sheet). The executing Court made various adjournments for evidence; on 2 June 1924 the Munsif held there was a compromise but it could not be given effect because its terms varied from the decree and would amount to substituting a new executable decree, citing Ladd Govindoss Krishnadoss v. Ramdoss Vishnadoss [1915] M.W.N. 225.

The judgment-debtors appealed to the District Judge, who affirmed the Munsif's decision, holding the compromise had not been satisfactorily proved and that even if proved it could not be acted upon as it was arrived at in execution proceedings (relying on the Ladd case and Order 23, Rule 4, Civil P.C.). The present appeal was then preferred by the judgment-debtors to the Court whose opinion is summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the compromise or adjustment alleged to have been made "on the spot" during the executing Court's local investigation (and embodied in the draft agreement filed on 5 January 1924) could be given effect in execution proceedings, in light of Order 21 Rule 2 and Order 23 Rule 4 of the Civil P.C. and relevant authorities.
  2. Whether an earlier adjustment said to have been made during the pendency of the appeal (i.e., prior to the appellate decree) could be taken cognizance of by the executing Court and, if so, what order should be made on the execution proceedings.
  3. Whether allegations of fraud permit an executing Court to inquire into a payment or adjustment that has not been certified as required by Order 21, Rule 2 (i.e., whether fraud brings the matter within Section 47 so as to permit inquiry).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Judgment-debtors') Arguments

  • The earlier adjustment, said to have taken place while the appeal was pending, should have been given effect by the executing Court and thus barred execution of the decree.
  • The parties did not abandon reliance on the earlier adjustment; the judgment-debtors maintained that the decree had already been adjusted before the appeal was disposed of.
  • The representation of adjustment to the appellate Court (while it was seised of the case) together with the subsequent petition filed before the executing Court should be read together and may satisfy the certification requirements of Order 21, Rule 2, Civil P.C.

Respondents' (Decree-holders') Arguments

  • The compromise or adjustment reached during the executing Court's on-the-spot investigation could not be given effect because it was made in execution proceedings and would substitute a new executable decree incompatible with the decree under execution (relying on Ladd Govindoss Krishnadoss v. Ramdoss Vishnadoss and Order 23, Rule 4).
  • As regards the earlier adjustment (during the pendency of the appeal), that was effectively an objection as to executability under Section 47 and therefore did not need certification under Order 21, Rule 2 for the executing Court to deal with it.
  • Because fraud was alleged, the executing Court could examine the matter under Section 47 and was not debarred from inquiry by the requirement of certification under Order 21, Rule 2.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Ladd Govindoss Krishnadoss v. Ramdoss Vishnadoss [1915] M.W.N. 225 That a compromise arrived at in execution which would substitute a new executable decree inconsistent with the decree under execution cannot be given effect in execution proceedings. The Munsif and the District Judge relied on this case to refuse to give effect to the on-the-spot compromise; the Court noted this authority in assessing whether the local compromise could be acted upon.
Case reported in 28 I.C. 376 The view that an adjustment which, if given effect, would create a new decree at variance with the decree under execution cannot be acted upon in execution proceedings. The Court endorsed the view expressed in this report, observing that even if the on-the-spot compromise were proved, its terms precluded giving it effect in execution.
Biroo Gorain v. Jaimurat Koer [1912] 16 C.W.N. 923 (a) That an executing Court is not competent to enquire into a payment or adjustment not certified as required by Order 21, Rule 2, even if fraud is alleged; (b) that notification of an adjustment to an appellate Court together with later proceedings may satisfy the certification requirement of Order 21, Rule 2. The Court relied on this decision both as supporting the general rule that uncertified adjustments cannot be inquired into by an executing Court (even on allegations of fraud) and, crucially, as authority that the representation to the appellate Court combined with the subsequent petition could satisfy Order 21, Rule 2 in the present facts.
Hassan Ali v. Ganzi Ali [1904] 31 Cal. 179 That an agreement not to execute a decree to be passed in future cannot be taken cognizance of by an executing Court; the remedy is a separate suit to restrain execution. The Court cited this case to reject the respondents' contention that the earlier adjustment (said to have been before the decree) could be dealt with by the executing Court without following the separate suit procedure.
Benode Lal Pakrashi v. Brajendra Kumar Saha [1902] 29 Cal. 810 Same principle as Hassan Ali: prior agreement not to execute future decree requires separate suit; executing Court cannot normally take cognizance. Used alongside Hassan Ali to support the view that prior adjustments cannot be enforced or relied upon in execution proceedings and require separate litigation to restrain execution.
Laldas v. Kishordas [1898] 22 Bom. 463 Represents the contrary view taken by another High Court on whether an executing Court may act on such adjustments. Cited as an example of a differing view in other High Courts; the Court recorded that other High Courts had taken a different approach but did not adopt it here.
Subramania Pillai v. Kumara Velu [1916] 39 Mad. 541 Another instance of a High Court taking a different view on the cognizability of prior adjustments by executing Courts. Noted as part of the contrary authorities from other High Courts; the Court recorded the divergence but proceeded on the consistent current of its own Court's authorities.
Chidambaram Chettiar v. Krishna Vathiyer [1917] 40 Mad. 233 Example of a Madras High Court decision adopting a different view on whether an executing Court can take cognizance of prior adjustments. Recorded among contrary authorities; the Court did not adopt this reasoning for the present matter.
Gavri Singh v. Gajadhar Das [1909] 6 A.L.J. 403 Another authority representing a differing approach of other High Courts on similar points. Noted in the opinion as part of a group of contrary cases from other jurisdictions; not applied as precedent for the Court's decision.
Jogendra v. Ashutosh [1916] 24 C.L.J. 462 Authority supporting the rule that executing Courts cannot inquire into uncertified payments or adjustments even when fraud is alleged. Included among the authorities relied upon for the proposition that fraud does not permit an executing Court to examine an uncertified adjustment.
Periatambi v. Vellaya [1898] 21 Mad. 409 Madras authority cited in support of the rule against executing Courts inquiring into uncertified adjustments (even if fraud alleged). Relied on as part of a line of authorities that the Court summarized to reject the fraud-based contention.
Ganapathy Aiyar v. Chenga Reddi [1906] 29 Mad. 312 Another Madras case cited on the same point (executing Court's inability to inquire into uncertified adjustments). Included as part of the authorities supporting the Court's statement that the executing Court cannot inquire into uncertified adjustments even if fraud is alleged.
Budruddin v. Gulam Mohideen [1913] 36 Mad. 357 Madras decision in the line of cases restricting inquiry by executing Courts into uncertified adjustments. Noted among the cases relied upon for the proposition that allegations of fraud do not permit inquiry without the certification required by Order 21, Rule 2.
Mehbunissa Beqam v. Mahednnissa A.I.R. 1925 Bom. 309 Bombay decision cited in the context of whether fraud permits an executing Court to inquire into uncertified adjustments. Mentioned among authorities discussing the limits on an executing Court's inquiry; used to illustrate the position of other decisions.
Imamuddin v. Bindabasini [1920] 5 Pat. L.J. 70 Another authority cited in the same context (executing Court's inability to investigate uncertified adjustments despite allegations of fraud). Included as part of the line of decisions that the Court referenced to reject the fraud exception to the certification requirement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a two-part analysis: first of the compromise said to have been made on the spot during the executing Court's local investigation, and second of the earlier adjustment said to have been made during the pendency of the appeal.

On the on-the-spot adjustment: the Court examined the draft agreement filed by the judgment-debtors and concluded that the terms were stipulations to be carried out in the future rather than a compromise that completely or partly extinguished the decree. Because the adjustment consisted of obligations to be performed in the future, it did not fall within Order 21, Rule 2, Civil P.C., but rather within the purview of Order 23. The Court noted that Order 23, Rule 4 excludes the application of Order 23 to execution proceedings, and explained that Order 21, Rule 2 together with Section 47 provide the procedure for recording compromises in execution proceedings. The Court adopted the view (citing the authority reported in 28 I.C. 376) that an adjustment which would substitute a new executable decree inconsistent with the decree under execution cannot be given effect in execution proceedings. For these reasons the Court held that even if the on-the-spot compromise were proved, it could not be given effect in execution.

On the earlier adjustment alleged to have occurred while the appeal was pending: the Court first rejected the respondents' argument that the judgment-debtors had abandoned reliance on the earlier adjustment; the record did not support abandonment. The Court considered whether such earlier adjustment could be cognized by the executing Court. It rejected the respondents' contention that the matter was simply an objection under Section 47 and need not be certified under Order 21, Rule 2, holding instead that an agreement not to execute a future decree (i.e., an adjustment prior to the decree) cannot ordinarily be taken cognizance of by an executing Court; to seek relief the judgment-debtors must institute a separate suit to restrain execution (citing Hassan Ali v. Ganzi Ali and Benode Lal Pakrashi v. Brajendra Kumar Saha). The Court acknowledged that other High Courts had taken a different view, but relied upon the consistent current of authorities in its own Court on this point.

The Court addressed the respondents' contention that allegation of fraud brings the matter within Section 47 and therefore permits inquiry by an executing Court. The Court rejected that proposition: although some earlier decisions from Bombay and Madras supported the contrary view, the Court concluded (relying on a line of its own authorities, including Biroo Gorain v. Jaimurat Koer) that an executing Court is not competent to inquire into the fact of a payment or adjustment not certified as required by Order 21, Rule 2, even if fraud is imputed to the decree-holder.

Finally, the Court accepted the appellants' argument of substance: because the earlier adjustment was notified to the appellate Court while it was seised of the case and because the decree-holders' pleaders had endorsed the appellate order with "Seen" (indicating no objection at that time), the representation made to the appellate Court together with the subsequent petition filed in the executing Court could be regarded as satisfying the requirements of Order 21, Rule 2. The Court relied on Biroo Gorain v. Jaimurat as directly on point and observed that the facts of that case were "exactly on all fours" with the present facts.

Because the learned Munsif did not appear to have made any factual finding on whether there had been such an earlier adjustment, the Court concluded that the proper course was to set aside the orders of the Courts below and remit the matter to the original Court for a factual finding on whether the adjustment had occurred, using the evidence already on record and permitting further evidence. After that finding the executing Court should pass proper orders as to whether execution should proceed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal succeeds. The Court set aside the orders passed by both the Munsif and the District Judge and directed that the case be remitted to the original Court with a direction to determine, upon the evidence on record and any further evidence, whether the earlier adjustment (said to have been made during the pendency of the appeal) had been proved and, depending on that finding, to pass appropriate orders as to whether the execution proceedings should continue.

Direct Consequences for the Parties:

  • The orders of the two Courts below are set aside and the matter is remitted for a factual finding on the alleged earlier adjustment and consequent orders on execution.
  • The appellants (judgment-debtors) were awarded the costs of the appeal; the hearing-fee was assessed at two gold mohurs.

Broader implications: The opinion applies existing authorities (including Biroo Gorain and the Ladd decision) to the facts; it does not purport to lay down a new general rule beyond applying and reconciling earlier authorities in the circumstances described.

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal has been preferred by the judgment-debtors from an order passed by the District Judge of Oachar affirming on appeal an order passed by the Sadar Munsif at Silchar overruling the judgment-debtors' objection in connexion with certain execution proceedings. The proceedings in the Courts below have been so irregular that it is necessary to set out the facts somewhat in detail in order to understand what has exactly happened. The execution proceedings relate to a decree that was passed on 23rd November 1921, in a suit which had been instituted by two persons Aliraja Choudhury and Elim Miah Chowdhury as the plaintiffs against Mansur Miah, Abdul Jalil and Azizur Rahman as the principal defendants. The decree declared the plaintiffs' right of easement on a certain pathway, directed the removal of certain obstructions that had been caused therein and granted a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from putting up such obstructions in future. The defendants thereupon preferred an appeal from the aforesaid decree to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Cachar. During the pendency of this appeal one of the defendants, namely, Mansur Miah died and at the hearing of the said appeal it was represented to the Court on behalf of the defendants that there had been adjustment of the said decree and that, therefore, the appeal would not be proceeded with. The adjustment was thus brought to the notice of the Court on 7th May 1923, and on that day the Court disposed of the appeal in the following words:

Appellant's pleader says that he will not proceed with the appeal as his clients who are alive informed him that there has been a compromise out of Court. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed for default.

2. From the certified copy of this order which is on the record it appears that the order was shown to two pleaders, one Babu R.R. Dutt and the other Babu B.L. Dhar and they put down their initials under the said order with the endorsement "Seen." It may be presumed that these two gentlemen were the pleaders of the parties to the said appeal. On 15th September 1923, an application was filed purporting to have been made by the two decree-holders Aliraja Chowdhury and Elim Miah Choudhury for the execution of the said 'decree. On 13th November 1923 the two defendants Abdul Jalil and Azizur Eahman who were then the surviving judgment-debtors, Mansur Miah having died, as I have already stated, during the pendency of the appeal, objected to the execution going on, on the ground that the decree that was sought to be executed had been adjusted out of Court by the judgment-debtors having given the decree-holders a pathway somewhat different from what had been awarded to the decree-holders by the decree and because on accepting the same the decree-holders had given up their claim to the decretal costs. This objection was taken up for the consideration by the learned Munsif before whom five witnesses were examined on 8th December 1923. The fact that the said witnesses were examined appears from the record of the depositions of the said witnesses but it is curious that the order-sheet does not contain any entry under that date showing that any witnesses had been so examined. One of these witnesses so examined was one of the decree-holders Elim Miah who supported the objection that was put forward on behalf of the judgment-debtors and who stated that there had been such an adjustment and who further represented to the Court that his name had been signed in the execution proceedings by his son, but that he himself did not want to proceed with the execution. The record does not show that the learned Munsiff arrived at any finding on the question as to whether there was such an adjustment or not. But on 10th December 1923, an application was put in on behalf of the judgment-debtors in which they stated that if the Court would care to go to the locality it would be apparent to the Court that there had been such an adjustment and that the parties had been acting upon the said adjustment for a good long time. The Munsif went to the locality on 24th December 1923 as appears from certain statements that are to be found in the petitions that were subsequently filed on behalf of the parties. I may note here again that this local investigation is not referred to in the order-sheet of these execution proceedings and there is no trace whatsoever therein as to what transpired in the course of this local investigation.

3. The next order in the order-sheet which has any bearing on this matter is dated 5th January 1924 which shows that on that date a petition was filed on behalf of the judgment-debtors stating that on the spot at the time of the local investigation there were certain proposals for giving the decree-holders another pathway and that the said proposals had been accepted and the ultimate result of the negotiations was embodied in a draft agreement a copy of which was filed along with the petition. The judgment-debtors prayed that effect might be given to this agreement that was reached between the parties on the local investigation as aforesaid. On this the decree-holders took time once on 5th January 1921 till 12th January 1921, again on 12th February 1921 and thereafter again on 12feh February 1924 till 1st March 1924. On this day the Court made an order to the effect that the parties should bring evidence to prove the compromise mentioned in petition 210. Petition 210, it may be stated, was the petition which had been filed on behalf of the judgment-debtors on 5th January 1924 alleging that there had been a compromise on the-spot and filing along with it the draft agreement to which I have already referred. Thereafter the matter was again adjourned from time to time till 10th May 1924. On the last mentioned day an objection was taken on behalf of the decree-holders that the compromise could not be given effect to by reason of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 2, Civil P.C. This objection must have referred not to the compromise that was alleged to have been arrived at on the spot because that was in the course of the execution proceedings themselves and the fact that there had been such a compromise was brought to the notice of the Court well within 90 days from the date on which it had been arrived at but it must have referred to the earlier adjustment which is said to have taken place during the pendency of the appeal. There is a note of this objection in the ordersheet, but it does not appear that the Court came to any finding as regards this objection at any time during the pendency of the proceedings.

4. We find next that after several adjournments of these proceedings, on 17fch May 1924 three witnesses were examined in the case, namely, two on behalf of the judgment-debtors and the decree-holder Aliraja Choudhury himself - all these witnesses having deposed to the adjustment that was alleged to have been arrived at on the spot daring the local investigation. On 2nd June 1924, the learned Munsif disposed of the case holding that there was no doubt about the compromise but that the compromise could not be given effect to inasmuch as the terms thereof ware at variance with the term3 of the decree and because to allow this compromise to stand would be to substitute for the decree in execution a new executable decree which is not permitted under the law. He referred to the decision in the case of Ladd Govindoss Krishnadoss v. Ramdoss Vishnadoss [1915] M.W.N. 225. The judgment-debtors thereupon preferred an appeal to the District Judge who affirmed the decision of the Munsif holding that the compromise had not been satisfactorily proved and further that even if it was proved, the agreement could not be acted upon because it was arrived at in the course of execution proceedings. He relied upon the aforesaid case reported in Ladd Govindoss Krishnadoss v. Ramdoss Vishnadoss [1915] M.W.N. 225. The judgment-debtors thereupon preferred an appeal to the District Judge who affirmed the decision of the Munsif holding that the compromise had not been satisfactorily proved and further that even if it was proved, the agreement could not be acted upon because it was arrived at in the course of execution proceedings. He relied upon the aforesaid case reported in Ladd Govindoss Krishnadoss v. Ramdoss Vishnadoss [1915] M.W.N. 225 as also on the provisions of Order 23, Rule 4, Civil P.C. From this order the present appeal has been preferred on behalf of the judgment-debtors.

5. Now, as regards the adjustment which is sought to have been arrived at on the spot during the local investigation we have looked into the terms of the compromise that is alleged to have been so arrived at and which are embodied in the draft agreement that was filed on behalf of the judgment-debtors and we find that the adjustment, did not consist of stipulations that had been carried out but consisted merely of terms that had to be carried out in future. Such an adjustment does not I come within the purview of Order 21, Rule 2, Civil P.C., and must, if at all, Come within the purview of Order 23 of the Code. Under Order 23, Rule 4, however, the provisions of that order do not apply to execution proceedings. The reason of the provision contained in Order 23, Rule 4 is that Order 21, Rule 2 and Section 47 taken together provide a complete procedure for recording compromises arrived at in execution proceedings. The adjustment referred to in Order 21, Rule 2 is such an adjustment as completely or partly extinguishes the decree under execution and cannot mean an adjustment to give effect to the terms of which would be to create a new decree at variance with the decree under execution and which will again have to be executed. The view taken in the case reported in 28 I.C. 376, in my opinion, is correct and accordingly even if the latter compromise or adjustment is said to have been proved, in view of the terms thereof, it cannot be given effect to in the course of the execution proceedings.

6. Turning now to the earlier adjustment, namely, the one which is said to have taken place while the appeal was pending: it was argued before us on behalf of the appellants that the said adjustment should have been given effect to by the learned Munsif. On behalf of the respondent it has been urged that having regard to the conduct of the judgment-debtors as disclosed in the statement which they made in the petition that they filed in the executing Court after the local investigation was held, it should be held that the judgment-debtors' no longer relied upon the earlier adjustment, but only relied upon the latter one as affording a bar to the execution proceedings. Having examined the materials that are on the record it is not possible for us to hold that the judgment-debtors ever abandoned the position that they had taken up in the first instance, namely, that the decree under execution had already been adjusted before the appeal was disposed of. I am, therefore, of opinion that this argument advanced on behalf of the respondent should not be allowed to prevail. The question then is whether this adjustment can betaken cognizance of by the executing Court and if so, what is the order that we should pass.

7. It has been argued on behalf of the decree-holders that this was an adjustment which took place before the appellate decree was passed and therefore the objection that such an adjustment stood in the way of execution of the decree is really an objection under Section 47 as to the executability of the decree itself and it need not be certified to the Court under the provisions of Order 21, Rule 2, Civil P.C. This contention, in my opinion, is not well founded. For if the adjustment be taken as having been prior to the decree, then it was, in effect, an agreement not to execute the decree which in future would be passed. According to the uniform current of authorities of this Court such an agreement cannot be taken cognizance of by an executing Court but to avail of it the judgment-debtors will have to institute a separate suit, to restrain the decree holders from executing the decree : see Hassan Ali v. Ganzi Ali [1904] 31 Cal. 179 and Benode Lal Pakrashi v. Brajendra Kumar Saha [1902] 29 Cal. 810 though the other High Courts have taken a different view on this point e.g., Laldas v. Kishordas [1898] 22 Bom. 463, Subramania Pillai v. Kumara Velu [1916] 39 Mad. 541, Chidambaram Chettiar v. Krishna Vathiyer [1917] 40 Mad. 233 and Gavri Singh v. Gajadhar Das [1909] 6 A.L.J. 403.

8. It has next been contended on behalf of the decree-holders that inasmuch as fraud was alleged, Order 21, Rule 2, his no application and that on account of the allegation of fraud the matter is brought within (She purview of Section 47, Civil P.C. This proposition also is not well founded because although it has for its support some earlier cases of the Bombay and the Madras High Courts, it is well settled now, the decisions of this Court having all along been consistent on this point, that it is not competent to a Court executing a decree to enquire into the fact of a payment or adjustment which has not been certified as required by Order 21, Rule 2, even if fraud is imputed to the decree-holder, Biroo Gorain v. Jaimurat Koer [1912] 16 C.W.N. 923, Jogendra v. Ashutosh [1916] 24 C.L.J. 462, Periatambi v. Vellaya [1898] 21 Mad. 409, Ganapathy Aiyar v. Chenga Reddi [1906] 29 Mad. 312, Budruddin v. Gulam Mohideen [1913] 36 Mad. 357, Mehbunissa Beqam v. Mahednnissa A.I.R. 1925 Bom. 309 and Imamuddin v. Bindabasini [1920] 5 Pat. L.J. 70.

9. The last contention on behalf of the appellants is of considerable substance. Having regard to the fact that the adjustment was notified to the appellate Court at a time when that Court was in seisin of the whole case and the statement that there had been such an adjustment not having been objected to on behalf of the decree-holders as is clear from the endorsements "Seen" of their pleaders to which I have already referred, the said representation made to the appellate Court may well be taken in connexion with the subsequent petition that was filed before the executing Court and the two together may be regarded as satisfying the requirements of Order 21, Rule 2, Civil P.C. That this position is maintainable has been held by this Court in the case of Biroo Gorain v. Jaimurat [1912] 16 C.W.N. 923. The facts of that case are exactly on all fours with the facts of the present case. I am therefore of opinion that the adjustment cannot be said to be one which has not been duly certified within the meaning of Order 21, Rule 2 of the Code. As the learned Munsif does not seem to have arrived at any finding on the question of fact, namely, as to whether there had been such an adjustment or not the proper order to pass in this case, in my opinion, is to set aside the orders passed by both the Courts below and to direct that the ease be remitted to the original Court with a direction that it will now proceed to arrive at a finding on the question of the said adjustment upon the evidence that is on the record together with such further evidence as may be adduced by the parties and then pass proper orders as to whether the execution case will proceed or not.

10. The appeal accordingly succeeds. The appellants will have their costs of the appeal, the hearing-fee being assessed at two gold mohurs.

Roy, J.

11. I agree.