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Pramatha Nath Roy Chowdhury And Ors. v. Rajah Bejoy Singh Dhudhuria And Anr.

Calcutta High Court
Jun 15, 1926
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Judgment Summary — Three Appeals from Rent Suits

Factual and Procedural Background

These three appeals arise from three suits for rent brought by the plaintiffs for the years 1325 to 1327 in respect of non‑agricultural lands which had allegedly been let out to the plaintiffs' predecessors for a period extending over more than 50 years.

The appeals correspond to the following suits and appeal numbers as recorded in the opinion:

  • Suit No. 1742 — Appeal No. 402
  • Suit No. 1739 — Appeal No. 405
  • Suit No. 1740 — Appeal No. 412

The plaintiffs in these suits are the executors named in the Will of Budh Singh. The defendants (now appellants) challenged the plaintiffs' right to maintain the suits after the death of Budh Singh, alleging that the lands were ancestral (part of a joint Mitakshara family) and, therefore, Budh Singh could not validly bequeath them. Other factual findings at trial included: rent having been paid at a uniform rate for more than 50 years, the lease being for dwelling purposes, and in at least one suit (No. 1739) documentary evidence (Exhibits 108 and 109) indicating the plaintiffs' predecessor as boundary owner.

Procedurally, contested factual and legal questions were considered by the Subordinate Judge at trial and then in a second appeal before this Court. The Subordinate Judge made specific factual findings (ownership, attornment, history of rent payments) and admitted particular boundary documents in evidence; the appellants challenged those findings and rulings on appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs, as executors under the Will of Budh Singh, had the right to maintain suits for rent after Budh Singh's death, given the allegation that Budh Singh was a member of a joint Mitakshara family and the properties were ancestral.
  2. Whether the properties in question were Budh Singh's self‑acquired property (and thus bequeathable) or ancestral property (not subject to a valid testamentary disposition by Budh Singh), and whether that factual question could be raised on second appeal when it was not pleaded at trial.
  3. Whether the tenancies in question were transferable or heritable (including whether a tenancy created before the Transfer of Property Act lost or retained the incidents of heritability and transferability), and whether acknowledgment by the landlord could affect the character of the tenancy.
  4. Whether two documents (Exhibits 108 and 109), executed by a third party (Imam Bux) describing boundaries and referring to the plaintiffs' predecessor, were admissible in evidence under Section 32 (and specifically Section 32(3)) of the Evidence Act when Imam Bux was deceased and the documents were proved by a person who was not a party to them.
  5. Whether the identity/ownership of the land in Suit No. 1740 (and relatedly in Suit No. 1739) belonged to Budh Singh (or to other family members such as Panna Bibi), in light of the Subordinate Judge's findings of rent payment and attornment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs had no right to maintain the suits for rent after the death of Budh Singh; they are not entitled to the rents claimed after Assin 1327.
  • Budh Singh was a member of a joint Mitakshara family; the properties in suit were ancestral, and therefore Budh Singh was not competent to execute a Will disposing of those properties — the executors named in the Will (plaintiffs) have no right to sue.
  • The tenancies were not transferable and therefore could not be bequeathed; tenancies created before the Transfer of Property Act do not attract heritability or transferability.
  • The documents (Exhibits 108 and 109) executed by Imam Bux that refer to the plaintiffs' predecessor as a boundary owner are inadmissible evidence and should not have been relied upon by the trial judge.
  • In suits where ownership/identity of the land was disputed, the land did not belong to the plaintiffs (e.g., claim that the land belonged to Panna Bibi in one suit).

Respondents' (Plaintiffs') Position — as reflected in the record

  • It was admitted by the appellants that they were bound to pay rent to the plaintiffs for the period until the death of Budh Singh; plaintiffs sought rent for the claimed years against the defendants as tenants.
  • The plaintiffs relied on the Will's statement that the properties were self‑acquired and on evidence (including Exhibits 108 and 109 and other material) to establish ownership/identity of the disputed lands.
  • It is recorded that plaintiffs could have adduced evidence at trial to substantiate that the properties were Budh Singh's separate, self‑acquired properties; the Subordinate Judge observed that such evidence was not contested at trial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdullah v. Kunj Behary [1911] 14 C.L.J. 476 (also cited later as Abdulla v. Kunj Behary Lal [1911] 14 C.L.J. 467) Authority relied upon to hold that documents of the kind executed by a boundary‑holder are admissible under Section 32 (specifically Section 32(3)) of the Evidence Act. The Subordinate Judge relied on this case to admit Exhibits 108 and 109; the Court noted that the Subordinate Judge had followed this authority in admitting the documents.
Ningawa v. Bharmappa [1899] 23 Bom. 63 Held that similar boundary documents are admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. Listed among a long line of authorities supporting admissibility; relied upon by this Court in preferring the line of authority that admits such documents.
Haji Bibi v. H.H. Sir Sultan Mahomed Shah [1909] 11 Bom.L.R. 409 Held that documents of the boundary‑description type are admissible under Section 32. Included in the sequence of cases this Court followed in concluding admissibility under Section 32.
Natwar v. Alkhu [1913] 11 A.L.J. 139 Support for the proposition that such documents are admissible under Section 32. Relied on as part of the long line of cases favoring admissibility; supported the Court's preference for that line.
Imrit Chamar v. Sirdhari Pandey [1911] 15 C.L.J. 7 Authority recognising admissibility of boundary documents under Section 32. Named among the authorities the Court followed in upholding admissibility.
Ambar Ali v. Lutji Ali (1918) 45 Cal. 159 Support for admissibility of such documents under Section 32. Included in the list of cases forming the long line of authority the Court preferred.
Raja Leelanund Singh v. Mt. Lakhputee Thakoorani [1874] 22 W.R. 231 Early authority discussed and followed in later cases (including Ningawa) as supporting admissibility. Referred to as part of the pedigree of authorities that the Court considered persuasive on admissibility.
Soroj Kumar Acharji Chowdhuri v. Umedali Howladar, A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 251 Dealt with admissibility issues but under Sections 11 or 13 of the Evidence Act — not directly with Section 32. The Court noted that this case did not decide the Section 32 point and therefore was not determinative for the question before the Court.
Pramatha Nath Chowdhuri v. Krishna Chandra Bhattacharjee Single case laying down a contrary proposition (i.e., against admissibility of such documents under Section 32). The Court observed this single case but chose to prefer the long line of contrary authorities; therefore it rejected the contrary proposition for the present disputes.
Ketabuddin v. Nafar Chandra Division Bench decision (Panton, J., and the present writer) in which the question was considered and previous cases were enumerated. The Court relied on its own prior Division Bench treatment of the issue as supporting admissibility; the present decision follows that enumeration and preference for the long line of authorities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered each core contention in turn and applied both procedural and substantive reasoning based on the record and existing authorities.

1. Plea that Budh Singh could not bequeath ancestral property:

  • The Subordinate Judge recorded that the Will states the properties were self‑acquired but did not find as a fact that they were ancestral. Importantly, the defendants did not raise the objection at trial that the properties were ancestral; the Subordinate Judge observed that had the point been taken at trial the plaintiffs could have led evidence to substantiate that the properties were Budh Singh's separate, self‑acquired properties.
  • On appeal the Court held that because this contention was not raised in the trial Court, it was not open to the defendants to raise it in the second appeal. The Court therefore rejected that challenge to the plaintiffs' title and maintained the trial Court's approach on this procedural basis.

2. Transferability/heritability of the tenancy and effect of the Transfer of Property Act:

  • The defendants argued that the tenancies were not transferable and therefore could not be bequeathed, and that the tenancies were created before the Transfer of Property Act so heritability/transferability did not attach.
  • The Court noted factual findings by the Subordinate Judge: origin of the tenancy unknown, rent paid at a uniform rate for more than 50 years, and that the lease was for dwelling purpose. Those factual findings could support an inference that the tenancy was permanent and heritable, but the Subordinate Judge refrained from deciding whether the plaintiffs' right was permanent because the question had not been directly put in issue in the suit for rent.
  • The Court observed that, in any event, the properties had been inherited according to the defendants' own allegation and that the plaintiffs' right of inheritance had been acknowledged by the landlord; under those circumstances it was open to Budh Singh to have acquired a title by acknowledgment, possibly after the Transfer of Property Act, so the defendants' contention lacked substance on the record before the Court.

3. Admissibility of Exhibits 108 and 109 (documents executed by Imam Bux):

  • The Subordinate Judge admitted the documents under Section 32 (referred to as Section 32(3) in the opinion) of the Evidence Act, relying on Abdullah v. Kunj Behary and a line of authorities.
  • The Court acknowledged conflicting decisions on the point but reviewed the authorities and noted a "long line of authority" in different High Courts holding such documents admissible under Section 32. The Court expressly preferred this long line of cases (including Ningawa v. Bharmappa, Haji Bibi, Natwar v. Alkhu, Imrit Chamar, Ambar Ali, and others) to the single contrary decision (Pramatha Nath Chowdhuri).
  • Given that precedent and the fact that no objection to admissibility had been taken at trial, the Court concluded that the exhibits were admissible and that the Subordinate Judge had correctly relied on them; the Court therefore rejected the argument that inadmissibility of those documents required remand or reversal.

4. Identity/ownership issues in Suit Nos. 1739 and 1740:

  • In Suit No. 1739 the Subordinate Judge concluded, on the evidence (including Exhibits 108 and 109 and other material), that the land belonged to the plaintiffs; the Court reviewed the objection and concluded that the documents were admissible, so there was no basis to disturb the trial Court's finding.
  • In Suit No. 1740 the Subordinate Judge found as a fact that the defendant and his father had been paying rent to Budh Singh and had attorned to him; therefore the defendants' claim that the land belonged to a different family member (Panna Bibi) could not be raised in the second appeal. The Court upheld that approach and dismissed the appeal on that ground as well.

5. Conclusion on the appeals:

  • On the combined procedural and substantive bases above — failure to raise certain pleas at trial, factual findings of the Subordinate Judge, and the Court's preference for the long line of authorities on admissibility — the Court dismissed each appeal and awarded costs against the appellants.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

All three appeals are dismissed with costs.

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The Subordinate Judge's findings (including findings of ownership/identity where made, findings of attornment and historical payment of rent, and the admission of Exhibits 108 and 109) stand and are not disturbed by this Court.
  • The appellants are precluded from raising, in the second appeal, the contention that the properties were ancestral when that objection was not taken at trial; similarly, issues which were not put in issue at trial (such as the permanent/heritable character of the tenancy) were not decided against the appellants by this Court, save insofar as the trial Court's operative findings stand.
  • With respect to admissibility of boundary documents, the Court followed a substantial body of prior decisions holding such documents admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act and therefore sustained the trial Court's reliance on Exhibits 108 and 109.

Note: The Court preferred a long line of High Court authorities supporting admissibility of the boundary documents under Section 32 over a single contrary decision; the appeals were dismissed on the specific factual and procedural record in each case.

Signed: Cammiade, J. (concurring); the opinion records concurrence.

Show all summary ...

1. These three appeals arise out of three suits for rent brought by the plaintiff for the years 1325 to 1327 for lands which are non-agricultural and which are said to have been let out to the predecessors of the plaintiffs a considerable number of years ago extending over 50 years.

2. The original defendants in Suit No. 1742 out of which the second appeal No. 402 arises wore three. Defendant No. 1 subsequently died and Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were her heirs. Defendant No. 3 had transferred his interest to Defendants Nos. 4 to 8. The appellants before us are the defendants. The plea of the defendants was that the plaintiffs had no right to maintain the suit for rent. The appeal was limited to the claim for rent after Assin 1327, when Budh Singh, the testator, whose executors, are two of the plaintiffs, died. It is now admitted by the appellants that they are bound to pay rent to the plaintiffs for the period till the death of Budh Singh. But after the death of Budh Singh they are not bound to pay rent to the present plaintiffs. Their argument is based on the following facts : Budh Singh was a member of a joint Mitakshara family which consisted of the Plaintiff No. 1 and the direct descendants of Budh Singh who are shown in the genealogical table given in the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge (at page 14 of the paper-book). Budh Singh being a member of such family and the properties in suit being his ancestral properties he was not competent to execute a Will with regard to these properties; and on that ground it is contended that the executors named in the Will had no right to bring these suits. They do not stand in the shoes of the coparceners of Budh Singh to whom the properties would go by survivorship. It is also urged that the lower appellate Court ought not to have taken into consideration the statement made in the Will of Budh Singh that the properties were self-acquired properties. But the difficulty in the way of the appellants is that this question was not raised in the trial Court. With reference to this contention the learned Subordinate Judge observed as follows:

But those objections were not raised in the trial Court. Had they been raised there, the plaintiffs could have adduced evidence to show that they were the separate and self-acquired properties of Budh Singh.

3. From that observation of the learned Subordinate Judge it is not possible for us to differ. The learned Subordinate Judge does not find as a fact whether these properties were self-acquired properties of Budh Singh on the basis of the statement in the Will. What he states is that it is stated in the Will that these properties were self-acquired properties. It was not shown that they were ancestral properties. Had the defendants taken the plea that they were-ancestral properties of the joint Mitakshara family evidence might have-been adduced by the plaintiffs to substantiate the statement made in the will. That being so it is not open to the1 defendants who are the appellants before-us to raise that contention in second appeal. This argument of the appellants-must fail.

4. It is next contended that these tenancies are not transferable and therefore they could not be bequeathed. The difficulty with regard to this question again is that the properties have not been transferred at all. A bequest cannot be placed on the same category as a transfer inter vivos. It is also argued that the tenancies having been created before the Transfer of Property Act the incident of heritability and transferability does not attach to it. But as a matter of fact-these properties have been inherited, according to the defendant's own allegation, and the plaintiffs' right of inheritance was acknowledged by the landlord. Under such circumstances even if it be conceded that the interest under the lease was not originally heritable Budh Singh might claim to have acquired a new title when his interest was acknowledged by the landlord. This might very well have been after the passing of the Transfer of Property Act. This question does not appear to have been directly put in issue in either of the Courts below. It seems to me therefore that this question is without any substance. The Subordinate Judge has very rightly refrained from coming to any conclusion as regards; the question whether the plaintiffs' right is a permanent right or not. But he comes to a finding as to the facts relating to the tenancy, that its origin is unknown; that the rent had been paid at a uniform rate for more than 50 years; and that the lease was for dwelling purpose. From these findings of fact he might have drawn the inference that the tenancy was permanent and heritable. But as this question does not directly arise in a suit for rent brought by the plaintiffs against the defendants as tenants he has not drawn the obvious inference from the facts found in the case. This appeal must therefore fail and is dismissed with costs.

5. With regard to Appeal No. 405 arising out of Suit No. 1739 the questions raised above are common to it. But there was another question with reference to the identity of the land. It was objected by the defendants that this land did not belong to the plaintiffs. The learned Subordinate Judge has come to the conclusion upon the evidence in the case that this land did actually belong to the plaintiffs. In dealing with the evidence he has taken into consideration two documents Exhibits 109 and 108 as being in favour of the plaintiffs' contention. These two documents appear to have been executed by one Imam Bux who was a person holding some land on the immediate east of the disputed land. He executed these documents in favour of some other person and in describing the boundaries of his own land he gave the name of the plaintiff's predecessor as the owner of the land on one of his boundaries. It is objected on behalf of the appellants that this evidence is inadmissible; and although the learned Subordinate Judge has come to his conclusion upon this evidence as well as upon other evidence it is contended that if this evidence is held to be inadmissible we have no other alternative but to send the case back to the lower appellate Court in order that that Court may come to a finding of fact on the question after excluding these two documents from the evidence in the case. I have therefore to examine the proposition that these two documents are not admissible in evidence.

6. There has been some conflict of decisions on this question. But before I deal with that question 1 must state that no objection was taken to the admissibility of these documents in the trial Court. It is not known whether any person gave evidence to the effect that Imam Bux was the person holding any land on the boundary of the disputed land. The documents themselves were, proved by a person who was not a party to the document. Imam Bux was dead, The Subordinate Judge held on the authority of the case of Abdullah v. Kunj Behary [1911] 14 C.L.J. 476 that under Section 32(3) of the Evidence Act the documents were admissible in evidence. It is contended before us that it is not so, and reliance has been placed on two cases : Soroj Kumar Acharji Chowdhuri v. Umedali Howladar A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 251 and Pramatha Nath Chowdhuri v. Krishna Chandra Bhattacharjee . As the Subordinate Judge points out the case of Soroj Kumar Acharji v. Umedali Howladar A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 251 does not deal with the question whether documents such as these are admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act or not. The learned Judges there dealt with the question whether such documents were admissible in evidence under Section 11 or Section 13 of the Evidence Act. The question that we have to consider is whether these documents are admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. This question was dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Panton, J., and myself in Ketabuddin v. Nafar Chandra , where I enumerated all the cases I could find in which the question was considered. It has been held in a number of cases that such documents are admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act : See Ningawa v. Bharmappa [1899] 23 Bom. 63, Haji Bibi v. H.H. Sir Sultan Mahomed Shah [1909] 11 Bom.L.R. 409; Abdulla v. Kunj Behary Lal [1911] 14 C.L.J. 467; Natwar v. Alkhu [1913] 11 A.L.J. 139; Imrit Chamar v. Sirdhari Pandey [1911] 15 C.L.J. 7; Ambar Ali y. Lutji Ali (1918) 45 Cal. 159. There is only one case of Pramatha Nath Chowdhuri v. Krishna Chandra Bhattacharjee which lays down the contrary proposition. I may also refer to the case of Raja Leelanund Singh v. Mt. Lakhputee Thakoorani [1874] 22 W.R. 231 which was discussed and followed in the case of Ningawa v. Bharmappa [1899] 23 Bom. 63 as laying down the proposition that such documents were admissible. A there is such a long line of authority in the different High Courts in support o£ the proposition that these documents are admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, it is not necessary to discuss the question as I should have felt it to be if this point were res integra. I need only say that I prefer to follow the long line of cases rather than accept the view expressed in the single case mentioned above. The result is that this point also fails and this appeal must also be dismissed with costs.

7. With regard to Appeal No. 412, arising out of Suit No. 1740, in addition to the question as to the right of the plaintiffs under the bequest of Budh Singh another question was raised that this property did not belong to Budh Singh at all. The learned Subordinate Judge has, however, found as a fact that the defendant and his father before him had been paying rent with regard to this land to Budh Singh and they had attorned to him. The defendants' case was that the land belonged to Panna Bibi, a lady of that family. Having regard to this finding of the Subordinate Judge this question cannot be raised in the second appeal. The special point with regard to this appeal also fails and this appeal also must be dismissed with costs.

Cammiade, J.

8. I agree.