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The Lyalpur Sugar Mi... v. The Ram Chandra Gur ...

Allahabad High Court
Apr 5, 1922
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The summary concerns three connected appeals involving Ramchandra Gur Sahei Cotton Mills Co., Ltd. (plaintiff) and defendants Lyalpur Sugar Mills Co., Ltd. (through manager L. Jai Ram Das) and the Cotton Ginning Factory at Lyalpur (proprietors L. Mathura Das and Thakur Das). The plaintiff sued for recovery of Rs. 32,759-8-0 as damages for non-delivery of 320 bales of Lyalpur cotton purportedly contracted at Cawnpore on 14 November 1917 for delivery at Lucknow in November and December 1917 and January 1918. The suit was instituted in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Cawnpore on 12 August 1918.

The litigation produced multiple procedural applications by the plaintiff seeking production of documents and replies to interrogatories. Repeated notices and applications were made between November 1918 and July 1919 under provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (variously described in the record as Order X, Rule 14; Order XI, Rule 14; and later an application dated 28 July 1919 purporting to be under Order XI, Rule 15). The learned Additional Subordinate Judge eventually struck off the defenses of the defendants at different dates (orders dated 12 August 1919 and 28 August 1919 are noted in the record). The suit was tried ex parte and decreed on 16 August 1919.

Jai Ram Das and Mathura Das each preferred appeals against the orders striking off their defenses (appeal numbers include No. 186 of 1919 and another unnumbered appeal admitted the same day), and there is a regular first appeal (No. 319 of 1919) from the ex parte decree. The defendants contended that the striking-off orders were invalid in law and were passed without proper discretion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the non-compliance by a defendant with an order under Order XI, Rule 14 (production of documents into Court) justified the Trial Court in striking off his defence under the powers conferred by Rule 21 of Order XI of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether the learned Subordinate Judge exercised proper discretion in striking off the defence of Mathura Das given the circumstances (including asserted Martial Law at Lyalpur and an asserted illness) and whether a short adjournment should have been granted.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff applied repeatedly for production of certain books and documents and for answers to interrogatories; defendants failed to comply with notices and orders requiring production.
  • The plaintiff asked the Trial Court to strike off the defendants' defences on the ground of non-compliance with the notices/orders requiring production of documents and answers to interrogatories.
  • It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the notice served under Order XI, Rule 14 required inspection or production and therefore justified the striking off.

Defendants' Arguments (as recorded)

  • Jai Ram Das stated in answers to interrogatories (filed 31 May 1919) that the documents called for were not in his possession; he also offered to make the books available for inspection and to hand them to the Court, and on one occasion said the books were in Court.
  • It was contended by or for Jai Ram Das that the order striking off his defence was not lawfully made because the Court had not exercised proper discretion and had not made orders under the correct provisions authorising striking off.
  • In respect of Mathura Das, his pleader said that Martial Law at Lyalpur and subsequent inability to communicate with the client (and later that the client was ill with fever) prevented timely filing of replies to interrogatories or attendance; the pleader requested an adjournment which was refused.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the legality of striking off the defendants' defences by reference to the specific rules of the Code of Civil Procedure invoked and their scope.

(1) Analysis regarding Jai Ram Das:

  • The Court observed that most of the plaintiff's applications against Jai Ram Das were under Order XI, Rule 14 (production of documents into Court). Rule 14 does not relate to answering interrogatories, discovery, or inspection of documents for purposes of invoking the sanction in Rule 21.
  • Rule 21 of Order XI (the Court noted) specifies the grounds upon which a Trial Court may strike off a defence or dismiss a suit: (1) refusal to answer interrogatories, (2) refusal to make discovery of documents, and (3) refusal to permit inspection of documents. Those grounds are connected to Rule 12 (discovery) and Rule 18 (inspection) of Order XI.
  • The learned Subordinate Judge had not made any order under Rule 12 or Rule 18; therefore, non-compliance with an order under Rule 14 did not by itself warrant striking off the defence under Rule 21.
  • The Court further examined the form of the notice issued under Order XI, Rule 14 and compared it with Form No. 6 in Appendix C, noting that the notice on record did not strictly comply with the form (which, as the Court quoted, begins with "Upon hearing... and upon reading the affidavit of... filed... the day...."). No affidavit stating reasons or relevance had been filed by the plaintiff to support the summons for the books.
  • Given that the proper statutory procedures for discovery/inspection (as embodied in the relevant Rules and forms) were not complied with, and that Jai Ram Das had stated in interrogatory answers that the documents were not in his possession (and had offered to produce/permit inspection), the Court concluded that striking off his defence was not justified on the basis of non-compliance with Rule 14.

(2) Analysis regarding Mathura Das:

  • Interrogatories had been served on Mathura Das's pleader; the record did not show whether the pleader forwarded them to his client. The Court observed that that omission, if it occurred, might be attributable to the pleader and would not necessarily defeat the plaintiff's right to seek enforcement under Rule 21; but the record also showed that Martial Law existed at Lyalpur until about early July 1919 and that the pleader had lost touch with his client thereafter.
  • On 12 August 1919 the pleader stated he had received intelligence that Mathura Das was ill with fever and requested an adjournment to permit the client to come to Cawnpore; the request was refused and the defence was struck off.
  • The Court concluded that, given the conditions at the time (including Martial Law and the reported illness), the learned Subordinate Judge would have exercised a wiser discretion in allowing a short adjournment; moreover, if Jai Ram Das's defence were to be restored, the Court observed that it would be inappropriate to keep Mathura Das's defence out and thus render the trial incomplete.

(3) Overall disposition based on the foregoing reasoning:

  • On the statutory interpretation point, the Court found that orders under Rule 14 (as used here) did not provide the legal foundation for striking off a defence under Rule 21.
  • On the exercise of discretion point, the Court found that the Trial Judge should have exercised a more flexible discretion in respect of Mathura Das's plea for a short time to enable attendance/reply in light of Martial Law and reported illness.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Both appeals by Jai Ram Das and Mathura Das are allowed; the orders striking off their defences and the related ex parte decree are set aside.

Direct consequences and directions ordered by the Court:

  • The orders of the learned Subordinate Judge dated 12th August and 28th August 1919 (striking off the defences of Jai Ram Das and Mathura Das respectively) are set aside.
  • The Court set aside the ex parte decree in the connected Appeal No. 39 of 1919 (as recorded in the opinion) and directed that the case be restored to the file of the Court below.
  • The Trial Court is directed to receive the defences of Jai Ram Das and Mathura Das and to try the case according to law.
  • Costs are to be "costs in the cause," and include fees in this Court for all three appeals on the higher scale.

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion confines its analysis to the statutory scope of the cited Rules of Order XI and the exercise of discretion in the particular factual context; the Court's decision restores the parties to a position in which the merits may be heard. The opinion does not purport to lay down a broader precedent beyond the statutory interpretation and application to the facts narrated.

Show all summary ...

1. There are three connected appeals before us today pending between the same parties, namely, Nos. 319 and 183 of 1919 and one other appeal from order which has been admitted by us to-day bat which has not been numbered by the office. This last appeal which we have admitted and No. 186 of 1919 are appeals from orders. The appeal No. 319 of 1919 is a regular first appeal from an ex parte decree.

2. The facts which have given rise to the three appeals are as follows: The parties to the three appeals are the Ramchandra Gur Sahei Cotton Mills Co., Ltd., as plaintiffs, and the Lyalpur Sugar Mills Co., Ltd., through their manager L. Jai Ram Dr, and the Cotton Ginning Factory at Lyalpur through their proprietors L. Mathura Das and Thakur Das as defendants.

3. The plaintiff Company sued for the recovery of Rs. 32,759 8-0 as damages on the allegation that the defendants had promised to supply the plaintiff firm with 320 bales of Lyalpur cotton at Rs. 45 8 0 per maund to be delivered at Lucknow in the months of November and December 1917 and in the month of January 1918. The contract was entered into at Cawnpore on the 14th November 1917. The defendant failed to deliver the goods at the specified time. The plaintiff firm had to go into the market and purchase the bales of cotton that were required, and as in the meantime the price of the biles of cotton had gone up, the plaintiff firm suffered a loss of Rs. 32,759 8 0.

4. The suit out of which these appeals have arisen was instituted in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Cawnpore, on the 12th August 1918, presumably because the contract was entered into at Cawnpore and because Jai Ram Das, defendant No. 1, lives at Cawnpore and carries on his business there. Jai Ram Das purchases sugar from Messrs. Begg Sutherland & Co., Cawnpore, and carries on the business of selling sugar at Lyalpur. Thakur Das and Mathura Das admittedly live at Lyalpur where they have got a Cotton Ginning Factory. The suit was resisted on various grounds. The issues were fixed by the learned Additional Subordinate. Judge on the 23rd October 1918. On the 23rd November 1918 the plaintiff firm made an application purporting to be under Order X, Rule 14. By the said application the plaintiff firm asked the Court to require the defendants to produce into Court certain books and other documents which were detailed in the application. On the 29th November 1918 the learned Subordinate Judge male an order to the effect that notice should be issued. On the 13th January 1919, a notice on the said application was issued and was served upon the Pleader for the defendants. The notice was in the form No. 6 given in Appendix C to the Code of Civil Procedure, As the notice was not complied with, a second application was made on behalf of the plaintiff firm on the 4th April 1919. The Pleader for the defendant No. 1 stated to the Court that the papers called for by the Court will be produced if all or any of them were found in the possession of Jai Ram Das. NO papers seem to have been filed. On the 21th April 1919, a third application was made on behalf of the plaintiff firm to the same effect. A notice was issued which was affixed to the gate of the house of Jai Ram Das as the latter was not found at home. This application also proved infructuous. On the 2nd June 1919 a fourth application was made on behalf of the plaintiff firm to the same effect. The learned Subordinate Judge allowed the defendant No. 1 to produce the documents called for within ten days. The order was not complied with. On the 28th July 1919 the plaintiff filed an application purporting to be under Order XI, Rule 15. The learned Subordinate Judge directed that notice should issue. The notice was served upon the Pleader for defendant No. 1 on the 4th August 1919. The case came up for hearing on the 12th August 1919 and the plaintiff firm applied to the Court for an order striking off the defence of the two defendants. The learned Subordinate Judge put off the case to the 15th August 1919, directing the production of the books and the documents called for from Jai Ram Das. On the 15th August 1919, Jai Ram Das filed an application stating that he had the books with him in Court and implying that he had brought them also into Court before but stating that none of the books or documents was in any way relevant to the dispute between him and the plaintiff firm. He, however, offered to make over the books to the Court and allow their inspection. This offer was not accepted by the plaintiff firm which insisted upon its prayer to the Court to strike off the defence, and the learned Subordinate Judge acceded to the request of the plaintiff firm.

5. So far we have recited the facts that led to the striking off the defence of Jai Ram Das. The fasts relating to the striking off the defense of Mathura Das and Thakur Das are somewhat different. On the 24th April 1919, interrogatories were filed on behalf of the plaintiff with a request that they should be served upon Mathura Das and Jai Ram Das for replies. The interrogatories for Mathura Das were served upon his Pleader. Jai Ram Das made replies to the interrogatories that were served upon him and they were filed on the 23rd May 1919. No replies were received from Muthura Das. The plaintiff firm again applied to the Court to compel Mathura Das to file answers to the interrogatories. The Pleader for Mathura Das Stated that there was Martial Law at Lyalpur and he could not get into touch with his client. On the 17th June 1919, the learned Subordinate Judge made an order that the replies to the interrogatories should be filed into Court within ten days after the termination of the Martial Law at Lyalpar. On the 28th July 1919, no replies having been received, the plaintiff firm asked the Trial Court to strike off the defence of Mathura Das. The Pleader who was appearing for him stated that though Martial Law had been withdrawn yet the whereabouts of his client were not known. He had made all attempts to get into communication with him but had failed. Thereupon the case was put off to the 12th August 1919. On the 12th August 1919, the Pleader for Mathura Das stated that he had received a wire from his client that he (Mathura Das) was suffering from fever and could not reach Cawnpore in time. The Pleader asked for an adjournment which request was rejected. The defence of Mathura Das was thereupon struck off on the 12th August 1919. In respect of the application against Jai Ram Das referred to above, the learned Subordinate Judge, according to the learned Counsel for Jai Ram Das who appears before us, made an oral order on the 13th August 1919, striking off the defense of Jai Ram Das also. The written order was, however, made on the 28th August 1919. The statement of the learned Counsel for Jai Ram Das that the defence of his client was struck off really on the 15th August 1919, is borne out by the fast that the claim of the plaintiff firm was tried on the 16th August 1919 ex parte. The suit was tried and the 16th August 1919, and decreed ex parts the same day.

6. Jai Ram Das and Mathura Das have preferred two separate appeals from the orders striking off their defence. The appeal of Jai Ram Das is No. 186 of 1919 and the other appeal is the one that has not yet been numbered. The third appeal, i.e., the one from the ex parte decree, No. 319 of 1919, is jointly by Jai Ram Das and Mathura Das. They contend that the orders of the learned Subordinate Judge striking off their defenses are invalid in law and in any case were passed without the exercise of proper discretion.

7. We will take up the case of Jai Ram Das first. There is no doubt that several attempts were made by the plaintiff firm to compel Jai Ram Das to produce in Court certain documents. All the applications on behalf of the plaintiff firm except the last one dated the 28th July 1919, were applications under Order XI, Rule 14. They were merely for the production of documents into Court. At the first blush it does appear that the conduct of Jai Ram Das was contumacious, but we find that there is evidence on the record to show that as early as the 31st May 1919 in answer to the interrogatories served upon him by the plaintiff firm he had stated distinctly that the documents that were called for from him were not in his possession. But if it be conceded for the sake of argument for a moment that Jai Ram Das was guilty of disobedience of the order of the Court, was the Court justified in striking off his defence? The order of the Court to Jai Ram Das to produce the books was an order made under Order XI, Rule 14, The non-compliance of that order does not warrant the striking off the defence of the party which is guilty of the not-compliance of the order. The grounds upon which the discretion is given to a Trial Court for striking off the defence of a defendant are given in Rule 21 of Order XI of the Civil Procedure Code. According to the said rule there are three grounds only upon which a Trial Court is justified in striking off the defence of a defendant or dismiss the suit of a plaintiff, namely, (1) the refusal to answer interrogatories, (2) the refusal to make discovery of documents, (3) refusal to permit inspection of documents. Now, Rule 14 of Order XI of the Code of Civil Procedure does not relate either to the answering of interrogatories or the discovery or inspection of documents. The rule relating to discovery is embodied in Rule 12 of Order XI and the rule relating to the inspection of documents is to be found in Rule 18 of the same Order. In the present case the learned Subordinate Judge made no order either under Rule 12 or Rule 18 of Order XI of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is, however, contended on behalf of the plaintiff firm that the notice which was issued to Jai Ram Das was one that required inspection of documents called for from him. The form of notice to be issued under Order XI, Rule 14 is given in appendix C, Form No. 6. The notice that was issued in the present case does not comply with the Form given in Appendix C. The said Form begins thus:

Upon hearing... and upon reading the affidavit of... filed... the day....

8. In the present; case no affidavit was filed on behalf of the plaintiff stating the reasons for which the books were summoned from Jai Ram Das or showing in what manner were they relevant to the dispute between the parties. It is, however, contended that when a set form is given by the Legislature for the issue of notice and that form is complied with, the notice, if not bad, would entail the penalty exacted by the Trial Court from Jai Ram Das. The argument may be called a technical argument. The obvious reply, a technical one also, is that the notice which we find on the record is not strictly in accordance with Form No. 6. As we find that the learned Subordinate Judge bad made no order for the inspection of documents and indeed he could not have made one as the provisions of Rule 18 of Order XI had not been complied with, the non-compliance of the order to produce books or documents into Court did not justify the Trial Court to strike off the defence of Jai Ram Das.

9. Now we take up the case of Mathura Das. The interrogatories were served upon his Pleader. There is no material on the record to show whether the Pleader sent those interrogatories to Mathura Das. It may, however, be said that if they were not rent that was the fault of the Pleader, and the omission by the Pleader would in no way affect the right of the plaintiff to demand the Court below to enforce the provisions of Rule 21, Order XI against Mathura Das. However that may be, it is in evidence that Lyalpur was under Martial Law up to somewhere in the beginning of July 1919. Subsequent to the date the Pleader for Mathura Das lost touch with him and could not get into communication with him. On the 12th August 1919, before the order for striking off the defence of Mathura Das was made, his Pleader requested the Court to allow a few days to enable his client to come up to Cawnpore on the ground that his client had been ill with fever, The statement of the Pleader may or may not have been correct but we think that under the circumstances of the conditions of life in the Punjab at that time, the learned Subordinate Judge would have exercised a wiser discretion in allowing a few days' adjournment to Mathura Das. Moreover, if the case has to go back for the admission of the defence of Jai Ram Das, the trial would be quite incomplete if the defence of Mathura Das is kept out. We, therefore, allow both the appeals of Jai Ram Das, and Mathura Das and set aside the orders of the learned Subordinate Judge, dated the 12th August and the 28th August 1919, respectively, striking off the defence of Jai Ram Das and Mathura Das. The result, therefore, is that we set aside the ex parte decree in the connected Appeal No. 39 of 1919 and also direct that the case be restored to the file of the Court below, defences' from Jai Ram Das and Mathura Das received, and the case tried according to law. As to costs we direct that they should be costs in the cause, including fees in this Court of all the three appeals on the higher scale.