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Mohini Mohan Misra v. Sarat Sundari Debi
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion concerns a dispute over a set of deeds dated 22 March 1830. According to the plaintiffs, their predecessor Nanda Lal (also referred to as Nanda Lil Surma Roy) received Rs. 11,000 from Kali Prosad Sarma Roy and executed a deed of conveyance in respect of the properties in suit; contemporaneously Kali Prosad executed an Ekrarnama giving Nanda Lal the right to repay the money. Two other documents executed the same day bear on the transaction.
In 1859 successors of Nanda Lal sued, claiming the principal had been satisfied out of the usufruct and seeking possession and a large sum. The trial court initially decreed for the plaintiff, finding principal satisfied and Rs. 24,000 due. On appeal to the High Court (and following directions as to accounts) the High Court found a large sum due to the defendant and dismissed the suit; the plaintiff's further appeal to the Judicial Committee (Privy Council) was unsuccessful (reported at 14 M.I.A. 443). Accounts taken pursuant to the High Court's directions showed a sum due to the mortgagee and, following prevailing practice, the suit was dismissed on 2 April 1864 without an order for redemption.
The present suit for redemption was filed on 13 February 1918. The plaintiffs alleged that, based on a continuing account, profits had by about 1900 (1307 B.S.) wiped out the debt and that over a lakh of rupees was due to the mortgagor. The subordinate court dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation. The plaintiffs appealed; the only issue argued before the appellate bench was whether the suit was barred by limitation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiffs' suit for redemption is barred by limitation under Article 148 of the Limitation Act, and if so, from what date the sixty-year period runs (in particular, whether it runs from the date when the mortgagor became entitled to redeem—i.e., after ten years—or from some later date such as 1900 based on the plaintiffs' account).
- Whether the mortgage is a usufructuary mortgage (or, alternatively, a mortgage by conditional sale) such that the rule in Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act (or the pre-Act law on the point) applies and limitation should be computed from the date when the mortgagee was paid off out of rents and profits.
- Whether an alleged acknowledgment in the defendant's written statement in the 1859 suit (attributed to Kripamoyi) operated to restart the period of limitation (i.e., whether it satisfies the requirements of acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The learned Judge erred in fixing the point in time from which the sixty-year period under Article 148 of the Limitation Act would run; the appellants contend it should not begin at the date the ten years expired (1840), or alternatively a later date should be adopted.
- The appellants argued that a fresh starting point for limitation is provided by an acknowledgment contained in the defendant's written statement in the 1859 suit.
- The appellants contended the mortgage was a pure usufructuary mortgage and that Section 62(a) of the Transfer of Property Act (or the pre-Act rule) applied so that, because the mortgagee was paid off within sixty years according to the plaintiffs' account, the present suit is not barred.
Respondents' / Court-Recorded Counter-Arguments
- The legal effect of the documents is that the mortgagor was entitled to redeem after the expiry of ten years (i.e., from April 1840) and therefore limitation under Article 148 began to run from that date.
- The documents contain no stipulation permitting the mortgagee to set off principal and interest automatically against rents and profits; rather the mortgagee insisted on payment in cash and only agreed to repay any surplus profits upon receipt of such payment in cash.
- The claimed acknowledgment in the 1859 written statement was not proved in admissible form (only a copy of a copy of a translation was produced), the alleged maker (Kripamoyi) may not have had a competent interest to bind successors, and the language of the alleged statement did not amount to an acknowledgment of liability under Section 19 of the Limitation Act.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Judicial Committee (Privy Council) judgment reported in 14 M.I.A. 443 (passage at 14 M.I.A. 451) | Construction of the contemporaneous documents concerning rents and profits — quoted passage interpreted about whether interest could be set off against rents and profits and whether the mortgagee could pay himself from the usufruct. | The court held that the Privy Council's passage did not establish that the mortgagee was entitled to pay himself the mortgage money out of the usufruct; rather their Lordships held the mortgagee was to account for any surplus received in excess of interest and pay interest on that surplus. This supports the conclusion that the mortgagee was not authorised to wipe out principal automatically by profits. |
| Soni Lal v. Kanhaiyalal (citation as referenced in the opinion) | Principle regarding the binding effect of acknowledgments on successors-in-interest (as invoked concerning whether an acknowledgment by Kripamoyi would bind the present defendants who claim through a different line). | The court relied on this authority to indicate that the defendants would not be bound by any acknowledgment by Kripamoyi because they claim through the last male owner and not through her; thus an acknowledgment by her would not necessarily bind them. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The bench (Walmsley, J., and B.B. Ghose, J.) analyzed the case on the following lines, staying strictly to the terms and chronology in the documents:
- Nature and operative date of the right to redeem: Both judges concluded that under the documents the mortgagor was entitled to redeem after the expiry of ten years from the date of the transaction (i.e., by April 1840 at the latest). The deeds were construed as entitling the mortgagor to sue for redemption from that point. Where the deeds contained expressions suggesting earlier repayment might be possible, the judges found nothing to support a view that redemption could be enforced at any indeterminate later date after the ten-year period.
- Commencement of limitation: Having fixed the date when the right to redeem accrued (April 1840), the judges held that Article 148 of the Limitation Act (sixty years) began to run from that date. Because the present suit was filed on 13 February 1918, nearly eighty-eight years after the deeds were dated, the suit was time-barred if limitation runs from 1840.
- Usufructuary mortgage argument: The appellants argued the mortgage was usufructuary and that rents and profits paid off the mortgage within sixty years. The judges examined the documentary terms and the earlier Privy Council judgment. They found no stipulation that principal and interest should be automatically extinguished by the accrual of profits. On the contrary, the mortgagee insisted on cash payment of principal and interest and undertook to repay any usufruct and interest only upon receipt of such payment in cash. The Privy Council passage relied upon by appellants was interpreted as indicating that the mortgagee was to account for surplus rents (if any) and pay interest on such surplus — not to treat rents as automatically extinguishing the debt.
- Acknowledgment argument: The court addressed the contention that an acknowledgment in the 1859 written statement (attributed to Kripamoyi) restarted limitation. Three objections were treated as decisive: (a) the plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of a proper acknowledgment document — only a copy of a copy of a translation was produced and the original records had been destroyed; such secondary evidence was insufficient; (b) the plaintiffs did not prove that the person who allegedly made the acknowledgment (Kripamoyi) had such an interest as would bind the defendants (issues of whether she had only a widow's interest or more); and (c) the content of the alleged statement did not amount to an acknowledgment of liability under Section 19 of the Limitation Act — the alleged statement admitted execution of documents but repudiated liability, which is not the requisite acknowledgment of liability.
- Consequential application of law: B.B. Ghose, J. noted that although the transaction predates the Transfer of Property Act, the pre-Act law or the rule in Section 62 could in principle be applied where relevant. He concluded, however, that the specific terms of the documents did not authorize self-payment of principal by the mortgagee out of rents and profits; hence the case fell within the ordinary rule that the right to redeem accrued on expiry of the term and limitation ran from that date.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The appeal is dismissed; the suit for redemption is barred by limitation under Article 148 of the Limitation Act.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The lower court's decree dismissing the plaintiffs' suit on the ground of limitation is affirmed; the plaintiffs' claim for redemption and for over-payments (including the asserted sum of about "a lakh and a quarter") fails as time-barred.
- On broader law: The court applied established principles of construction of pre-Act mortgage documents, interpreted the Privy Council passage as not authorising automatic extinguishment of mortgage principal by rents and profits, and applied Article 148 to start limitation when the mortgagor's right to redeem accrued (after ten years). The opinion does not claim to establish a novel principle of law; it confines itself to applying existing rules to the contractual terms before the Court.
Costs: The appeals were dismissed with costs as recorded by the judges.
Walmsley, J.:— The plaintiffs prefer this appeal. They say that they are the successors-in-interest of one Nanda Lil Surma Roy, who in March 1830 received a sum of Rs. 11,000-0-0 from Kali Prosad Sarma Roy and in consideration therefor executed in his favour a deed of conveyance in regard to the properties in suit. On the same day Kali Prosad executed an Ekrarnama in favour of Nanda Lil by which the latter was given the right to repay the money. Two other documents bearing on the transaction ware also executed on the same day.
2. In 1859 Nanda Lal's successor brought a suit on the documents: he wanted to recover possession of the land on the footing that the principal had been paid off out of the usufruct, and that there was a large sum due to him from Kali Prosad. The first Court decreed the suit finding that the principal had been satisfied and that Rs. 24,000-0-0 were due to the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to this Court: he failed on his main argument, that the transaction contained in the documents did not amount to a mortgage, bul he succeeded in the second branch, that is in regard to the mode in which the account was to be made up. The result of this Court's directions as to the manner of making up the account was a finding that a large sum was still due to the defendant, and in consequence the suit was dismissed. The plaintiffs' appeal to the Judicial Committee was unsuccessful. In the present suit the plaintiffs have given a long account, beginning with the sum due from them as ascertained in the suit of 1859 after the appeal to this Court. This account shows a debt growing steadily until the year 1873, then it shows a substantial increase in the usufruct, which gradually reduces the debit balance until in 1900, the position has changed, with the result that at the date on which the suit was instituted there is a sum of lakh and a quarter due to the mortgagor.
3. Numerous objections were raised by the defendants, but it is not necessary to deal with any except the plea of limitation. The learned Judge has held that the suit is birred by limitation and that is the question which has been argued before us.
4. The data of the documents mentioned was March 22, 1830. This suit was filed on February 13, 1918, or nearly eighty-eight years later.
5. The argument on behalf of the appellants is that the learned Judge is wrong in his decision as to the point of time from which the period of sixty years, under Article 148 of the Limitation Act, will run, and that in any event a fresh-starting point was provided by the acknowledgment contained in defendant's written statement in the suit of 1859.
6. It was decided in the suit of 1859 that the transaction between the parties did amount to a mortgage. The decision however did not go beyond that. That is to say it did not determine when the option of redeeming could be enforced. The documents are rather vague on this punt, but I think that the obscurity is in regard to a matter which does not help the plaintiffs. There are expressions which seem to suggest that repayment of the principal might be made before the period of tea years expired, and not only on the expiry of the period. I cannot however find in them any clause to warrant the view that the option might be exercised at any indeterminate point of time after the expiry of the tan years period. In my view therefore the contract made by the parties entisled the mortgagee on the one hand to sue in 1840 for foreclosure and the mortgagor on the other hand to sue for redemption. That being so, the point of time from which limitation began to run must be March 22, 1840 and if that is so the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation.
7. The suggestion that the mortgage was of an usufructuary one and that time began to run from the year 1900 according to plaintiff's account or such other point of time as may be determined by an account taken under the orders of the Court is met by reference to the terms of the agreement. There was no stipulation that usufruct should be set against principal and interest. On the contrary the mortgagee insisted on cash payment of principal and interest, and agreed to repay usufruct and interest only on receipt of such payment in cash. A stipulation of that kind cannot be reconciled with the view that he agreed to have principal and interest automatically wiped out by growing profits. In my opinion therefore the learned Judge was right in holding that the provisions of Article 148 bar the suit.
8. The plea of acknowledgment is rather a desperate one and there are three overwhelming objections to it. The first is that the plaintiffs have not proved that any acknowledgment was made; the second is that they have not proved that the person who is said to have made the acknowledgment was competent to make it: and the third is that the acknowledgment said to have been made does not amount to such an acknowledgment as is described in Section 19 of the Limitation Act.
9. As to the first objection, I think that the plaintiffs have been unfortunate: the records have been destroyed, and nothing but a copy could be produced, but they have put in not a copy of the original document, but a copy of a copy of a translation of the original. I quite understand that it would be extremely difficult after sixty years to secure the evidence which would make such a paper admissible as secondary evidence, but the law is clear and the defendants are entitled to demand that such a paper shall not be admitted as proof of what the defendants said in the 1859 suit.
10. The second objection is this, that the defendant in that suit was a widow named Kripamoyi: this lady had a daughter Shyama Sundari, who made a Hebanama in 1873 in favour of the father of the present defendants. On this branch of the case, the plaintiffs seem to be on the horns of a dilemma: if Kripamoyi had nothing but a Hindu widow's interest, an acknowledgment by her would not be operative against the reversioner: If on the other hand she had more than a widow's interest and the property came to the defendants by gift from her daughter and the learned pleader for the appellant said that he made that assertion then the defendants are not successors-in-interest of Kali Prosad but held under a title which is not affected by the transaction contained in the documents.
11. The third objection is simpler, but no less convincing. Assuming that Kripamoyi made the statements which she is said to have made, they dc not amount to an acknowledgment of liability: she only admitted certain facts, namely, the execution of documents and so forth, and after that admission she went on to repudiate liability, not to acknowledge it. For these reasons I agree with the learned Judge that the plaintiffs have failed to show that acknowledgment lifts the bar of limitation.
12. The result is that I confirm the decision of the lower Court to the effect that the suit is barred by limitation. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.
B.B Ghose, J.:— This is an appeal by the plaintiffs against the decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Rajshahi dismissing their suit for redemption of a mortgage. The facts are not disputed before us. One Nanda Lal Sarma Roy predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs executed a deed which was in form a kobala in favour of Kali Prosad Sarma Roy with regard to the properties in suit on the 22nd March 1830. Three other contemporaneous deeds were executed, an Ekrarnama by the transferee Kali Prasad, another Ekrarnama by Nanda Lal and a third document by Kali Prosad which appears to be a counterpart of Nanda Lal's agreement. By his Ekrannama (Exhibit, 7b) Kali Prosad agreed that if the vendor paid be him in cash the principal with interest in one lump after the expiry of ten years ending on the 30th Cheyt 1246 B.S, he would execute a deed of sale in favour of the vendor. There is no question now that the transaction constituted a mortgage and the parties will henceforth be described as mortgagor and mortgagee. The mortgagee entered into possession and has been in possession ever since. After the death of the original parties the representatives of the mortgagor brought a suit in 1859 against the widow of the mortgagee Kripamoyi for redemption alleging that the mortgage debt had been paid off out of usufruct and claiming a large sum of money from the defendant as over payments. He was successful in the first Court, but the principle of accounting adopted by that Court was reversed by the High Court on appeal by the defendant, and the decision of the High Court was affirmed by the Privy Council on further appeal by the plaintiff. The judgment of the Privy Council is reported in 14 M.I.A 443. In the meantime accounts being taken as directed by the High Court a large sum of money was found due to the mortgagee and according to the practice then prevailing the suit was dismissed on the 2nd April 1864 no order for redemption having been made by payment of the mortgage money by the mortgagor. Nothing further happened till the present suit was brought in February, 1918 by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs allege in their plaint that Nanda Lal was at liberty to repay the principal with interest after the expiry of ten years from the date of the mortgage, but base their claim on the ground that they believe that the mortgage debt has been fully paid off from the usufruct in or about 1307 B.S corresponding to 1900 A.D and they make the usual prayers for redemption claiming over a lac of Rupees from the mortgagee as over payments. A large number of issues were raised in the trill Court. All the material issues were found in favour of the plaintiffs except the question of limitation on which the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit and the only question argued before us was whether he suit was barred by limitation or not. The Subordinate Judge held that Article 148 of the Limitation Act (IX of 1908), applied to the case and the right of the plaintiffs to redeem accrued more than 60 years before suit and it is therefore barred. It is not contested that the present Limitation Act is applicable, but it is contended by the appellants that the mortgage was a pure usufructuary one and the rule laid down in Section 62(a) of the Transfer of Property Act is applicable to it, and as the mortgagee was paid off within 60 years of the suit it is not barred. A good deal of argument addressed to us was on the question as to whether the mortgage was a usufructuary mortgage or a mortgage by conditional sale. In the view I take it is immaterial by what name the mortgage may be called. It seems that such mortgages used to be termed Byebil wafa or Kut-kabala usufructuary, before the Transfer of Property Act (Macpherson's Law of Mortgage, 7th Ed. P. 21). I think that the position of the mortgagee was that of a mortgagee by a conditional sale in possession. The transaction being prior to the passing of the Transfer of Property Act, that Act does not apply in terms. But he rules laid down in S. 62 of the Act might be applied in a proper case as the general law in force before the act was passed. The real question is whether the mortgagee was authorised to pay himself the mortgage money from the rents and profits and was entitled to remain in possession of the property till he was so paid off. There was no such agreement in the document constituting the mortgage. The stipulation in this case was, as already stated, that the mortgagor would be entitled to redeem after the expiry of 10 years and would obtain a reconveyance on payment of the principal and interest. Further, the Ekrarnama of the mortgagor (Exhibit 6 a) and the counterpart executed by the mortgagee (Exhibit 8a) amongst other things provided that the profits remaining at the end of every year after deducting the revenue and collection charges etc., should be paid to the mortgagor by the mortgagee with interest at 12 annas per cent. whenever the mortgagor would pay off the principal amount with interest in full. The mortgagor was entitled to redeem the mortgage certainly at the expiry of 10 years from the date of the transaction i.e, in April 1840 A.D It is unnecessary to discuss the question whether he could redeem before that date under the other terms in the deeds as the suit has been brought more than 60 years after 1840. It is, however, contended by the learned vakil for the appellant that the Privy Council held in the previous litigation for redemption upon a construction of the documents that the mortgagee was authorized to pay himself the mortgage money out of the usufruct. Reliance is placed on a passage in the judgment of their Lordships reported in 14 M.I.A, 451 which runs thus “………the parties intended that the interest might be set off, from time to time against the rents and profits and that the mortgagee was only to account to the mortgagor for any rents and profits and interest on the same which he may have received over and above the interest due to him upon the debt.” It appears that far from laying down that the mortgagee was entitled to pay himself the mortgage money their Lordships held that he was to account for the surplus received in ex jess of his interest and to pay interest on that account. If Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act were applied then the case would come under the provision of S. 62(b) of the Act and I am of opinion that limitation commenced to run against the mortgagor from the date when he was entitled to recover possession on payment of the mortgage money in 1840 at the latest. The present suit having been brought more than 60 years after that date is barred.
13. It was also contended by the appellants that there being no personal obligation to pay the mortgage money limitation does not run from the expiry of the term. If this were accepted there would be no limitation in the case of a suit to redeem a mortgage by conditional sale, where there is generally no personal obligation on the mortgagor to pay. This, however, cannot be correct. The last contention for the appellants was that there was an acknowledgment of the right of the mortgagor by Kriparaoyi in her written statement in the suit of 1859 and so a fresh period of limitation should be computed from that, date. This was not pleaded in the plaint and although the document was not proved according to law, a copy of a copy of a translation which was on the record, was placed before us. I do not find that the right of the mortgagor was acknowledged in it anywhere. Apart from this the defendants would not be bound by any acknowledgment by Kripamoyi as they claim to rough the last male owner, and not through her, Soni Lal v. Kanhaiyalal(1). An attempt was made to establish that the defendants derived title under a Heba from Shyama Sundari, daughter of Kripamoyi. If the plaintiffs had made such a case in the plaint they would very likely have been met with other difficulties as Shyama Sundari if she had any title could never have derived it from the mortgagee. The grounds urged by the appellants having failed, the appeal must be dismissed with costs.
14. Appeal dismissed.
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