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Ganesa Aiyar v. Amirthasami Odayar

Madras High Court
Oct 29, 1917
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (appellants) sued for partition of specified properties and sought to set aside alienations effected by their father (the 1st defendant) in favour of other defendants under four sale deeds identified as Exhibits B, C, D and F. The Subordinate Judge held that the alienation under Exhibit C was binding on the plaintiffs and dismissed the suit with respect to the items comprised in Exhibit C. The Subordinate Judge found the alienations under Exhibits B, D and F not binding, but decreed only in favour of the 2nd plaintiff for his share of those items, holding that the 1st plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation. The plaintiffs appealed the parts of the decree adverse to them.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether suits by sons to set aside their father's alienations of joint family (ancestral) property are governed by Article 126 of the Limitation Act (12-year period) rather than Article 44, and the effect of that on the 1st plaintiff's claim.
  2. Whether the sale under Exhibit C (conveying about 46 acres 45 cents of Nanja land and 3 acres 65 cents of Punja for Rs. 5,000) was justified by necessity or for the manifest benefit of the family and therefore binding on the plaintiffs.
  3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to mesne profits from the date of alienation.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lachmi Narain Prasad v. Kishan Kishore Chand (33 Ind. Cas. 913) Illustrates that Article 126 applies to conveyances by a father and that a suit may be dismissed if alienation occurred more than 12 years before suit. Cited to support the proposition that Article 126 governs suits by sons to set aside a father's alienation of joint family property and thus to inform the limitation analysis in the present case.
Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachpal (20 Ind. Cas. 958; 40 C. 966; 25 M.L.J. 512; (1913) M.W.N. 661; et al.) Authority (including Privy Council treatment) that a suit by sons to set aside partition/alienation by the father is governed by Article 126. Cited to reinforce that Article 126 applies to suits by sons to set aside a father's alienation; used in the court's limitation analysis.
Soundararajan v. Saravana Pillai (34 Ind. Cas. 794; 30 M.L.J. 592) Case cited in support of the application of Article 126 to suits by sons against a father's alienation. Referenced among authorities to confirm the applicability of Article 126 to the facts before the court.
Kishan Lal v. Shib Narain (3 Ind. Cas. 505; 6 A.L.J. 614) Authority cited in the context of Article 126 applying to fathers' alienations. Used as part of the body of precedent that guided the court's conclusion on limitation.
Asaram v. Ratansingh (32 Ind. Cas. 242; 12 N.L.R. 12) Authority cited in relation to Article 126. Cited to support the court's view on the limitation regime applicable to the father's alienation.
Palamappa Chetty v. Sreemath Deivasikamony Pandara Sannadhi (39 Ind. Cas. 722; 40 M. 709; et al.) Observations about sales of joint family properties — applied with equal force to sales by non-trading families; bearing on necessity/justification for sale. Cited to support the court's skepticism about allowing sales of ancestral lands by non-trading families absent clear necessity or family benefit.
In Re: Krishnasawmi Doss (13 Ind. Cas. 648; (1912) M.W.N. 167; 11 M.L.T. 182) Authority concerning the justification required for sale/mortgage of ancestral lands — sale justified only if clearly for the family's benefit. Cited as part of the authorities establishing that alienation of ancestral lands must show manifest benefit to the family; informed the court's analysis of Exhibit C.
Subramania Nadan v. Ramasami Nadan (21 Ind. Cas. 656; 25 M.L.J. 563) Authority on the principle that sale/mortgage of ancestral lands requires proof of clear family benefit. Relied upon in assessing whether the sale under Exhibit C was justified as for the family's benefit.
Adikesavan Naidu v. Gurunatha Chetti (39 Ind. Cas. 358; 40 M. 338; 32 M.L.J. 180; (1917) M.W.N. 171) Authority reinforcing the requirement of clear family benefit to justify alienation of ancestral property. Used together with other authorities to conclude that the sale in Exhibit C lacked the necessary proof of family benefit.
Bhirgee Nath v. Narasingh Tewari (35 Ind. Cas. 475; 39 A. 61; 14 A.L.J. 1161) Sets out the correct principle regarding mesne profits: mesne profits are in the nature of damages and entitlement depends on the merits and circumstances of each case. Cited to support the court's approach that plaintiffs are not of right entitled to mesne profits from the date of alienation and that mesne profits must be determined on the facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a stepwise analysis addressing limitation, the validity of the sale under Exhibit C, mesne profits, and the consequential relief to be granted.

  1. Limitation (Article 126):

    The court held that the case concerning the 1st defendant's alienations falls under Article 126 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a 12-year period for suits by Hindus governed by Mitakshara law to set aside a father's alienation of ancestral property. The court rejected the idea that the father's description of himself as "guardian" of his son would bring the case under Article 44 (which concerns transfers of property belonging to a minor by his guardian). The court emphasized that in a joint family the father is a co-owner with the sons and that sales by the managing member, even if described as guardian acts, remain within Article 126. The court cited several authorities applying Article 126 to similar circumstances and used those authorities to support its limitation analysis. On this basis the court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to a decree in respect of his one-third share in properties covered by Exhibits B and C (i.e., limitation did not bar that entitlement as framed in the judgment).

  2. Validity of the sale under Exhibit C:

    The court examined the sale deed (Exhibit C) and the recorded recital of consideration. The sale conveyed about 46 acres 45 cents of Nanja land and 3 acres 65 cents of Punja for Rs. 5,000, and the deed recited reasons including interruption of cultivation due to distance between villages and the desire to discharge "present small debts" and to purchase lands nearer where the family resided.

    The court analyzed the factual material: the distance between the villages was admitted to be within 10 miles (calling into question the claim of interrupted cultivation), no clear evidence was produced as to the extent of debts or that debts had been paid off, and the family was not one engaged in money-lending business (so prospective money-lending activities did not justify alienating family property). The court scrutinized defendants' witnesses who asserted poor harvests due to silt and later improvement after government works; however, the court noted that the government had completed irrigation improvements over two years before the sale and reasoned that selling after such improvements — when further works (silt removal or shutters) were likely to restore productivity — was not prudent.

    The court also examined the price: a sale (Exhibit 11) relied upon by the Subordinate Judge as a comparator involved a vendor who admitted selling cheaply to discharge debts; the court found such a sale an unsafe criterion of market value. Taking into account other sale deeds in the case, the court concluded that the value per acre was certainly much more than the price obtained under Exhibit C.

    The court acknowledged that the 1st defendant's father also joined in the sale deed and that the joining of all adult co-parceners might carry weight where necessity is unclear; nevertheless, the court stated that where no justifying necessity exists, the mere fact that all adult co-parceners joined does not validate the transaction. Applying the authorities that require a clear family benefit for alienation of ancestral lands, the court concluded that the sale under Exhibit C is not binding on the plaintiffs.

    However, the court made a limiting factual finding: it was proved that lands covered by Exhibit 11 (dated 9 April 1908) were purchased for Rs. 3,000 out of the Rs. 5,000 consideration of Exhibit C. Consequently, the plaintiffs, if they avoid Exhibit C, cannot claim any share of the lands purchased under Exhibit 11. The court therefore dismissed the plaintiffs' claim to the lands specified as items Nos. 2 to 27 in schedule B to the plaint, declaring those properties the separate property of the 1st defendant.

  3. Mesne profits:

    The court held that plaintiffs are not of right entitled to mesne profits from the date of alienation. It characterized mesne profits as being in the nature of damages, concluding entitlement depends on the circumstances and merits of each case. The court cited Bhirgee Nath v. Narasingh Tewari for the correct principle on mesne profits and noted that the question should be determined on all circumstances.

  4. Decree and consequential relief:

    On the cumulative application of the legal principles and the facts, the court modified the decree of the Subordinate Judge to grant the plaintiffs a one-third share in the properties alienated under Exhibits B and C (in addition to the already decreed one-third share to the 2nd plaintiff). The court set aside the Subordinate Judge's dismissal insofar as Exhibit C and awarded the plaintiffs a one-third share in the items covered by Exhibit C (with the 1st plaintiff receiving one-sixth). Where plaintiffs elected to take lands in schedule A1 (lands exchanged for some family lands covered by Exhibit C), they would receive a one-third share of lands in schedules A and A1. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit as regards items covered by sale deed Exhibit VII (B schedule properties). The alienees (defendants Nos. 2 to 6) were to have a charge on the properties covered by Exhibit VII, except those alienated under Exhibit E, to the extent of one-third of the consideration they paid under Exhibit C. The court directed a preliminary decree for partition on those terms and ordered that each party bear his own costs of the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court modified the Subordinate Judge's decree: it held that Article 126 governs suits by sons to set aside their father's alienations and, on the facts, concluded that the sale under Exhibit C was not binding on the plaintiffs, subject to the limitation that lands purchased by the father under Exhibit 11 (for Rs. 3,000 out of the Rs. 5,000 consideration) remain the separate property of the 1st defendant. The plaintiffs were decreed a one-third share in properties alienated under Exhibits B and C (the 1st plaintiff receiving a one-sixth share where specified). The court also held that plaintiffs are not automatically entitled to mesne profits and that such entitlement must be decided on the facts.

Implications: - Direct consequences for the parties: plaintiffs obtain a one-third share in the properties alienated under Exhibits B and C (with the detailed adjustments described above); the 1st defendant retains ownership of the lands specifically purchased under Exhibit 11; defendants Nos. 2–6 receive a charge to the extent of one-third of the consideration they paid under Exhibit C on certain properties; a preliminary decree for partition was directed; and each party bears their own costs of the appeal.

The opinion does not state any broader legal precedent being newly established; it applies existing principles and precedents to the facts of the case.

Judicial Authorship

The principal opinion is delivered by John Wallis, C.J. Another judge concurred, expressly agreeing with the Chief Justice's observations about the mesne profits question being one to be determined on all the circumstances of the case.

Show all summary ...

1. The plaintiffs, who are the appellants, sued for a partition of the properties specified in the plaint between themselves and their father, who was the first defendant, after setting aside the alienations made by the first defendant to the other defendants, The alienations complained of were made under four sale deeds, Exhibits B, C, D and F. The Sub-ordinate Judge held that the alienation under Exhibit C was binding on the plaintiffs and dismissed the. suits as regards the items comprised therein. He found that the alienations under B, D and F were not binding, but passed a decree in favour only of the 2nd plaintiff for his share of the items holding that the 1st plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation. The plaintiffs appeal in so far as the decree is against them.

2. As regards the question of limitation, the case so far as the 1st defendant's alienation is concerned clearly falls under Article 126 of. the Limitation Act, which provides for a period of 12 years for suits by a Hindu governed by the law of the Mitakshara to set aside his father's alienation in ancestral property. The fact that the father executes the document as guardian of his son will not take the case out of Article 126 and bring it under Article 44, which applies to cases where property belonging to a minor is transferred by his guardian. In the case of joint family property the father is co-owner with the sons. He sells property as the managing member of the family and the mere fact that he describes himself as guardian of the sons would not take the case out of the express terms of Article 126. In Lachmi Narain Prasad v. Kishan Kishore Chand 33 Ind. Cas. 913 : 38 A. 126 : 14 A.L.J. 25 which was a case where property had been conveyed by the father and grandfather, the Article that was held applicable was Article 126 and the suit was dismissed on the ground that the alienation was more than 12 years before suit. In Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachpal 20 Ind. Cas. 958 : 40 C. 966 : 25 M.L.J. 512 : (1913) M.W.N. 661 : 15 Bom. L.R. 867 : 14 M.L.T. 163 : 17 C.W.N. 1189 : 18 C.L.J. 237 : 11 A.L.J. 865 : 10 N.L.R. 1 : 40 I.A. 213 (P.C.) their Lordships of the Privy Council treated a suit by the sons to set aside a partition by the father giving to a stranger properties as a suit governed by Article 126. I might also refer to Soundararajan v. Saravana Pillai 34 Ind. Cas. 794 : 30 M.L.J. 592 and Kishan Lal v. Shib Narain 3 Ind. Cas. 505 : 6 A.L.J. 614 and Asaram v. Ratansingh 32 Ind. Cas. 242 : 12 N.L.R. 12. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to a decree so far as his one-third share in the properties covered by Exhibits B and C is concerned.

3. As regards the alienation under Exhibit C, I am unable to agree with the Subordinate Judge. The 1st defendant and his father, who died before 1909, conveyed about 46 acres 45 cents of Nanja land and 3 acres 65 cents of Punja for Rs. 5,000. The recital as to consideration runs as follows: ' Owing to the distance between the said Palli Vialkam village and Mudikondan village where we live, the cultivation and other business have been interrupted and a great deal of loss has been occasioned. Intending, therefore, to discharge the present small debts of our family and to purchase lands in the village where we reside and to, better our prospects by carrying on money dealings you and we entered into an agreement on the 29th October last, and under this we receive Rs. 500 in cash, and the amount received by us this day from you is Rs. 1,500 and the amount with which we are debited under the agreement to receive in the presence of the Sub-Registrar of Nannilam from you is Rs. 3,000."

4. The distance between the village where the lands sold are situate and the 1st defendant's village is admitted to be within 10 miles, and it is difficult to see why cultivation should be interrupted and a great deal of loss occasioned because of the distance. Families often own lands few miles away and this would not justify a Hindu father in alienating the lands. So far as the debts are concerned, all that is stated is that there were some "present small debts," and there is no evidence either as to the extent of the debts or as to any debts having been paid off. The transaction was not very old and the existence of debts could easily have been proved. The family was not a tracing family or one carrying on money-lending business and the starting of prospective moneylending transactions is no ground for alienating family properties. The observations of the Privy Council in Palamappa Chetty v. Sreemath Deivasikamony Pandara Sannadhi 39 Ind. Cas. 722 : 40 M. 709 : 21 C.W.N. 729 : 15 A.L.J. 485 : 1 P.L.W. 697 : 33 M.L.J. 1 : 19 Bom. L.R. 567 : 22 M.L.T. 1 : (1917) M.W.N. 477 & 507 : 26 C.L.J. 153 : 6 L.W. 222 (P.C.) apply with equal force to sales of joint family properties by non-trading families. Though there is nothing said in the sale deed as to any difficulties having been experienced owing to the want of irrigation facilities, from evidence of the defendants' witnesses the sale does not seem to be justified. The lands sold consisted of 46 acres 45 cents of wet land and it appears from the evidence of 3rd defendant that irrigation supply was improved by Government in 1904 or 1905 (prior to the sale Exhibit C). He wants to make out that because the silt was not cleared by the Public Works Department) the harvest' was poor for 4 or 5 years and that when the department removed the silt, the harvests were good. Defendants' 4th and 5th witnesses 'want to make out that the water supply was bad till shutters were fitted up to the irrigation channel and improved afterwards. It is nut disputed that the Government completed the irrigation channel over two years before the sale. If all that was required to make the channel a success was the removal of the silt or the putting up of shutters, I cannot say that it was a prudent act to sell the lands after irrigation facilities were completed, as it was almost certain that the Government would do the needful to give a good supply of water. The sale or mortgage of ancestral lands to purchase other lands can only be justified if there was clear benefit to the family: In Re: Krishnasawmi Doss 13 Ind. Cas. 648 : (1912) M.W.N. 167 : 11 M.L.T. 182; Subramania Nadan v. Ramasami Nadan 21 Ind. Cas. 656 : 25 M.L.J. 563; Adikesavan Naidu v. Gurunatha Chetti 39 Ind. Cas. 358 : 40 M. 338 : 32 M.L.J. 180 : (1917) M.W.N. 171 : 5 L.W. 425 : 22 M.L.T. 300 and having regard to the case with which such recitals can be made by an improvident < father in order to raise money, I think Courts ought to be slow to find necessity unless on clear proof that the transaction was one manifestly for the benefit of the family. So far as the price' of the lands is concerned, I do not think Exhibit 11, which is relied on by the Subordinate Judge, is a safe criterion. Thamarai Selvam Pillai, the purchaser under Exhibit 11, admits that he got the lands cheap. Subramania Iyer, the vendor, D. W. No. 4., admits that he purchased the lands for Rs. 3,600 and that he sold the lands for Rs. 3,000 as he had debts to the extent of Rs. 3,600. The sale deed shows that Rs. 3000 went to discharge debts and the price at which a needy debtor sells is no safe criterion as to value. Having regard to the other sale-deeds filed in the case the value per acre is certainly much more than the price for which the lands have been sold under Exhibit C.

5. I am not unmindful of the fact that the 1st defendant's father also joined in the sale-deed. When evidence as to necessity is not clear, the fact that all the adult members of the family joined' would have an important bearing, but when there is no justifying necessity the mere fact that all the adult co-parceners joined would not give any additional weight to the transaction.

6. I am of opinion that the sale of the land under Exhibit C is not binding on the plaintiffs. As, however, it is proved that the lands covered by Exhibit 11, dated 9th April 1908, were purchased for Rs. 3,000 out of the sum of Rs. 5,000, the consideration for Exhibit C, the plaintiffs, if they seek to avoid the alienation under Exhibit C, cannot get any share of the lands purchased by 1st defendant under Exhibit 11. Their claim to these lands, items Nos. 2 to 27 specified in schedule B to the plaint, is, therefore, dismissed and the property will be declared to be the separate property of the 1st defendant.

7. As regards the claim for mesne profits, I do not think plaintiffs are of right entitled to mesne profits from the date of alienation. Mesne profits are in the nature of damages and each case must be dealt with on merits. I think the correct principle has been laid down in Bhirgee Nath V. Narasingh Tewari 35 Ind. Cas. 475 : 39 A. 61 : 14 A.L.J. 1161.

8. In the result, the decree of the Subordinate Judge will be modified by decreeing to the plaintiffs a third share in the properties alienated under Exhibits B and C in addition to a third share decreed to the 2nd plaintiff. The decree of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the suit as regards alienation of the items covered by the sale-deed Exhibit C is set aside, the plaintiff getting 1/3rd share in the said items (the 1st plaintiff getting l/6th share). As plaintiffs elect to take the lands in Al schedule to the plaint which represent lands exchanged for some of the family lands covered by Exhibit C they will get 1/3rd share of the lands covered by schedules A and A1 to the plaint. The plaintiffs' suit as regards items covered by the sale deed Exhibit VII (B schedule properties) will be dismissed. The alienees defendants Nos. 2 to 6 will have a charge on the properties covered by Exhibit VII, except those alienated under Exhibit E, to the extent of a third of the consideration paid by them under Exhibit C. There wilt be a preliminary decree for partition on the above terms. Each party will bear his own costs of the appeal.

John Wallis, C.J.

9. I agree and will only say that I concur in what my learned brother has said as to the question of mesne profits in a case like this being determined upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the case.