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Lakhiama Jiu And Another v. Lokenath Das And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
These two appeals arise from a judgment of the District Judge of Cuttack dated 11 July 1918, which granted letters of administration with a copy of a will annexed to the petitioner Lokenath Das in respect of properties left by the late Ram Prapanna Das. Appeal No. 10 was brought by Lakhiama Jiu; Appeal No. 12 by Sudersan Mata on behalf of herself and her two minor sons, Narsingh Das and Krishna Das, who had been caveators in the court below. The will in question is dated 4 November 1917; the deceased died on 6 November 1917.
After the death, the Sub-Inspector of Police took possession of the property because disputes over succession had arisen. Claims by Lakhiama Jiu and Sudersan Mata were registered as Miscellaneous Intestate Claim Cases Nos. 137 of 1917 and 1918 respectively; the letters of administration case was No. 6. These matters were disposed of in the same judgment.
The will purported to favor Lokenath Das and one Narsingh Das (the minor son of appellant Sudersan Mata). The appellants primarily contested that the will was not executed by Ram Prapanna Das and that he was not of sound disposing mind when it was executed. Lakhiama Jiu also contended that the deceased died intestate and that the properties should pass to the malik of a mutt of which the deceased was a chela (a position now held by Lakhiama Jiu). Sudersan Mata claimed to be the lawfully married wife and asserted that her minor sons were lawfully begotten, so the property should devolve upon her and her sons.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the will dated 4 November 1917 was duly executed by the deceased Ram Prapanna Das.
- Whether the deceased was in a sound disposing state of mind at the time the will was executed.
- Whether the competing claims (Lokenath Das under the will; Sudersan Mata and her minor sons as heirs; and Lakhiama Jiu claiming intestacy and succession as malik of the mutt) prevail.
- Whether there was any illegality or want of jurisdiction in the judgment because the judge who wrote the judgment (Mr. Williams) was not the District Judge at the time of pronouncing it, and whether a successor (Mr. Allanson) could lawfully pronounce a judgment written by his predecessor.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The will was not executed by the deceased (i.e., it is not genuine).
- The deceased was not of sound disposing mind when the will was supposedly executed.
- Lakhiama Jiu: the deceased died intestate and the estate should devolve on the malik of the mutt of Narsingh Kachari in Puri, of which the deceased was a chela; Lakhiama Jiu is the current holder.
- Sudersan Mata (also on behalf of her minor sons): she was the lawfully married wife and the minor sons were lawfully begotten, so the properties should devolve upon them as heirs.
- Procedural objection: the learned vakil contended that the judgment was illegal because Mr. Williams (who heard the case and wrote and signed the judgment) was not the District Judge at the time of pronouncement—raising jurisdictional and procedural validity issues.
Respondent's Arguments
- The will was properly written and executed in favour of the respondents (Lokenath Das and the minor Narsingh Das).
- The deceased had an intention to pay debts and had executed a kabala (document) on 3 November 1917 to pay a debt to Michhu Misra; because the kabala could not be registered on Sunday, the parties returned and a will was executed on the morning of 4 November 1917.
- Witness evidence (especially Michhu Misra and the scribe Jagabandhu Chhotra) supports that the will was read, understood, and the deceased affixed his thumb-impression—indicating competency and proper execution.
- On the procedural point, the respondent maintained that Order 20, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits a judge to pronounce a judgment written by his predecessor, and that the parties were given notice and did not object, so there was no prejudice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mt. Parbutty v. Mt. Higgin (decided 1872) | Supports the proposition that a judge may pronounce a judgment written by his predecessor (addressing difficulties raised by earlier authorities). | The Court relied on this decision to show that Order 20, Rule 2 permits a successor judge to pronounce a judgment written but not pronounced by his predecessor; it helped resolve the procedural objection regarding Mr. Williams writing the judgment and Mr. Allanson pronouncing it. |
| Mahomed Akil v. Assadunnissa Bibee and Mutty Lall Sen Gywal v. Deshkar Roy | Referenced as earlier authorities that created difficulties regarding judgments written by one judge and pronounced by another. | The Court indicated these cases had created difficulties that were later addressed and clarified by the rule and by Mt. Parbutty v. Mt. Higgin. |
| Satyendra Nath Ray Chaudhuri v. Kastura Kumari Ghatwalin (Calcutta High Court) | Recent decision cited as supporting the view that a successor judge may pronounce a judgment written by his predecessor. | The Court cited it as supporting authority for the procedural ruling allowing Mr. Allanson to pronounce the judgment written by Mr. Williams. |
| Fort Gloster Jute Manufacturing Co. v. Chandra Kumar Das (Calcutta High Court) | Holds that writing a judgment by one judge and pronouncing by another is at most an irregularity, not a jurisdictional defect; an irregularity is actionable only if it prejudices parties and objection is not taken promptly. | The Court applied this principle to conclude that, because the parties had notice and made no timely objection and there was no prejudice, the procedure was not fatal to the validity of the judgment. |
| Benodini Dasi v. Bholanath (unreported, Division Bench: Coutts and Adami, JJ.) | Noted as an unreported decision that raised the issue; the Court observed certain authorities were not cited to that bench. | The Court observed that earlier authorities discussed in the present opinion were apparently not cited in that unreported decision; the mention did not alter the Court's conclusion here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined first whether the will was validly executed and whether the deceased had testamentary capacity. The Court reviewed the evidence of primary witnesses:
- Michhu Misra (witness): regarded as a convincing and credible witness (municipal commissioner, zamindari holder, income-tax payer). He stated the will was written under the instructions of the deceased, read to and understood by him; the deceased touched the pen, the scribe read a ritual formula (karamala santak), and the deceased placed his thumb-impression. Michhu Misra had been in consultation with the deceased from 3 November, attended on the morning of 4 November, visited the Sub-Registrar, and was present at execution.
- Jagabandhu Chhotra (scribe): gave direct evidence that the deceased was in his senses when the will was read to him and when it was executed.
The Court found no reason to discredit these witnesses. It considered corroborating circumstances: the deceased's intention to make a will (admitted by Sudersan Mata), the deceased's anxiety to pay debts (demonstrated by the execution of a kabala on 3 November), and the fact that the will gave effect to the intention to pay debts (respondent paid off the testator's debts and the property intended to be sold by the kabala was instead given under the will). Although the deceased had become hopeless of life and was found in a semi-unconscious state by the Sub-Registrar on the evening of 4 November (a circumstance favoring appellants), the Court held that this only increased the onus on the respondents to prove testamentary capacity — an onus the Court found had been "amply discharged" by the evidence.
On the objection regarding the judge who wrote and signed the judgment: the trial concluded with arguments heard by Mr. Williams on 5 June 1918; Mr. Williams ceased to be District Judge and Mr. Allanson succeeded him. Mr. Williams wrote the judgment on 11 July 1918 and sent it to Mr. Allanson "for favour of pronouncement"; Mr. Allanson pronounced the judgment on 29 July 1918 and signed the decree on 3 August. The Court analyzed Order 20, Rule 3 of the CPC (which requires judgment to be dated and signed by the judge in open court when pronounced) and found it did not cover the present situation. Instead, Order 20, Rule 2 permits a judge to pronounce a judgment written but not pronounced by his predecessor. The Court relied on prior authorities (including Mt. Parbutty v. Mt. Higgin and Calcutta High Court decisions) and the principle that such a procedural irregularity is not fatal unless it causes prejudice and objection is not promptly taken. Because the parties had notice and did not object, no prejudice was found and the procedural objection failed.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court below and held that the will was properly executed and that the deceased was in a sound disposing state of mind. The appeals were dismissed with costs.
Direct effect on the parties:
- The grant of letters of administration with a copy of the will annexed to Lokenath Das is upheld.
- The competing claims of the appellants (Lakhiama Jiu and Sudersan Mata with her minor sons) were rejected to the extent challenged in these appeals.
Implications regarding precedent: The Court applied existing authorities regarding the procedural issue of a successor judge pronouncing a predecessor's written judgment; it treated the matter as one of established principle rather than creating a new precedent. The decision affirms application of those prior rulings and treats any procedural irregularity as non-fatal in the absence of prejudice and prompt objection.
1. These two appeals arise out of a judgment of the District Judge of Cuttack, dated 11th July, 1918, whereby he granted letters of administration with a copy of the will annexed to the petitioner Lokenath Das in respect of the properties left by the late Ram Prapanna Das. Appeal No. 10 is on behalf of Lakhiama Jiu, and Appeal No. 12 is on behalf of Sudersan Mata and her two minor sons, Narsingh Das and Krishna Das, who were caveators before the Judge. The will, which is the subject-matter of this appeal, purports to have been executed by Earn Prapanna Das on 4th November, 1917. He died on 6th November, 1917. Upon his death, the Sub-Inspector of Police took possession of the property as it appeared to him that there were disputes regarding the succession to his properties. The claims preferred by Lakhiama Jiu and Sudersan Mata were registered as Miscellaneous Intestate Claim Cases Nos. 137 of 1917 and of 1918 respectively. The letters of administration case was numbered 6. These cases were disposed of by the same judgment.
2. The will purports to be in favour of the respondents Lokenath Das and one Narsingh Das, minor son of the appellant Sudersan Mata. The naain ground upon which this appeal is contested by the appellants is that the will in question was not executed by the deceased Ram Prapanna Das, and that he was not in a sound disposing state of mind at the time when the will is said to have been executed. The case of Lakhiama Jiu further was that the deceased died intestate and the properties left by him would devolve upon the malik of the mutt of Narsingh Kachari in Puri of which the deceased was a chela, and Lakhiama Jiu is the present holder of that mutt. The case of Sudersan Mata, who acts also on behalf of her minor sons Narsingh and Krishna Das was that she was the lawfully married wife of the deceased and that the minor sons were lawfully begotten by the deceased and the properties of Ram Prapanna Das therefore devolved up on Sudersan Mata and her minor sons.
3. It would thus appear that there were three distinct claimants to the properties of the deceased: the respondent Lokenath Das, on the strength of the will in question; Sudersan Mata with her minor sons, and Lakhiama Jiu, who claimed to succeed to the exclusion of each other on the ground that he, Ram Prapanna Das, died intestate.
4. The deceased was ill for a few days before his death; according to Sudersan Mata ten or twelve days; according to Lokenath Das seven or eight days; Lakhiama Jiu does not give any definite idea upon this point. He was suffering from fever and cold and rheumatism and was a fairly aged man. His condition became worse on 3rd November, when according to the evidence of Lokenath Das, he was not able to come out of his room. Lakhiama Jiu does not appear to have attended the deceased during his illness and contented herself with sending some of her attendants to look after him. Sudersan Mata appears to have been in attendance throughout. On 3rd November her case is the deceased expressed a desire to execute a will in her favour and in favour of the two minor sons, and for that purpose she gave a sovereign to Lokenath Das to purchase stamp and prepare the will but that the will could not be signed or properly executed as the de ceased became unconscious on the evening of the 3rd. She however says that according to her wishes and in consultation with Lokenath Das and others the Sub-Registrar of Puri was called to have the will registered, but that when the Sub-Registrar came he found the deceased in a semi-unconscious state and hence he was unable to obtain from him any statement regarding the will in question. Sudersan Mata believed, according to her that a will was executed by the deceased in her favour and in favour of her sons, and she actually demanded the will after the death of the deceased from Lokenath Das and was told that the will was deposited with the Sub-Registrar and subsequently came to know that it was not so deposited. The case of the respondent is that the deceased was indebted to one Miohhu Misra, witness 3, on behalf of the petitioner, and that the deceased was anxious to pay off the debt, naturally because he felt that his end was coming near and for that purpose he wanted to have a kabala executed in favour of Lokenath Das. Not only a stamp for the kabala was purchased, but as a matter of fact a kabala was executed and the thumb-impression of the deceased was taken thereon. This kabala is Ex. 6, and bears date 3rd November, 1917. It being late in the evening on Saturday 3rd November, the kabala could not be presented for registration on that date. On Sunday morning some time about 9 a.m Lokenath Das and Michhu Misra went to the Sub-Registrar's residence and asked him to visit the deceased and to register the document. The Sub-Registrar refused to do so as it was Sunday and informed thorn, that if it were a will he could do so. Lokenath and Michhu Misra returned to the deceased and told him what the Sub-Registrar had told them. Thereupon the deceased expressed his desire to execute a will. A will was accordingly written out and executed. Thumb impression was affixed upon it between 9 and 10 a.m These persons went back to the Sub-Registrar at 3-30 p.m The Sub-Registrar came at 4-20 p.m and found the deceased in a semi-unconscious state as already stated.
5. The question is whether in these circumstances of the case, the evidence on behalf of the respondent is such as can be accepted to prove that the deceased was in a sound disposing state of mind and that he actually did execute the will. The will in question was attested by Michku Misra and Kashinath Misra; Jagabandhu Chhotra is the scribe. The evidence of Michhu Misra appears to be convincing. He is a Municipal Commissioner, holds a zamindari, the sadar jama of which is Rs. 1,500, and he pays income-tax of Rs. 900. He clearly states that the will was written under the instructions of the deceased, it was read to, and understood by him; he then touched the pen and Jagabandhu read karamala santak for him and Ram Prapanna Das placed his thumb-impression on the will. This man had been in consultation with the deceased at least from the 3rd when the kabala was executed, he attended him on the morning of the 4th, he went to the Sub-Registrar and came back and was also present when the will was executed. There is absolutely no reason why the evidence of this witness should not be: accepted. Nothing has been suggested, either in the cross-examination or in the argument of the learned vakil on behalf; of the appellant, why the evidence of this witness should not be accepted Jagabandhu Chhotra, the scribe of the document, is clear in his statement that Ram Prapanna was in his senses when the will was read out to him. This is direct evidence of the mental condition of the testator and of his having executed the will in question.
6. The circumstances in the case do not at all, in any way, shake the credit of these witnesses. The first and the most important circumstance is the intention of the testator to execute a will. Sudersan Mata admits that this was his intention and also asserts that the will which was executed was actually in her favour. The next circumstance of importance is the anxiety of the deceased to pay off his debts. He actually executed a kabala in favour of the respondent on the 3rd November in order to pay off his debt, but it proved in fructuous as it could not be executed on the 4th, that day being Sunday. This intention to pay off his debts has been given effect to by the will and the respondent actually paid off the debts of the testator. The property that was intended to be sold to him by the kabala has been given to him by the will.
7. There is no doubt that the deceased had become hopeless of his life, as is admitted by the witnesses on behalf of Lakhiama Jiu and also from the statement made in the will itself. No doubt, when the Sub-Registrar came on the evening of the 4th he found the deceased in an unconscious' state of mind; this circumstance is in favour of the appellants, but the effect of it is only to cast a heavier onus upon the respondent to prove that the deceased was in a fit condition of mind to execute the will. That onus, to my mind, has been amply discharged by the evidence on the record.
8. I would therefore agree with the finding of the Court below, and hold that the will was properly executed by the deceased, and that he was in a sound disposing state of mind.
9. Our attention has been drawn to the fact that the will ignores the second sort of Sudersan Mata, Krishna Das, and that nothing has at all been given to him. From this it is argued that it is unlikely that the testator would have executed such a will. It is impossible to know the reason why the testator did give all the property to Narsingh and not to Krishna Das. Sudersan Mata claims to be the lawfully married wife of the deceased, but the learned Court below has held, and rightly, upon the evidence in the case that she was no better than a kept mistress. If the will is properly proved to have been executed by the deceased, it is no business of ours to inquire into the reasons for giving certain property to persons named in the will, and not to the second son of Sudersan Mata. This contention is overruled.
10. The result is that the judgment of the Court below must be affirmed.
11. The learned vakil has however contended that the judgment in this case is illegal inasmuch as Mr. Williams, who heard the case and is said to have written out and signed the judgment, was not the District Judge of Cuttack at the time when the judgment was pronounced.
12. The trial of the case was over on 5th June, 1918, when the arguments on both sides were heard by Mr. Williams. Mr. Williams then ceased to be the District Judge of Cuttack, and Mr. Allanson succeeded him. On 11th July, 1918, the judgment in question was written out by Mr. Williams, and was received by Mr. Allanson “for favour of pronouncement.” On 29th July, 1918 the judgment was after notice to the parties pronounced by Mr. Allanson. In accordance with the judgment, Mr. Allanson ordered the suit to be decreed, and on 3rd August the decree was signed and sealed by Mr. Allanson.
13. The contention of the learned vakil on behalf of the appellant has been that Mr. Williams had no jurisdiction to write the judgment and send it to Cuttack to be pronounced by the District Judge of this Court. Reliance is placed upon O. 20, R. 3 of the CPC, but that rule has obviously no application inasmuch as it simply says that:
“the judgment shall be dated and signed by the Judge in open Court at the time of pronouncing it and when once signed, shall not after wards be altered or added to save as provided by S. 152 or on review.”
14. That rule relates to the case when the judgment is pronounced by the very Judge who wrote it, but does not cover the case where the judgment is written by one officer and is pronounced by another. To meet this difficulty, R. 2 of the same order has provided that a Judge may pronounce a judgment written but not pronounced by his predecessor. Here Mr. Allanson pronounced the judgment written by Mr. Williams, his predecessor, but not pronounced by him. There was some difference of opinion at one time, but it was settled so long ago as in the year 1872 by the decision in the case of Mt. Parbutty v. Mt. Higgin(1). To meet the difficulties created by the earlier authorities in 5 Madras High Court Rulings and Mahomed Akil v. Assadunnissa Bibee and Mutty Lall Sen Gywal v. Deshkar Roy(2), the above rule in the above Court was made clear. The recent decisions of the Calcutta High Court also support the view which I have taken: vide Satyendra Nath Ray Chaudhuri v. Kastura Kumari Ghatwalin(3) and Fort Gloster Jute Manufacturing Co. v. Chandra Kumar Das(4). The latter decision lays down that, at most, it would only amount to an irregularity, and that applying the principle governing cases of irregularities, it is one that cannot be taken seriously into consideration, unless it prejudices the parties affected thereby and an objection to the procedure is taken promptly at the earliest possible opportunity. In the present case, the evidence was heard by Mr. Williams, and he was therefore the best person to write the judgment. He did write it and sent it for pronouncement to his successor, Mr. Allanson. The parties were given notice thereof, but did not make any objection. Therefore, there was no prejudice at all.
15. Attention has also been drawn to an) unreported decision of a Division Bench of this Court, Coutts and Adami, JJ., in the case of Benodini Dasi v. Bholanath(5). The authorities quoted above do not appear to have been cited to the learned Judges, nor does their attention seem to have been invited to O. 20, R. 2.
16. The result is that the appeals are dismissed with costs.
V.S/R.K
17. Appeals dismissed.
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