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Bhupati Charan Basu v. Chandi Charan Basu Mallik

Calcutta High Court
Nov 23, 1934
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Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by Mitter, J. (with Patterson, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an order of the District Judge of Hooghly refusing letters of administration in respect of the estate of Bhuban Mohan Roy who died on 23 November 1930. The proponent (the appellant before this Court) produced a Will said to have been executed by Bhuban Mohan some years before his death. Bhuban left a widow, Srimati Krishna Bhabini Dasi, but no issue. The widow died on 20 February 1931.

The widow had two sisters: Karuna Moyee Dasi and Ayhore Moni Dasi. The respondent, Chandi Charan Basu Mallik, is a son by the first sister; the applicant for the letters of administration and the appellant on this appeal, Bhupati (referred to as Bhupati Charan Basu in the will), is a son by the other sister.

On 21 April 1931 Bhupati applied for letters of administration with the will annexed. An objection was taken that no estate of Bhuban remained to be administered and, on construing the will, the District Judge held that the applicant had no interest in the estate and that the gift over to him (in the will) was inoperative and of no effect. The District Judge therefore dismissed the application for letters of administration. The present appeal challenges that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the probate Court (the Court dealing with the application for letters of administration) was competent to deal with the construction of the will for the purpose of determining entitlement to letters of administration.
  2. Whether, on a proper construction of the will, the appellant (Bhupati) has locus standi (i.e., a sufficient interest) to maintain the application for letters of administration with the will annexed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Proponent's) Arguments

  • Dr. Mukherji, for the appellant, relied on a decision reported as 1933 Cal. 5711 (a judgment delivered by S. K. Ghose, J.) which contains language that the probate Court is entitled to read the will to see whether petitioners could come in as residuary legatees or their representatives. The appellant relied on that passage to contend the probate Court could construe the will to determine his entitlement.

Objector's / Respondent's Arguments

  • The objector contended that the application was not maintainable because, as a matter of construction of the will, the testator gave an absolute estate to the widow so that no estate remained to be administered after her death; consequently, the gift over to the appellant was repugnant and inoperative.
  • Dr. Sen Gupta, for the respondent, pointed to an alternative passage in Tristram and Coote's Probate Practice (p. 432) which states that, although construction and interpretation are normally left to the Chancery Division, the Probate Division may and should construe a will to the extent necessary where entitlement to probate or administration depends on construction. This was relied on to frame the proper scope of probate Court examination.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
1933 Cal. 5711 (S. K. Ghose, J.) Contains the statement that the probate Court was entitled to read the will to see whether in the circumstances petitioners could come in as residuary legatees or their representatives; reference to Ss. 232 and 233 of the Succession Act was made. The Court examined that judgment and accepted its correctness in the narrower sense that the probate Court may read a will to determine whether an applicant is a residuary or universal legatee; but noted some passages in that judgment may have been stated somewhat broadly.
Tristram & Coote's Probate Practice, Edn. 7, p. 5 (treatise) States the function of the Probate Division is to determine what documents are testamentary and who is entitled to be constituted the personal representative of the deceased. The Court quoted this passage but regarded it as a broad statement; it considered a further, more nuanced passage (p. 432) from the same work to be the truer exposition of the Probate Division's powers to construe a will to the limited extent necessary.
Tristram & Coote's Probate Practice, Edn. 7, p. 432 (treatise) States that after probate the construction of contents is generally for the Chancery Division, but where entitlement to probate or administration depends on construction the Probate Division may and should construe the will to that extent. The Court relied on this passage (and two cases cited in it — Frogley and Lundon) to support the proposition that the probate Court may construe a will to decide whether an applicant is a residuary or universal legatee entitled to letters of administration with a copy of the will annexed.
Frogley (1905) Illustrated instances in which the probate Court had to construe a will to determine whether the applicant was the residuary legatee named in the will. The Court examined the case and treated it as authority for the proposition that the probate Court may enter into construction to determine residuary legatee status when an application for administration with the will annexed is made by the purported residuary legatee.
Lundon (1905) Similar to Frogley: example of the probate Court construing a will in order to decide entitlement to letters of administration with the will annexed. The Court examined the case and relied on it, together with Frogley, to show the probate Court may decide whether the applicant is the residuary legatee under the will.
30 All. 842 (leading case cited) Referred to as a leading decision relied on in later Privy Council cases about construction of wills (specific rule from that case is not elaborated in the opinion). The Court observed that the facts and provisions of wills in those cases differed from the present will and cautioned against relying unduly on the provisions of different wills when construing the will before the Court.
(1922) 2 Ch. D. 7783 (Lord Sargent) States the general rule that one will will not be construed by reference to another, though reasoning in similar cases may assist. The Court cited Lord Sargent's statement to support the view that while similar cases may offer assistance, each will must be construed on its own language and context; the Court applied this caution in construing the present will.
23 Cal. 5634 Expresses the view that construing a will by reference to expressions in other wills is generally unprofitable and out of fashion. The Court cited this passage to reinforce the point that comparison with other wills is of limited value and that the present will must be interpreted on its own terms.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed the procedural question whether the probate Court could enter into construction of the will for the purpose of deciding whether an applicant is entitled to letters of administration with the will annexed. The Court reviewed authorities relied upon by both sides: the Calcutta decision (1933 Cal. 5711) relied on by the appellant, and passages from Tristram & Coote relied on by the respondent.

The Court reconciled the authorities by stating the correct limited rule: under the Indian Succession Act, and having regard to Ss. 232 and 234, it is open to the probate Court to construe a will to the extent necessary to determine whether the applicant is a universal or residuary legatee and thus entitled to apply for letters of administration with a copy of the will annexed. The Court accepted that some prior observations might have been expressed too broadly (for example, that the probate Court "cannot go into" the validity of a gift over), and emphasized the narrower proposition that the probate Court may determine whether an applicant is a residuary legatee by construing the will.

Having concluded the probate Court had jurisdiction to consider construction for that limited purpose, the Court proceeded to the construction of the will itself. The operative clause of the will (printed in the record) provides that after the testator's death his wife Krishna Bhabini shall "hold and enjoy" all properties left by him and "become entitled to make gift and sale" and that no objection shall be entertained. A subsequent clause declared that whatever properties remained after the death of the wife would vest in the testator's "future heir" (specifically naming the appellant Bhupati) as the sole heir. An alternate contingent gift (if Bhupati died before the widow) named another person (Tara Prosanna Roy).

The Court examined the Bengali original and the translation, concluded the gift to the wife was an absolute gift (the testator intended to confer on her an absolute estate by expressly empowering her to make gifts and sales), and found that the testator therefore recognized she had the power to dispose of the property entirely. Because the subsequent clause attempted to operate as a gift over of any property left after the wife's death, the Court held that, insofar as the will's later clauses attempted to affect property that the testator had already given absolutely to the widow, those clauses were repugnant to the earlier absolute gift and could not operate to create an effective interest in the appellant.

The Court also observed that clauses 2 and 3 of the will (the later provisions) were contrary to Hindu law and therefore could not be given effect to in any case. The Court cautioned against construing the present will by reference to other wills, noting that precedents dealing with different wills are of limited assistance; it invoked Lord Sargent's statement that one will will not be construed by reference to another, though reasoning from similar cases might be instructive.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed. The Court held that (1) the probate Court may construe a will to the limited extent necessary to determine whether an applicant for letters of administration is a universal or residuary legatee entitled to apply with the will annexed; and (2) on a proper construction of the will in this case the appellant (Bhupati) has no locus standi because the testator gave an absolute estate to his widow and the gift over to the appellant is inoperative.

Direct consequences on the parties: The application for letters of administration by Bhupati was rightly refused by the District Judge and that refusal is upheld. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs; the hearing fee was assessed at two gold mohurs.

The opinion does not announce any general new precedent beyond applying established principles; it emphasizes the limited scope in which a probate Court may construe a will for the purpose of deciding entitlement to letters of administration and applies that principle to the construction of the particular will before the Court.

Disposition

Appeal dismissed. (Patterson, J. concurred.)

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Mitter, J.:— Two questions arise in this appeal from the decision of the District Judge of Hooghly refusing letters of administration to the estate of one Bhuban Mohan Roy who died on 23rd November 1930. The proponent, who is now the appellant before us, set up a Will said to have been executed by Bhuban Mohan several years before his death. Bhuban died leaving behind him a widow, Krishna Bhabini Dassi, but no issue. The widow died shortly after on 20th February 1931. The widow had two sisters, Karuna Moyee Dasi and Ayhore Moni Dasi. Chandi Charan Basu Mallik, who is the respondent before us, is a son by the first sister, and Bhupati Dharan Bose, who is the applicant for petters of administration, is the son by the last named sister. According to the Drdinary law of inheritance the applicant as well as the objector would be entitled to a share in the properties of Bhuban after the death of the widow in case of his dying intestate. When the application for letters of administration with the will annexed was made by Bhupati on 21st April 1931 a preliminary objection was taken by the objector that the present application was not maintainable as no estate of Bhuban remains to be administered and this objection seems to have prevailed with the learned District Judge who has held, on the construction of the will, that the applicant for the letters of administration has no interest in Bhuban's estate and that the gift over to him was inoperative and had no effect. The learned Judge, as has already been said, dismissed the application for letters of administration. It is against this decision that the present appeal has been brought and the two questions indicated in the beginning of our judgment which have been debated before us are: (1) that the probate Court was not competent to deal with the construction of the will and secondly that on the construction of the will the appellant Bhupati has no locus standi to maintain the application. With'regard to the first question reliance has been placed by Dr. Mukherji who appears for the appellant to a decision of this Court in 1933 Cal. 5711. The passage on which reliance has been placed occurs in the judgment of S.K Ghose, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court and which runs as follows:

“As regards the question of locus standi the learned Judge no doubt refers to Sections 232 and 233 of the Succession Act. He was entitled to read the will in order to see whether in the circumstances the petitioners could come in as residuary legatees of their representatives.”

2. And then the learned Judge quoted a passage from Tristam and Coot's Probate Proctice, Edn. 7, p. 5 which is to the following effect:

“The function of the Probate Division is to determine what documents are testamentary and who is entitled to be constituted the personal representative of the deceased.”

3. The true rule, however, appears from another passage in Tristam and Coot's Probate Practice to which our attention has been drawn by Dr. Sen Gupta who appears for the respondent. What passage occurs at p. 432 of the same edition. The passage is as follows:

“After the Court has admitted a document to probate the construction and interpretation of its contents are left to the Chancery Division. But where the question who is entitled to a giant of probate or of administration (with will) depends on the construction of a Will the Probate Division may and should construe it to that extent.”

4. In support of this statement the learned author Btates two cases, Frogley (1905), p. 137 and Lundon (1905), p. 32. We have examined the two cases and it appears to us that for the purpose of determining as to whether a person applying for letters of administration is entitled to such administration it is open to the probate Court to determine as to whether the applicant is a residuary legatee under the will on a construction of the will. Both the applications in the two cases cited were made for the grant of letters of administration with a copy of the will annexed by the person named in the will as the residuary legatee. Notwithstanding that, the Court had to enter into the question of construction of will to see whether the applicant was the residuary legatee under the will and entitled as such, according to the practice, to apply for the grant of letters of administration with a copy of the will annexed. Under the Indian Succession Act having regard to the provisions of Ss. 232 and 234 it would appear that before letters of administration can be granted the probate Court should see as to whether the applicant is a universal or a residuary legatee so as to be entitled to apply for the letters of administration with a copy of the will annexed. Some of the observations in the case cited might have stated the law somewhat broadly. As for instance it is said,

“the probate Court cannot go into the question whether a gift over in the Will is valid or not.”

5. As we understand the judgment of the learned Judge if on the face of the will it appears that the applicant for the letters of administration is either a residuary legatee or a universal legatee it is not open to the Court to decide as to whether such provisions are valid or not. In the earlier part of the judgment the learned Judges however stated this, as we have already said, that the Court is entitled to read the will in order to see whether the applicant is a residuary legatee or his representative. That seems to be the correct statement of the law. In a subsequent passage to which reference has been made the law seems to have been somewhat broadly formulated (p. 5, Tristam and Coot's Probate Practice). We have examined the cases cited in p. 432 and we are of opinion that it is open to a probate Court to consider on the construction of the will as to whether the applicant for the probate is entitled to letters of administration being the residuary legatee or universal legatee. The next question is the question of the construction of the will. The will has been printed in the appendix at the end of the paper book and the material portion of the will runs as follows:

“After my death my wife Srimati Krishna Bhabini Dasi, on becoming the sole heir to all the properties moveable or immovable and of all monies whether cash or, due from the money-lending business to be left by me, shall hold and enjoy the same and become entitled to make gift and sale, and to that no objection on the part of any one shall be entertained. Whatever properties shall be left after the death of my wife Srimati Krsihna Bhabini Dasi, shall vest in our future heir my sister's son Sriman Bhupati Charan Basu who will be the sole heir to the said properties. I absolutely disinherit the other sister's son of mine, Sriman Chandi Charan Basu, who is of very bad character and addicted to excessive drinking and who has treated us badly.”

6. Then there is a provision as what is to happen if Bhupati dies before the death of Krishna Bhabini:

“In that case Sriman Tara Prosanna Roy, the great-grandson of the elder brother of my father, will get the estate which will be left by Krishna Bhabini.”

7. It is contended for the objector that this contention has prevailed with the District Judge that in the first paragraph of the will the gift to the wife is an absolute gift and therefore the subsequent clause, if it refers to the testator's estate, must be held to be inoperative seeing that it is repugnant to the absolute gift in favour of the wife in the first paragraph. We have no doubt read the original will in Bengali as also the translation which appears to us to have been accurately made and it appears to us that the gift to the wife was an absolute gift. The Bengali words are:

“Samasta aurther uttra adhikarinee haiya bhogsamaya abang dan bickroyaer malick haiben tahate kahars upotty chalibena.”

8. It was distinctly stipulated that she was to hold and enjoy the same i.e the properties left by the testator and become entitled to make gift and sale and to that no objection on the part of any one shall be entertained. A Hindu widow under the Hindu law has no power to make a gift or sale except for the purposes of what is understood as legal necessity. By giving this power to her the testator was intending to confer on her an absolute estate. That seems to be the dominant intention in the will and in the subsequent cause the testator is careful enough to state,

“that whatever properties shall be left after the death of my wife Sm. Krishna Bhabini shall vest in our future heir my sister's son Sriman. Bhupati Charan Basu who will be the sole heir to the said properties.”

9. The Bengali words are: “Aumar patny Srimati Krishna Bhamini Daseer lokantte je kono sampathy thakicey Aumader bhabee oyarish aumar bhaginiya Sreeman Bhupati Charan Bysu of sampattier eake matra uttra adhikari haibey,” intending thereby that if Krishna Bhabini did not dispose of all the properties bequeathed to her by the testator in that case those properties shall vest in Bhupati. The testator had clearly in view the legal position which he had indicated in the first paragraph that he was giving absolute estate to the wife. Of course Cls. 2 and 3 are contrary to Hindu law and therefore cannot be given effect to. Several cases have been cited before us, many of them being the decisions of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. As for instance, the leading case of 30 All. 842 and the subsequent cases in which their Lordships approved of the said decision. But the provisions of those wills were different and of while occasionally reference may be made to construe one will with reference to the provisions of another will it is always dangerous to rely on the provisions of a different will for the purpose; of construing the will which is in controversy before the Court. The proper rule in cases of this kind is laid down by Lord Sargent in (1922) 2 Ch. D 7783:

“One Will will not be contrued with referenee to another, but that does not mean that one is debarred from seeking assistance from the reasoning which the Courts have employed in construing bequests of a similar character.”

10. In 23 Cal. 5634, it is laid down that,

“to contrue one Will by reference to expressions of more or less doubtful import to be found in other Wills is for the most part an unprofitable; exercise. Happily that method of interpretation has done out of fashion in this country.”

11. We are therefore of opinion that the learned District Judge has arrived at the right conclusion on the question of the will and having regard to this view it appears to us that the plaintiff-appellant has got no locus standi to maintain the application for Letters of Administration which has rightly been refused. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with cests, hearing fee being assessed at two gold mohurs.

Patterson, J.:— I agree.

K.S

12. Appeal dismissed.