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Gossain Ramdhan Puri v. Gossain Dalmir Puri
Factual and Procedural Background
This litigation arises out of the estate of Manraj Puri, a dasnami Gossain of the Budhauli monastery (died 16 June 1897), who left considerable movable and immovable property. Upon his death the head of the Budhauli monastery, Dalmir Puri (the Defendant/Respondent), took possession of the estate. Two alleged chelas, Hetlal Puri and Ramdhan Puri (the first Plaintiff / first Appellant), each asserted rights of succession as disciples entitled by law and custom. Early contestation included a criminal proceeding under section 107 Cr.P.C. and applications for letters of administration and for a succession certificate. Hetlal's initial claim for administration was refused, then set aside on appeal and retried; ultimately Hetlal's application was refused after trial. Dalmir was appointed administrator during pendency and later obtained a succession certificate.
On 29 February 1904, Ramdhan executed two conveyances purporting to transfer one-fourth shares of his alleged interest in Manraj's estate to Madhusudan Singh (second Plaintiff) and Doman Singh (third Plaintiff) respectively (each for a stated consideration of Rs. 45,000, Rs.2,000 paid in cash, Rs.43,000 retained to fund litigation). On 5 March 1904 the three Plaintiffs sued for declaration of title and recovery of possession, alleging entitlement by inheritance; Dalmir resisted on multiple grounds including alleged invalidity of transfers (benami / champerty / lack of consideration), limitation as to certain property, lack of proper initiation ceremonies (Biraja Home) for Ramdhan, and that under custom the estate passed to the monastery (doctrine of lapse).
After a lengthy trial the Subordinate Judge, on 17 April 1906, dismissed the suit. He held (inter alia) that:
- the second Plaintiff was proved to be beneficially interested under his conveyance;
- the third Plaintiff was a benamdar for Mohunt Toke Narain and not entitled to maintain the action for that transferred share;
- claims as to non-immoveable property and debts were time-barred;
- as regards the first Plaintiff, he was taken as a chela but the essential ceremonies (Biraja Home) to constitute a valid chela and entitle him to inherit had not been performed;
- the judge did not reach a definite conclusion on the defendant's custom-of-lapse plea for the monastery.
The Plaintiffs appealed. During the appeal the first Plaintiff applied to have the appeal dismissed as to his share (alleging he had discovered the doctrine of lapse and that his claim was unfounded). The other Plaintiffs opposed that application. The Division Bench directed that the application be considered at the hearing.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, despite the first Plaintiff's withdrawal (petition for dismissal), the second and third Plaintiffs can continue the appeal in respect of their purchased shares — i.e., the proper construction and effect of the two conveyances of 29 February 1904.
- Whether the second and third Plaintiffs' transactions are champertous/contrary to public policy and, if so, whether their suit must be dismissed.
- Whether the third Plaintiff is the beneficial transferee under the conveyance or merely the benamdar (nominal holder) of Mohunt Toke Narain of Mandra.
- Whether the first Plaintiff, Ramdhan, was a valid chela of Manraj entitled to succeed by inheritance — specifically (a) whether he was taken as a chela; (b) whether the Biraja Home final initiation ceremony was performed; and (c) whether such ceremony is essential to succession.
- Whether the custom of lapse (estate of a deceased sanyasi passing to the monastery rather than to any chela) was proved to apply to the Budhauli monastery.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments
- The first Plaintiff (Ramdhan) argued that the conveyances of 29 February 1904 gave him exclusive authority to enter into a compromise with the Defendant and thereby bind the transferees; consequently his application to dismiss his part of the appeal should dispose of the entire appeal.
- On the merits, the Appellants contended that the Subordinate Judge erred in rejecting the claim to immoveable property: Ramdhan was, they asserted, the chela of Manraj; his initiation was complete; Biraja Home had been performed; and consequently he was entitled to succeed by inheritance.
- The Appellants also argued that the third Plaintiff was beneficially interested under his conveyance and not merely a benamdar.
- The Appellants accepted the Subordinate Judge's limitation finding for non-immoveable property other than debts.
Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments
- The Defendant contested the validity of the transfers: argued the second Plaintiff was benamdar for heirs of Loke Nath Singh and the third Plaintiff benamdar for Toke Narain Puri; alleged transfers were without consideration, champertous and for the purpose of litigation and spoil.
- He argued that, on the merits, the first Plaintiff was only a nominal chela, the essential initiation ceremonies had not been performed, and even if there was a chela the custom and usage was that the estate passed to the monastery (doctrine of lapse).
- On the Appellants' application to dismiss as to the first Plaintiff, the Respondent contended that the second and third Plaintiffs are champertors who should not be allowed to continue once the transferor has withdrawn, and that the transferees derived no title because the transferor had no valid title (no proper initiation/Biraja Home).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Lal Achal Ram v. Kazim Husain Khan | Protecting transferees who acquire an immediate interest in the subject-matter: a transferee may continue suit even if the transferor withdraws; a transferee with present title can sue. | Cited to uphold that the conveyances prevented the transferor from compromising to defeat the transferees; held that the petition by the first Plaintiff only dismissed his part of the appeal and did not affect the transferees' rights to continue the appeal. |
| Fischer v. Kamala Naicher | Definition of champerty/maintenance to be objectionable only where it has the qualities attributed by English law—i.e., against good policy, tending to promote unnecessary litigation, immoral, requiring bad motive. | Used as authority for the test to determine whether the transactions creating the purchasers' interests were champertous; the Court must look to substance not mere language. |
| Chedambara Chetty v. Renga Krishna | Test whether acquisition of an interest in litigation is bona fide or an unfair/illegitimate transaction got up for spoil or litigation. | Applied to assess whether the conveyances were bona fide acquisitions in the subject of litigation or illegitimate speculation; supported the approach of examining substance. |
| Ram Coomar Koondu v. Chunder Kant Mookerjee | Contracts to fund litigation in return for a share may be invalid as against public policy if extortionate or unconscionable; but fair agreements to fund suits are not per se opposed to public policy. | Relied on to acknowledge that funding agreements may be valid unless extortionate; guided the Court in weighing fairness of consideration and terms of the conveyances. |
| Kunwar Ram Lal v. Nilkanth | Example where an agreement was found extortionate; remedy given not for specific performance but for compensation for legitimate expenses when terms were unconscionable. | Used to illustrate how unconscionable bargains have been dealt with: possible relief limited to expenses rather than enforcement of harsh terms. |
| Rajah Mokham Singh v. Rajah Rup Singh | Similar principle: where consideration was considerably less than true value, transferee entitled only to reimbursement of advances, not excessive reward. | Cited to show precedents where courts limited relief when transfers were inequitable between assignor and assignee (distinguishing public policy invalidation from internal contractual fairness disputes). |
| Bhagwat Dayal v. Debi Dayal | Transaction where large part of price payable upon success was upheld by Judicial Committee; not contrary to public policy despite small down payment. | Applied to support upholding the purchasers' title despite small initial cash payment and contingent balance; reinforced that such attacks go to rights between assignor and assignee unless transaction is absolutely void. |
| Rangachariar v. Yegna Dikshatur | Importance of sradh / the ceremonial indicia of civil death as evidence of final renunciation; indicates ceremonies indicative of complete initiation. | Cited in assessing whether the omission of certain essential ceremonies (e.g., pinda, burning tuft) was inconsistent with the Biraja Home having been performed, and relevant to status of probationer vs full chela. |
| Mahanth Ramji Dass v. Lachhu Dass | Authority rejecting that Biraja Home ceremony could have been performed for one below age of discretion. | Used to support the conclusion that it was unlikely the Biraja Home was performed for the plaintiff who was about eleven, and to evaluate customary age practices. |
| Madho Das v. Kamta Das | Ordinary rule among sanyasis: a chela has no automatic right to succeed; succession depends on nomination by the deceased or election/installation by mohunts at funeral. | Relied upon to show that, even apart from Biraja Home, succession among sanyasis commonly requires nomination or formal recognition; supported the conclusion that the plaintiff was not entitled to inherit. |
| Juggunnath Paul v. Bidianund Dutt and Chhajju Gir v. Diwan | Cases supporting the rule that succession by nomination or election is the norm among sanyasis. | Referred to as consistent authorities for the principle on succession among sanyasis and the need for nomination/installation. |
| Ganes Gir v. Omrao Gir | Note (by Colebrooke) indicating that the rule of succession by nomination/election is not universally applied in all muths. | Used to qualify the general rule: courts must consider particular customs of a muth; succession may vary by local custom. |
| Pray ad Das v. Mohunth Kriparam | On the relation between superior and subordinate muths: no fixed rule; a subordinate muth is governed by its own rules of management. | Applied to caution against assuming uniform customs between parent and branch monasteries; relevant to assessing the alleged custom of lapse at Budhauli. |
| Kashibashi v. Chitumbernath and Giyana Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi v. Kandasami Tambiran | Earlier decisions on relation of muths and on succession customs; used as authorities on variability of rules among monasteries. | Referred to in evaluating whether the custom of lapse at Budhauli could be inferred from practices in other muths. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through the issues sequentially and applied legal principles and the evidential record strictly as presented in the trial record and authorities cited:
- Construction of the conveyances (29 Feb 1904): The Court examined the express terms of the deeds. The conveyances expressly prohibited the transferor (Ramdhan) from confessing judgment, entering into a compromise with the Defendant, or abandoning the claim; they provided that, if he did, the transferees could prosecute the suits and recover damages. On this basis and following the principle in Lal Achal Ram v. Kazim Husain Khan, the Court held the conveyances created present interests enabling the transferees to continue the litigation. Consequently the first Plaintiff's petition to dismiss affects only his share; it does not defeat the transferees' rights to pursue recovery of their one-half interest as represented by their two quarter shares.
- Champerty / public policy analysis: The Court reviewed the long line of authorities (Fischer; Chedambara Chetty; Ram Coomar Koondu; Kunwar Ram Lal; Rajah Mokham Singh; Lal Achal Ram; Bhagwat Dayal) and distilled the governing test: an agreement to fund litigation is not automatically objectionable; the key is whether it is bona fide and not an unfair, speculative or unconscionable transaction designed to promote unnecessary litigation or to extort. The Court then evaluated the factual incidents of the conveyances — the total estate value, the stated consideration (Rs.45,000 for a one-fourth share where a one-fourth share is worth about Rs.50,000), the small cash payment, and the contingency clauses about litigation expenses and reward. The Court concluded the bargains were speculative but not so extortionate or unconscionable as to be void as against public policy. It noted that any challenge to the fairness of particular covenants (for example, the mechanism for allocating litigation expenses and surplus) would arise between assignor and assignee; but as the assignor had throughout affirmed the transfers (including in his application to dismiss his appeal), the conveyances vested title good enough for the transferees to sue.
- Beneficial interest / benami issue as to the third Plaintiff: The Court considered the evidence (discussed in fuller detail in the record) and found the defendant's benami allegation not established; the evidence fell short of what was required to prove benami status, so the Court held the transferee must be treated as beneficially interested.
-
Status of the first Plaintiff as chela and performance of Biraja Home:
- Whether taken as chela: The parties agreed the initial shaving/first initiation ceremony occurred. The Court accepted that Ramdhan had been taken as a probationer chela in 1892.
- Whether Biraja Home (final initiation) was performed: Weighing the plaintiff's testimony against a "large mass of evidence" for the defendant (including Dalmir and six other witnesses), the Court found the plaintiff's account unreliable. Key factors: plaintiff omitted to mention performance of essential rites (pinda, burning tuft, eating burnt betel-nut), conflicting witness lists, absence of the spiritual head/acharya-guru who should have officiated, lack of invitation or permission from Dalmir, and improbability given plaintiff's age (~11) and the seasonal timing asserted. The Court therefore concluded the Biraja Home had not been performed.
- Necessity of Biraja Home for succession: The Court examined customary practice and authorities (including Mr. Warden's note, works cited, and a substantial body of witness evidence) and concluded that Biraja Home is the rite that converts a probationer into a complete chela and signals irrevocable renunciation — and that, for the sect in question, the Biraja Home is essential to entitle a chela to inherit the estate of his guru. The Court reinforced this conclusion by reference to prior judicial decisions distinguishing probation from final initiation (e.g., Rangachariar and others).
- Doctrine of lapse / custom of monastery: The Court analyzed the defendant's evidence attempting to establish a custom by which estates of deceased sanyasis pass to the monastery. It held that the Budhauli monastery's custom could not be conclusively shown to be one of lapse: (a) the monastery was a relatively recent offshoot and claimed independence; (b) many instances cited to establish lapse did not clearly demonstrate that a qualified chela (one whose Biraja Home had been performed) existed and was bypassed; (c) some illustrative instances were ambiguous because the deceased had lived outside the muth or the chela's own initiation was doubtful. On balance, the Court found the evidence of well-authenticated, long-standing lapse despite presence of qualified chelas to be too few and recent to establish a binding custom of lapse for Budhauli.
Holding and Implications
Final Disposition:
APPEAL DISMISSED. Concretely:
- The appeal of the first Plaintiff (Ramdhan) is dismissed without costs — his petition to withdraw and have his share dismissed is effective as to his share only.
- The appeal of the other Plaintiffs (the second and third Plaintiffs / transferees) is dismissed with costs — the decree of the Subordinate Judge is affirmed as substantially right on the merits.
Implications and immediate effects:
- The conveyances executed by Ramdhan on 29 February 1904 were held to create present interests and, being not absolutely void for champerty, vested sufficient title in the transferees to enable them to sue; accordingly the first Plaintiff's withdrawal did not extinguish the transferees' capacity to pursue their acquired rights.
- The first Plaintiff was held not to have been a valid chela entitled to inherit because the Biraja Home ceremony had not been proved and that ceremony is essential (in the sect involved) for succession to a guru's estate.
- The Court did not find the custom of lapse (estate passing to the monastery despite presence of qualified chelas) satisfactorily established for Budhauli; however, that finding was peripheral to the main disposition because the first Plaintiff's lack of valid initiation was decisive against his inheritance claim.
- No relief altering the Subordinate Judge's substantive dismissal of the suit was granted; the trial court's decree was affirmed.
The opinion applies established authority on champerty, conveyances and succession customs among sanyasis; it affirms the trial court's factual findings after weighing testimonial conflicts and customary evidence. The judgment enforces the contractual protections for transferees and emphasizes that, for the sect in question, the Biraja Home is the key rite conferring the right of inheritance.
The subject-matter of the litigation which has given rise to this appeal is the estate of Manraj Puri, a dasnami Gossain of the monastery of Budhauli in the District of Gya, who died on the 16th June 1897, possessed of considerable moveable and immoveable properties. Immediately upon his death, disputes broke out as to the right of succession to these. The Defendant, who is the head of the monastery at Budhauli, took possession of all the properties left by Manraj, while one Hetlal Puri, as well as the Plaintiff, Ramdhan Puri, set up a claim to the properties as chelas entitled to succeed by law and custom. The first stage of the struggle for possession of the properties was represented by a criminal case under sec. 107, Cr. P.C, which was instituted by a petition presented on the 16th July 1897. On the 2nd August 1897, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate delivered judgment with the result that he discharged the Respondent, Dalmir Puri, and made the rule absolute against Hetlal Puri directing him to execute a bond and to find sureties to keep the peace for one year. On the 19th August 1897, Hetlal Puri presented an application for letters of administration to the estate of Manraj Puri. At one stage of the proceedings thus initiated, one Mandar Lal was appointed administrator pendente lite, but subsequently on the 13th September 1897, Dalmir himself was appointed administrator during the pendency of the proceedings. On the 21st September 1897, the application of Hetlal for letters of administration was refused. Hetlal then appealed to this Court, and on the 5th January 1900 the order of the District Judge was set aside, and the case was remitted to him for retrial. On the 30th April 1900, the District Judge, after a careful examination of the evidence in the case, came to the conclusion that Hetlal was not the validly appointed chela of Manraj and refused the application. As Dalmir had himself put in an application for a certificate under the Succession Certificate Act, the District Judge observed that there was no difficulty as to the collection of the outstanding debts. Meanwhile Ramdhan, the present Appellant, applied to intervene in the proceedings for letters of administration. The District Judge held that he had no locus standi in the matter and refused his application. Hetlal subsequently appealed to this Court against the order of dismissal of his application for letters of administration by the District Judge, and Ramdhan also applied to this Court to set aside the order of the refusal of the District Judge to make him a party to the proceedings. A Division Bench of this Court, on the 20th July 1900, dismissed the appeal of Hetlal on the ground that he had failed to establish that he had been validly taken as a chela by Manraj and that what was described as the Biraja Home had been performed in his case. The application of Ramdhan was at the same time dismissed on the ground that, as the appeal of Hetlal had failed on the merits, there was no pending proceedings to which Ramdhan might claim to be made a party. Subsequently, on the 19th May 1900, the District Judge made an order for the issue of a succession certificate to the present Respondent, Dalmir Puri, inspite of the objection of Ramdhan, who claimed to be entitled to the certificate as the chela of Manraj. Ramdhan then made an infructuous attempt to have this order reviewed, his application for the re-opening of the proceedings being dismissed by the District Judge on the 22nd February 1901. The claims of Hetlal and Ramdhan in the usual preliminary proceedings under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Probate Act and the Succession Certificate Act, having thus proved ineffectual Dalmir continued to be in possession of the entire estate of Manraj which he had seized immediately upon the death of the latter. On the 29th February 1904, Ramdhan executed two deeds one in favour of Madhusudan Singh, the second Plaintiff in this suit and another in favour of Doman Singh, the third Plaintiff. Under each of these two deeds, the terms of which we shall examine later, Ramdhan purported to convey to the transferee a one-fourth share of what he alleged to be his interest in the estate of Manraj. The consideration for each conveyance was Rs. 45,000, out of which the sum of Rs. 2,000 was paid in cash to the transferor and the balance of Rs. 43,000 was retained by the transferee to enable him to carry on litigation for the recovery of the estate of Manraj out of the hands of Dalmir. The effect of those two conveyances was that the Plaintiff retained one-half of his alleged right by inheritance in the estate of Manraj and the remaining half was vested equally in the two transferees. On the 5th March 1904, the three Plaintiffs commenced the litigation out of which the present appeal arises for declaration of their title to the estate of Manraj and for recovery of possession of the properties, moveable and immoveable, together with mesne profits. The Defendant resisted the claim on the following amongst other grounds, which need not be referred to. He questioned the validity of the transfers to the second and third Plaintiffs on the ground that the second Plaintiff was the benamdar of the heirs of one Loke Nath Singh and the third Plaintiff the benamdar of one Toke Narain Puri, the Mohunt of the monastery at Mandra. He further contended that the transfers were without consideration and were in the nature of champerty and made for the purpose of spoil and litigation. He also alleged that, in so far as the claim related to properties other than immoveable, it was barred by limitation. On the merits he asserted that the first Paintiff, Ramdhan, was merely a nominal chela of Manraj, that the essential ceremonies necessary to constitute a sanyasi and entitle a chela to claim by inheritance the property of his guru, had never been performed, and that, in any event, according to well-established custom and usage, upon the death of Manraj, the properties left by him had passed not to any possible chela of his, but to the monastery at Budhauli of which Manraj was a subordinate gossain and the Defendant, Dalmir, was the spiritual head. Upon these pleadings the Subordinate Judge framed nineteen issues which exhaustively raised every possible question in controversy between the parties, After a prolonged trial, which extended over fifty-four days, and upon an examination of the voluminous evidence in the case, the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the 17th April 1906. He held, so far as the second Plaintiff was concerned, that he had been proved to be the person beneficially interested under the conveyance from the first Plaintiff. He further held as regards the third Plaintiff that he was the benamdar for Mohunt Toke Narain of Mandra and was consequently not entitled to maintain the action in respect of the one fourth share transferred by the conveyance executed nominally for his benefit. As regards the properties other than immoveable and other than the debts collected by Dalmir, he held that the claim was barred by limitation. As regards the first Plaintiff he held that he had been taken as a chela by Manraj, but that he was not entitled to succeed to his estate by inheritance under the law and custom applicable inasmuch as the ceremonies essential to make one a valid chela of a sanyasi had not been performed in his case. As regards the custom set up by the Defendant, that upon the death of a Gossain his estate is not taken by his chela but passes to the monastery, the Subordinate Judge did not come to any definite conclusion. The Plaintiffs appealed to this Court on the 2nd July 1906. During the pendency of the appeal on the 2nd December 1906, the first Plaintiff made an application to this Court, in which he alleged that the second and third Plaintiffs had not properly managed the litigation, that he himself had upon subsequent enquiry into the custom and usage of the monastery ascertained that the doctrine of lapse alleged by the Defendant was true, and that consequently he had come to the conclusion that his claim was unfounded and ought not to be further pressed. He prayed accordingly that the appeal might be dismissed and the judgment of the Court below affirmed. This application was resisted by the other Plaintiffs, who denied the allegation that they had not diligently prosecuted the litigation and contended that the first Plaintiff had no right by a fraudulent compromise with the Defendant to prejudice the rights they had acquired for valuable consideration under the conveyances executed in their favour. The Division Bench to which this application was presented directed that it should be considered at the time of the hearing of the appeal, and this has accordingly been done.
On behalf of the first Plaintiff, who is the first Appellant, it has been argued that the entire appeal ought to be dismissed upon a true construction of the conveyances of the 29th February 1904, which, it has been urged, gives the first Plaintiff exclusive authority to enter into a compromise with the Defendant so as to bind thereby the other Plaintiffs. This position has been controverted by the other Plaintiffs, on whose behalf it has been argued that the appeal may be dismissed in respect to the half share of the estate claimed by Ramdhan, but that it must be heard and determined on the merits so far as the other half share is concerned. On the merits of the appeal it has not been disputed that the decision of the Subordinate Judge upon the question of limitation with regard to properties other than immoveable properties and other than the debts realised by Dalmir is well-founded. But as regards the immoveable properties it has been urged that his decision is erroneous upon the question of the title of the first Plaintiff to succeed by inheritance. The learned Counsel for the Appellant has in fact contended that upon the evidence of custom it is plainly established that the first Plaintiff was the chela of Manraj, that, whether his initiation was perfected by the performance of Biraja Home or not, he was entitled to take by inheritance the estate of his guru, that as a matter of fact he was not merely the nominal chela of Manraj but was his fully initiated disciple and that all the essential ceremonies had been performed, both at the initial and in the final stages. The learned Counsel has further contended that the custom of lapse set up by the Defendant has not been proved by the evidence. He has further argued that the third Plaintiff is beneficially interested under the conveyance executed in his favour on the 29th February 1904, and is not the benamdar of the. Mohunt of Mandra. In answer to this argument it has been contended on behalf of the Respondent that the third Plaintiff is the benamdar of Toke Narain, that the second and the third Plaintiffs are both champertors who ought not to be allowed to prosecute this litigation after the first Plaintiff has retired therefrom, that they have derived no title under their conveyances as he had none to convey because in his case there was no proper initiation ceremony, and, that in any event his initiation into the order was not perfected by the performance of Biraja Home, which is essential to constitute the relationship of guru and chela and to entitle the latter to take by inheritance the estate of the former. It has also been suggested that the evidence is sufficient to establish the custom of lapse as alleged by the Defendant in his written statement. These points were argued before us at considerable length, and since the close of the arguments we have minutely examined the whole of the evidence on the record. We shall now state our conclusion upon the various questions raised in the appeal.
The first question which calls for decision is whether, inspite of the withdrawal of the first Plaintiff from this appeal, it is competent to the other Plaintiffs-Appellants to proceed thereunder in respect of their shares in the disputed properties. The answer to this question must depend upon the true construction of the two conveyances executed by Ramdhan in favour of Madhusudan and Daman on the 29th February 1904. It was suggested on behalf of the first Plaintiff that under these conveyances he was entitled to effect the compromise so as to prejudice the rights of his transferees. In our opinion there is no foundation for this contention. The contingency which has happened was contemplated by the parties. The conveyances expressly recite that it will not be competent to the transferor to confess judgment in favour of the Defendant or to enter into any compromise with him, or to abandon or withdraw the claim in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of any suit instituted for the recovery of the properties of Manraj. This is followed by the covenant that if Ramdhan entered into such a compromise in contravention of the terms of the deed, the transferees would be entitled to prosecute the suits and might also recover damages resulting from the action of the first Plaintiff. In the face of an agreement like this it is difficult to appreciate how it can be seriously maintained that it was open to the first Plaintiff to enter into a settlement with the Defendant so as to make it impossible for the second and third Plaintiffs no enforce any rights acquired by their purchases. That an agreement of this nature for the protection of the purchasers is valid in law is clear from the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Lal Achal Ram v. Kazim Husain Khan. There one Ardwan, who claimed to be entitled to a taluk in Oudh, transferred his half share in the property to Raja Kazim Hossain. The suit was then jointly brought by the transferor and the transferee for recovery of the property but during the pendency of the action Ardwan withdrew from the suit on a petition of compromise. The transferee, Kazim Hossain, was then allowed to continue the suit on the ground that there was a valid transfer in praesenti of a moiety of the estate to him which gave him a good title on the basis of which it was competent for him to sue. We must consequently hold that the only effect of the petition of the first Plaintiff presented to this Court on the 2nd December 1906, is that the appeal in respect of his share must be dismissed. But this does not in any way affect the title of the other Plaintiffs, who are consequently entitled to have the appeal heard on the merits so far as their claim to a half share of the estate of Manraj is concerned.
The second question which calls for decision on the appeal is whether the second and third Plaintiffs are entitled to maintain the action, or whether as champertors their suit is liable to be dismissed. It has been contended on behalf of the Respondent that although the English law of champerty and maintenance is not in force in this country, yet the transactions under which the second and third Plaintiffs claim to have derived title to the estate of Manraj are of such a character that no Court of Justice ought to assist them in the enforcement of their rights. The validity of the contention of the Respondent must be determined with reference to the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in a long series of decisions. In the case of Fischer v. Kamala Naicher, Sir John Coleridge observed that the champerty or maintenance to be open to objection must have the qualities attributed to it by the English law, that is, it must be something against good policy and justice, something tending to promote unnecessary litigation, something that in a legal sense is immoral and to the constitution of which a bad motive in the same sense is necessary. To determine this, it is necessary therefore to look at the substance of the transaction and not merely the language of the instrument. Again in Chedambara Chetty v. Renga Krishna, Sir James Colvile stated that although the English law of champerty had not been extended to India, the test that would be applied is whether the transaction is merely the acquisition of an interest in the subject of litigation bonâ fide entered into, or whether it is an unfair or illegitimate transaction got up for the purpose merely of spoil or litigation, disturbing the peace of families and carried on from a corrupt or improper motive. It was further laid down that “it would be contrary to every sound principle of justice and policy to prevent a person who had acquired an irregular interest in a suit and a power which cannot be safely conceded to any speculator to make his power of preventing a family arrangement so just and proper the means of extorting large sums of money from the person whose title has been unjustly challenged.” The same question was elaborately examined in Ram Coomar Koondu v. Chunder Kant Mookerjee, where Sir M. Smith reviewed the earlier decisions on the subject and came to the conclusion that, although the English law of maintenance and champerty had not been introduced into India, contracts of this character might under certain circumstances be held invalid as against public policy. It was pointed out that a fair agreement to supply funds to carry on a suit in consideration of having a share in the property, if recovered, ought not to be regarded as per se opposed to public policy; for cases may be easily supposed in which it would be, in furtherance of right and justice, necessary to resist oppression that a suitor who had a just title to property and no means except the property itself should be assisted in this manner. But agreements of this kind ought to be carefully watched and when found to be extortionate and unconscionable so as to be inequitable or to be made not with the bonâ fide object of assisting a claim believed to be just and of obtaining a reasonable recompense therefor, but for improper objects, as for the purpose of gambling in litigation or of injuring or oppressing others by encouraging unrighteous suits so as to be contrary to public policy—effect ought not to be given to them. To the same effect are the decisions of their Lordships in Kunwar Ram Lal v. Nilkanth and Rajah Mokham Singh v. Rajah Rup Singh. In both these cases the question of the validity of an agreement of the description now before us arose as between the transferee and the transferor. In the first of these cases it was found by the Court of Appeal below that the value of the property agreed to be transferred was much in excess of the amount spent in litigation for the recovery thereof. A decree was consequently made, not for the specific performance of the agreement which was found extortionate and inequitable, but only for payment of compensation to cover the legitimate expenses incurred in the litigation. This view was affirmed by the Judicial Committee. In the second case, it was found that the consideration for the transfer was considerably less than the true value of property dealt with. The transferor who succeeded in the litigation with the and of the champertor declined to give him either the property conveyed or damages sufficient to cover the costs of the litigation. The Court of Appeal below held that the champertor was entitled to a decree for the amount of money actually advanced with interest thereon, but not to the reward actually stipulated for, which in the circumstances was excessive and unconscionable. This view was affirmed by the Judicial Committee. The question arose again in the case of Lal Achat Ram v. Kazim Husain Khan to which we have already referred. In that case the claimant to the estate transferred a moiety share to the champertor ostensibly for a sum of a lakh and a half rupees. In the conveyance he acknowledged receipt of one lakh; the balance of rupees fifty thousands, it was decided, was to remain on deposit with the champertor to be expended in prosecuting a proposed suit and in paying a monthly stipend to the transferor and his mukhtear. The title upon which the litigation was commenced was established by the evidence. The transferor, however, compromised the matter and withdrew from the suit which was carried on in respect of the half share of the estate by the champertor alone. The person in possession resisted the claim of the champertor on the ground, amongst others, that the consideration recited in the conveyance was untrue and that a substantial portion of it still remained unpaid. This objection was overruled. The Judicial Committee held that, though the consideration had not been paid to the transferor as recited in the conveyance, and although, therefore, the transferor might have a grievance against the champertor, the champertor was entitled to succeed. It was observed that, apart from the untrue recital in the sale-deed, there was no fraud in the transaction. Without his assistance the transferor could not have prosecuted his claim. There was nothing extortionate or unreasonable in the terms of the bargain; there was no gambling, in litigation; there was nothing contrary to public policy. The transaction was, in essence, a present transfer by the person ultimately found to be the true owner of a half share of his interest in the estate, which vested in the transferee a good title and made it competent for him to sue. Substantially the same view was affirmed by the Judicial Committee in Bhagwat Dayal v. Debi Dayal. In that case the purchase-money was fixed at Rs. 52,600 of which only Rs. 600 was paid down and the balance was payable only on the event of the vendees' success in recovering the property in suit. The transferor and the transferee jointly sued to recover possession. On behalf of the person in possession an objection was taken that the transfers were inoperative in law as they were champertous and contrary to public policy. This contention was upheld by this Court, but overruled by the Judicial Committee. Their Lordships referred to the case of Lal Achat Ram v. Kazim Husain Khan, and held that the transaction was not contrary to public policy and not void on that ground. As regards the further objection that the transaction was an unfair and unconscionable bargain for an inadequate price, their Lordships held that was entirely a question between the assignor and the assignee and that it was consequently unnecessary to consider what the decision ought to have been in a litigation between the assignor and the assignee in which the former might seek to repudiate the assignment. Their Lordships held that the attack upon the title of the champertor on the ground that the transaction was opposed to public policy and was an unconscionable bargain could not be supported. Let us now in the light of these principles test the validity of the transactions under which the second and third Plaintiffs found their title. The total value of the estate of Manraj, the subject-matter of the present litigation, is approximately two lakhs of rupees. The value of an one-fourth share of the estate may therefore be taken to be Rs. 50,000. The consideration for each of the conveyances was stated to be for Rs. 45,000. It cannot be suggested, therefore, that the transfer was for a grossly inadequate price so as to stamp the transaction as an unfair and unconscionable bargain. No doubt only a small portion of the purchase-money, namely, Rs. 2,000 in the case of each conveyance, is stated to have been paid to the transferor in cash. But that by itself would not be sufficient to invalidate the transaction. The only element of unfairness in the transaction apparently was the covenant in the conveyances that, if half the actual expenses of litigation exceeded Rs. 43,000 each of the purchasers would have to make up the deficit; but that, if half of such expenses fell short of Rs. 43,000 each of the transferees would be entitled to appropriate the balance as reward for his exertion and management of the litigation. This, no doubt, stamps the transaction as a speculative bargain; but having regard to the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Runwar Ram Lal v. Nilkanth and Rajah Mokham Singh v. Rajah Rup Singh, we cannot hold that the bargains were against public policy and consequently void. It is conceivable that, if the question arose between the assignor and the assignee as to the validity of such a covenant in the conveyance, the transferee might find it extremely difficult to maintain the propriety and legality of such a condition, and he might find himself obliged either to content himself with the sums actually advanced and re-transfer the property to the assignor, or to retain the property and refund to the assignor the unexpended balance of the consideration for the conveyance. That, however, is a question which, in the view taken by the Judicial Committee, can arise only between the assignor and the assignee. The assignor has, ever since the execution of the conveyances and throughout the litigation in the Court of first instance, affirmed the transfers, and, even in his application to this Court for dismissal of the appeal, he does not challenge the propriety of the transaction. In the words of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Lal Achal Ram v. Kazim Husain Khan “it is not enough for the Defendant to make out that the sale-deed is voidable; he must show that it was absolutely void. But now the Defendant has this further difficulty that, according to the petition of compromise, the transferor has nothing to complain of, for he had nothing to sell.” The result, therefore, upon this part of the case is that the conveyances upon which the second and third Plaintiffs founded their title must be upheld: and they must be treated as effecting a present transfer by Ramdhan of one moiety of his interest in the estate and giving title to the transferees on which it was competent for them to sue.
The third point which requires decision in the appeal, is whether the third Plaintiff is the person beneficially interested under the conveyance nominally executed in his favour on the 29th February 1904; or merely the benamdar of Mohunt Toke Narain of Mandra. [Their Lordships, after discussing the evidence on this point, came to the conclusion that the evidence in this case fell short of what is required to establish the allegation of benami set up by the Defendant].
The fourth point which requires decision in this appeal, is whether the first Plaintiff, Ramdhan, was the chela of Manraj of such a description as to be entitled to claim by inheritance the estate of his guru according to the custom of the sect of sanyasis to which he belonged. This is the fundamental question in the case and has to be regarded from more than one point of view. The first matter to be considered is whether Ramdhan was taken as a chela by Manraj. According to Ramdhan himself, he was born on the 8th December 1882, he was brought by his father into the monastery about five or six months before October 1893, apparently in a time of some distress; he was initiated on the 7th October 1892, and his Biraja Home ceremony was performed on the 20th October 1898. So far as the first initiation ceremony is concerned, the parties are agreed that Ramdhan was taken as a chela by Manraj; but they differ upon two fundamental points. For in the first place, while according to the Plaintiff, he became a full chela upon performance of the initiation ceremony, accordingly to the Defendant, the effect of such performance was merely to make him a probationer. In the second place, according to the case made by the Plaintiff in the present litigation, elaborate ceremonies were performed on the occasion of his initiation, while, according to the Defendant, the ceremonies were of the simplest character and did not comprise the teaching of the mulmantra without which no person can attain the rank of a sanyasi. In so far as the factum of initiation is concerned, the parties are agreed that it did take place, and it is not necessary for us to refer to the evidence in detail upon this part of the case. Upon the other part of the case as to the precise ceremonies which were observed at the time of initiation and their effect upon the status of Ramdhan, the matter requires close examination.
[As to this, on a review of the evidence, their Lordships came to the following conclusion:]
There is a large body of evidence on the side of the Defendant, including the testimony of Dalmir himself, that Ramdhan was taken as a chela, that the ordinary ceremonies of the shaving of the head, bathing of the body, wearing of new clothes and the taking of a new name were performed, but that manttas were not recited at the time of the performance of these ceremonies nor were muhnantras whispered into the ears of the intending disciple. We are not prepared to disbelieve this mass of evidence on the side of the Defendant, which is strikingly supported by the statements of the Plaintiff made in 1897 that no special ceremonies were performed on the occasion of the latter's initiation. We may further observe that there is a considerable body of evidence to show that, as a rule, the mantras are not whispered into the ears of the novice at the time of his first initiation, and that this practice is based upon eminently practical reasons. Every aspirant for entrance into the order of sanyasis has to pass through a period of probation. Upon his first arrival at the monastery his habits and character are closely 11 watched for some days, and enquiries are made into his caste, for the sanyasis admit into their order ordinarily members of the twice-born classes and very rarely take members of the fourth class. If the novice is approved, his head is shaved, his name is changed and upon the performance of this preliminary ceremony he is regarded as a probationer for entrance into the order. The final ceremony, however, which is called the Biraja Home ceremony, is not performed for many months, and sometimes for many years. During this period of apprenticeship it is open to the chela to return to his natural family, but after the performance of the final ceremony his connection with the world is deemed to have been finally severed. This is amply borne out from the valuable note of Mr. Warden on the customs of Gossains printed as an appendix to Steel's “Law and Custom of Hindu Castes.” This note was prepared in 1825 upon information gathered from several thousands of Gossains of the first rank, who had assembled at Trimbuk near the source of the Godaveri on a religious festival, and the statements contained in it have always been treated as of great authority. In paragraph 27 Mr. Warden states that the head of the candidate is first shaved, when he immediately becomes a Gossain in a state of probation; and that after he has remained so for a year or two and made himself familiar with the usages of the order, the ceremony of Biraja Home is celebrated, when he becomes a perfect Gossain. In paragraph 28 it is further stated that during the novitiate of the candidate his parents are at liberty to withdraw him, but that, after the solemnization of the Biraja Home, he is irrevocably attached to the Gossain sect and as much alienated from his family by birth as if he had never belonged to it. Now it is stated by the witnesses on the side of the Defendant that it is not usual to whisper the mulmantra into the ears of the novice at the time of the first initiation, when it is still uncertain whether he will or will not return to the enjoyments of worldly life. That some mantras, however, may be recited on this occasion is stated by some of the authorities. Among these it will suffice to refer to the work of Dr. Jogendra Nath Bhattacherjee on “Hindu Castes and Sects,” at page 382 of which it is stated that after the shaving ceremony, the guru whispers into the ears of the neophyte the words namah sivaya and the latter recites the formula and takes a new name. In the same work, however, it is expressly stated that the neophyte has to go through a course of probation, and that, after the completion of the period of apprenticeship, elaborate ceremonies have to be performed, the effect of which is to cut off completely the connection of the sanyasi with his natural family and the enjoyments of worldly life. On the evidence, therefore, we hold that the Plaintiff was, as alleged by him, taken as an apprentice chela by Manraj in 1892, but that no such ceremonies were performed on the occasion as were necessary to make him a complete chela.
The second matter which requires consideration is whether the Biraja Home ceremony of Ramdhan was performed by Manraj. According to the first Plaintiff such ceremony was performed in a cow-house attached to the Budhauli monastery on the 20th October 1893, which corresponds with what is known as the Bejoya Dasami day, that is, the last day, of the Dasserah festival in Aswin 1301. It is strenuously asserted on the other hand on behalf of Dalmir that the story is a myth, and that the Biraja Home ceremony was not, and could not have been, performed at the time it is alleged to have taken place. It is further alleged that up to the present it has not taken place at all. In support of his case the Plaintiff relies upon his own oath as also the testimony of four witnesses; Guru Sahai, Titari Puri, Karu Pandey, and Nand Kishore Puri. The Defendant, on the other hand, has examined himself and six witnesses; who all assert that, at the time alleged, they were in the monastery and that no such ceremony was performed. The whole question is, which of these conflicting stories is to be believed. As regards the Plaintiff himself, it must be admitted that he throws considerable discredit on his story by omitting to mention the performance of what must be deemed as essential part of the ceremonial. If he is to be believed, he did not offer pinda to himself, nor did he devour the burnt betel-nut with a betel leaf, nor was the tuft of his hair burnt and mixed with clarified butter. The evidence of the Gossain witnesses on both sides show that these are ceremonies of great importance and, if the Biraja Home was performed it is impossible to believe that those could have been omitted. The question is not what the effect of an accidental omission of one out of many ceremonies would be, but rather whether it is at all probable that Manraj, who was a man of great ability and circumspection, should have performed the Biraja Home ceremony and omitted the essential details, specially the performance of the sradh of one's self, which as pointed out in Rangachariar v. Yegna Dikshatur is indicative of the fact that the probationer has suffered civil death and determined his secular status prior to his final entrance into the order of sanyasis. In our opinion the evidence of the Plaintiff tends, as the Subordinate Judge points out, to show that the Biraja Home was not performed in his case, and the story which he repeats is merely a description of what he had witnessed in connection with the performance of the Biraja Home of other persons. It may further be observed that the Plaintiff mentioned several persons as having been, though uninvited, present on the occasion; of these Monohar Puri and Baij Nath Pandey were admittedly not examined. Moreover, if the other witnesses, to whose evidence we shall presently refer, are reliable, they give a different list of persons as present.
[Their Lordships here discussed the evidence of these persons and came to the following conclusion:]
Upon an examination, therefore, of the evidence on the side of the Plaintiff the conclusion of the Subordinate Judge appears to be well-founded that the evidence is untrustworthy and does not satisfactorily prove that the Biraja Home ceremony was performed. This evidence weak and unreliable as it is, is contradicted by a large mass of evidence on the side of the Defendant. The Defendant and six other persons who were undoubtedly present in the Budhauli monastery in October 1893, assert that the alleged ceremony is a myth. Dalmir himself deposes that, if such a ceremony had taken place his permission as that of the spiritual head of the monastery would unquestionably have been obtained. He asserts that he was neither informed nor invited to give his consent and this is supported by a statement of the Plaintiff to the effect that the latter cannot remember whether or not Dalmir was present at the time of the alleged ceremony. There are, however, six other persons closely connected with the monastery, people apparently of considerable respectability, who come forward and say that the ceremony did not take place. No doubt, it may be said that this is a case of oath against oath; but there are important circumstances which, in our opinion, confirm the story of the Defendant. The Defendant asserts, and his assertion is supported by respectable witnesses—that the Biraja Home ceremony is not performed till the probationer attains the age of discretion. Different witnesses give different limits of age but there is a general consensus of testimony that sixteen years is treated as the minimum. It is not necessary to hold that the Biraja Home ceremony cannot be performed if the chela is under sixteen years of age; but unquestionably the rule is that the chela must have reached years of discretion so as to be able to realize for himself the full significance of the final act of renunciation of the world. If the story of the Plaintiff is true, he was at the time about eleven years of age. It is extremely unlikely that a man of the position and attainments of Manraj would think of performing the Biraja Home ceremony in the case of a boy of eleven years of age, when, without doubt, the performance of the ceremony might have been delayed without any disadvantage. One of the learned vakils for the Appellant invited our attention to the Sankar Digbijoy which purports to contain an account of the history and career of the great Sankaracharya; the founder of the dasnami sect of sanyasis (Wilson on the Religion of the Hindus, Vol. I, 197). Whether this work can be treated as authentic and authoritative has been a matter of controversy amongst scholars but even if the statements contained therein are accepted as reliable, they do not help the Appellant. The book recites that Sankaracharya finished his studies of the Vedas and adopted the life of a sanyasi in his eighth year (Poona Edition, p. 140, Verse 1, and p. 163, Verse 59). The book further recites that he died in his thirty-second year after having composed his great commentaries on the Upanishadas and Vedantas, the study of which has furnished occupation for a life-time to generations of students. Even if all these statements were assumed to be facts, they would only show that in the case of Sankaracharya he attained not merely discretion but maturity of intellect in his infancy and before he became a sanyasi. His case, therefore, cannot be treated as an authority for what was or might have been done in the case of an ordinary man. On the whole, therefore, the assertion that the Biraja Home ceremony of the Plaintiff was performed before he completed his eleventh year is extremely unlikely. Reference may in this connection be made to the case of Mahanth Ramji Dass & Anr.…Plaintiffs, v. Lachhu Dass…Defendant, ., where this Court refused to believe that the Biraja Home ceremony could have been performed in the case of one who had not attained the age of discretion. There is another circumstance which also discredits the story of the Plaintiff. According to him the ceremony was performed in October 1893, and the last day of the Dasserah festival is the day on which the Biraja Home ceremony is always performed. The Defendant asserts on the other hand that the Biraja Home is never performed in October, and that the proper time for its performance is spring, after the winter and before the summer solstice. The evidence makes it quite clear that the second part of the assertion of the Plaintiff, namely, that the Biraja Home ceremony is invariably performed on the last day of the Dasserah festival is unquestionably false. Dalmir asserts that the Biraja Home in his own case took place in April on the Akshyay Tritia day. Another witness, Jog Mohun Puri, states that in his case it was performed on the Shiva Ratri day in February. It is further unlikely that the Biraja Home ceremony should be reserved for performance on only one day in the year. It is more likely that it should be allowed to be performed on specially auspicious days. On the other hand, there is some evidence to show that the spring is the appropriate time for the performance of a ceremony like this. Reference may be made to the Dharmasindhu (Bombay Edition, 339) and the Nirnaya Sindhu (p. 513) which are works of high authority on Hindu ritual, to show that the uttarayan that is the time when the sun proceeds from the south of the equator towards the north, is the appropriate time for the performance of a, ceremony of this description. If so, it is again unlikely that a man of the position and attainment of Manraj should, without any reason, perform the ceremony at a season of the year, which was not quite appropriate. As regards the age of the Plaintiff, therefore, and the time of performance of the Biraja Home ceremony, it is clear that they both tend to throw doubt upon the truth of his story. These two circumstances, as also the facts that at the time of the alleged ceremony Dalmir was not invited, his permission was not taken, no invitations were issued, the acharya guru Seo Churan whose duty it was to officiate at the ceremony, was not present, and according to the Plaintiff himself certain ceremonies were omitted which are deemed essential, the cumulative effect of all these is to discredit the story that the Biraja Home ceremony was performed in the case of the Plaintiff.
The next matter calling for consideration is the question whether the performance of the Biraja Home ceremony is essential to entitle a chela to claim by inheritance the estate of his guru. As we have previously explained, the Biraja Home indicates the final and irrevocable renunciation of worldly life by the chela. During the period of probation it is open to the chela to renounce the life of the monastery and to return to his family, but after the performance of the Biraja Home, reversion to secular life is an impossibility. Primâ facie, therefore, the Biraja Home is indicative of complete status of chela, and till such status has been attained it is unlikely that a chela would be deemed qualified to take by inheritance the estate of his spiritual preceptor. That this is the custom is established by a large mass of unimpeachable evidence. The very circumstance also that on behalf of the Plaintiff strenuous effort was made to prove that his Biraja Home ceremony had been performed tends to indicate that he also regarded it as essential for the establishment of the right of inheritance. Guru Sahainand, to whose evidence we have previously referred, was constrained to admit that the Biraja Home is necessary for a sanyasi and that, if it is not performed in the case of a chela, he does not become a valid chela. Hoolash Narain also describes it as essential. Titai Puri, on the other hand, did not consider it necessary. Not much importance can be attached to the statements of Karu Pandey, who does not belong to the order of sanyasis. Another witness, Hicheyram, considered it necessary, but not essentially necessary. Other witnesses give different opinions; some treat it as necessary while others do not. On the side of the Defendant a large number of witnesses testify to its necessity. Ramanand Swamy and Harish Chandra Gir, who are apparently men of considerable learning and sanctity, as well as Rameshwar Puri and Hardeo of whom the former belongs to the monastery at Deokhand, while the latter occupies the position of acharya guru of the sanyasis of Budh Gaya declare that the ceremony is essential. They are supported by Ramprosad, Anant Puri, Rameshwar Puri, and Ram Nath Puri, all of whom belong to the monastery at Budhauli. Some of these are old men, apparently noted for their piety and respectability; and it is difficult to understand why they should all have combined to set up an absolutely false and unfounded case of custom in relation to succession amongst their order. It was suggested that no reliance ought to be placed upon the testimony of some of these witnesses who belong to monasteries other than the one at Budhauli, and it was urged that it was conceivable that the custom might vary in different monasteries. But it appears from the evidence of Ramanand Swamy that the rules of dasnami sanyasis are uniform amongst the followers of Sankaracharya, and this is borne out to some extent by the notes of Mr. Warden, to which reference has already been made. In paragraph 27 of this report it is stated that the chela becomes a perfect Gossain only when the Biraja Home has been celebrated upon completion of the term of probation. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiff suggested that although this might be the strict rule and the Biraja Home might give a superior status to a chela yet it was not essential for the purpose of succession, and that at any rate it was probable that during the last three quarters of a century since Mr. Warden's report was drawn up, the practice amongst the members of the order has grown lax. He invited our attention to some instances in which it was stated that the property had been inherited by chelas although their Biraja Home ceremony had not been performed. It was asserted that Tilakdhari, Raghunath, Biswa Nath, Indar Narain and Deo Puri succeeded without the performance of any such ceremony. In the case of Biswa Nath, however, it is clear that he succeeded under a title by nomination, and as regards Deo Puri, it is clear that he succeeded under a deed. The other three are closely connected with the Mohunt of Mandra, who is undoubtedly at the root of this litigation, and it would not be safe to place reliance upon their testimony. At any rate, their evidence is weakened by the circumstance that in the case of a good many witnesses cited by the Plaintiff, for instance, Guru Sahai, Hoolash Narain, Tetai Puri, Jog Mohun, Nand Kishore and Ram Doyal, upon their own testimony they succeeded to the estate of their respective Gurus only after the performance of the Biraja Home ceremony. On the other hand, there is a mass of evidence on the side of the Defendant to the effect that the performance of the Biraja Home ceremony is necessary to entitle a chela to the estate of his preceptor by succession. No valid reason has been assigned why this evidence should be discarded. Besides the custom which these witnesses assert and seek to establish is on the face of it reasonable and probable. We are not unmindful of the fact that in a passage in the Nirnaya Sindhu (p. 513) it is stated that some regard the performance of Biraja Home as essential. But, so far as this particular sect of sanyasis is concerned, the evidence of custom to the effect that the performance of the Biraja Home ceremony is essential, is of a weighty character, and the custom in question is certainly consistent with what is described in Manu, Book VI, Verse 33 (25 S.B.E 205) Vishnu, Chap. 96, Verse 1 (7 S.B.E 279), Baudhayan Kanda 17 (14 S.B.E 273) and Apararka's Commentary on Yajnavalkya, Book III, Verses 55, 56 (Poona Edition, 948). The same view is also supported by statements in the sanyas padhyati, one version of which was produced by the Defendant but various redactions of which appear to be current. Whatever difference in detail there may be in these versions, they appear to agree in this particular that the Biraja Home is assumed to be essential. On the whole, therefore, we must affirm the view taken by the Subordinate Judge that the Biraja Home ceremony is necessary to make a valid chela, at any rate, it is essential to entitle the chela to claim by inheritance the estate of his guru. This view is also supported by judicial decisions in which the question of succession has been considered in relation to other muths. Amongst these reference may be made to the cases of Mohunt Ramji Dass v. Lachhu bass, Giyana Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi v. Kandasami Tambiran and Rangachariar v. Yegna Dikshatur. These cases pointedly bring out the distinction between the period of probation and the final entrance into the order of sanyasis. They further show that for the purpose of complete initiation a mere nomination by the guru is not sufficient, but initiation in the root mantra is an essential requisite. As according to the view we take, the root mantra is whispered into the ears of the chela at the time of the performance of the Biraja Home ceremony, it is clear that a chela who has merely become a probationer and whose Biraja Home has not been performed, has not attained the status of a valid sanyasi and is consequently not entitled to take by inheritance the estate of his guru.
The next matter which requires consideration is whether inspite of the fact that the Biraja Home of the first Plaintiff has not been performed, he is entitled to succeed to the estate of Manraj. The learned vakil for the Appellant invited our attention to a passage from the Mitakshara (Chap. II, sec. 8, paragraph 14) to the following effect: “The heirs to the property of a hermit, of an ascetic, and of professed students are in order the preceptor, a virtuous pupil and a spiritual brother and associate in holiness.” On the basis of this proposition it was argued that the Plaintiff took by inheritance the estate of Manraj as his virtuous pupil. It is clear, however, from paragraph 4 of the same chapter and section of the Mitakshara that the rule thus laid down has no application to the circumstances of the present case, for a virtuous pupil takes the property of a yati or ascetic and a virtuous pupil is one who is assiduous in the study of theology, in retaining the holy science and in practising its ordinances. Now, Manraj was manifestily not a yati or ascetic whose duties are described in Verses 56 to 65 of Book HI of the Institute of Yajnavalkya (Mandalik's Edition, 250), nor can the first Plaintiff be by any stretch of language described as a virtuous pupil or student of theology or a yati. It is clear, therefore, that the passage from the Mitakshara upon which reliance is placed, is of no assistance to the Appellant. We may add that it was contended by the learned vakil for the Respondent that the Plaintiff would not be entitled to claim by inheritance the property of Manraj because, it was suggested, the chela of a sanyasi could succeed to the estate of his guru only if he had been nominated as his heir or had been installed as the successor by a congregation of sanyasis. No doubt the ordinary rule is as laid down in the cases of Madho Das…(Plaintiff); v. Kamta Das…(Defendant)., that amongst the sanyasis generally no chela has a right as such to succeed to the property of his deccased guru; his right of succession depends upon his nomination by the deccased in his lifetime as his successor, which nomination is generally confirmed by the mohunts of the order when assembled together to perform the funeral obsequies of the deceased: when a guru does not nominate his successor from among his chelas, such successor is elected and installed by the mohunts and principal persons of the sect in the neighbourhood upon the occasion of the funeral obsequies of the deceased. To the same effect are the decisions in Juggunnath Paul v. Bidianund Dutt and Chhajju Gir v. Diwan. The rule of succession by nomination or election is, however, not of universal application as appears from a note of Mr. Colebrooke to the case of Ganes Gir v. Omrao Gir(15), and Shama Charan Sirkar's Vyabastha Chandrika (Vol. I, p. 545). In some cases, according to the custom of the sanyasis sect, a guru is succeeded in his rights and possessions by his principal chela even though he has not been nominated as successor and there has not been a formal election and installation by an assembly of mohunts, but apparently an election or recognition by members of the sect is necessary. It is clear, therefore, that the Plaintiff is not entitled to succeed to the estate of Manraj.
The last point which requires consideration is as to the custom of lapse set up by the Defendant. The Defendant alleged in his written statement, and gave a mass of evidence to prove his assertion, that, no matter whether a sanyasi of his sect does or does not leave a valid chela, upon the death of the sanyasi his estate lapses to the monastery of which he was a member. There appears to have been a great deal of controversy in the Court below as to whether the monastery at Budhauli was subordinate to the monastery at Mandra, and whether their customs in this respect are identical. It is not necessary in the view we take of the rights of the first Plaintiff to express any opinion upon this question. But we may indicate briefly that upon the evidence the monastery at Budhauli does appear to have been an offshoot of the monastery at Mandra, and that Ganpat Puri, who was the great grand chela of Ajodhya Swami, one of the Mohunts of the Mandra monastery, founded the monastery at Budhauli. It is clear, however, that for many years past the branch has claimed independence of the original institution, and that there has been a considerable amount of rivalry and ill-feeling between the spiritual heads of the two institutions. It may further be conceded that primâ facie the founder of the branch monastery carried with him the customs of the monastery in which he was originally brought up. But it is well-settled, as pointed out by this Court in the case of Pray ad Das v. Mohunth Kriparam upon the authority of the earlier decisions in Kashibashi v. Chitumbernath and Giyana Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi v. Kandasami Tambiran, that there is no fixed rule which regulates the relation between superior and subordinate muths, for even if a muth is subordinate to another in must be governed by its own rules of management. The decision on the question of lapse must therefore primarily depend upon the custom if any, which may have grown up in the monastery at Budhauli, though some assistance may be derived from the evidence of custom in the parent monastery or in any other neighbouring monastery occupied by members of the dasnami sect. So far as the Budhauli monastery is concerned, it is difficult to say that there have been any instances which conclusively prove the alleged custom of lapse. The monastery is itself a little over half a century old and its founder died about 1851. A large body of evidence, however, has been adduced to prove that the custom of lapse obtains in other muths. The difficulty of dealing with this evidence arises from two circumstances. In the first place, although specific instances are alleged in which the property of a deceased sanyasi has been taken by the spiritual head of the monastery to which he belonged, it is not conclusively shown that he left any valid chela whose Biraja Home ceremony had been performed and who was competent to take the estate by inheritance. In the second place, in some of the other instances produced to show that the monastery did take by lapse it is not satisfactorily proved whether the deceased lived as a member of the monastery or whether, though a member of the order, he lived outside the monastery and was by custom allowed to hold separate property which might pass by inheritance to a valid chela. In order to establish the custom of lapse it would be necessary for the Defendant to prove not merely that in some instances the property had passed to the spiritual head of the monastery, but also that this took place in the presence of a chela who would otherwise be competent to take by inheritance. For instance, if there was no chela at all or if there was a chela who was a mere probationer and whose Biraja Home ceremony had not been performed, the property of the deceased might very well be taken by the spiritual head of the monastery. To illustrate the difficulty of following evidence of this character it is sufficient for our present purpose to refer to one typical instance. As regards one sanyasi, Jam Narain, it was asserted that his chela Radhe Giri got his assets although he subsequently left the muth. The Biraja Home of this chela does not appear to have been performed, and the truth appears to be that on that ground he was excluded from succession. Such evidence is obviously of no assistance. Again to take an instance on the other side, upon the death of a sanyasi by name Kesho, his chela Meghulal was allowed to inherit his assets, and this was relied upon to negative the alleged custom. On examination of the I evidence it transpired that Kesho lived outside the muth in Ghoramba, which was in reality a subordinate muth of Budhauli. The rule of succession in such a case might well be different from what it is in the case of a sanyasi who resided in the monastery as a member and died there. After a careful analysis of the whole evidence upon this point which is set out in detail in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, the impression left upon our minds is that well authenticated instances of lapse inspite of the presence of chela of the deceased qualified to take by inheritance are too few in number and of too recent a date to enable the Court to hold that the custom of lapse has been satisfactorily established. As we have already stated, mere assertion of cases of lapse are of no use unless it is conclusively shown in each case that the superior of the monastery took the estate of the deceased by lapse inspite of the presence of chelas who, but for the custom of lapse, would be entitled to succeed.
The result, therefore, is that the Plaintiffs-Appellants have failed to prove that upon the death of Manraj his estate was taken by inheritance by the first Plaintiff. The decree made by the Subordinate Judge is substantially right on the merits and must be affirmed. The appeal of the first Plaintiff will, therefore, be dismissed without costs and the appeal of the other Plaintiffs will also be dismissed with costs.
H.C
N.G
Appeal dismissed.
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