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Thirupathi Goundan v. Shamanna Goundan

Madras High Court
Sep 17, 1924
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Second Appeals concerning Occupancy Rights

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals addressed a single question: whether the respondents possessed a right of permanent occupancy in the plaint lands. The lands in dispute derive from a sannad (Ex. A) issued in 1829 by the East India Company to Muhammad Moosa Sahib, granting two villages in lieu of a money grant of Rs. 1,700 for services rendered. The sannad granted both cultivated and uncultivated portions, including waste and puramboke, and was later confirmed at the time of the inam settlement. The grant was described as being for three generations. The respondents remained in possession and the lower Courts held they had occupancy rights and decreed their suit. The appellant appealed, challenging the existence of any permanent occupancy rights in the plaint lands.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondents have a right of permanent occupancy in the plaint lands.
  2. Whether the sannad (Ex. A) and the subsequent history of the villages show that the grant constituted an "estate" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Estates Land Act (such that Section 6 would confer occupancy rights on occupants in possession when the Act came into force).
  3. Whether, absent classification as an "estate," the onus is on the tenants (respondents) to prove they possess occupancy rights.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The grant in Ex. A was not an estate; it did not create tenants with rights of permanent occupancy at the time of the grant.
  • The subsequent history (as recorded in the inam register, Ex. XIV) shows there was no permanent cultivation and no evidence of tenants with occupancy rights; income varied year to year and much land was waste.
  • The mere use of the word "Jaghir" in Ex. A does not, by itself, create an estate with the incidents of an estate under the Estates Land Act.
  • Where the grant included waste and puramboke it indicates that land itself (and not merely land revenue) was granted; the fact that Government obtained income does not itself prove the existence of tenants with permanent occupancy.
  • The onus to prove occupancy rights rests upon the tenants (respondents) where the property is not shown to be an estate within the meaning of the Act.
  • The appellant additionally argued that the original money grant (Rs. 1,700) and the actual income from the villages (about Rs. 1,500) indicated waste lands were included to make up the difference — supporting that the grant was not a ryotwari grant conferring tenant-occupancy rights.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The grant constituted an estate within the meaning of the Estates Land Act (relying in particular on the sannad's use of the word "Jaghir" and references in the Salem District Manual).
  • Because the respondents continued in possession when Section 6 of the Estates Land Act came into force, they acquired occupancy rights under that provision, even if they had no such rights before.
  • Ex. A contained statements (such as that beriz of the village was taken into account and a recital directing that ryots and others in the villages be made to obey orders) that prima facie suggested the existence of ryots (tenants) on the land.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Venkata Sastrulu v. Sutharmudu (Privy Council) The history of an estate is relied upon to determine the existence or otherwise of permanent occupancy rights. The Court relied on the principle that the historical record of an estate is significant; it found that the inam register and history here weighed against finding permanent occupancy rights and thus supported the appellant's contention.
Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar When a tenant claims a right of permanent occupancy in a suit by his landlord to eject him, the onus of proving such a right is upon the tenant. The Court applied this rule to place the burden on the respondents to prove occupancy rights; since they failed to discharge that onus, the Court rejected their claim.
Sam v. Ramalinga Mudaliar (opinion of Justice Coutts Trotter) The description of lands as "Jaghirs" does not necessarily make them Jaghirs within the meaning of the Estates Land Act; such lands may be ordinary inam. The Court used this reasoning to reject the argument that the mere use of the word "Jaghir" in Ex. A conclusively made the villages an estate under the Act.
Musammat Sakina Bai v. Kaniz Fatima Begam (Privy Council) The word "Jaghir" primarily points to occupancy (which may include occupancy of land); where "Jaghir" in a sannad is used in contrast to an ilaka held as a permanent zamindari, it is an almost necessary inference that the occupancy referred to is occupancy of land. The Court referenced this observation when analysing whether the sannad's language indicated occupancy of land; it considered the sannad's terms but concluded, on the whole evidence, the villages did not form an "estate" under Section 3.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by applying legal principles to the documentary and oral evidence before it:

  1. Examination of Ex. A (the 1829 sannad): Ex. A contains language supportive of the respondents (beriz taken into account; a recital about making ryots and others obey), which prima facie suggested the possible presence of ryots. The Court observed that Ex. A granted not only cultivated land but uncultivated, waste and puramboke as well, and that the grant was for three generations.
  2. Contradictory documentary history (Ex. XIV, the inam register, 1865): The Court gave substantial weight to the inam register's entries. It noted acreage breakdowns showing that waste land constituted more than half the village area (puramboke excluded), and that cultivation figures varied over time. The register expressly remarked that the present cultivation was not permanent and that the villages were "held by one of the Jaghirdars on rent from others" with amounts that did not reflect actual cultivation value. The Court treated this as strong evidence that income was derived from actual cultivation rather than from tenants with fixed occupancy rights.
  3. Evidence of possession and descent: The villages descended to Moosa Sahib's heirs and were held in shares. Under the Muhammad law as explained to the Kazi, shares of sharers who died without issue lapsed to Government; however, the Government did not take over physical possession but added such share incomes to the fixed jodi. The Court also noted witness evidence that one witness and his ancestors had enjoyed the land for 70 years (back to 1849), but there was no explanation about how possession originally arose after the 1829 grant.
  4. Burden of proof: The Court reiterated the settled principle (citing Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar) that there is no presumption a tenant has occupancy rights; where property is not an estate, the onus is on the tenant to prove such rights. Section 6 of the Estates Land Act grants occupancy where the property is an "estate," but that protection applies only if the land actually falls within the Act's definition.
  5. Meaning and effect of the term "Jaghir": The Court examined arguments that the use of the word "Jaghir" in Ex. A, and references in local manuals, established estate status. Citing Sam v. Ramalinga Mudaliar and Musammat Sakina Bai, the Court held that the mere use of the term "Jaghir" does not automatically impart all incidents of an estate under the Act; the substance and history must be examined.
  6. Whether the grant conveyed land or merely revenue: The Court considered whether Ex. A granted merely land revenue (an inam of revenue) or the land itself. It observed that because the sannad expressly included waste and puramboke, it was unlikely that only revenue had been granted. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that even if waste land had been granted (and some of it later brought under cultivation), there was no evidence of tenants with permanent occupancy or of pottahs (ryotwari pattas) being issued. Thus the evidence did not establish ryoti (tenant) lands with occupancy rights.
  7. Weighing of evidence and conclusion: Considering Ex. A in conjunction with the inam register and witness testimony, the Court found the historical and documentary evidence favoured the appellant's position that there were no tenants with rights of permanent occupancy at the time of the grant or subsequently. Accordingly, the Court concluded the villages did not constitute an "estate" under Section 3 of the Estates Land Act, and the respondents failed to discharge the onus of proving occupancy rights.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeals are allowed; the judgments of the lower Courts are set aside; and the plaintiffs' suits are dismissed with costs throughout.

Immediate consequences and orders recorded in the opinion:

  • The Court held that the villages are not an "estate" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Estates Land Act, and that the respondents have no right of permanent occupancy in the plaint land.
  • The judgments of the lower Courts, which had found occupancy rights in favour of the respondents, were set aside.
  • The appeals were allowed and the plaintiffs' suits dismissed with costs throughout.
  • The case was remanded to the Munsif's Court for trial of the remaining issue(s).
  • The appellant was awarded costs in this Court and in the Lower Appellate Court; costs in the Munsif's Court were ordered to abide the result of the suit.
  • The appellant was to have a refund of the Court fee paid in this Court.

The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel or sweeping new legal principle; it applies established authorities and statutory interpretation to the specific facts and documentary history of these villages to reach its decision.

Show all summary ...

The only question argued in the Second Appeals is whether the respondents have a right of permanent occupancy in the plaint lands. The question whether the respondents have an occupancy right or not would depend upon the terms of the grant Ex. A and the subsequent history of the villages granted to Muhammad Moosa Sahib in 1829. Ex. A is the sannad given to Moosa Sahib by the East India Company, by which two villages were granted to him, in lieu of a money grant, which was made on account of the services rendered by him to the East India Company. The amount originally granted was Rs. 1,700, being the income of these villages. Moosa Sahib wanted one village to be granted in lieu of these villages and he was willing to retain one of the seven villages originally granted. The sannad gave him two villages and the grant comprises not only cultivated portions but all the uncultivated portions as well, as waste portions and puramboke etc. This grant was afterwards confirmed at the time of the inam settlement. The grant was for three generations. The contention on behalf of the appellant is that what was granted was not an estate and that there were no tenants on the land, at the time, with rights of occupancy and that the subsequent history of the villages shows that no tenant had occupancy right on the lands. On behalf of the respondents, it is urged that what was granted was an estate, within the meaning of the Estates Land Act and that as the respondents continued to be in possession, at the time when the Estates Land Act came into force, by virtue of Sect. 6 of the Act, they acquired an occupancy right though they had it not before. The question is not free from difficulty. Both the lower Courts have found that the respondents have occupancy rights and have decreed their suit.

Ex. A is no doubt favourable to the contention of the respondents. There are two statements in it, which I think to some extent support the contention of the respondents. One is that the villages were granted in lieu of a money grant and that the beriz of the village was taken into account in order to determine the income from the villages. The second is the following recital: “In order to make the ryots and others in the two villages given as aforesaid to obey your orders, you should publish it as well so as to proclaim it to all.” Prima facie, it would appear there were ryots on the land in the two villages. If Ex. A had stood alone, it might lend considerable support to the respondents' contention; but Ex. XIV, the inam register prepared in 1865, which gives the history of the villages is opposed to their contention. In fasli 1211, the extent of the village is given as 3244.92 acres, of which 728.17 were puramboke. Of the remaining 2516.75 acres, the dry land was 1083.52 acres and wet 38.36 Dry waste is given as 1322.14 and wet waste 72.73 Therefore out of the total, the waste land was more than half of the land in the village excluding the puramboke. In fasli 1270, the extent of dry cultivation is given as 1191.85 and that of wet cultivation as 62.38 and the extent of the remaining wet and dry waste is 1262.52 acres. There is a remark on page 4 to the effect that:

“the value of the village should be fixed at the beriz of fasli 1261, that is the one fixed by Mr. Phillips and the reason assigned by them is that though the present cultivation is 2,200 acres, the cultivation is not permanent. It is permanent nowhere and the actual cultivation is not strictly ascertained ……They are not able to give any reliable account of the past year's beriz. The villages are held by one of the Jaghirdars on rent from others and they fixed it at a sum which does not exhibit the actual value of the cultivation”.

The villages descended to the heirs of Moosa Sahib and they held the villages in several shares. According to the Muhammedan Law, as understood by the Kazi, whenever any sharer died without an issue, his share lapsed or escheated to the Government. But the Government did not take over his share, but added the income due to his share to the jodi fixed on the villages and the persons in possession were asked to pay to the Government the income from such share, together with the jodi. It is clear from the statement in the inam register that there was no permanent cultivation of the land and that the amount of cultivation varied from year to year. This circumstance is strongly opposed to the contention that there were tenants, with rights of permanent occupancy of the land and the statement that “the villages are held by one of the Jaghirdars on rent from others and that they fixed it at a sum, which does not exhibit the actual value of the cultivation” shows, I think, that the income was derived from the actual cultivation of the land and not from the tenants, who paid a certain amount to the landlord. It is not suggested that the sharing system prevailed in this village, in which case it might be that the income varied from year to year, depending upon the cultivation. But the income was only calculated in money and therefore the statement in the inam register should be considered, as referring to the actual cultivation by the inamdars; either through their own servants, or by giving leases to people, prepared to cultivate the land. Their Lordships of the Privy Council rely upon the history of an estate, in order to determine the existence or otherwise of permanent occupancy rights. Venkata Sastrulu v. Sutharmudu. In this case, the history of the two villages affords considerable weight to the contention of the appellant that the respondents had no occupancy right. In the first place, there is no evidence that there were any tenants with occupancy rights, at the time of the grant. Secondly, the evidence of the 5th witness is that he and his ancestors enjoyed the land during the last 70 years.

He gave his evidence in 1919 and 70 years from that date would carry us back to 1849. The grant was made in 1829, and there is no explanation offered by him, as to how his ancestors came into possession. Thirdly, there is also the evidence supplied by the inam register that the cultivation was not permanent and that the income varied from year to year.

It is well settled now, that there is no presumption that a tenant has occupancy rights. If the property in dispute is an estate, then under Sect. 6 of the Estates Land Act he gets occupancy rights. But where it is not an estate, the onus is upon him to prove that he has occupancy rights. In Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar their Lordships observe:

“It cannot now be doubted that when a tenant of land in India, in a suit by his landlord to eject him from them, set up a defence that he has a right of permanent occupancy in the lands, the onus of proving that he has such a right is upon the tenant”.

That being so, it is for the respondents to prove that they have occupancy rights. It is urged on behalf of the respondents that these villages were granted as jaghir to Moosa Sahib and that therefore these villages formed an estate, within the meaning of Sect. 3 of the Estates Land Act. Mr. Sampath Aiyangar relied upon Sect. 3 Cl. 2(c) that any unsettled palayam or jaghir is an estate. The Subordinate Judge is of opinion that a jaghir in order to come within the definition of Sect. 3 must be a jaghir, before the time of the East India Company. Without considering whether such an opinion is well-founded or not, we have to see whether by the mere use of the word ‘Jaghir’, the incidents of an estate would attach to any property. It was strongly urged for the respondents that as the word ‘Jaghir’ is used in Ex. A, the sannad, the villages must be considered as possessing all the incidents of a Jaghir. The use of the word ‘Jaghir,’ by itself does not signify much. Mr. Justice Coutts Trotter, as he then was, observes in Sam v. Ramalinga Mudaliar:

“I have come to the conclusion that these lands, though so described, are not Jaghirs, within the meaning of the Estates Land Act, but are merely ordinary inam.”

We have, therefore, to see whether these villages form an estate, within the meaning of Sect. 3 of the Estates Land Act, apart from the mere use of the word ‘Jaghir’. The respondents rely upon the statements in the Salem District Manual, which described these villages as Jaghir. I do not think that by the mere use of the word ‘Jaghir’, the villages can be said to be an estate.

It is next urged for the respondents that if it is not a ‘Jaghir’ it must be considered to be an inam the meaning of within Sub-cl. 1) of Sect. 3, Cl. 2. In that case, any village of which the land Revenue has been granted in inam to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof would be an estate. To say, this is an inam would be begging the question. The question is whether the land revenue alone was granted in this case, or whether the and itself was granted. In Musammat Sakina Bai v. Kaniz Fatima Begam their Lordships of the Privy Council held:

“the word, ‘Jaghir’ primarily points to occupancy, though it may be occupancy of an office, such as that of Collector of revenue. Where, however, a Jaghir held for life only is, as in this sannad, used in contradistinction to an ilaka, held as a permanent Zamindari, it is an almost necessary inference that the occupancy referred to is occupancy of land.”

By the sannad, not only cultivated land but waste, puramboke, Jamabandi, Kattumaniam and the inam were granted. It is urged by Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar, who appears for the appellant, that the fact that puramboke and waste land was given shows that it was given and not merely land revenue. He further contends that a good portion of the waste land was brought under cultivation and that it cannot be said there were any tenants with occupancy right on the waste land. That a good deal of waste land was brought under cultivation is clear from Ex. XIV. When waste land was given to the grantee, it cannot be said that land revenue alone was granted. That being so, the grant does not come within the purview of Sect. 3 Cl. 2 (d).

It is urged for the respondents that the onus is upon the landlord to show that lands are not subject to occupancy right. That argument assumes that the villages are an estate. If the villages are an estate, within the meaning of Cl. 3, no doubt the onus would be upon the landlord to show that the lands are not subject to occupancy right; in other words, the lands are not ryoti lands. But in this case, we have to determine from the evidence whether the villages are an estate or not. That being so, Sects. 23 and 185 of the Estates Land Act do not help him. It is urged by Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar that the original grant of money was about Rs. 1,700, and that the income from the villages was only about Rs. 1,500 and odd, and that in order to make up for the balance, waste and other lands were given. That argument receives support from the statement in the inam register:

“The only indirect explanation for his deficiency is found in the reservation of the purumboke land and resumed kuthu kodigi marcs for the use of the Jaghirdar in right as profit.”

That waste lands were given to the grantee under Ex. A cannot be disputed. That they could not have been in anybody's possession is apparent. There is no evidence in this case, that there were any tenants at the time of the grant in 1829. It is urged for the respondents that it was not likely that the East India Company's agents cultivated the lands and that there must have been tenants on the land. The mere fact that Government was able to get an income does not show there were tenants, with rights of occupancy, as in the case of Ryotwari land. If it was ryotwari land, then pottahs must have been issued to the persons in occupation. No such evidence is forthcoming in this case. It is open no doubt to the Government to grant a ryotwari village, as inam to a person. In such cases, the revenue alone is inam. In the absence of evidence, it cannot be presumed from the mere fact that Ex. A speaks of beriz, it must be beriz, derived from the tenants with rights of permanent occupancy. The lower Courts have come to the conclusion that the respondents have occupancy right, on the ground that the villages were granted as Jaghir. They overlooked the fact that the onus is upon the tenants to prove that they have occupancy right. I hold that the villages in question are not an estate, within the meaning of Sect. 3 of the Estates Land Act and that the respondents have no occupancy right in the plaint land. In the result, the appeals are allowed and the judgments of the lower Courts are set aside and the plaintiffs' suits are dismissed with costs throughout.

S. A. No. 254 of 1922.

The judgment of the lower Courts are set aside and the case remanded to the Munsif 's Court, for trial of the remaining issue. The appellant is entitled to his costs in this Court and the Lower Appellate Court. The costs in the Munsif's Court would abide the result of the suit.

Appellant will have the refund of the Court fee paid in this Court.

C. K.Appeals allowed..