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Ashutosh Basu v. Sudhangshubhushan Mukherji
Factual and Procedural Background
The mortgagor, Sudhangshubhushan Mukherji, applied for leave to pay into Court Rs. 1,365-0-0 (being 5 per cent of the purchase money) to the Registrar and to have a sale set aside. The sale had been held by the Registrar of the Court on 11th April 1930 under a mortgage decree dated 18th February 1929.
It appeared that the mortgagees had been paid and that a sum equal to 5 per cent of the purchase money was paid in on the last possible day. There were three purchasers for four lots sold. Two purchasers (the firm of Chandanmull Indrakumar) purchased lots 3 and 4 for Rs. 3,050 and Rs. 2,000 respectively and claimed, in addition to the 5 per cent, Rs. 604-13-0 for costs allegedly incurred investigating the title and preparing to complete the sale before notice of the mortgagor's application. Jumnadas Bagree, the purchaser of lot 1 for Rs. 17,200, claimed an unspecified sum for similar costs. The third purchaser did not appear.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the purchasers are entitled to recover any sum over and above the 5 per cent of the purchase money (and the return of their deposits) when a sale under a mortgage decree is set aside.
- Whether the amended provisions of Act 21 of 1929 (which amended Order 34) apply to this sale and thereby affect the mortgagor's liability.
- Whether the purchasers' claimed costs (loss of interest and costs incurred in investigating title and preparing completion) are payable by the mortgagor in addition to the fixed 5 per cent deposit prescribed by Order 21, Rule 89.
Arguments of the Parties
Mortgagor's Arguments
- It was contended for the mortgagor that liability is limited to 5 per cent under Order 21, Rule 89 and Order 34, Rule 5(2) as amended by Act 21 of 1929 (para 5).
- The mortgagor conceded that he must pay the costs of the parties who appeared on the motion (para 41).
Purchasers' Arguments
- Counsel for the purchasers relied on Chapter 27, Rule 37 of the rules and orders and asserted entitlement to sums in addition to the 5 per cent (para 6).
- The firm of Chandanmull Indrakumar claimed Rs. 604-13-0 as costs incurred investigating title and preparing for completion prior to notice of the mortgagor's application (para 3).
- Jumnadas Bagree claimed an unspecified sum for similar costs (para 4).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Virjiban Dass Moolji v. Biseswar Lal Hargovind, A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 169 | Held that Order 21, Rule 89 applied to sales under a mortgage decree and to the original side of the High Court; and that Order 21, Rule 89 contemplates applications on deposit of prescribed sums (paras 8–11). | The court acknowledged this decision and its propositions but stated that, although Lort-Williams, J.'s decision must be considered, the present judge considered that decision erroneous and proceeded to re-examine the matter (paras 8, 11, 12). |
| Kalyanee Debi v. Hari Mohan Ghosh (referenced) | Consideration of the amount a mortgagor must deposit under Order 21, Rule 89; where a rule cannot be applied exactly under local practice, it should be applied fairly and reasonably (para 10, 14–15). | The court noted that any difficulty identified in that case related to a specific provision not relevant here, and emphasized that where a rule can be applied strictly, it must be applied strictly (paras 10, 15, 18). |
| Umeshchandra Banerji v. Kunjalal Biswas (Lort-Williams, J.) | Considered whether a purchaser must be paid, in addition to 5 per cent, loss of interest and costs incurred; Lort-Williams, J. held the purchaser was entitled to such sums (para 11). | The present court reviewed Lort-Williams' reasoning, stated an inability to follow it, and specifically rejected the conclusion that purchasers are entitled to interest and costs in addition to the prescribed 5 per cent (paras 11–13, 16–17, 40). |
| Vacher & Sons, Ltd. v. London Society of Compositors [1913] A.C. 107 | Authority on statutory interpretation: the plain/literal meaning of statutory words should be followed even if a literal meaning produces an inequitable result; courts should read statutory language in its natural sense (paras 18–26). | The court relied on the House of Lords' statements to support a literal reading of the rule prescribing 5 per cent, concluding that mere injustice is not a ground to disregard clear statutory language (paras 18–26, 33–34). |
| Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. [1892] A.C. 481 | Where conditions are specified in a statutory provision, it must be taken that no other conditions are to stand in the way of the statutory right conferred (para 42/35). | The court cited Lord Hobhouse's reasoning to support the proposition that the rule's specified condition (deposit of 5 per cent) was intended to be exhaustive and that no additional conditions (such as payment of extra costs or interest) could be read into the rule (para 42/35). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, applying statutory text, prior decisions and principles of interpretation stated by higher courts:
- Applicability of Act 21 of 1929: The court held that the amended provisions of Act 21 of 1929 (which amended Order 34) did not apply to the rights of the parties in this case because, by Section 15(e) of the Act, nothing in the Act was to affect anything done in the course of any proceeding pending in any Court on 1st April 1930. The decree was dated 18th February 1929 and the sale occurred on 11th April 1930; therefore the parties' rights did not fall within the amended provisions (para 7).
- Review of precedent and conflicting authorities: The court reviewed prior local decisions, including a decision of the Court of Appeal (Virjiban Dass) and the Lort-Williams judgment (Umeshchandra Banerji). Although acknowledging those decisions, the court expressed the view that the earlier judgment (Lort-Williams) was erroneous on the central point and required re-examination (paras 8, 11–13).
- Interpretation methodology: The court invoked principles of statutory interpretation articulated by the House of Lords in Vacher & Sons and Robinson to support a literal reading of the rule prescribing the deposit. The court emphasized that if the language of the rule is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to its natural meaning even if the result may seem harsh (paras 18–26, 33–34).
- Plain meaning of the rule: The court concluded that Order 21, Rule 89 plainly prescribes a specified sum (5 per cent) to be deposited by the mortgagor as compensation. The court found no textual basis within the rule (or related rules such as Order 21, Rule 92 and Order 21, Rule 93) to read into that prescription an entitlement by purchasers to recover additional unquantified sums such as loss of interest or costs (paras 27, 31–39).
- Rejection of alternative rules and practices: The court rejected the purchasers' reliance on Chapter 27, Rule 37, holding that that rule applies to sales set aside at the instance of the purchaser for defects in title and involves materially different considerations (para 33). The court also explained that practices of the original side inconsistent with applicable rules of the Civil Procedure Code must yield to those rules; where the Code rule can be applied strictly, it must be so applied (para 36).
- Legislative intent and amendment: The court noted that where the legislature amended the rule by Act 21 of 1929 to provide one-fourth of the amount prescribed in certain mortgage sale settings, that amendment demonstrated that the legislature deliberately fixed the quantum of compensation and that it was not for the court to expand the specified compensation by judicial construction (para 30, 32).
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The court ruled that the purchasers are entitled only to the 5 per cent deposited by the mortgagor and to the return of their deposits, and are not entitled to any additional sum (such as loss of interest or costs) over and above the 5 per cent (para 40).
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The purchasers' claims for additional costs and interest beyond the prescribed 5 per cent are rejected; they may receive the 5 per cent deposited and the return of deposits as applicable (para 40).
- The mortgagor is to pay the costs of the parties who appeared on the motion (this was conceded) (para 41).
Broader implications: The opinion focuses on strict textual application of the rule prescribing 5 per cent and rejects judicial expansion of that prescribed sum. The opinion does not purport to set out a new rule-making exercise by the Court; rather it applies established principles of statutory interpretation to conclude that the statutory prescription is exhaustive. The opinion does not explicitly state that it is creating authoritative precedent beyond the disposition in this matter.
1. In this matter Sudhangshubhushan Mukherji, one of the mortgagors, applies for liberty to pay to the Registrar Rs. 1,365-0-0, being 5 per cent of the purchase money in respect of a sale held by the registrar of this Court under a mortgage decree on 11th April 2930. and that thereupon the sale be set aside.
2. It appears that the mortgagees have been paid and that a sum equivalent to 5 per cent of the purchase money was paid in on the last possible day. There wore three purchasers of four lots sold.
3. The only question for decision is whether these purchasers are entitled to anything over and above 5 per cent in their purchase money and of course the return of their deposits. The firm of Chandanmull Indrakumar, purchasers of lots 3 and 4 for Rs. 3,050 and Rs. 2,000, respectively claim in addition to the 5 per cent Rs. 604-13-0 as costs alleged to have been incurred in investigating the title and preparing for the completion of the sale before notice that the mortgagor was applying to set aside the sale.
4. Jumnadas Bagree, the purchaser of lot 1 for Rs. 17,200, claims an unspecified sum for similar costs. The third purchaser did not appear.
5. For the mortgagor it is argued that under Order 21, Rule 89 and Order 34, Rule 5 (2)- that is the amended rule under Act 21 of 1929, Civil P.C., the liability of the mortgagor is limited to 5 per cent.
6. Counsel for the purchasers relied on Ch. 27, Rule 37 of the rules and orders, and said that the matter had been considered recently by this Court, but could not give the reference. I have at last, thanks to the exertions of the Deputy Registrar, obtained a copy of the judgment referred to.
7. In my opinion the rights of the parties to this suit do not come within the provisions of Act 21 of 1929 by which Order 34 was amended, for although that Act came into force on 1st April 1930, by Section 15 (E) of the Act, nothing in the Act shall be deemed to affect anything done in the course of any proceeding pending in any Court on the aforesaid date. The sale was held on 11th April 1930, pursuant to a decree, dated 18th February 1929.
8. I regret that according to the decision of the Court of appeal in Virjiban Dass Moolji v. Biseswar Lal Hargovind A.I.R. 1921 Cal. 169, although the point was decided by Lort-Williams, J., I must consider it. For although I have the greatest respect for the learned Judge, in my opinion it is clear that his decision is erroneous. I must therefore consider the matter.
9. In the case just cited, the Court of appeal laid down the following propositions:
(1) That Order 21, Rule 89 applied to a sale tinder a mortgage decree and to the original side of a Chartered High Court, because it is not one of the rules referred to in Order 49, Rule 3 and because there is no specific provision in the rules framed by this Court under Clause 37, Letters Patent, which justifies the inference that it does not so apply.
(2) That Order 21, Rule 89, lays down that * * any person * * * may apply * * * on his depositing in Court certain prescribed sums.
10. In the recent decision in Kalyanee Debi v. Hari Mohan Ghosh , the learned Chief Justice had to consider the question of the amount which a mortgagor must deposit under Order 21, Rule 89, in respect of the sums due to the mortgagee, and as there is no " amount specified in the- proclamation of sale " within Order 21, Rule 89 (1) (b), under the practice of this Court, laid down that where a rule cannot be applied exactly it must be applied fairly and reasonably.
11. In Umeshchandra Banerji v. Kunjalal Biswas , Lort-Williams, J., considered whether a purchaser must pay, in addition to this 5 per cent, loss of interest and costs which he may have incurred. That learned Judge held that he was bound to pay these sums. As I am unable to follow the learned Judge, I must give my reasons. I have no wish to at-tribute to the learned Judge any reasoning which he did not intend and will: therefore only consider what be said.
12. The judgment begins with a discussion, about the power of a High Court to make rules. Then the learned Judge says that Order 21, Rule 89, is incompatible and inconsistent with the rules of the High Court on the original side, but immediately cites a decision of the Court of appeal, where it was held that it is not and states that he is bound by that decision.
13. Then he states that the difficulty in applying Order 21, Rule 89, to sales on the original side was recognized by the Chief Justice, in Kalyani Debi v. Hari Mohan Ghosh.
14. A reference to that decision however shows that any difficulty was with reference, not to the rule but to one provision in that rule, with which this ease has no concern. The learned Judge then quotes from the judgment of the learned Chief Justice:
Where owing to the difference between our original side practice and the mufassil practice, which is contemplated in the rule, it is impossible to apply the rule strictly, the Court must apply it as fairly as possible to the circumstances of a sale on the original side.
15. That is a decision of the Court of appeal and binding, but I find nothing in it to justify any idea that where it is not impossible to apply the rule, it is legitimate not to apply it strictly.
16. The learned Judge quotes another decision to the effect that the 5 per cent was given " partly " as a solatium to the purchaser for the loss of his bargain. The emphasis on the " partly " is mine.
17. Then the learned Judge says:
In many cases, if the 5 per cent is all that the purchaser is entitled to, it would mean that he would not get anything for the loss of his bargain and might be actually out of pocket on account of loss of interest on his money and for costs incurred. It cannot have been intended to give the judgment-debtor a special indulgence at the expense of an innocent third party. 1 am of opinion therefore that the purchaser in addition to the 5 per cent is entitled to be paid by the judgment-debtor any loss of interest and costs which he may have incurred. This conclusion in my opinion is indicated by Order 21, Rule 89 (3), and Order 21, Rule 93.
18. One reason for disagreeing with the conclusion of the learned Judge is that, with the greatest respect for the learned 'Judge, his judgment, in my opinion, conflicts with, among other decisions, the decision of the House of Lords in Vacher & Sons, Ltd. v. London Society of Compositors [1913] A.C. 107.
19. There the House of Lords considered the proper method of interpreting and applying a statute. In this case the rule under consideration is part of an Act, and must be read with the rules; framed by this Court. As I read the speeches, it was unanimously held that the mere fact that the literal meaning of the words used led to an injustice was no ground for disregarding the meaning.
20. Haldane, L.C., said:
In endeavouring to place the proper interpretation on the sections of the statute * * * * I propose * * * * to exclude consideration of everything excepting the state of the law as it was when the statute was passed, and the light to be got from reading it as a whole * * * *Subject to this consideration, I think that the only safe course is to read the language of the statute in what seems to be its natural sense.
21. Lord MacNaghten said:
In the absence of a preamble there can, I think, be only two cases in what it is permissible to depart from the ordinary and natural sense of the words of an enactment. It must be shown either that the words taken in their natural sense lead to some absurdity, or that in the Act there is something repugnant to or inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the words used.
22. Lord Atkinson says:
A Court of law has nothing to do with the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a provision of a statute, except so far as it may help it in interpreting what the legislature has said. If the language of a statute be plain, admitting of only one meaning, the legislature must be taken to have meant and intended what it has plainly expressed, and whatever it has in clear terms enacted must be enforced though it should lead to absurd or mischievous results.
23. Lord Shaw says a Court must loyally accept and plainly expound the simple words employed and must not "vaporize" them.
24. Lord Moulton says that the consideration of the result of a provision is only-relevant when there are two rival interpretations of the words used.
25. Lord MacNaghten alone supports the theory that absurdity of itself is a sufficient ground for disregarding the natural meaning of the words. But he does not suggest that in the case of an absurdity, the Court can disregard the words used altogether and re-draft the provision. Interpretation cannot go beyond the possible meaning of the words used.
26. In extreme cases, where the words conflict with the obvious intention of the enactment, they may be disregarded, but it must be an extreme case and the words are then construed as meaning nothing.
27. Now turning to the words of the rule nothing could be plainer; there are no rival interpretations of these words. I do not suggest that the learned Judge said that there were or that the result was absurd * * * * if the literal meaning were accepted. But, in my opinion, the rule first provides for the amount of compensation to be deposited by the mortgagor for payment to the purchaser. Obviously, it was desirable to fix the amount precisely; nothing could have been more unreasonable than to include costs which the purchaser might have incurred, for only 30 days are allowed for the deposit. In my opinion, the language is plain and unambiguous and Order 21, Rule 92, shows that this deposit made within a fixed date is the only condition precedent, if the application be granted, which can be exacted before the sale is set aside, as far as the purchaser is concerned.
28. It is immaterial to consider whether the learned Judge regarded the meaning of the rule as a question of interpretation, he was dealing with the provisions of an Act and, in my opinion, dealt with these provisions in a way which is certainly inconsistent with the decision of the House of Lords.
29. The rule is the same as in the previous Code. It occurs in a Code and in an order which deals with costs and interest. Had the legislature been so minded it could have provided for costs and interest. The context of the rule does not support any suggestion that these were overlooked. It is impossible to say that the legislature did not fix the compensation and irrelevant to say that it was fixed at too low a figure. I have considered whether there is any rule which throws any light on the meaning of this rule. The Court of appeal decided that point in 1920 and, as the learned Chief Justice followed the decision recently, there was no new rule modifying this rule at the time of his decision. Since then, there has been no new rule framed under the Letters Patent.
30. The rule has been amended by Act 21 of 1929, which provides that, in the ease of a sale under a decree in a mortgage suit, the purchaser is to receive as compensation, if the sale be set aside in circumstances such as are contemplated in Order 2L, Rule 89, one-fourth of the amount prescribed by that rule.
31. As regards the provisions of Order 21, Rule 89 (3), on which the learned Judge railed, they refer to sums due to the mortgagee. There could be no purchaser at the time when a proclamation of sale was made. Order 21, Rule 93, refers to interest payable by persons to whom the purchase money has been paid, and has nothing to do with a judgment-debtor.
32. Having regard to this amendment, if it was absurd or unjust to fix a sum equivalent to 5 per cent of the purchase money, the legislature has clearly shown that it was intentional. I must confess that, having regard to the fact that the rule extends to all Courts, I see no absurdity in it or in the amended rule.
33. The argument before me that Chap. 27, Rule 37 of the rules and orders applied is not well founded. That rule clearly refers to the case of a sale set aside at the instance of the purchaser for defect in the title of the mortgagor, and entirely different considerations apply to such a case.
34. Further, in my opinion, the conclusion arrived at is contrary to the decision of the Chief Justice. The learned Chief Justice says that the auction-purchaser in the appeal before him thought so highly of his bargain that he was not content with the 5 per cent. That does not suggest that the 5 per cent was obviously so inadequate that it could not have been intended. Then the Chief Justice says that the rule is a concession to the judgment-debtor and is to be applied strictly in cases to which the rule can be applied strictly. There is nothing to show that this was meant to mean strictly only as against the judgment-debtor, and in fact the Chief Justice applied the rule in favour of the judgment-debtor.
35. I am entirely unable to persuade myself that it is legitimate to read a rule which expressly prescribes a fixed sum as meaning that to that sum may be added an unascertained amount or that that result can be arrived at by any other method. As I read the judgment of Lord Hobhouse in Robinson v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. [1892] A.C. 481, it may be cited for the proposition that where the conditions are specified it must be taken that they were inserted in the rule for the purpose of showing that no other conditions other than those specified are to stand in the way of the statutory right conferred.
36. In my opinion the High Court has power to make rules inconsistent, if that be necessary, with the rules in the schedule to the Civil Procedure Code. 'That power it derives from the Letters Patent. Unless the High Court frames a rule on the same point, the orders and rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply to the original side save as provided in Order 49. Any "practice" of the original side inconsistent with the rules of the (Civil Procedure Code which apply, is contrary to law. Where a rule of the Code, owing to the operation of rules framed by this Court, cannot be applied exactly, it must be applied as reasonably as possible. Where it can be applied 'strictly, it must be so applied, and if the {result is unsatisfactory, the Court can {frame a different rule, but unless and until it does so, the rule must be followed, (and cannot be enlarged or altered in any {way by any judicial decision of this Court.
37. Now, turning once more to the rule. 'The words "5 per cent" only occur once. It would be extraordinary if the identical words meant two very different things : one at the time of the deposit and much more, assessed on a different principle, at the time of payment to the purchaser.
38. To justify any such method of construction, there must be something in the rules necessitating so radical a departure from the ordinary way of interpreting the same words in the same Act as meaning the same thing-which rule applies nonetheless where there is only one sentence referred to as a sentence again in an Act.
39. I cannot persuade myself that the words could mean or could be intended {to mean that the mortgagor must deposit one anna more than the prescribed 5 per cent. Nothing but the intractability of the words used in this or some other rule would induce me to interpret them as meaning more than 5 per cent as far as the amount of the deposit is concerned. To my mind, the words clearly express that intention and negative any other. It follows that it is not legitimate to construe them as meaning something more at the time of payment to the purchaser, for there is nothing in the rule or any rule of this Court that supports any such inference.
40. With the greatest respect for the learned Judge, I am unable to follow his ruling, and in my opinion the purchasers in this case are entitled to the 5 per cent-deposited and to nothing more.
41. The mortgagor must pay the costs of the parties who appeared on this motion -that is conceded by counsel for the mortgagor.
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