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Koyyalamudi Subbanna v. Koduri Subbarayudu
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Letters Patent Appeals arising from promissory notes)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeals arise from three suits concerning promissory notes allegedly executed in relation to debts of the late Chinna Veeranna. The plaintiffs sought decrees against the minor son (1st defendant) to the extent of his father's estate and personal decrees against Defendants 2 and 3, who had executed the promissory notes. Defendants 2 and 3 were respectively the minor's maternal uncle and brother-in-law; in various notes they described themselves either as guardians of the minor or as executors under the deceased father's Will. The District Munsif's decisions varied: in one posture decrees were entered against Defendants 2 and 3 personally and suits dismissed as to the minor's estate; in another the Subordinate Judge dismissed suits against Defendants 2 and 3 and passed decrees against the minor to the extent of his father's assets. The plaintiffs appealed to the High Court (second appeals), where Krishnan, J., passed decrees against Defendants 2 and 3 in two of the three suits but left the decree against the minor undisturbed (the minor had not appealed). Defendants 2 and 3 then filed these Letters Patent Appeals challenging personal liability on the promissory notes.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Defendants 2 and 3 are personally liable on the promissory notes they signed (either as executors, guardians, or otherwise) or whether their liability is limited to the assets of the deceased's estate or excluded entirely by their indicated representative capacity.
- How Sections 28 and 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Act apply to signatures made in a representative capacity (agents, guardians, executors) and whether the language of each promissory note unequivocally excludes personal liability.
- Whether the fact that Defendants 2 and 3 described themselves as executors in instruments (despite alleged invalidity of the Will as to joint family property) affects the applicability of Section 29 and their personal liability to holders of negotiable instruments.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants (Defendants 2 and 3) — summary of points advanced
- They contended they were not personally liable on the promissory notes.
- Where they described themselves as executors or guardians, they argued that the notes showed no personal undertaking to pay (i.e., liability was only on the deceased's estate or on the minor).
- Specifically, in respect of notes described as executed "as executors" they argued Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Act should not apply because the Will (naming them executors) was invalid as to joint family property, and therefore they were not true legal representatives/executors in law.
- They sought to rely on authorities (various decisions and analogies cited before the Court) to show that recourse should be limited to the estate or that personal liability was excluded by the language of the notes.
Plaintiffs / Respondents — summary of points advanced
- The plaintiffs claimed decrees against the 1st defendant to the extent of his father's estate and personal decrees against Defendants 2 and 3 as makers of the promissory notes.
- They relied on the express language of several notes and on statutory provisions (Sections 28 and 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Act) to contend that Defendants 2 and 3 were personally liable where they signed without indicating they signed only in a representative capacity or without expressly limiting liability.
- They argued a holder of negotiable instruments is not required to investigate the true legal status (e.g., whether a person is in fact an executor) when the instrument itself describes the signatory as an executor or guardian; thus Section 29 should apply where defendants described themselves as executors.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent / Authority | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sadasuk Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Prasad (Privy Council) | Principle that, as negotiable instruments pass from hand to hand, the person liable must be plainly disclosed; general application of the principle underlying representative signatures. | Cited as the most useful case supporting the view that the principles governing signatures in representative capacity are of general application and assist in deciding whether a signature discloses personal liability. |
| Ramaswami Mudaliar v. Muthuswami Aiyar | Application of the principle underlying Section 28 (agent signing) to the case of guardians signing promissory notes; indicates that facts showing a guardian's involvement are not alone sufficient to exclude personal liability. | Referred to as authority that courts have applied the principle of S.28 to guardians; used to support liability of guardians signing without clear exclusion of personal liability. |
| Krishna Chettiar v. Nagamani Ammal | Case cited by appellants' counsel (context: recovery from estate, trustee/executor/guardian questions). | Not examined in detail by the Court because it did not directly address the precise statutory question before the Court; the Court said such cases need not be considered in detail for the present issue. |
| Ramajogaya v. Jagannadhan | Case cited among decisions dealing with recourse to estate or executor/guardian liability. | The Court did not consider it in detail for the specific question of Sections 28/29 application and liability on negotiable instruments. |
| Ammalu Ammal v. Namagiri Ammal | Case cited by counsel relating to similar areas of trustee/executor liability. | Not discussed in detail; Court indicated these authorities did not directly decide the statutory point before it. |
| French v. Howie and Wife; Moore v. Flanagan and Wife | Rules relating to 'rule of election' (raised as a possible new point by appellants' counsel). | The Court did not permit these points to be raised because they were not raised before the lower court; no application of these cases in the decision. |
| Krishna Aiyar v. Krishnaswami Aiyar (cited on alternative pleading) | Illustration that courts may pass a decree against a minor himself provided plaint framed alternatively (sue guardian on the note and the minor alternatively on the consideration). | Not directly decided here (issue did not arise) but cited as authority supporting alternative pleading practice; the Court noted the point but did not adjudicate it. |
| Unreported Appeal No. 306 of 1922 (High Court file) | Reportedly applied the principle of Section 28 to guardians and wards. | Referred to as another instance where the principle underlying S.28 was assumed applicable to guardian cases; used to support the Court's approach. |
| Chalmers, Law of Bills of Exchange (treatise) | Observation on difficulty of determining whether a signature is agent's or principal's and the need for clarity as instruments circulate. | Used by the Court to underscore the general difficulty and to support emphasis on clear disclosure of representative capacity on negotiable instruments. |
| Section 28, Negotiable Instruments Act (statute) | An agent who signs a promissory note without indicating that he signs as agent or that he does not intend to incur personal liability is personally liable. | Applied by the Court as the rule that an agent/guardian who signs is prima facie personally liable unless the instrument unequivocally indicates otherwise; applied (by analogy) to guardians in relevant notes. |
| Section 29, Negotiable Instruments Act (statute) | A legal representative (executor/administrator) who signs a promissory note is personally liable unless he expressly limits his liability to the extent of the assets received by him as such. | Directly applied where defendants described themselves as executors: because they did not expressly limit liability to estate/assets, the Court held them personally liable on those notes to holders. |
| Section 26, Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (English statute) | English provision requiring words excluding personal liability to be added to the signature itself; referenced for contrast with Indian law. | Used for comparative purpose: the Court noted the Indian provision (S.28) is less strict and intention may be inferred from the whole instrument rather than signature alone. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court engaged in a textual and statutory construction exercise applied to each promissory note and to the relevant statutory provisions:
- The Court began from the general proposition that on a negotiable instrument only the executant is liable, and that the central question is, on a fair construction, who is the executant of the document (i.e., whether the signatory intended to incur personal liability or to sign in a representative capacity).
- Section 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was interpreted to mean that an agent who signs a promissory note is prima facie personally liable unless he clearly indicates on the instrument that he signs as agent or that he does not intend to incur personal liability. The Court noted that under the Indian Act the intention may be inferred from the whole instrument (contrasting Section 26 of the English Act which requires words to be added to the signature itself).
- Applying Section 28 (and the principles in Sadasuk Janki Das), the Court examined the particular language of the notes signed by Defendants 2 and 3 when they appeared as guardians. Where the preamble or body was ambiguous but the operative clause used unconditional language (e.g., "We shall pay, either of us, on demand" or "We both individually promise to pay..."), and the signatures gave no indication of representative capacity, the Court held that a reasonable reader would connect 'We' to the signatories and treat them as personally liable.
- Where the signature portion expressly stated that the signatories were signing "on behalf of" the minor or expressly described themselves as "guardians of minor Viswanatham" in the signature portion, the Court found that such language clearly indicated the exclusion of personal liability and therefore those notes did not give rise to personal liability of Defendants 2 and 3.
- For notes where Defendants 2 and 3 described themselves as "executors" in the preamble, the Court turned to Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which specifically addresses legal representatives. Section 29 provides that a legal representative who signs is personally liable unless he expressly limits his liability to the extent of assets received. The Court reasoned that a holder of a negotiable instrument is not expected to verify the legal correctness of the signatory's description (i.e., whether a Will is valid or whether the signatory is truly an executor in law), and therefore if a person describes himself as an executor, Section 29 applies. Because the promissory notes so described the signatories as executors and did not expressly limit liability, the Court held them personally liable under Section 29.
- The Court rejected the appellants' contention that Section 29 was inapplicable because the Will was invalid vis-à-vis joint family property; the Court emphasized the negotiating function of promissory notes and that persons dealing with such instruments are entitled to treat the instrument's description as conclusive for circulation purposes.
- The Court also noted the different statutory standards: under Section 28 an agent's personal liability can be excluded by sufficiently unequivocal words anywhere in the instrument, while under Section 29 an executor's liability can be limited only by express words limiting liability to estate assets.
- Both judges (Venkatasubba Rao, J. and Madhavan Nair, J.) applied these principles to the three appeals individually, upholding personal liability in the cases where the operative language and signature did not exclude it, and setting aside liability where the signature portion expressly disclosed representative capacity (guardian) and thereby excluded personal liability.
- The Court declined to entertain a new point relating to the rule of election raised for the first time before them by appellants' counsel, because it had not been raised before Krishnan, J.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The Letters Patent Appeals result in two appeals being dismissed and one appeal being allowed. Specifically:
- L.P. Appeals Nos. 64 and 66 of 1924 — dismissed with costs. The Court held that, on the construction of the promissory notes and by application of Section 29 (for executors) and Section 28 principles (by analogy for guardians where appropriate), Defendants 2 and 3 were personally liable on those notes because they signed without expressly limiting their liability or without indicating representative capacity in a manner that excluded personal liability.
- L.P. Appeal No. 65 of 1924 — allowed with costs; suit dismissed against Defendants 2 and 3. In this note the signature portion expressly described the signatories as "guardians of minor Viswanatham," and thus the Court found that they had indicated they did not intend to incur personal liability; consequently they were not personally liable on that note and the plaintiff's remedy was confined to the minor's estate.
Implications (direct effects):
- For the parties: plaintiffs obtain personal decrees against Defendants 2 and 3 on the notes covered by Appeals Nos. 64 and 66 (because the notes did not unequivocally exclude personal liability and in any event Section 29 applied where the signatories were described as executors and did not expressly limit liability). For the note in Appeal No. 65, plaintiffs are restricted to recovery from the minor's estate; Defendants 2 and 3 are not personally liable on that particular instrument.
- On legal principle: the opinion reiterates and applies established principles concerning signatures in a representative capacity under Sections 28 and 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and endorses the approach that a holder of a negotiable instrument may rely upon the instrument's description of the signatory (executor/guardian) for circulation purposes. The judgment distinguishes between the standards of exclusion under S.28 (agent — intention may be inferred from the whole instrument) and S.29 (legal representative — express limitation to extent of assets required).
- The Court did not purport to lay down a new overarching precedent beyond application of existing statutory provisions and cited authorities; the decision turns on statutory construction and the specific language of the promissory notes involved.
Note: This summary reflects only the information expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or interpretations beyond the text.
Venkatasubba Rao, J.:— These three appeals have been filed against the judgment of Krishnan, J. Defendants 2 and 3 are the executants of the promissory notes in question. In some notes they described themselves as the guardians of the 1st defendant, in others as executors under his father's Will. The 1st defendant was and continues to be a minor. The 2nd and 3rd defendants are respectively the maternal uncle and the brother-in-law of the 1st defendant. The plaintiffs in these suits asked for a decree against the 1st defendant to the extent of the assets of his father's estate and against Defendants 2 and 3 personally. It is not necessary to say what the decision of the trial Court was, but the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suits against Defendants, 2 and 3 and passed decrees against the 1st defendant to the extent of the assets of his father. The plaintiffs preferred second appeals to the High Court and Krishnar, J., in all the three suits passed decrees against Defendants 2 and 3. As the first defendant had not appealed to the High Court the decree against him was not disturbed. Defendants 2 and 3 have filed the present Letters Patent appeals. They contend that they are not liable on the promissory notes.
2. On a negotiable instrument only the executant is liable. This proposition admits of no doubt. The question that has in each case to be determined is, on a fair construction, who is the executant of the document? As Chalmers says:
“It is often difficult to determine whether a given signature is the signature of the principal by the band of an agent, or the signature of the agent naming a principal.”
See Law of Bills of Exchange, 8th Edn p. 91.
3. The law relating to negotiable instruments differs from the ordinary law of contracts in several respects. The liability must be determined on the wording of the note and in each case the question is: Is the instrument so drawn in form as to make the executant liable or the principal liable? In other words, who is the real executant of the documents? Is the executant in truth the principal although the agent's signature appears on the bill, or is the executant the agent although the principal is named? So far as the Indian Law is concerned, Section 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act enacts the rule of law applicable to agents. The material portion of the section runs thus:
“An agent who signs his name to a promissory note without indicating thereon that he signs as agent or that he does not intend thereby to incur personal liability is liable personally on the instrument.”
4. Under the section an agent signing the note prima facie is liable but he may exclude his liability by indicating on the note that he signs as agent or that he does not intend to incur personal liability. In each case the question is: Are the words sufficiently unequivocal to indicate that the agent has not made himself personally liable?
5. Section 28 of the Indian Act is in one respect strikingly different from Section 26 of the Bills of Exchange, Act, 1882. The English Act requires that the words indicating that the personal liability is excluded must be added to the signature itself. The Indian Act is less rigorous and from the whole of the instrument the intention may be inferred.
6. The most useful case on the subject is Sadasuk Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Prasad(1). Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee point out that as the document passes from hand to hand it is of the utmost importance that the responsibility is made plain and can be instantly recognized. The English theory of bills, as Chalmers observes in his introduction to the work already quoted, is the banking or currency theory and in England, bills have developed into a perfectly flexible paper currency. It follows, therefore, that as the note passes from hand to hand the real name of the person liable upon it must be disclosed.
7. In the light of this principle I shall first examine; the promissory note in Letters Patent Appeal No. 66 of 1924. The note is signed by the two guardians. Their representative character is not disclosed in the signature. In regard to the body of the note, the following points are no doubt in favour of the appellants:—
(1) The debt is mentioned as having been originally due by the minor's father:
(2) It is stated that their ward is a minor and that they were appointed guardians.
8. But the language in the opening portion of the note is ambiguous. It is susceptible of two meanings: literally it means that the guardians are executing the note because their ward is a minor. What may be said to be the idiomatic meaning is, that the guardians are executing the note on behalf of the minor.
9. In the operative part of the note, they make themselves unconditionally liable. They say:—
“We shall pay, either of us, on demand.”
10. Who are referred to by this Word ‘We’. The words in the preamble being doubtful and there being no ambiguity in regard to the signature, the proper view to take is, that anyone reading the note will reasonably connect the word ‘We’ with the names appearing at the bottom of the note.
11. It is true that the debt of the minor's rather is mentioned in the body of the document. But, on this does it necessarily follow that the executants are not personally liable? Supposing the guardians had been pressed for payment of the debt and they undertook to pay the amount personally themselves, can it be said that such a note as the present could not have been passed? In my opinion, a mere allusion to the pre-existing debt does not clinch the question. On the whole I think that the wording does not clearly unequivocally exclude the personal liability, of the executants and that Krishnan, J.'s decision in regard to this note must be upheld.
12. Before passing on to the next note, I desire to make one observation. Unlike Section 26 of the English Act, which deals generally with the liability of persons signing in any representative capacity, Section 28 of the Indian Act in terms applies only to single case of agents and principals. But it seems to me that there is no reason to make the scope of the section so narrow ami indeed their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case already quoted [Sadasuk Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Prasad], first state the principles as of general application and then proceed to say that the sections of the Negotiable Instruments Act contain nothing inconsistent with those general principles. In Ramaswami Mudaliar v. Muihuswami Aiyar(2) and the unreported Appeal No. 306 of 1922 on the file of the High Court, the principle of S. 28 is tacitly assumed to be applicable to cases of guardian and ward.
13. Now I pass on to the note in L.P Appeal No. 65 of 1924. This bears a very close resemblance to the note which I have just dealt with. But there is a striking difference in one particular, that in the signature portion it is made to appear that the guardians are signing the note on behalf of the minor. The point is thus left no longer in doubt, and, on the construction of the note, I find that the guardians have clearly indicated that they did not intend to incur personal responsibility. In my opinion, therefore, Krishnan, J.'s decision in regard to this note is wrong, and cannot be supported.
14. I shall next deal with the promissory note in L.P Appeal No. 64 of 1924. To my mind these present no difficulty. The appellants do not describe themselves as guardians but as executors, and the section that applies is Section 29 of the Negotiable Instalments Act. The relevant portion of that section is as follows:
“A legal representative of a deceased person who signs his name to a promissory note is liable personally thereon unless he expressly limits his liability to the extent of the assets received by him as such.”
15. The language of S. 29 is widely different from that of S. 28. In the first place, under S. 28 it is sufficient to indicate that personal liability is excluded. Under S. 29 there must be express words limiting the liability. Secondly, under S. 28 the agent's liability may be altogether excluded, but under S. 29 the executor's liability can only be limited to the extent of the assets.
16. These notes purport to have been executed by the appellants in their capacity as executors. When S. 29 specifically deals with the case, it is not permissible to invoke the principle of S. 28. The appellant's learned vakil has contended that his clients were not in fact executors because the minor's father could not have made a valid appointment of executors. Granting this to be so, it does not in my opinion make the slightest difference. We are concerned not with the fact whether they are executors, but only whether they have described themselves as executors. It is not to be expected that when the paper passes from hand to hand every successive holder is to satisfy himself as regards the truth of the statement in the note; and I am not prepared to accept the contention that the section has no application unless the executant happens to be in fact a legal representative. I am, therefore, of the opinion that Krishnan, J.'s judgment in regard to this note is right and must accordingly be confirmed.
17. I feel that it is necessary that I must add one word. The lower Court has passed a decree against the minor and he, has not filed an appeal challenging its correctness. We are, therefore, not concerned with the propriety or otherwise of the decree against the minor. But nevertheless it seems to me that although the agent is personally liable on the note, there is nothing to prevent the Court from passing a decree against the minor himself provided that the plaint is framed in an alternative form suing the guardian on the note and the minor alternatively on the consideration: see Sadasuk Janiki Das v. Sir Kishan Prasad and Krishna Aiyar v. Krishnaswami Aiyar(3). This question, however, does not here arise and need not be pursued further.
18. I may state in conclusion that Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar, the learned vakil for the appellants, desired to raise a new point, one relating to the rule of election as laid down an French v. Howie and Wife(4) and Moore v. Flanagan and Wife(5), but that we did not permit him to raise this point as he did not raise it before Krishnan, J., and attempted to do so for the first time before us.
19. The result is that L.P Appeals Nos. 64 and 66 of 1924 are dismissed with costs and L.P Appeal No. 65 of 1924 is allowed and the suit dismissed with costs throughout against Defendants 2 and 3.
Madhavan Nair, J.:— These Letters Patent Appeals are directed against the decision of Krishnan, J., in three second appeals which arose out of suits instituted by the plaintiff for the recovery of the money due to them on promissory notes executed by Defendants 2 and 3. The 1st defendant is the minor son of one Veeranna who died leaving debts. Though the property belonging to him is joint family property, Veeranna nevertheless executed a Will naming Defendants 2 and 3 as executors. Though the document is invalid, so far as it purported to deal with joint family property, Defendants 2 and 3 entered upon the management under the Will and executed the various suit promissory notes to Veeranna's creditors. The plaintiffs in these suits claimed decrees against Defendants 2 and 3 personally as the makers of the promissory notes and against the estate of the 1st defendant. The District Munsif gave a decree against Defendants 2 and 3 personally and dismissed the suits against the minor's estate. Both the plaintiffs and Defendants 2 and 3 preferred appeals to the Subordinate Judge who gave decrees against the estate of the minor dismissing the suits against Defendants 2, and 3. The minor i.e, the 1st defendant, did not appeal to the High Court, but the plaintiffs preferred second appeals, claiming personal decrees against Defendants 2 and 3. The learned Judge, Krishnan, J., set aside the decrees passed by the Subordinate Judge with the result that the plaintiffs in the High Court succeeded in obtaining the decrees against Defendants 2 and 3 personally.
20. The question, for determination in all these Letters Patent appeals is the same, namely, whether Defendants 2 and 3 are personally liable under the suit promissory notes.
21. L.P.A No. 64 of 1924.—As there is some difference in the language of the promissory notes in the various suits, and as the argument, advanced by the learned vakils on both sides had reference to the language, it will be useful to refer to these promissory notes at the very commencement. Exs. A, B, E and F are the four promissory notes, in this Letters Patent appeal against S.A No. 998 of 1921. Ex. A states in its preamble that it is “executed by Subbanna and Satyanarayana (Defendants 2 and 3) jointly as executors appointed in accordance with, the registered Will of the late Chinna Veeranna, his son Viswanatham being a minor….” In its body it states: “On demand we promise to pay to you or to your order the sum of Rs. 113-2-0 only, the amount borrowed to serve our need, i.e, the amount we have agreed to pay on behalf of the aforesaid Chinna Veeranna……” This promissory note is signed by the two defendants without the qualification as executors being added to their signatures. Ex. B is similar to Ex. A, except that in its body the statement “the amount we have agreed to pay on behalf of the aforesaid Chinna Veeranna” is absent. It simply says: “On demand we promise to pay to you or to your order the sum of Rs. 585-10-6 only, the amount borrowed to serve our need, i.e, the amount of principal and interest on the promissory note executed by the late Chinna Veeranna.” The preambles of Exs. E and F are similar to those of Exs. A and B, with this difference, that in the preamble of Ex. F “his son Viswanatham beinga minor” is absent. In the body of these two promissory notes, Exs. E and F, we find the expression: “We both individually promise to pay to you or to your order the sum of Rupees…….” which does not appear in Exs. A and B. These promissory notes run thus: “We both individually promise to pay to you or to your order the sum of Rupees………on the promissory note executed by the late Chinna Veeranna.” In the signature portion of all these promissory notes the names of Defendants 2 and 3 appear without any qualification. Though these promissory notes thus present some special features they agree in this respect that each of them is stated in the preamble to have been executed by Defendants 2 and 3 “as executors” and signed, by them without disclosing their representative capacity.
22. Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar, the learned vakil for the appellants, argues that the language used in these promissory notes distinctly shows that the appellants have not undertaken any personal liability to pay the promissory note debts and that the learned Jude was wrong in applying Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in deciding this case, inasmuch as it is clear that Defendants 2 and 3 cannot in law be considered executors as the deceased Veeranna had no power to execute a Will, the property being joint family property. S. 29 being inapplicable, and the language of the documents showing that there was no personal, liability, the learned vakil argues on the analogy of various decisions which he has brought to our notice that in this case the only decree that could be passed is one against the estate of the deceased Veeranna.
23. The important question for consideration is whether Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Act applies to this case. S. 29 runs as follows:
“A legal representative of a deceased person who signs his name to a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque is liable personally thereon, unless he expressly limits his liability to the extent of the assets received by him as such.”
24. The term “legal representative” includes executors or administrators. If this section is applicable, Defendants 2 and 3 are liable personally on these promissory notes, as they say in the preamble of the notes that they have executed them “jointly as executors appointed in accordance with the registered Will of the late Chinna Veeranna.” The argument that Defendants 2 and 3 are not, strictly speaking, executors and therefore S. 29 is inapplicable cannot be accepted; for we are dealing with promissory notes and it is well known that those are intended to pass freely from hand to hand and a party who takes a negotiable instrument of the class we are dealing with is not expected to decide for himself whether the person who has executed the instrument in his capacity as an executor is really an executor in the eye of the law or not, before accepting the note. If this principle is not given effect to the very object of a negotiable instrument would be defeated. Defendants 2 and 3 having described themselves as executors, persons dealing with them on the promissory notes will naturally treat them as executors, and the promissory notes will be passed on from hand to hand distinctly on that understanding. It is necessary, there fore, that S. 29 should be applied in a case like the present one; and if so, Defendants 2 and 3 are clearly liable personally, unless they are able to show that they have expressly limited their liability to the extent of the assets received by them as such. The language of the promissory notes that I have already referred to speaks with no uncertain voice. In none of them is the liability of the executants expressly limited in any way to the extent of the assets received by them as such, while in all of them there is a distinct promise to pay made by the executants. The cases cited by Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar in this connexion need not be considered in detail, as most of them deal with the question bow far can recourse he had to the estate on notes executed by an executor, or guardian of a minor or trustee of a property. The decisions in Krishna Chettiar v. Nagamani Ammal(6), Ramajogaya v. Jagannadhan(7) and Ammalu Ammal v. Namagiri Ammal(8) and the other cases cited by him do not deal with the question with which we are here concerned. As the executants of the promissory notes in question have not in any way expressly limited their liability to the extent of the assets received by them, I must hold that Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Act applies to this case and that the decision of the learned Judge is right. I dismiss this Letters Patent Appeal with costs.
25. L.P.A Nos. 65 and 66 of 1924.—The langugage of the promissory notes in these appeals is different from the language of the notes already examined. The preamble speaks of these notes as promissory notes executed “by guardians under the Will of the late Veeranna, as Viswanatham happens to be a minor.”
26. L.P.A No. 66 of 1924.—In L.P.A No. 66 the body of the note, amongst other things, contains the statement that: “On demand the amount of principal and interest accrued up to date……will be paid by either of us.” In this appeal the two executants signed the promissory note with their names without describing themselves as guardians. The language of the promissory note, Ex. A, which I have noticed above, distinctly shows that the executants intended to incur personal liability on this note; Though there are no specific provisions in the Negotiable Instruments Act regarding the liability of a guardian on a promissory note executed by him, it seems to me that the principle underlying S. 28 regarding the liability of an agent signing a promissory note may well be applied to such a case. S. 28 of the Act deals only with the case of agents and principals, in this respect differing from Section 26 of the English Act which deals generally with the liability of persons signing in a representative capacity. In two decisions of this Court the principle underlying Section 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been applied in deciding on the liability of a guardian executing a promissory note on behalf of the minor. Ramaswami Mudaliar v. Muthuswami Aiyar. The 2nd defendant who was described in the body of the note as the guardian of the 1st defendant who was at its date a minor, and the necessity for borrowing was stated in it as arising from the 1st defendant's father's debt. The learned Judges state: “We are not, however, prepared to treat those facts alone as sufficient to indicate that 2nd defendant signed as 1st defendant's guardian or did not intend to incur personal liability.” The 2nd defendant was therefore held liable on the promissory note. The extract from the judgment shows that the learned Judges in deciding the case have assumed that the principle of Section 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is applicable to the case of the guardian and ward: See also the unreported decision in Appeal No. 306 of 1922 on the file of the High Court. The decision in the Privy Council in Sadasuk Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Prasad supports the view that a general application can be given of the principle underlying Section 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Defendants 2 and 3 in this case have not indicated that they signed the promissory note as agents or that they did not intend to incur personal liability. On the other hand, the language of the promissory note, in my opinion, distinctly shows that they are personally liable. The decision of the learned Judge is, therefore, right and this Letters Patent Appeal No. 66 should be dismissed with costs. L.P.A No. 65 of 1924.—In this appeal the language used in the preamble 1 and in the body of the promissory note indicating, the liability of Defendants 2 and 3 is like the language in the promissory note in L.P.A No. 66, but the executants in signing the promissory note described themselves in the signature portion as “guardians of minor Viswanatham.” This is a distinctive feature of this note and in this respect it differs from the promissory note, Ex. A, just noticed. When we read the promissory note bearing this feature in mind, the conclusion is irresistible that the executants have signed this note merely as guardians excluding thereby their personal liability. It therefore follows that, on the language of this note, Defendants 2 and 3 are not personally liable. As the construction that I am putting on the language of this promissory note is different from that given to it by the learned Judge, the decision in S.A No. 999 of 1921 must be set aside. The plaintiff in this case will only be entitled to a decree against the minor's estate and not against the guardians personally. This Letters Patent Appeal is allowed with costs, throughout.
27. As pointed out by my learned brother, we have not allowed the learned vakil for the appellants to argue a new point which he desired to raise in these appeals.
28. A. Nos. 64 and 66 of 1924 dismissed.
29. A. No. 65 of 1924 allowed.
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