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Panna Lal v. Rameshar Sahai

Allahabad High Court
Mar 17, 1915
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Judicial Opinion — Structured Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion arises on an appeal from a remand order dated 3 July 1914. The lower Appellate Court, on the remanded issue, found that the plaintiff is the successor-in-interest of the original mortgagor. The essential factual matrix recapitulated in the opinion is as follows:

  • On 24 January 1867 the predecessor-in-title of the present plaintiff mortgaged by conditional sale a house in Chandausi to Hazari Lal, who was put in possession.
  • On 15 June 1873 Hazari Lal executed a deed purporting to sell the shop to Panna Lal (defendant-appellant). The deed recited that the shop had come into Hazari Lal's possession under a mortgage by conditional sale but stated he was now in possession as a full owner; it did not recite any foreclosure.
  • The lower Appellate Court found that the vendee (Panna Lal) did not in fact believe that his vendor had power to convey an absolute interest in the shop.
  • The present appeal challenges, among other matters, the correctness of that finding and raises questions about the application of limitation provisions (especially Articles 134 and 148 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, IX of 1908) and the relation of those provisions to the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the lower Appellate Court's finding that the vendee (Panna Lal) did not in fact believe that his vendor had power to convey an absolute interest was open to that court on the materials before it.
  2. Whether, on the factual findings (including that the plaintiff is successor-in-interest of the mortgagor), the present suit for redemption is barred by limitation — in particular, whether Article 134 of the First Schedule (limitation for suits for possession) applies, or whether Article 148 (limitation for suits for redemption — sixty years) governs.
  3. Whether a purchaser who takes under a deed purporting to convey full proprietary rights but who actually acquires only mortgagee rights should be treated as a transferee of mortgagee rights (rendering an action a suit for redemption) or as an adverse possessor protected by Article 134, and how that classification interacts with Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant challenged the correctness of the lower Appellate Court's factual finding that the vendee did not believe his vendor had power to convey an absolute interest, contending that the finding was not fairly open on the record.
  • The appellant relied on decisions it contended were inconsistent with the older course of decisions relied upon by the respondent, pointing to later opinions in this Court (notably Behari Lal v. Muhammad Muttaki) and other judges' decisions (e.g., Dal Singh v. Gur Prasad and an unreported Second Appeal No. 547 of 1914) as showing a different approach to the operation of Article 134.
  • The appellant also urged that other High Courts (particularly the Bombay High Court) adopt a contrary line of authority on the operation of Article 134, citing a series of Bombay decisions as representing a consensus inconsistent with some decisions of this Court.

Plaintiff-Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent relied on a long course of decisions of this Court (including Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din, Kampta Prasad v. Bakar Ali, and Husaini Khanam v. Husain Khan) to the effect that, on the findings before the lower court, the suit for redemption must succeed and the plea of limitation must be overruled.
  • The respondent asserted that the present action is, on its face, a suit for redemption (governed by Article 148 — sixty years) when brought against the legal representatives of the original mortgagee and against any transferee of mortgagee rights.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din (9 A. 97 : A.W.N. (1886) 303) Cited as part of a long course of decisions supporting that the suit for redemption must succeed and limitation plea should be overruled on the facts found. Placed among reported decisions of this Court which the judge considered binding and supportive of the respondent's position that the suit is not barred.
Kampta Prasad v. Bakar Ali (A.W.N. (1881) 122) One of the earlier decisions of this Court relied upon for the proposition that redemption suits succeed in similar circumstances. Included with other older cases as binding authority for the respondent's contention; judge stated he was bound by these decisions.
Husaini Khanam v. Husain Khan (29 A. 471: A.W.N. (1907) 133 : 4 A.L.J. 375) Relied upon by the plaintiff-respondent as a recent decision of this Court supporting the respondent's position on limitation and redemption. Recognised as the latest decision of this Court relied on by the respondent; discussed as possibly proceeding upon a particular view about transfers by trustees or mortgagees.
Behari (Bchari) Lal v. Muhammad Muttaki (20 A. 482 : A.W.N. (1898) 123) Referred to by the appellant as later opinion allegedly inconsistent with older decisions of this Court; concerns application of Article 134. The court examined the point and held that Behari Lal does not conflict with the course of decisions of this Court governing transfers by mortgagees and was not shown to have overruled older cases relied upon by the respondent.
Dal Singh v. Gur Prasad (2 Ind. Cas. 250 : 12 O.C. 84) Cited as a decision elsewhere (Oudh) and said to have been recently re-affirmed by the same judge in an unreported second appeal, argued to support the appellant's position. Noted by the court as part of appellant's reliance; court did not treat these as displacing the earlier reported decisions cited for the respondent.
Abhiram Goswami Mohant v. Shyama Charan Nandi (4 Ind. Cas. 449 : 6 A.L.J. 857 ...) Privy Council decision cited as an authority allegedly inconsistent with Husaini Khanam on the effect of a mortgage by a trustee or mortgagee amounting to a "purchase" under Article 134. The opinion records the contention of inconsistency between Husaini Khanam and the Privy Council decision; the court treated this as a point to be noted but did not resolve it against the older bench decisions it considered binding.
Baiva Khan Daud Khan v. Bhiki Sabza (9 B. 475) Bombay High Court authority cited as representing a line of decisions contrary to some decisions of this Court about Article 134. Used by the appellant to show a contrary consensus in Bombay; the court observed that Calcutta and Madras cases cited were transfers by trustees (distinguishing them from transfers by mortgagees).
Yesu Ramji Kalnath v. Balkrishna Lakshman (15 B. 583) Another Bombay High Court decision cited in support of a contrary position on Article 134. Noted by the court as part of the Bombay line of authority; the court acknowledged the divergence but did not adopt it.
Pandu v. Vithu (19 B. 140) Cited as part of the Bombay High Court decisions forming a contrary trend. Noted in argument; the court recognized the differing authorities but relied on its own bench decisions applicable to mortgagee transfers.
Ramchandra v. Sheikh Mohidin (23 B. 614) Another Bombay decision relied on by appellant for a contrary approach to Article 134. Recorded as part of the appellant's authorities showing a different approach in Bombay; the court distinguished trustee transfers from mortgagee transfers.
Ram Kanai Ghosh v. Raja Sri Sri Hari Narayan Singh Deo Bahadur (2 C.L.J. 546) Cited by the appellant as an additional authority in argument. Referred to in argument; court did not rely on it to disturb the older decisions of this Court which it found binding.
Chettokulam Prasanna Venkata-chela Reddiar v. Collector of Trichinopoly (24 Ind. Cas. 369 : (1914) M.W.N.587 : 26 M.L.J. 537) Cited as an authority relevant to the general debate on Article 134 and its application in other High Courts. Noted among the array of authorities presented in argument; not treated as displacing the court's view on mortgagee transfers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in distinct steps, each grounded in the facts found by the lower Appellate Court and in the applicable statutory provisions:

  1. Accepting the lower Appellate Court's factual finding: The judge declines to disturb the lower Appellate Court's finding that Panna Lal did not in fact believe his vendor had power to convey an absolute interest, noting that the lower court had material — documentary wording, facts about location and residence, and oral evidence — on which to base that finding.
  2. Consequences of that finding for limitation: If that finding stands, then, following a long course of decisions of this Court, the suit for redemption must succeed and the defendant's plea of limitation must be overruled.
  3. Statutory framework: The opinion analyses Articles 134 and 148 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act (IX of 1908) and the effect of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882). The court notes that on its face the suit is for redemption and governed by Article 148 (sixty years) when brought against a mortgagee or transferee of mortgagee rights.
  4. Need to classify the defendant's status: The court states the central question is whether Panna Lal is a transferee of mortgagee rights (making the suit one for redemption governed by Article 148) or a person who came into possession under a title adverse to the mortgagor (potentially attracting Article 134).
  5. Three possible legal characterisations:
    • The court might confine itself strictly to the terms of Panna Lal's deed (a sale-deed) and treat him as holding full proprietary title on the face of the document, in which case the action against him could be a suit for recovery of possession.
    • The court might treat the deed in law as conveying only whatever rights the vendor actually possessed (i.e., mortgagee rights), so that Panna Lal would be a transferee of mortgagee rights and the suit would be for redemption subject to the sixty-year period.
    • If the purchaser honestly believed he had received full proprietary rights and acted as a full proprietor, then under the line of reported decisions of this Court he would be entitled to the protection of Article 134, which effectively makes his possession adverse to the owner of the equity of redemption from the date of sale to him.
  6. Interplay with Section 60 Transfer of Property Act: The judge expresses concern that the first view (allowing Article 134 to run against the mortgagor merely because a mortgagee executed a sale-deed purporting to transfer full title) would conflict with Section 60 T.P. Act and established principles that a mortgagor's right to redeem subsists until extinguished by act of parties or order of court. The court states it is settled law that an assertion of adverse title by a mortgagee during the continuance of a mortgage cannot of itself start time running so as to deprive the mortgagor of the right to redeem.
  7. Practical consequences considered: The judge illustrates the difficulty of accepting the Bombay High Court view (as represented in argument) by hypothetical reasoning — if a mortgagee in possession could by a sale-deed to a third party compel the mortgagor to sue for redemption within twelve years or lose rights, that would be an unlikely legislative intention and produce harsh results inconsistent with the Transfer of Property Act.
  8. Conclusion of analysis: On the facts found by the lower Appellate Court and the binding authorities of this Court relied upon, the suit for redemption is not barred by limitation. The court also records its independent reasoning (in addition to reliance on bench decisions) to show that on multiple analyses the suit as brought would be within time.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The court states explicitly that, given the lower Appellate Court's findings and the authorities to which it is bound, "this suit for redemption must succeed and the plea of limitation set up by the defendant-appellant must be overruled." The ultimate order is: the appeal is dismissed with costs, including fees on the higher scale.

Immediate Consequences for the Parties

  • The dismissal of the appeal leaves in place the findings of the lower Appellate Court that the plaintiff is successor-in-interest of the original mortgagor and that the vendee did not honestly believe he had power to convey full title.
  • As formulated by the court, the defendant-appellant's plea of limitation is overruled, and the suit for redemption is preserved (i.e., the plaintiff's right to redeem is recognised as not barred by limitation on the grounds argued by the defendant).
  • The successful party is awarded costs, including fees on the higher scale, as ordered in the opinion.

Broader Legal Implications (as discussed in the Opinion)

The court observed tensions between interpretations of Article 134 (First Schedule to the Limitation Act) that would treat certain transfers by mortgagees as triggering shorter limitation periods, and the provisions of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act protecting a mortgagor's right to redeem until extinguished by act of the parties or order of a court. The judge recorded that he is bound by a series of reported decisions of this Court favouring the respondent's position, but also offered independent reasoning reflecting reluctance to accept an interpretation that would allow a mortgagee's bare assertion of adverse title to start the running of limitation against a mortgagor. The opinion thus affirms the existing bench authority of this Court on the point and articulates a principled basis for preferring the view that safeguards the mortgagor's right to redeem.

Note: This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what is contained in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. I have stated the facts of this case at some length in my remand order of July the 3rd 1914. The finding of the lower Appellate Court on the remanded issue puts it beyond question that the plaintiff is the successor-in-interest of the original mortgagor. The essential facts may, therefore, be recapitulated. On the 24th of January 1867 the predecessor-in-title of the present plaintiff mortgaged by conditipnal sale a house in the town of Chandausi to one Hazari Lal and put him in possession. On June the 15th, 1873, Hazari Lal sold this shop to Panna Lal, the defendant-appellant. There had been no foreclosure of the mortgage by conditional sale. In the deed of June the 5th, 1873, Hazari Lal recited that the shop in question had come into his possession under a mortgage by conditional sale, but that he was now in possession as a full owner. He did not say that he had foreclosed the mortgage. He undoubtedly purported to sell the shop itself and not any mortgagee rights in respect of the same. The lower Appellate Court has found that the vendee, Fanna Lal, did not in fact believe that his vendor had power to convey an absolute interest in the shop.

2. I must pause to note that this finding is challenged in argument on behalf of the appellant. It is contended that it was not fairly open to the lower Appellate Court to arrive at this finding. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the very recital in the sale-deed of 1873 was calculated to put the vendee on his guard, that the vendee made no sort or kind of inquiry but went into the transaction with eyes shut. He has, however, gone further than this. Relying partly on the wording of the document and partly on certain facts and circumstances regarding the location of the shop, residence of the parties and so on, and partly on certain oral evidence, he has come to the conculsion that, when the vendee chose to accept his vendor's assertion that he was in full proprietary possession of the shop, he had good reason for believing that this assertion was not true, and did not in fact believe it to be true. Sitting as a Court of second appeal, I am not prepared to hold that the lower Appellate Court had not before it materials on which it was entitled to arrive at the above finding.

3. If this finding cannot be disturbed, it seems to me that, according to a long course of decisions in this Court, this suit for redemption must succeed and the plea of limitation set up by the defendant-appellant must be overruled. I refer to Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din 9 A. 97 : A.W.N. (1886) 303; Kampta Prasad v. Bakar Ali A.W.N. (1881) 122 and Husaini Khanam v. Husain Khan 29 A. 471: A.W.N. (1907) 133 : 4 A.L.J. 375. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that these decisions are inconsistent with later opinion in this Court itself. On this point reference is made to the case of Bchari Lal v. Muhammad Muttaki 20 A. 482 : A.W.N. (1898) 123. I have also been referred to a case decided elsewhere by one of the learned Judges of this Court, namely Dal Singh v. Gur Prasad 2 Ind. Cas. 250 : 12 O.C. 84 and it has been contended that the same learned Judge has recently re-affirmed the view taken by him in Oudh in an uureported decision in Second Appeal No. 547 of 1914 pronounced by him on March 11, 1915. Further, I have been asked to consider that the current of decisions of this Court with regard to the application of Article 134 of the first Schedule to the Limitation Act (IX of 1908) is inconsistent with the opinions pronounced by other High Courts. There would certainly appear to be a clear consensus of opinion to the contrary in the Bombay High Court, reference being made to Baiva Khan Daud Khan v. Bhiki Sabza 9 B. 475; Yesu Ramji Kalnath v. Balkrishna Lakshman 15 B. 583; Pandu v. Vithu 19 B. 140 and Ramchandra v. Sheikh Mohidin 23 B. 614. Other cases to which I have been referred in argument may be found reported as Ram Kanai Ghosh v. Raja Sri Sri Hari Narayan Singh Deo Bahadur 2 C.L.J. 546 and Chettokulam Prasanna Venkata-chela Reddiar v. Collector of Trichinopoly 24 Ind. Cas. 369 : (1914) M.W.N.587 : 26 M.L.J. 537. Finally it was suggested that the latestdecision of this Court relied uponon behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, namely, that in Husaini Khanam, v. Husain Khan 29 A. 471: A.W.N. (1907) 133 : 4 A.L.J. 375 proceeds upon a view as to the effect of a mortgage by a trustee or a mortgagee amounting to a "purchase" within the meaning of Article 134 of the first Schedule to the Limitation Act, or I should say to a transfer of the property in question within the meaning of the same Article as it appears in Act IX of 1908, and is inconsistent with the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Abhiram Goswami Mohant v. Shyama Charan Nandi 4 Ind. Cas. 449 : 6 A.L.J. 857 : 14 C.W.N. 1 : 11 Bom. L.R. 1234 : 19 M.L.J. 530 : 10 C.L.J. 284 : 36 C. 1003.

4. With regard to a good deal of this argument I think it is sufficient to say at present that, although the article of the limitation act in question refers to transfers both by trustees and by mortgagees, it may well be that by reason of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) different considerations may govern the application of this Article in cases where a transfer has been made by a trustee or by a mortgagee respectively. On this point I desire to add a few words presently. I mention it merely for the sake of noting that the Calcutta and Madras cases to which I have referred above were both cases of transfer by trustees. For the same reason I find nothing of the decision of Behari Lal v. Muhammad Muttaki 20 A. 482 : A.W.N. (1898) 123 to conflict with the course of decisions of this Court governing transfers by mortgagees. All the older cases of this Court relied upon by the present respondent are not even referred to, much less overruled,.by the Full Bench which decided Behari Lal v. Muhammad Muttaki 20 A. 482 : A.W.N. (1898) 123. It seems to me, therefore, that I might content myself with saying that I have before me at least three reported cases, each decided by a Bench of this Court, in favour of the respondent's contention that the present suit is not, upon the findings arrived at by the lower Court, barred by limitation. Sitting as a single Judge of this Court I am bound by the decisions above referred to.

5. I desire, however, as the matter has been fully argued before me, to place on record my opinion that the decision which I propose to pass may be supported independently of the authorities above referred to, by a line of reasoning somewhat different to that which has been followed by other learned Judges of this Court. The suit as brought is against the legal representatives of the original mortgagee and against Panna Lal as transferee of the mortgagee rights. It is on the face of it a suit for redemption of a mortgage and governed by the provisions of Article 148 of the first Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1908). Such a suit is undoubtedly maintainable within the prescribed period of sixty years, against either a mortgagee or any transferee of mortgagee rights. When, therefore, the defendant Panna Lal pleads that the suit as against him is barred by limitation by reason of the provisions of Article 134 of the first Schedule to the Limtiation Act, it seems to me that his pleading requires some further analysis. He must be taken to plead that he is not a transferee of the mortgagee rights, but a person who has somehow come into possession of the property in suit, and that his possession can only be disturbed by means of a suit for ejectment. Now it is quite conceivable that, in a case like the present, the original mortgagor (or his successor-in-interest) might have gone to the original mortgagee (or his successors) and redeemed the mortgage out of Court, receiving in return a full discharge of the mortgage-debt and the mortgagee's claims. If, after having done this, he found himself obstructed by the defendant Panna Lal in his attempt to enter into possession of the mortgaged property, any suit which he might bring against Panna Lal would clearly be a suit for recovery of possession of the kind contemplated by Article 134 already mentioned. Whatever view might be taken as to the meaning of that Article, it could not be denied that the suit was governed by it. In the present case the controversy in reality is whetfter Article 134 applies at all. The answer to this question must depend on whether Panna Lal is a transferee of the mortgagee rights or is simply a person who has come into possession of the property in suit under a title adverse to that of the original mortgagor.

6. I venture to suggest that on this view of the case three possible contentions are open: (1) It might be said that the Court will not go beyond the terms of Panna Lal's document of title. He holds what purports to be a sale-deed of the property out and out. Therefore, he cannot be treated as a mere transferee of the mortgagee rights. The suit as against him would, therefore, not be a suit for redemption at all, but a suit for recovery of possession. (2) It might be contended that the Court will not go behind the actual status of the parties to the transaction embodied in the sale-deed of June 5th, 1873 : or the legal effect of the said deed. The vendor under that deed purported to convey something which he did not possess, namely, full proprietary rights in respect of the house in suit. He did, however, possess some rights in respect of the house, namely, mortgagee rights. The legal effect of the deed, therefore, would be to convey to the transferee whatever rights Hazari Lal possessed at the time of the transfer. Those rights being rights of a mortgagee, Panna Lal became in law a transferee of the mortgagee rights. A suit for redemption will, therefore, lie as against Panna Lal and the period of limitation for such a suit is sixty years. (3) The case may be looked at from the point of view which has been actually taken in the reported decisions of this Court which I am prepared to follow. If it had been found that Panna Lal entered into possession of the house in dispute under the sale-deed of June 5th, 1873, in the honest belief that he had obtained full proprietary rights in the said house by reason of that deed, and with the obvious and avowed intention to exercise the rights of a full proprietor, he would, under this view of the case, be entitled, as the learned Judges of this Court said, to the "protection" of Article 134 aforesaid. In effect, as it seems tome, this view of the case involves holding that Panna Lal's possession became adverse against the owner of the equity of redemption from the date of the sale in his favour.

7. On either of the last two views the suit as brought is within time. I do not desire to discuss the matter further, beyond remarking that, if the learned Judges who have accepted the first of the views sat forth above with regard to the operation of Article 134 of the first Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act are right in the interpretation which they have put on the words of that Article, considered by themselves, it seems to me that a conflict of principles becomes involved between the provisions of that Article and those of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882). A mortgagor's right to redeem subsists until it has been extinguished by act of parties or order of a Court. Act of parties must mean act of the parties to the mortgage transaction. I take it to be settled law that no assertion of adverse title on the part of a mortgagee during the continuance of a mortgage could set time running against the mortgagor so as to deprive the latter of his right to redeem within a period of sixty years. The sale by Hazari Lal in favour of Panna Lal was, so far as the vendor was concerned, simply an assertion of adverse title as against the mortgagor. This, I take it, could not operate so as to extinguish his right to redeem, or set time running against the mortgagor. If anything can be held to have set time running against him, it must be Fauna Lal's entry into possession under the terms of the sale-deed in his favour. Now assuming for the sake of argument that the present suit had been brought within twelve years of the sale of June the 5th, 1873, it is worth while to consider what sort of suit the mortgagor would have been bound to bring. Tf he had sued Panna Lal for ejectment as a trespasser he would most undoubtedly have been met by a plea that if Panna Lal took nothing else under this sale-deed he had at least acquired Hazari Lal's rights as a mortgagee, and that the suit against him should be one for redemption and not for ejectment. Yet if the view which seems to have been taken by the Bombay High Court regarding the operation of Article 134 to the first Schedule of the Limitation Act is correct, it would seem to follow that, if the mortgagee in possession chose, even on the very day after entering into possession, to execute a deed purposing to sell the property itself, and not his mortgagee rights therein, to a third party, he could thereby compel the mortgagor to sue for redemption within twelve years of the sale, or to lose his rights by operation of the law of limitation. I find it very difficult to believe that this is either the intention of the Legislature or the effect of the provisions of the law which I have been considering. The result is that I dismiss this appeal with costs, including fees on the higher scale.