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Surendra Kumar Guha v. Jaminee Kumar Guha
Structured Summary of the Opinion (as provided)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner instituted Money Suit No. 501 of 1934 in the Second Court of the Munsif at Feni to recover money from opposite parties Nos. 2 to 8. Before judgment, some immovable property of those opposite parties was attached (19 March 1934). The petitioner obtained a decree on 4 September 1934 and applied for execution in the Second Court on 4 February 1935 (Money Execution Case No. 32 of 1935).
Opposite party No. 1 obtained a separate money decree against the same judgment-debtors in the First Court of the Munsif at Feni and applied for execution there (Money Execution Case No. 445 of 1934). The First Court attached the properties that had been attached earlier by the petitioner on 20 December 1934 and fixed a sale for 11 March 1935.
On 8 March 1935, with a sale date fixed in the First Court, the petitioner applied in the Second Court (where his execution application was pending) for rateable distribution. The Second Court initially ordered (Order No. 5 dated 9 March 1935) that rateable distribution be allowed and sent a copy to the First Court requesting necessary orders for rateable distribution.
The First Court received that copy on 11 March 1935 and, after issuing a permission for the opposite party No.1 to bid, directed the Nazir to realize the purchase-money in cash so it could be rateably distributed. A sale took place (13 March 1935); most lots were purchased by a stranger (Sudhir Kumar Bhowmik) and one lot by opposite party No. 1. Proceedings on the sale included a dismissed application to set aside the sale and eventual confirmation of several lots.
The First Court thereafter placed Rs. 131-5-9 to the petitioner's credit as his share on rateable distribution and informed the Second Court. Opposite party No. 1 filed an objection on 26 September 1935 in the Second Court to the petitioner's claim for rateable distribution. The Second Court, on 28 November 1935, allowed that objection and recalled its previous order No. 5 (9 March 1935), holding that: (a) the Second Court had no jurisdiction to order rateable distribution because the assets were held by the First Court, and (b) the petitioner had no right to rateable distribution because he had not applied for execution in the First Court (the Court holding the assets).
The petitioner challenged that recall in the present proceeding, maintaining that Order No. 5 of 9 March 1935 was correct and seeking its restoration.
Legal Issues Presented
- How are Sub-section 63 and Sub-section 73 of the Civil P. C. to be interpreted and applied to determine whether a decree-holder who has attached property in one Court but sought execution in another is entitled to rateable distribution?
- Which Court has the authority or duty to direct or effect rateable distribution of proceeds when identical immovable properties have been attached by different Courts at the instance of different decree-holders (i.e., whether the Court that holds the sale proceeds or the Court which first attached should distribute)?
- Whether the Second Court's recall of its earlier order (Order No. 5 of 9 March 1935) was correct, given the interplay between Sections 63 and 73 and the factual sequence of attachments and receipt/realisation of sale proceeds.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner maintained that Order No. 5 dated 9 March 1935 (in which the Second Court allowed rateable distribution and sent a copy to the First Court) was correct and should be restored.
- The petitioner sought restoration of the Second Court's earlier order and the remedy of rateable distribution in accordance with that order.
Opposite Party No. 1's / Second Court's Position (as recorded)
- Opposite party No. 1 filed an objection in the Second Court to the petitioner's claim for rateable distribution.
- The Second Court, on allowing that objection (28 November 1935), held two points: (a) that it had no jurisdiction to order rateable distribution because the assets were held by the First Court, and (b) that the petitioner had no right to rateable distribution because he had not applied for execution in the First Court (the Court which held the assets).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For (as stated in the opinion) | Application by the Court (how the opinion used or relied on it) |
|---|---|---|
| Arimuthu Chetti v. Vyapuripandaram (1912) 35 Mad 588 | Expresses the view that a decree-holder of the Munsif's Court, when there is no transfer to the District Court, is entitled only to share by virtue of his attachment in the proceeds of the attached property realized; a transfer to the higher Court is not essential for that limited relief. | Quoted and relied on to illustrate the limited scope of Section 63 and to support the proposition that Section 63 governs distribution of proceeds of the specifically attached property. |
| Muttalagiri v. Muttayyar (1883) 6 Mad 357 | Contains observations as to the need for transfer (noted as running counter to the Arimuthu Chetti passage). | Noted in the opinion as a contrary observation to the Madras view in Arimuthu Chetti; cited to show divergence in earlier case law. |
| Nilkanta Rai v. Gosta Behary (1919) Cal 545 | Illustrates the problem that a decree-holder cannot always apply for execution in a lower court due to limited pecuniary jurisdiction; cited for the proposition that such a decree-holder should not be deprived of a right to share in the proceeds. | Relied upon to support directing the sale proceeds to be sent by the First Court to the Second Court for rateable distribution and as authority for procedural steps in such cases. |
| Deckappa v. Chanbasappa (1925) Bom 420 | Cited in the context of the limited pecuniary jurisdiction of inferior Courts affecting a decree-holder's ability to apply for execution there. | Referenced alongside Nilkanta Rai to show precedent supporting the practical difficulty created by limited jurisdiction and to justify considerations under Sections 63 and 73. |
| Obhoy Churn Kundu v. Golam Ali (1881) 7 Cal 410 | Identified the duty of the Court of inferior grade (or the Court which attached later) to send sale proceeds to the superior Court (or the Court which first attached) for distribution. | Cited as the first decision pointing out the duty to send sale proceeds to the appropriate Court for distribution; used to show existing practice and principle in this High Court. |
| Bykanta Nath Shaha v. Rajendra Narayan Roy (1886) 12 Cal 333 | Part of the line of decisions that the Court which is to distribute is the superior Court or, where Courts are of same grade, the Court which first attached. | Included in the list of consistent Calcutta High Court authorities supporting distribution by the proper Court. |
| Clark v. Alexander (1894) 21 Cal 200 | Another Calcutta High Court decision cited in support of the established principle on distribution among attaching decree-holders. | Cited as part of the chain of decisions that the opinion regarded as consistent with the principle of distribution by the Court entitled to do so. |
| Har Bhagat v. Annadaram (1898) 2 C W N 126 | Cited as an authority forming part of the Calcutta High Court's consistent course on distribution of proceeds. | Referenced among the cases showing the Court's past approach to attachments and distribution. |
| Bhugwan Chandra v. Chandra Malla (1902) 29 Cal 773 | Included among earlier Calcutta decisions concerning the distribution of sale proceeds where multiple attachments existed. | Cited as part of the High Court's established line of authorities. |
| Shidappa v. Guru Gumsanggya (1931) Bom 350 | Cited to show that Bombay and Madras High Courts ultimately took similar positions regarding distribution in such cases. | Used to demonstrate convergence of views across High Courts on the distribution principle. |
| Narasimachariar v. Krishnamachariar (1914) Mad 454 | Formulates the principle that where attachments are in different Courts and the highest grade Court receives or realises the property under Section 63, that receipt may be deemed to be on behalf of all Courts which had made attachments; supports reading Section 73 with Section 63. | Relied upon as stating the correct principle (quoting Wallis, J.) and used to support the view that Section 73 can apply where highest Court receives assets after prior attachments in other Courts. |
| Sarju Ram v. Pratap Narain (1933) All 563 | Identified as a decision where most earlier cases are noticed and reviewed. | Cited as a survey reference where prior authorities on the subject are considered. |
| Kwai Tong Kee v. Lim Chaung Ghee (1928) Rang 157 | Cited for the proposition that Section 73 must be read in conjunction with Section 63. | Used to support the opinion's holding that the two provisions should be read together in appropriate cases. |
| Gourgopal De Sarkar v. Kamal Kalika Datta (1934) Cal 559 | Also cited for the proposition that Section 73 must be read with Section 63. | Relied upon to justify the Court's approach to reading the two Sections together where attachments and receipt/realisation occur in different Courts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court framed the central question as one of interpreting Sub-section 63 and Sub-section 73 of the Civil P. C. It identified a common purpose of both sections—the fair distribution of sale proceeds among judgment-creditors of common judgment-debtors—but also identified a fundamental distinction between them:
- Section 73 deals with distribution of the entire fund realised or received by the executing Court (for example, where decree-holders bring execution in the same Court which receives the sale proceeds).
- Section 63 deals with proceeds of property specifically attached by decree-holders in different Courts; its operation is tied to the fact of attachment of the identical properties by several decree-holders.
To clarify the distinction the Court used two illustrations: (a) where multiple decree-holders apply for execution in the same Court before the sale proceeds are received, the whole proceeds fall under Section 73 for rateable distribution; and (b) where a single Court attaches and sells properties X, Y, Z but other decree-holders have attached those same properties in other Courts prior to the receipt of sale proceeds by the selling Court, then Section 63 governs distribution so that proceeds of each specifically attached property are distributed rateably among those who attached that particular item (e.g., proceeds of X between A and B, of Y between A and C, etc.).
The Court emphasized the policy considerations underlying Section 63: convenience, avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings, and fair distribution. It observed that if Section 63 were ignored, a decree-holder prevented by pecuniary limits of a lower Court from applying in that Court could be unjustly deprived of any share.
Turning to precedent and practice, the Court reviewed authorities from the Calcutta High Court and other High Courts, noting a divergence in some jurisdictions but identifying a generally consistent practice in this High Court: where Courts of inferior grade sell property that is under attachment by a Court of superior grade (or where attachments were effected earlier by another Court), the Court which holds the sale proceeds should send them to the proper Court (superior Court or the Court which first attached) for distribution. The Court discussed differences of opinion as to procedure (whether a requisition must be moved by the District Judge or the distributing Court can act of its own motion) but held that those procedural differences did not affect the result in the present case.
The Court accepted the formulation in Narasimachariar v. Krishnamachariar that, where assets are received or realised by the Court of the highest grade under Section 63, that receipt may be deemed to be on behalf of all Courts which had attachments prior to actual receipt; read that way, Section 73 can operate in conjunction with Section 63 to entitle decree-holders in other Courts to rateable distribution.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court concluded that the Second Court's recall of its order was incorrect. The appropriate remedy was to require the First Court (which held the sale proceeds) to send those proceeds to the Second Court so that the Second Court could effect rateable distribution between the petitioner and opposite party No.1.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The rule is made absolute; the order complained of (the recall of Order No. 5) is set aside and Order No. 5 of the Munsif, Second Court, Feni dated 9th March 1935 is restored.
Consequential directions given by the Court (direct effects on the parties):
- The sale proceeds are to be sent by the First Court of the Munsif at Feni to the Second Court of the Munsif at that place so that the Second Court may make rateable distribution between the petitioner and opposite party No. 1.
- The petitioner is awarded costs of this Court and of the Court below to be paid by opposite party No. 1.
- A hearing fee of 1 gold mohur is recorded.
Broader legal implications: The opinion interprets Sub-sections 63 and 73 as complementary (Section 73 to be read with Section 63 in appropriate circumstances) and adopts the view that, when assets are received or realised by a Court that can be deemed to be acting on behalf of all Courts which had made earlier attachments, rateable distribution may follow. The text does not state that this decision establishes any novel rule of law beyond its application to the facts before the Court; it articulates and applies existing principles from prior authorities and directs the procedural remedy appropriate to the case.
1. The petitioner instituted a suit for recovery of money against opposite parties Nos. 2 to 8 in the Second.Court of the Munsif at Feni, being Money Suit No. 501 of 1934. Some immoveable property of the said opposite parties was attached before judgment on 19th March 1934, on his application. He obtained his decree on 4th September 1934, and on 4th February 1935, applied for execution of his decree in that Court (Money Execution Case No. 32 of 1935). The opposite party No. 1 also obtained a money decree against the said opposite parties Nos. 2 to 8 in a suit instituted by him in the first Court of the Munsif at Feni and on 19th November 1934, applied in that Court for execution (Money Execution Case No. 445 of 1934). The properties which had been attached before judgment by the petitioner were attached by the First Court of the Munsif at Feni on 20th December 1934. In the sale proclamation issued by that Court, 11th March 1935 was the date fixed for sale. On 8th March 1935, the petitioner made an application to the Second Court of the Munsif at Feni, in which Court his application for execution was pending. In that application he stated that the opposite party No. 1 was executing his decree for money against the same judgment-debtors in the first Court and that 11th March 1935 had been fixed for sale. He prayed for rateable distribution. On that application the Second Court passed an order on the same date requiring petitioner "to show papers" that the judgment-debtors were the same." The next day the petitioner satisfied the Court that the judgment-debtors were the same and on that the Court (Second Court of the Munsif at Feni) passed order No. 5 dated 9th March 1935, in these terms:
Heard pleader. Prayer for rateable distribution of the assets to be fetched at the sale of the above Money Execution Case No. 445 of 1934 is allowed. Send a copy of this order to the local first Court for favour of passing necessary orders for rateable distribution. The claim of this case is Rs. 270-4-0.
2. On 18th March 1935, the Second Court passed the following order:
"(Order No. 6) Put up on 27th April 1935 for rateable distribution with the Money Execution Case No. 445 of 1934 of the local First Court."The first mentioned order (No. 5) reached the First Court on 11th March 1935, but before its arrival that Court had allowed by its order No. 6, dated 11th March 1935, the decree-holder (opposite party No. 1) to bid at the sale, but on receipt of the said order, it passed on the same date order No. 7 which is in these terms:
Received the copy of Order 5 dated 9th March 1935, passed in Money Execution Case No. 32 of 1935 of the local Second Court. It appears that the decree-holder of the above execution case prayed for rateable distribution of the assets to be fetched at the sale of immoveables. The Nazir is accordingly directed to realise the purchase money in cash, so as to have the same rateably distributed between the decree-holders of both the cases.
3. Opposite party No. 1 did not proceed with the sale of lot No. 1. The sale of the other lots by the First Court could not be held on the 11th or 12th March, but it was held on 13th March 1935. Opposite Party No. 1 purchased one lot and the rest were purchased by a stranger, Sudhir Kumar Bhowmik. Earnest money of 25 per cent was deposited on that date, and the balance in April, within 30 days of the sale. An application to set aside the sale was made but was dismissed on 23rd September 1935. Thereafter the purchaser failed to deposit the landlord's transfer fee in respect of lot No. 5 with the result that the sales of lots Nos. 2 to 4 6, 7 and 8 were confirmed and the first Court passed an order on 26th September 1935 stating that the petitioner would get by way of rateable distribution the sum of Rs. 131-5-9. The said sum of money was placed to his credit and the second Court was informed by the first Court. Opposite Party No. 1 thereafter filed on 26th September 1935 in the second Court an objection to the claim for rateable distribution which had been made by the petitioner in the Court and had already been allowed. On 28th November 1935, the Second Court allowed this objection and recalled its order No. 5 dated 9th March 1935. It held that (a) it had no jurisdiction to order rateable distribution as the assets were held not by it, but by the First Court and (b) that the petitioner had no right to rateable distribution as he had not made an application for execution of his decree to the first Court which held the assets. It is against this order that the petitioner has moved this Court. He maintains that Order No 5 dated 9th March 1935, is the correct order and prayed for its restoration.
4. The question involved depends upon the interpretation of Sub-section 63 and 73, Civil P. C. There is a mass of case law on the subject and the High Courts have taken divergent views, and as I read the case law, there is sharp conflict of opinion in the decisions of the Madras and Bombay High Courts, but so far as this Court is concerned except for one or two decisions, a well-marked, definite and consistent course has been taken. Before reviewing the important decisions of the different High Courts, it is necessary that the precise scope of Sub-section 63 and 73 should be examined. At the outset one fundamental identity and one fundamental distinction are apparent. The scope of both the sections is the fair distribution of the proceeds of sale among the judgment-creditors of the common judgment-debtors, certain conditions being fulfilled by the former. That is the common feature. But the fundamental distinction is that the fund available for distribution under Section 73 among those creditors is the entire fund realized or received by the executing Court. (I am not considering the proviso which may be left out of consideration for the present purpose.) The funds available for distribution under Section 63 are the proceeds of common property attached by the judgment-creditors. It is the fact of attachment and attachment of the identical properties by the several judgment-creditors that bring into operation Section 63. To make the point clear, the following two illustrations are helpful: (1) A, who has a decree for payment of money against J, executes his decree in the Court of a particular Subordinate Judge and sells the judgment-debtor's properties, X Y and Z. If other persons B, C and D who have decrees for payment of money against the same judgment-debtor apply for execution of their decrees in the Court of the said' Subordinate Judge before the receipt of the proceeds of the sale of X, Y and Z, the whole of the proceeds of the sale will have to be rateably distributed amongst A, B, C and D under Section 73. B, C, and D need not have proceeded further beyond making their application for execution in that Court. A, who has a decree for payment of money against J, executes his decree in the Court of a particular Subordinate Judge and attaches and sells properties X, Y and Z the proceeds of which are received by that Court. B, C and D, who have decrees for payment of money against J, proceed to execute their respective decrees in other Courts, say the first, second and third Court of the Munsif of a particular place, and attach respectively X, Y and Z. These attachments are effected before the sale proceeds are received by the Subordinate Judge. They do not apply for execution of their decrees in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, nor are their executions transferred to that Court before the receipt of assets by that Court, but they bring the fact of the attachments to the notice of the Subordinate Judge. The entire proceeds of the sale of X, Y and Z cannot be distributed by the Subordinate Judge amongst A, B, C and D rateably under Section 63, but the proceeds of the sale of X has to be distributed rateably between A and B, those of Y between A and C and those of Z between A and D. This view which I am taking of the scope of Section 63 has been advanced by Abdur Rahim, J. in Arimuthu Chetti v. Vyapuripandaram, (1912) 35 Mad 588. The relevant passage in the judgment is at p. 590 and runs as follows:
What the decree-holder of the Munsif's Court is entitled to, when there is no transfer of his decree to the District Court, is not a general execution of his decree by the District Court or rateable distribution in all the assets of the judgment-debtor received by the District Court but only to share by virtue of his attachment in the proceeds of the attached property realized. To a relief, so limited, it appears to me to be not essential that the decree of the Munsif's Court shall have been previously transferred to the District Court, though this view runs counter to the observations in Muttalagiri v. Muttayyar (1883) 6 Mad 357 as to the need of transfer.
5. Section 63 contemplates the case where attachments of the same property have been made by different Courts at the instance of the different decree-holders of the common judgment-debtor and provides for the distribution among them of the proceeds of the attached property by one of Courts only. The principle underlying it is the principle of convenience, the principle of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings, the principle of fair distribution and not the principle of exclusion. The distribution is to be made by the superior Court, and if all the Courts be of the same grade, the distribution is to be made by the Court which first attached the property. Any other view of Section 63 would make the position manifestly unjust. A person obtains a decree for money over Rs. 5,000 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, applies for execution there and attaches a property. Another person obtains a decree for money against the same judgment-debtor for Rs. 500 in a Munsif's Court, applies for execution there and attaches the same property. The Munsif being unaware of the attachment effected by the Subordinate Judge, sells the property before the Subordinate Judge could put it up for sale. The sale by the Munsif would be a valid one. If Section 73 is to be regarded as the only section for rateable distribution, the person who obtained the decree for over Rs. 5,000 in the Subordinate Judge's Court would not be able to claim rateable distribution, if the terms of Section 73 be strictly construed and Section 63 be not looked into, because he would not, as has been pointed out in Nilkanta Rai v Gosta Behary 1919 Cal 545 and Deckappa v. Chanbasappa 1925 Bom 420, be able to apply for execution of his decree in the Munsif Court, by reason of the limited pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif.
6. Cases of such sales by Courts of inferior grades, where the property was under attachment effected by a Court of superior grade or where the Courts are of the same grade by the Court which attached later in point of time, had come before the Courts when the Code of 1882 was in force. A provision corresponding to Sub-section (2), Section 63 was not in Section 285 of the Code of 1882. So far as this High Court is concerned, it has consistently held that such sales are valid, but this Court has pointed out that in such cases it is the duty of the Court of inferior grade or the Court of same grade which had attached last of all, as the case may be, to send the sale proceeds to the Court of superior grade for distribution, or if all the Courts be of the same grade, to the Court which first attached the property. This was pointed out first by Pontifex, J., in Obhoy Churn Kundu v. Golam Ali (1881) 7 Cal 410 at p. 413 and this principle has been almost consistently followed in this Court, which has held that the Court of superior grade or of the same grade which had first attached the property, as the case may be, is to distribute the sale proceeds amongst all the attaching decree-holders: Bykanta Nath Shaha v. Rajendra Narayan Roy (1886) 12 Cal 333; Clark v. Alexander (1894) 21 Cal 200; Har Bhagat v. Annadaram (1898) 2 C W N 126; Bhugwan Chandra v. Chandra Malla (1902) 29 Cal 773 and Nilkanta Rai v Gosta Behary 1919 Cal 545. The Bombay and Madras High Courts, which in the matter of distribution of sale proceeds in such cases had taken differrent views, ultimately veered round to the same position: Shidappa v. Guru Gumsanggya 1931 Bom 350; Arimuthu Chetti v. Vyapuripandaram, (1912) 35 Mad 588; Narasimachariar v. Krishnamachariar 1914 Mad 454; see also Sarju Ram v. Pratap Narain 1933 All 563, where most of the earlier cases are noticed. When such assets are not sent by the Court holding the sale to the Court which is given the right to distribute the same under the provisions of section 63, there is a difference of opinion in the matter of procedure only.
7. This Court and the Bombay High Court have held that the District Judge is to be moved for asking the Court holding the sale to send the sale proceeds to the proper Court, but some of the other High Courts have held that the Court of superior grade or the Court which first attached the property, as the case may be, can of its own motion make the requisition. So far as the case before me is concerned it makes no difference because I can direct, as was done in Nilkanta Rai v Gosta Behary 1919 Cal 545, the sale proceeds to be sent by the first Court of the Munsif at Feni to the second Court of the Munsif of that place and direct the last mentioned Court to distribute the sale proceeds rateably among the petitioner and the opposite party No. 1. In my judgment the correct principle in such cases has been formulated by Wallis, J. in Narasimachariar v. Krishnamachariar 1914 Mad 454 in the following passage:
What however where the attachments are in differents Courts and the property is received or realised by the Court of the highest grade under Section 63? In such a case there is no receipt at all by the other Courts unless the receipt by the Court of highest grade can be deemed to be a receipt by the other creditors as well. (The word 'creditors' in the report is obviously a slip for the word 'Courts'). In my opinion this is the correct view and it is only for the purposes of convenience that the highest Court is made the collecting Court, and the Court to adjudicate on claims and objections and the property received or realised must be deemed to have been received.or realised by or on behalf of all the Courts in which there have been attachments in execution of money decrees prior to the actual receipt of assets. If this be so, then the decree holders in the other Courts are entitled to rateable distribution under the very terms of Section 73.
8. It is in this view that it can be said, as has been said in Kwai Tong Kee v. Lim Chaung Ghee 1928 Rang 157 and Gourgopal De Sarkar v. Kamal Kalika Datta 1934 Cal 559, that Section 73 must be read in conjunction with Section 63. I accordingly make the rule absolute, set aside the order complained of and restore the order No. 5 of the Munsif, Second Court, Feni, dated 9th March 1935. The sale proceeds to be sent by the first Court of the Munsif at Feni to second Court of the Munsif of that place, in order that the last mentioned Court may make the rateable distribution among the petitioner and opposite party No. 1. The petitioner will have his costs of this Court and of the Court below from opposite party No. 1. Hearing fee 1 gold mohur.
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