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Maharaja Sashi Kanta Acharjya Bahadur v. Nasirabad Loan Office, Co., Ltd.
Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This Rule was brought by the landlord after the learned Munsiff at Mymensingh dismissed his suit to recover the balance of the transfer fee claimed under the provisions of Section 26-B of the Ben. Ten. Act, on the ground that no suit lay.
The underlying facts set out in the opinion are:
- Opposite party No. 1, The Nasirabad Loan Office, Co., Ltd., obtained a mortgage decree against opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 and, on execution of that decree, the mortgaged property was sold.
- Because the mortgage decree was not fully satisfied, opposite party No. 1 obtained a decree for the balance under Order 34, Rule 6 of the CPC and put the holding (the subject matter) up for sale. In the sale proclamation the holding was described as an ordinary occupancy holding.
- At the sale held by the Court opposite party No. 1 purchased the holding for Rs. 325 and deposited Rs. 65 (20% of the purchase price) in the executing Court. The sale was confirmed.
- The rent of the holding was Rs. 57-13-9. Under the provisions of S. 26-E the landlord is entitled to either five times the annual rent or 20% of the purchase price, whichever is greater. Five times the annual rent was calculated as Rs. 289-4-9; thus, under that section the landlord was said to be entitled to that sum instead of Rs. 65.
- The landlord instituted a suit to recover the balance. The learned Munsiff held that no suit lay and assessed the value of the holding at Rs. 1,500 on the basis of which he concluded the landlord's dues would be Rs. 300.
- Mr. Bose, appearing for the landlord, stated his client would be satisfied with a decree based on entitlement to five times the annual rent and in this Rule prayed for a decree for Rs. 224-4-9.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the learned Munsiff was correct in holding that no suit lay and that the proper remedy for the landlord to obtain the balance of the transfer fee was by an application rather than by a suit.
- Whether this High Court could exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the CPC in the circumstances of this case, given that the decree of the Munsiff was one from which an appeal lay to the lower appellate Court (i.e., preliminary objection as to competence of revisional jurisdiction).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Landlord's) Arguments — (Mr. Bose)
- The landlord's suit sought recovery of the balance of the transfer fee that he contended was due under S. 26-E of the Ben. Ten. Act.
- Mr. Bose stated that his client would be satisfied with a decree calculated on the basis that the landlord was entitled to five times the annual rent and accordingly prayed for a decree for Rs. 224-4-9.
Respondent's / Munsiff's Position — (represented in argument by Mr. Karkoon)
- The learned Munsiff held that no suit lay and thus dismissed the landlord's suit; the Munsiff relied on certain decisions of the Court (referenced as 36 CWN 8471 and 36 CWN 9242 in the opinion) to support that view.
- Mr. Karkoon (appearing for the opposite party) relied on other decisions of this Court, specifically the case in 35 CWN 9743 and an unreported Division Bench decision in Civil Rule No. 1598 of 19344 (decided 4 April 1935), to support the contention that the appropriate remedy might be by application rather than by suit.
- As a further contention (analogy), Mr. Karkoon invoked the decision in 35 CWN 974 (a case concerning S. 48-H) to argue that where a statutory fee is not deposited the landlord might be without a remedy to recover the money by suit; he relied on that analogy to argue against the landlord's suit in the present case.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 36 CWN 8471 | Relied upon by the learned Munsiff to support the view that an application (not a suit) was the proper remedy. | The Court treated this decision (and the companion decision 36 CWN 9242) as relating to proceedings under Section 36-J of the Ben. Ten. Act and held they had no bearing on the present question under S. 26-E. |
| 36 CWN 9242 | Relied upon by the learned Munsiff to support the view that an application (not a suit) was the proper remedy. | As above: the Court found the decisions dealt with sales described on the footing of permanent tenure/raiayti/lakhiraj under Section 36-J and therefore were distinguishable and not applicable to the present case. |
| 36 CWN 847 | Referenced (in the opinion) as one of the two decisions dealing with Section 36-J proceedings. | The Court said these cases related to S. 36-J and, because S. 188 required an application for enforcement under S. 26-J (as discussed in the opinion), those cases were not applicable to the present matter. |
| 36 CWN 924 | Referenced (in the opinion) as the companion decision dealing with Section 36-J proceedings. | Distinguished on the ground that those decisions concerned different statutory provisions (Section 36-J / S. 26-J) and did not decide the question now before the Court under S. 26-E. |
| 35 CWN 9743 | Relied upon by Mr. Karkoon analogously: a case in which a fee due under S. 48-H was not deposited and the Court held landlord had no right to recover the same by suit. | The Court observed that 35 CWN 9743 was a judgment of a single Judge (sitting singly) and therefore not binding; the Court rejected the analogy as applicable and declined to follow that decision on the present question. |
| 35 CWN 974 | Referenced in the opinion in relation to the foregoing point about recovery of fees under another section (S. 48-H). | Distinguished and not followed as binding authority for the present case; the Court held ubi jus ibi remedium applied and that the landlord had a right to seek recovery unless jurisdiction or the remedy was taken away by statute. |
| Civil Rule No. 1598 of 19344 (Division Bench, 4 April 1935) | Relied upon by Mr. Karkoon and discussed as a Division Bench decision where the Bench expressed doubt about whether an application or suit was the proper procedure. | The Court held that that earlier Division Bench decision did not decide the question in a binding way; it noted the Bench was doubtful and so the matter remained open. |
| 46 Cal 9625 (Eankin, J.) | Cited for the principle that Section 115, Clause (c) of the CPC applies where a subordinate court by an erroneous decision on a point of law has refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. | The Court relied on this principle to support the view that the present case fell within S. 115 and that revisional jurisdiction in the High Court could be invoked despite an appeal lying to the lower appellate Court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two stages: it first resolved a preliminary jurisdictional objection and then dealt with the merits—i.e., whether a suit or an application was the proper procedure to recover the landlord's claimed transfer fee.
Preliminary objection: revisional jurisdiction under Section 115
- The petition had been instituted in the Munsiff's ordinary file though the Munsiff had no powers under the Small Cause Courts Act to try suits of the value involved; the Munsiff's decree was one from which an appeal could have been preferred to the lower appellate Court.
- The petitioner invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the CPC. The Court accepted that the facts fell within S.115, Clause (c) (and potentially Clause (b)) because the Munsiff had by an erroneous decision on a point of law refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in law (a principle attributed to Eankin, J., in 46 Cal 9625).
- The Court interpreted Section 115 as permitting the High Court to call for the record of any case decided by any subordinate Court in which no appeal lies to the High Court, but held that the revisional power under S. 115 would be a bar only when an appeal lay to the High Court itself. The fact that an appeal lay to the lower appellate Court did not oust the High Court's revisional jurisdiction.
- On that basis the Court overruled the preliminary objection and accepted jurisdiction to hear the Rule under S. 115.
Merits: whether the remedy is by suit or by application
- The Court began from the general principle under Section 9 of the CPC that a civil Court must entertain suits of a civil nature unless the jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly barred. The ordinary method for enforcing a civil right is by instituting a suit.
- The Court explained that the jurisdiction conferred by S. 9 can only be taken away either expressly or by necessary implication—either by removing the remedy altogether or by prescribing another mode of obtaining relief (for example, by providing that relief may be obtained by application/petition).
- The Court examined the authorities cited by the Munsiff and by counsel. It distinguished the two decisions relied upon by the Munsiff (36 CWN 847 and 36 CWN 924), noting those cases concerned proceedings under Section 36-J (and S. 26-J as discussed) where the statutory scheme and S. 188 required an application; in those circumstances the legislature had, by implication, taken away the right to enforce the right by a suit.
- By contrast, in the present case (involving S. 26-E and the landlord's claim after execution purchase), the Ben. Ten. Act contained no provision indicating whether the remedy should be sought by suit or by application. Because the legislature had not indicated either expressly or by necessary implication that relief should be obtained by application, the Court held that the ordinary jurisdiction under S. 9 to entertain a suit remained unaffected.
- The Court considered the analogy to 35 CWN 974/35 CWN 9743 (a case dealing with S. 48-H), but rejected the analogy and observed that the judge's decision in that case was not binding; the Court emphasized the principle ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right there is a remedy) and held that if the landlord is not paid his legitimate dues he has a right to seek the assistance of the Court to recover them.
- The Court also considered Civil Rule No. 1598 of 1934 (Division Bench) and found that that decision did not decide the procedural point in a binding way—the Bench had expressed doubt and ultimately dismissed the rule on other grounds—so it did not preclude the present Court from deciding the correct procedure.
- On these bases the Court concluded that the proper remedy for the landlord in the present situation is by a suit.
Holding and Implications
Final Disposition:
The Court set aside the judgment of the learned Munsiff and, in lieu thereof, passed a decree in favour of the petitioner (the landlord) in the amount of Rs. 224-4-9. The Court made no order as to costs of the Rule.
Legal Consequences / Implications (as stated in the opinion):
- The Court held that the revisional power under Section 115 of the CPC can be exercised by the High Court in a case where an appeal lies to a lower appellate Court; Section 115 becomes a bar only when an appeal lies to the High Court itself.
- The Court held that, in the circumstances of this case and absent any express or implied statutory provision to the contrary in the Ben. Ten. Act, the landlord's right to recover the balance of the transfer fee could properly be enforced by a suit under Section 9 of the CPC rather than by an application.
- The opinion records that this was a "case of first impression" and that the procedure was settled by the Court for the first time in this judgment; accordingly the Court declined to make an order for costs of the Rule.
- Direct effect: the landlord obtained a decree for Rs. 224-4-9; the Munsiff's earlier dismissal of the suit on the ground that no suit lay was set aside.
Order accordingly.
1. This Rule has been obtained by the landlord whose suit to recover the balance of the transfer fee due to him under the provisions of Section 26-B of the Ben. Ten. Act, has been dismissed by the learned Munsiff at Mymensingh on the ground that no suit lay. The position is this: Opposite party No. 1, The Nasirabad Loan Office, Co., Ltd., obtained a mortgage decree against opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3. In execution of that decree the mortgaged property was sold, but the mortgage decree not being fully satisfied, opposite party No. 1 obtained a decree for the balance under the provisions of O. 34, R. 6 of the CPC. In execution of this decree they put up the holding which is the subject matter of controversy, to sale. In the sale proclamation the holding was described as an ordinary occupancy holding. At the sale held by the Court opposite party No. 1 purchased the holding for Rs. 325 and deposited a sum of Rs. 65 in the executing Court, the sum being 20 per cent, of the purchase price. The I sale was confirmed. The rent of this holding is Rs. 57-13-9 and therefore under the provisions of S. 26-E the landlord is entitled to either five times the annual rent or 20 per cent, of the purchase price whichever sum is greater. Five times the annual rent is Rs. 289-4-9 and therefore in accordance with the terms of that section the landlord is entitled to that sum in any case and not Rs. 65. The landlord accordingly instituted a suit to recover the balance of the money. The learned Munsiff has held that the value of the holding is Rs. 1,500 and on that basis the dues of the landlord will be Rs. 300. Mr. Bose who appears for the landlord says that his client will be satisfied if he is given a decree on the basis that he is entitled to five times the annual rent. In this Rule he prays for a decree for Rs. 224-4-9.
2. The question in this Rule therefore is-whether the learned Munsiff was right in holding that no suit lay, but the proper remedy was by means of an application. In support of his view the learned Munsiff relies upon two decisions of this Court in 36 CWN 8471 and 36 CWN 9242. I shall indicate hereafter that the two aforesaid decisions have no bearing on the present question. In support of the Munsiff's view Mr. Karkoon has relied upon two cases of this Court, namely, the case in 35 CWN 9743 and an unreported decision of a Division Bench in Civil Rule No. 1598 of 19344 decided on 4th April 1935. I shall deal with the question on the merits later on but it is necessary first of all to decide a preliminary objection which has been raised by Mr. Karkoon. The suit was instituted in the Court of the Munsiff at Mymensingh in his ordinary file.
3. The Munsiff had no powers under Small Cause Courts Act to try suits of the value of this suit. The decree which he passed was a decree against; which an appeal could have been preferred by the petitioner to the lower appellate Court. Instead of filing an appeal an application has been moved in this Court under Section 115 of the CPC. There cannot be any doubt that this case falls within the provisions of S. 115, Cl. (c) if not under Cl. (b) of S. 115, because the Munsiff by an erroneous decision on a point of law has refused to exercise jurisdiction which is vested in law. This is the principle which has been laid down by Eankin, J., as he then was, in 46 Cal 9625.
4. The question therefore is whether this Court can exercise its revisional jurisdiction in these circumstances. In my judgment the revisional power under S. 115 is a bar only when an appeal lies to this Court. The fact that an appeal lay to the lower appellate Court will not take away the powers of this Court to revise the order of the Munsif. The language of S. 115 is that the High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court in which no appeal lies thereto. I accordingly overrule the preliminary objection on the view which I have indicated above, which is supported not only by the decisions of this High Court but also of the other High Courts to which it is not necessary to refer in detail.
5. Regarding the merits of the case the principle is clear. A civil Court must entertain a suit of a civil nature unless the jurisdiction of the Court is either expressly or impliedly barred. This is the provision of Section 9 of the CPC, which indicates that for the purpose of enforcing a civil right the normal and the ordinary method is by instituting a suit. The jurisdiction of the Court conferred by S. 9 may be taken away either expressly or impliedly altogether by taking away the remedy, or the legislature may prevent institution of a suit to enforce a civil right by prescribing another mode of obtaining assistance of a Court, as for instance by an application. But unless the jurisdiction of a civil Court is taken away altogether, or for enforcement of a right another method is provided for, namely, by means of a petition, a suit will be the proper remedy to get relief in respect of a civil right. This in my view is the principle from which the question ought to be approached and in the light of these principles I shall examine the cases which have been referred to in the Munsif's judgment as also the two cases which have been referred to by Mr. Karkoon. The cases referred to in 36 CWN 847 and 924 relate to proceedings coming within the provisions of Section 36-J of the Ben. Ten. Act. That section deals with only three classes of cases, namely where an occupancy holding is sold on the footing: (a) That it is a permanent tenure; (b) that it is a raiyati at a fixed rate or (c) that it is a lakhiraj. In these cases the landlord is expressly given the right to institute proceedings to recover the balance that will be due to him as landlord's transfer fee. The position in the above two cases in 36 CWN 847 and 924 was that although the holding was an ordinary occupancy holding, the transfer was made on the footing and with the false description that it was either a permanent tenure or a raiyati at a fixed rate. The landlord made an application to recover the balance but the transferee's reply was that the remedy was in a suit. S. 26-J does not say that the right is to be enforced by a suit or by an application, but S. 188 says that an application has to be made for enforcing the right given under S. 26-J. Therefore, in those cases which come under S. 26-J, it can be said with a good amount of reasoning that the legislature by providing for an application for enforcement of that right, has taken away the right to enforce it by a suit.
6. With regard to the case that I have, before me there is no indication in the Bengal Tenancy Act anywhere whether the remedy is to be sought by means of a suit or by means of an application. Mr. Karkoon says that where an ordinary occupancy holding is transferred but the transfer fee deposited is less than what is mentioned in Ss. 26-C and 26-E the landlord is without a remedy to recover the money. He says that he cannot recover money in by civil Court and he cites by way of analogy the case in 35 CWN 974. That was a case in which the proper fee due to the landlord under S. 48-H had not been deposited and a suit was instituted to recover the legitimate dues of the landlord. This Court held that the landlord had no right to recover the same, and that all he can say is that the sublease was not binding on him. This is a judgment of a Judge sitting Bingly, and this decision accordingly is not binding on me. I cannot accept that view. If the landlord is not paid his legitimate dues certainly he has a right to seek assistance of the Court to recover. Ubi jus ibi remedium is a well settled principle of law. The question then is what is the proper form of procedure to enforce the right which is in controversy in this case. Inasmuch as the legislature has not indicated, either expressly or by necessary implication, that right of the landlord is to be enforced by an application, the power of the Court to entertain a suit under the provisions of S. 9 in my judgment remains unaffected. In this view of the matter I do hold that the proper remedy is a suit.
7. So far as the decision in civil Rule No. 1598 of 1934 is concerned, the matter is not decided there in a binding way. There was a gift of an occupancy holding on the footing that it was an ordinary occupancy holding, but the recital was that the donees were related to the donor by blood within three degrees and the landlord's fee was not therefore paid. The landlord filed an application and said that the recital was false and he successfully established his case and the Court decreed landlord's fee. The donees moved this Court and it was contended that an application would not lie and the remedy of the landlord was a suit. The learned Judges of this Court said that they were doubtful as to what would be the proper form of procedure. Then they said that there was no merit in the rule at all and discharged the rule on that ground, although in one passage of the judgment they indicated that they were rather in dined to think that an application would be the proper form of procedure. Having regard to the form of that judgment I think that the matter has not been decided in a binding way. I accordingly set aside the judgment of the learned Munsif and in lieu thereof pass a decree in favour of the petitioner before me to the extent of Rs. 224-4-9. As this case is a case of first impression and the procedure is settled by me for the first time, I make no order for costs of this rule.
B.D/R.K
8. Order accordingly.
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