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Chilakamarri Lakshminarasimhacharyulu v. Mclaurin High School
Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by Pandrang Row, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal from the decree dated 9th September 1937 of the Subordinate Judge of Coconada in O.S. No. 22 of 1935. The plaintiff (appellant) sued for damages estimated at Rs. 10,000 for wrongful dismissal from his appointment as first assistant in the defendant school (McLaurin High School, Coconada), the school being represented by its manager. The suit was dismissed by the Court below and the plaintiff appealed.
Key factual chronology and documents (as set out in the opinion):
- Plaintiff employed initially in 1912; made a permanent employee by a contract signed on 1 July 1927.
- Relevant contractual clause: "This is a permanent appointment and will not ordinarily be terminated by the manager for reasons other than that of such conduct or unsatisfactory work ... In either case three months notice shall be given ..."
- Manager's communication terminating services: notice dated 24 January 1934 (Ex. F), terminating appointment effective 30 April 1934, citing "extraordinary financial circumstances".
- Earlier communication from manager dated 18 October 1933 (Ex. O) offering a reduced scale (Rs. 90 per month) from 1 January 1934 because of financial stringency; plaintiff's salary under contract was Rs. 125 per month.
- Plaintiff responded on 15 December 1933 offering to accept a maximum reduction of 12.5% during the period of financial stringency, otherwise asserting the original contract stands.
- Plaintiff reiterated willingness to accept a 12.5% cut in a letter dated 23 April 1934; manager replied (Ex. H, 30 June 1934) that there was no breach and that termination was due to extraordinary financial conditions.
- Defendant's defence: termination was necessitated by financial necessity, traceable to an unofficial cable from the Home Board in Toronto (14 March 1933) and subsequent local Mission conference decisions (July 1933) and Home Board communications.
- Suit filed 29 March 1935; lower Court dismissed the suit; appeal followed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether there was a breach of contract by the defendant — in other words, whether the manager's dismissal of the plaintiff was wrongful given the contractual language ("permanent" and "will not ordinarily be terminated").
- If there was a breach, what is the appropriate quantum of damages payable to the plaintiff?
- (Implicitly framed by the court's analysis) How should the words "permanent" and "ordinarily" in the contract be interpreted in the context of alleged extraordinary financial stringency?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The termination was wrongful and amounted to a breach of the contract (Ex. A), which described the appointment as "permanent" and protected against ordinary termination by the manager except for conduct or unsatisfactory work.
- The plaintiff offered, before the final notice, to accept a reduction of up to 12.5% during financial stringency; therefore less drastic measures were available and the final termination was unnecessary.
Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments
- The termination was necessitated by extraordinary financial stringency facing the Mission and the Indian branch; the manager acted on authority of the Mission conference and on information (including an unofficial cable from the Home Board) indicating severe reductions were likely.
- The plaintiff's refusal to accept the reduced salary (the offer of Rs. 90) justified termination; the management's decision was taken in good faith in response to the financial situation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| (1936) 3 ALL ER 322 | Interpreting the word "permanent" in an employment contract — court held "permanent" meant employment for life subject to any contractual proviso (e.g., continuing to perform duties to satisfaction). | The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that "permanent" cannot be read down to mean merely a year-to-year engagement; combined with the word "ordinarily" the contract must be interpreted so that termination in exceptional circumstances is possible but subject to judicial scrutiny. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a step-by-step manner, addressing both factual and contractual questions. The analysis can be summarized as follows.
- Context and comparative litigation: The Court noted a connected appeal with similar contractual wording where a different view was taken at the lower court level; nevertheless, the present appeal had to be decided on its own facts.
- Examination of the contract: The Court focused on the contractual words "permanent" and "ordinarily" (the operative sentence being: "This is a permanent appointment and will not ordinarily be terminated by the manager ..."). The Court accepted the English Court of Appeal authority that "permanent" is not to be construed as a mere year-to-year engagement, and concluded that "ordinarily" must retain its ordinary meaning: that termination in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances may be permissible, but such a right is subject to examination by a court.
- Standard for managerial discretion: The Court rejected the extreme submission that the management's belief about circumstances could justify termination without any judicial inquiry. It also rejected the opposite extreme that "ordinarily" would nullify the manager's right altogether. The correct approach, the Court held, is to allow termination in exceptional circumstances but to permit the court to examine whether such circumstances in fact existed and whether termination was necessitated by them.
-
Examination of financial evidence: The Court analyzed the defendant's evidence about financial necessity. It observed that:
- The Home Board in Canada had given notice of possible reductions (cable of 14 March 1933 and subsequent proceedings), and the local conference approved a more extensive scheme in July 1933.
- However, the precise reduction in the Home Board's contribution to the Indian branch for 1934 was not clearly evidenced before the Court; the manager's figures related only to allocations to the High School and the institutional finances were pooled among several institutions.
- Although alternative budgets showing cuts of 12.5% and 16 2/3% were contemplated, the reductions actually implemented locally averaged about 22% and in some cases 38%—a scheme that went beyond what the available information seemed to justify.
- Application to this case: Given the lack of clear proof that the financial exigency required dismissal or such a large cut in salary, and given the plaintiff's prior offer to accept a 12.5% reduction, the Court concluded the termination amounted to a breach of contract (Ex. A).
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Quantum of damages: For assessment of damages the Court considered the plaintiff's age (53 at time of notice) and customary employment practices in education (ordinary age of superannuation 55; some may be kept on till 60 if fit). The Court held:
- The contract must be read in light of usages known to both parties; it was not a contract for life.
- Although the lower Court found the plaintiff could have continued until 60, that finding relied on a speculative assessment of future health and fitness; contemporaneous evidence suggested "growing incapacity" and adverse inspection reports in the plaintiff's subject area.
- Given the probability that the plaintiff would not have been retained beyond 55, damages should be assessed on the basis that he was likely to continue only until 55 (not 60).
- Final assessment: Taking the above into account, the Court considered Rs. 3,000 to be reasonable compensation for the breach. The Court ordered a decree for this amount against the institution, allowed the appeal to that extent, directed proportionate costs on that amount in both courts to be paid by the defendant, and ordered interest at 6% per annum from the date of the judgment until realization.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Court's dispositive ruling was that the dismissal was wrongful and amounted to a breach of contract. The appeal was allowed in part and a decree for Rs. 3,000 was entered in favour of the plaintiff, with proportionate costs in this Court and the Court below to be borne by the defendant, and interest on the decree at 6% per annum from the date of the judgment until realisation.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The defendant school must pay Rs. 3,000, plus interest and the plaintiff's proportionate costs on that amount. The decree is directed against the properties of the institution.
- Contractual principle emphasized: The contract wording ("permanent" and "ordinarily") was interpreted to mean that termination in exceptional circumstances may be permissible, but the existence and necessity of such circumstances are subject to judicial scrutiny; management's assertion of exceptional circumstances is not immune from examination by the courts.
- Broader precedent: The opinion applied the cited English authority to give content to "permanent" in the contractual context, but the Court did not purport to establish any novel general rule beyond the application of ordinary contract interpretation principles to the facts. The opinion does not state that it sets a wider binding precedent beyond resolving the dispute before it.
Order accordingly.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Pandrang Row, J.:— This is an appeal from the decree dated 9th September, 1937 of the Subordinate Judge of Coconada in O.S No. 22 of 1935 on his file. The suit was for damages estimated at Rs. 10,000 for wrongful dismissal of the plaintiff from his appointment as first assistant in the defendant school, namely, the McLaurin High School, Coconada, which is represented in the litigation by its manager. The suit was dismissed with costs by the Court below and the plaintiff is the appellant before us. Two questions arise for determination in this appeal, namely, whether there was a breach of contract by the defendant, or, in other words, whether the dismissal of the plaintiff by the manager of the school was wrongful and if so, what is the amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled.
2. So far as the first question is concerned, a similar question arises in a connected appeal, Appeal No. 30 of 1939, in which the contract of service or employment is couched in similar language. In the present case, as observed already, the suit was dismissed, but in the connected case, the suit was decreed, the Court which passed that decree being the District Judge of East Godawari. In other words, in these two cases, two Courts have taken different views as to the interpretation to be placed on the contract and also as regards the actual financial position at the time when the services of the teachers were dispensed with. It seems desirable that we should deal with the appeals separately though in some respects the questions are the same in both the appeals. The plaintiff is a trained graduate who was employed in 1912 when the defendant school was started. He was then on a temporary basis. On 1st July 1927 the position was changed to his advantage, a contract being signed between him and the manager on that day giving him the status of a permanent employee. The important portion of the contract is as follows:
This is a permanent appointment and will not ordinarily be terminated by the manager for reasons other than that of such conduct or unsatisfactory work as, in his opinion, unfits the teacher for his post; or by the teacher except for reasons which, in his opinion, make it impossible for him to continue in the school. In either case three months notice shall be given to the other party by the party that terminates the agreement.
3. The order of communication which terminated the services of the plaintiff is dated 24th January, 1934 (Ex. F). It runs as follows:
Due to the stress of extraordinary financial circumstances, I hereby give you three months notice that the agreement made between you and the manager of the MoLaurin High School, Coconada, on 1st July, (year nil), is terminated from today and that your appointment to the Btaff of this school ends on 30th April, 1934.
4. This letter was sent by the manager, Mr. Quirk, D.W 3, and it purports to have been sent under the authority of the C.B Mission Conference, 3rd January, 1934. Before this final notice terminating the plaintiff's services, there was some previous correspondence which may be briefly referred to. On 18th October, 1933, the then manager, Mr. Wilton, wrote a letter (Ex. O) which runs as follows:
Owing to financial stringency a reduced scale of salaries throughout the Mission will come into force from 1st January 1934. According to that scale we can offer you Rs. 90 per month without further increments. If you desire to enter into a contract with the Mission on this basis and to continue in your present capacity, please intimate the same below.
5. It must be mentioned in this connexion that the pay that the plaintiff was entitled to get under his contract even in 1927 was Rs. 125 a month. Subsequent to Ex. O there was a reminder and a request for more time to make a decision by the plaintiff and finally a reply was sent by the plaintiff on 15th December, 1933. The material part of it runs as follows:
I beg to state that during the period of financial stringency, I agree to a reduction of my salary in the maximum out of 12½ per cent, which is usual in all institutions public or private. Kindly consider the possibility of a contract on that basis, in the absence of which, the original contract stands.
6. The final notice was in answer to this letter from the plaintiff, terminating the services of the plaintiff with effect from 30th April, 1934. Later on, on 23rd April, 1934, the plaintiff wrote again to the manager protesting against the termination of his services and again expressing his willingness to submit to a cut of 12½ per cent, during the period of financial depression and threatening a suit in case his offer was not accepted. The final reply sent to the plaintiff by the manager is Ex. H which stated that there was no breach of contract committed by the management and that on account of extraordinary financial conditions the management was constrained to make the changes and terminate his services: vide Ex. H, dated 30th June, 1934. The suit was instituted on 29th March, 1935. The defendant's main defence, as disclosed in the correspondence, is that the termination of the services of the plaintiff was necessitated by the plaintiff's refusal to accept the reduced salary of Rs. 90 a month, which reduction in its turn was necessitated by the extraordinary financial stringency that prevailed at the time. Apart from their income in the shape of fees and Government grant, the maintenance of the school was possible only with the addition of a grant from the Mission whose head office is at Toronto, Canada. It is the case of the defendant that the first intimation they had of this extraordinary financial stringency was a cablegram sent unofficially by the chairman of the Mission, Dr. MaoNeill, on 14th March, 1933, which was to the following effect:
Foreign Board facing unprecedented financial crisis: severe reductions likely near future: earnestly suggest missionary leaders consult immediately and submit to Board recommendations of voluntary reduction in salaries and work effective at earliest possible date. This message purely personal and unofficial.
7. It would seem that immediately on the receipt of this cable, a few missionaries met at Coconada on 27th March, 1933 and they seem to have straightway decided to propose at the regular conference in July that there should be a “downward revision of salary schedules of the more highly paid Indian workers.” It would appear from the evidence, that this description would take in every Indian worker paid more than Rs. 21 a month. It will at once be seen that this proposal which was ultimately carried into effect after approval by the conference in July and subsequent approval by the Home Board on 25th October, 1933 went very much further than the information before the meeting justified, because, what the cablegram had stated was that recommendations in respect of voluntary reductions of salaries and work should be made as soon as possible and there was no suggestion as to the extent of the reduction that would be necessary and no hint of any lowering of salaries even in the case of existing and permanent employees. In any case, this proposal seems to have met with the approval of the conference in July 1933. At the same time, so far as the missionaries themselves are concerned, their proposal was that there should be a cut in salaries. Between these two dates, there was a meeting of the Home Board early in May 1933 at which a statement of the financial position of the Mission was read and a copy of the statement was forwarded to the missionaries in India.
8. It is however unnecessary to go into the question of the financial condition of the Mission in Canada because it was admitted by both the parties in the Court below that what the Court had to consider was, not the financial condition of the Home Board but the financial condition of the Indian branch of the Mission in 1933 and the early part of 1934. It is obvious that so far as any reduction in the salaries or expenditure of any other kind in India was concerned, there could be a necessity to effect it only if there was an anticipated reduction in the income of the Indian branch. In short, unless there had been or there was going to be a serious reduction in the contribution made by the Home Board to the Indian branch of the Mission, there would not have been any necessity to effect any economies or make any reductions in salary. Unfortunately, so far as this aspect of the case is concerned, there is very little evidence as to the information that was before the school authorities (including in this phrase not merely the manager but also the conference which appears to have exercised some power of supervision over the school finances) when they decided to put into force the reduced scale of salaries even in the case of existing permanent employees and authorized the giving of a notice like Ex. F to the plaintiff. So far as Ex. O dated 13th October, 1933 is concerned, it would appear that it was sent even before the Home Board had approved the scheme of reduced salaries being applied even to existing employees, for the communication sent by the Home Board after their meeting in May 1933 was substantially to the effect that alternative budgets should be sent for the year 1934 on the basis of a reduction in the grant from the Home Board of, 12½ per cent., and 16⅔ per cent, respectively and a note was added to the effect that at that moment the best that could be done was to limit the reduction to 12½ per cent, but that it might be necessary to make the larger reduction of 16⅔ per cent.
9. In short, the information which the conference had before it in July 1933 was that in all probability there would be a reduction in the grant from the Home Board to the extent of 12½ per cent, and that the reduction might be even as much as 16⅔ per cent.; in other words, that the reduction was likely to be one-eighth and must even have to be one sixth. The actual reduction made in the salaries by the scheme approved by the conference in July was however much more drastic, because, in some cases the reduction was as much as 38 per cent, and the average was 22 per cent. It is clear therefore that the scheme went very much beyond what the situation required. There is, moreover, no clear evidence as to whether the threatened reduction by 12½ per cent., of 16⅔ per cent, was actually made in the budget of 1934. It is extraordinary, but the fact remains, that there is no clear evidence to show what was the actual reduction made by the Home Board in their contribution for the year 1934. No communication or paper has been put before us from which it can be seen at a glance what the contribution by the Home Board was in 1933 and what it was in 1934. No doubt, in respect of the High School, with which we are concerned in this case, there is the evidence of the manager given in cross-examination to the affect that the monthly contribution on 1933 was Rs. 548 and the contribution in 1934 was Rs. 439-11-1. This, however, is not sufficient, because, it is admitted that the High School is only one of the several institutions which have, so to say, a common finance. The manager himself admits that though separate accounts were kept, the finance of all the institutions is treated as one unit. In his own words, “the accounts of the two schools, the High School and the Training School are kept separate but are grouped together for institutional finances.” Again, he stated in his examination-in-chief that the Mission makes a grant in the name of the defendant school but it is divided into four heads, the defendant School, the Training school, the Manual Training School and the Hostel.
10. These figures, namely, the grants made by the Mission in Canada for all these four institutions for the year 1933 and for the year 1934 are not before us, because the figures given by the manager in his cross-examination relate only to the grant actually allocated to the High School proper by the local authorities here. It is therefore not inaccurate to say that there is no evidence before us to show what was the actual reduction in the grant made by the Board in Canada in its contribution to the Indian branch for the year 1934. Assuming however that the threatened cut in the grant which was foreshadowed in the cable and in the proceedings of the Board in Canada, was sufficient to justify the need for a reduction of salaries, it would have justified the imposition of a cut of 12½ per cent, or so. The manager himself, in his letter to the Director of Public Instruction (Ex. 20) admitted that to meet the 12½ per cent, mission cut, a 12½ per cent, cut on the Mission institutions would have been sufficient to meet the expected deficit for 1934. He also admitted in that letter that for 1934 only a 12½ per cent, cut was made on the Indian work but nevertheless a more drastic reduction was made in the salaries because the conference “decided to make a permanent new scale which should meet the situation with which the mission was faced.” In his evidence also, the manager, as D.W 3, admits that during 1934 the cut on the institutions was only 12½ per cent. This discussion of the evidence is sufficient to show that while a case could be made out for reduction in salaries to the extent of 12½ per cent, either in the shape of compulsory reduction or of voluntary cuts, there was no need to make a more drastic reduction of salary even in the case of existing employees and in particular of employees who enjoyed the privilege of being permanent employees with contracts in their favour. This leads us to the question of the interpretation of the contract in this case. The two words in the contract which are relied upon are the words, “permanent” and “ordinarily”, which are found in the following sentence:
This is a permanent employment and will not ordinarily be terminated by the manager for reasons other than that of such conduct or unsatisfactory work….
11. It is not necessary to consider the exception of bad conduct or work, because it is not the case of the defendant that the dismissal or termination of services in this case was on account of unsatisfactory work or conduct. Throughout, the reason for the act complained of by the plaintiff has been the extraordinary financial circumstances which faced the Mission in India. Mr. Govindarajachari for the plaintiff-appellant relies on a comparatively recent ruling of the Court of Appeal in England in (1936) 3 ALL ER 322.1 The agreement in that case contained the following relevant words:
In the absence of such notice, the engagement to remain in force as a permanent one, subject to your continuing to perform your duties to the satisfaction of the directors.
12. It was argued in that case on behalf of the company that the word “permanent” was used in the same sense as a permanent civil servant as opposed to a temporary civil servant and that the use of the word was compatible with the employment being from year to year. This argument was repelled by the Court of Appeal which observed that actually this argument amounted to saying that permanent does not mean permanent but means an engagement which can be determined at any time by notice expiring on 31st December or at any other time in the year; and it was held that the words mean that the plaintiff in the suit was to have a permanent employment, i.e, employment for life, subject to the proviso contained in the agreement, namely, his continuing to perform his duties to the satisfaction of the directors. In the present case, there is not only the use of the word “permanent”, but also the additional words which have been quoted above which provide, so to say, against termination of the employment. In substance, omitting the cases of dismissal for bad conduct or work, the words are: ‘this is a permanent appointment and will not ordinarily be terminated by the manager’. Unless the word ‘ordinarily’ is given such a meaning as to nullify the effect of the word ‘not’ preceding it, it is impossible to interpret the contract in the way pressed before us by the learned Advocate-General namely, that in spite of the appointment being declared to be permanent and in spite of the words which provide that the appointment will not ordinarily be terminated by the manager, nevertheless, if the management at any time in its opinion thought that the circumstances were other than ordinary, it would validly terminate the appointment and the Court would have no right to canvass the reasons which led the management to form the opinion that the circumstances were other than ordinary or required the termination of the services. We are unable to accept such an interpretation of the contract in the present case. “Ordinarily” no doubt, must be given its full force but the meaning of this word as well as of all words in ordinary use must be their ordinary meaning. It means, in our opinion, that in other than ordinary circumstances, or, to put it differently, in exceptional or special or unusual or extraordinary circumstances, the management shall not be prevented by the contract in doing what these extraordinary or unusual circumstances required; and the management's right to terminate the services must be a right which can be made the subject of examination by a Court. It is more or less on this basis that the case proceeded in the Court below, that the reason given for the act complained of, namely, the extraordinary financial stringency, must be established by the defendant and must be shown to have necessitated the termination of the services. As the lower Court put it, it is not every financial stringency that would come under the definition of “ordinary” but it must be of a sufficiently grave character and what has to be considered in the present case is, whether the financial stringency was of such grave character as to necessitate directly a revision of the scales of pay and indirectly the termination of the contract with the plaintiff. This appears to us to interpret the contract in a reasonable and correct way. The “extreme” contentions on both sides appear to be extreme in reality. They were put forward before us as extreme contentions and they do not deserve to be regarded in any better light. On the one side, it was argued that it was for the management to decide whether the circumstances had changed and thus to terminate the services at their discretion and that their act could not be questioned in a Court of law. On the other side, it was contended that the word ‘ordinarily’ practically meant nothing and that actually the management had no right to terminate the services except on grounds of bad conduct or work. We dismiss both these contentions as not being supported by the language found in the contract.
13. It would follow from what has been already stated regarding the facts of the case, that even the existence of an extraordinary financial stringency has not been clearly established. Even assuming that there was a financial stringency, which was brought to the notice of the Indian branch-by the Home Board in March 1933, the stringency was not sufficiently stringent to necessitate a permanent and unduly drastic reduction in the salaries of the existing permanent staff. There was in particular no reason why the remedy that was found to be sufficient and proper in the case of the missionaries themselves should not have been considered sufficient to meet the needs of the situation in the case of what are described as the more highly paid Indian workers, who are not more highly paid than the missionaries themselves. It is contended before us that the local authorities preferred to make a greater reduction in the salary of the Indian employees than the needs of the situation demanded with the idea that the economies thereby effected would make their own sacrifice a little less than what it might otherwise have to be. We are not prepared to go to the length of saying that this was done with this object, though it is impossible to reject the contention entirely that some such impression might have had its effect on the final decision of the conference. It is also possible as argued, though there is no evidence on the subject, that with the reduced salaries it was thought possible to get sufficiently qualified persons for the work owing to the increase in the number of unemployed qualified men. Whatever the other motives might have been, we are prepared to assume that the motives of those who effected the reduction complained of in this case were not other than honest. We are unable to say that the defendant has satisfied us that there was such an extraordinary financial stringency as made it necessary to make a drastic reduction of the kind that the plaintiff complained of. In other words, there was no justification or need for reducing the salary of the plain, tiff by as much as 28 per cent, especially when he had offered, even before the final notice was given to him, to submit to a cut of 12½ per cent. We are therefore satisfied that in this case the termination of the plaintiff's services was wrongful because it amounted to a breach of the contract, Ex. A.
14. The only other question relates to the quantum of damages. The plaintiff's exact date of birth is not given in the evidence but it is clear, and the fact is admitted, that he was 53 years old when he was given notice of termination of his services. Though the contract merely says, ‘permanent’ and though the word ‘permanent’ may in a proper case be taken to mean for life, nevertheless in the matter of appointment of teachers in schools, it is the general usage, so to say, for the educational institutions not to continue to employ teachers who have passed the age of 60, the ordinary age of super annulation being 55, those who are over 55 being kept on till 60 in case the management is of opinion that they are fit to perform their duties efficiently. This usage prevailing in the educational world must be deemed to be part of the contract and it is impossible in our opinion to regard the contract as being one for life having regard to the conditions and usages known to both the parties at the time of the contract. It is not necessary to elaborate this aspect of the case because the plaintiff himself has not made the claim that the contract gives him an appointment for life. He has claimed only on the basis that he would have been entitled under the contract to continue in service till 60 and he does not contend that even during this period he cannot be sent away if found to be not fit for work. The lower Court has found that the plaintiff would have been entitled under the contract to continue till he was 60 years old. There is a qualification introduced by the Court below to this finding. In para. 44 of the judgment which contains the finding, the lower Court observes as follows:
I hold that plaintiff is physically fit to continue in service till he completed 60 years of age. I hold that but for the plaintiff's growing incapacity to teach, he could have continued in service till he completed 60 years.
15. It must be remembered in this connexion that the first finding is to some extent an attempt to forecast the future, because the plaintiff had not attained the age of 60 when the lower Court pronounced its judgment and it was certainly impossible for the lower Court to hold that he is physically fit to continue till he completed 60 years of age. In fact, no one can be so positive about anyone's health and even continued existence. It would seem that even the lower Court was thus of opinion that there was a growing incapacity to teach though the lower Court appears to have also thought that but for that growing incapacity he could have continued till he completed 60. It is obvious that under the contract if the growing incapacity for service really made the plaintiff unfit to perform his duties efficiently, his services could have been terminated by the management. There is also the statement of the manager as D.W 3 to the effect that the plaintiff was never a good teacher in his subject and it would appear that the inspection reports by the Government educational authorities were not quite favourable to him. The inspection reports show that from 1928 adverse remarks were being made about the teaching in history. Having regard to the facts in this case, it is extremely unlikely that the plaintiff would have been retained in service by the manager after he attained 55 years. The chances of his retention upto 60 were so remote that it is not possible in our opinion to allow him damages on the basis that he would have continued in service till he completed 60 years. Under the circumstances, damages have to be calculated on the basis that he was likely to have continued in service only till he completed 55 years.
16. Having regard to this important consideration and having in mind the other circumstances as well, which bear on the question of damages, we are of opinion that damages to the extent of Rs. 3000 would be a reasonable compensation for the breach of contract established in this case. There would be a decree accordingly for this amount against the properties of the institution, the appeal being allowed to this extent. The plaintiff appellant will have his proportionate costs on this amount in this Court and in the Court below to be paid by the defendant. The decree amount will bear interest at 6 per cent, per annum from this date until the date of realization.
C.R.K/K.S
17. Order accordingly.
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