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Sukhan Singh And Others Objectors v. Uma Shankar Misir And Others Decree-Holders
Factual and Procedural Background
These two appeals arise out of proceedings under Section 144, Civil P.C. The Collector of Benares, who was in charge of the Sakaldiya estate, instituted a suit against Mt. Chandrajota Kunwar seeking to set aside an agreement and for possession of property that included the lands now in dispute. The Court of first instance decreed the suit on 17 March 1930 and delivered possession to the Collector on 26 May 1930. Chandrajota appealed to the High Court, which reversed the decree and dismissed the Collector's suit on 5 September 1933.
After the High Court's reversal, Mt. Chandrajota applied for restitution under Section 144, Civil P.C., seeking delivery of possession of the property that had been taken in execution of the first Court's decree. The present appellants were impleaded in that application; they claimed to have been admitted as tenants by the Collector (who had been in possession between the first decree and the High Court's reversal) and asserted statutory tenancy rights under Section 19 of the Agra Tenancy Act. The lower Court dismissed the appellants' objection to restitution and delivered actual possession to Mt. Chandrajota. The present appeals challenge that decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Section 144, Civil P.C., Mt. Chandrajota is entitled to restitution of possession free from encumbrances arising during the period of the Collector's possession, including tenancies created in that interval.
- Whether the appellants, having been admitted as tenants by the Collector while he was in possession, acquired the status of statutory tenants under Section 19, Agra Tenancy Act, which would prevent their removal on restitution to Mt. Chandrajota.
- Whether lessees or sub-tenants let into possession by a person temporarily in possession (here, the Collector under a decree subsequently reversed) fall within the scope of persons against whom restitution can be claimed under Section 144 (i.e., whether they are "representatives" or persons deriving title for the purposes of restitution).
- Whether the exclusive jurisdiction of Revenue Courts under Section 230 of the Tenancy Act (and Schedule 4 references to suits under Section 44 for ejectment of trespassers) prevents Mt. Chandrajota from obtaining actual possession by way of a restitution application under Section 144, Civil P.C.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants claim they were admitted as tenants by the Collector during the period he was in possession and therefore became statutory tenants under Section 19 of the Agra Tenancy Act, acquiring a life-tenancy that cannot be defeated by restitution to Mt. Chandrajota.
- They relied strongly on the case Rajjabali Khan v. Faku Biri (1932 Lab. 29), contending that sub-lessees or persons let into possession by a decree-holder are not "legal representatives" of that decree-holder and, consequently, restitution should not be ordered against them.
- Alternatively, it was argued that, at worst, they are trespassers within the meaning of Section 44 of the Tenancy Act and that ejectment suits against such persons fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Court under Section 230 and Schedule 4; therefore civil restitution proceedings should not be used to displace them.
Respondent's (Mt. Chandrajota Kunwar's) Position
- Mt. Chandrajota applied for restitution under Section 144, Civil P.C., seeking restoration of possession to the position she occupied but for the decree later reversed — i.e., actual possession of the lands free from encumbrances created while she was deprived of possession by the decree-holder.
- Implicit in her claim (and accepted by the Court) is the position that persons admitted as tenants by a wrongful or temporary possessor (including a decree-holder later found to have no title) cannot acquire statutory tenancy rights that defeat restitution.
- She did not accept that mere receipt of rent (were that to be offered) would be an adequate substitute for physical restoration of possession, because rent is not the only relevant interest of a landholder and appellants may be undesirable tenants.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rajjabali Khan v. Faku Biri, 1932 Lab. 29 | The reported view in that case was that sub-leases created by the decree-holder in favour of third persons were not created under or as an immediate consequence of the decree, that such lessees were strangers to the litigation and not legal representatives of the decree-holder, and therefore restitution should not be ordered against them. | The Court considered this authority but rejected its broad application to the present facts. While acknowledging the peculiar facts and possible tenancy-law difficulties in that case, the Court held that lessees or persons deriving title from a decree-holder who was temporarily in possession can be removed by restitution under Section 144 and are within the scope of persons against whom restitution may be claimed. The Court regarded the Rajjabali view as unpersuasive insofar as it suggests that such lessees cannot be treated as persons deriving title for the purposes of restitution. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded by examining the scope and purpose of Section 144, Civil P.C., and the competing statutory provisions and case-law relied upon by the parties.
- Application of Section 144, Civil P.C. — The Court emphasized that Section 144 makes it imperative, where a decree of the first instance is reversed on appeal, that the Court should place the successful party in the position he or she would have occupied but for that (now reversed) decree. Restitution under Section 144 includes restoration free from encumbrances created in the interim; it can be claimed against the opposite party and persons deriving title from him.
- Character of possession and creation of tenancy under Section 19, Agra Tenancy Act — The appellants relied on Section 19 to claim statutory tenancy rights. The Court rejected the idea that temporary or wrongful possession confers power to "admit" statutory tenants. The Court reasoned that if a person in wrongful possession (including a trespasser or a decree-holder subsequently found to have no title) could create statutory tenants, this would permit a wrongdoer to saddle the rightful owner with tenants during the pendency of litigation — an outcome contrary to natural justice and inconsistent with Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
- Interaction with Section 52, Transfer of Property Act — The Court relied on Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, which prohibits transferring or otherwise dealing with property during the pendency of litigation in which the right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question. Admitting tenants during such pendency was characterized as "dealing with" the property, and therefore a wrongful possessor lacks the competence to create enforceable statutory tenancies.
- Treatment of the Rajjabali precedent — The Court examined Rajjabali Khan v. Faku Biri and acknowledged that the facts there were complicated and might have presented tenancy-law difficulties. Nonetheless, the Court declined to accept the broader obstructionist view from that case that sub-lessees cannot be considered persons deriving title for the purposes of restitution under Section 144. The Court held that to give full effect to the restitution remedy, tenants admitted after the decree must be removable so as to place the successful appellate party in the position he or she would have had absent the reversed decree.
- Jurisdictional challenge under Section 230, Tenancy Act — The appellants argued that ejectment proceedings against those retaining possession without the consent of the landholder fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of Revenue Courts (per Section 230 and Schedule 4 references). The Court distinguished that scenario: Mt. Chandrajota was not bringing an independent ejectment suit in a civil court treating the appellants as trespassers; rather she sought restitution under Section 144 of the Civil P.C. against the Collector and those claiming under him. The Court held Section 230 had no application to the present restitution proceedings.
- Rent as inadequate remedy — The Court rejected the contention that payment of rent to Mt. Chandrajota would be an adequate restoration of her rights. The Court noted that receipt of rent does not fully replicate the position of actual possession and that appellants might be undesirable tenants; therefore rent cannot be treated as equivalent to restoring the position she occupied before losing possession.
Holding and Implications
APPEALS DISMISSED. The Court held that the lower Court correctly dismissed the appellants' objections and ordered restitution in favour of Mt. Chandrajota Kunwar under Section 144, Civil P.C. The appeals were dismissed under Order 41, Rule 11, Civil P.C.
Direct consequences and implications:
- Mt. Chandrajota is entitled to restoration of possession of the lands in dispute free from encumbrances created during the Collector's possession, including tenancies created by the Collector or persons deriving title from him.
- The appellants, having been admitted as tenants by a person in wrongful or temporary possession (the Collector subject to a decree subsequently reversed), cannot claim statutory tenancy rights under Section 19 of the Agra Tenancy Act to defeat restitution.
- The remedy of restitution under Section 144 extends to persons deriving title from the party temporarily in possession and is not confined to the original parties to the decree.
- The jurisdictional provision in Section 230 of the Tenancy Act (and Schedule 4) does not bar a restitution application under Section 144 in the facts of this case; that provision concerns ordinary ejectment suits and is distinguishable from restitution proceedings following reversal of a decree.
The opinion did not indicate that a novel legal precedent was being expressly laid down beyond its application of Section 144 to the facts; it primarily affirmed the correctness of the lower Court's view in this case and declined to accept the contrary implications drawn from Rajjabali Khan v. Faku Biri.
1. These two appeals arise opt of proceedings under Section 144, Civil P.C. The appellants objected to restitution being made under Section 144, Civil P.C., to a lady named Chandrajota Kunwar, so far as it was claimed in denial of the appellants' rights as statutory tenants. The lower Court dismissed the appellants' objection and delivered actual possession of the lands in dispute to Mt. Chandrajota Kunwar. It appears that the Collector of the Benares, who was in charge of the estate known as Sakaldiya estate, instituted a suit, against Mt. Chandrajota Kunwar for setting aside an agreement and for possession of property of which the lands now in dispute were parts. It is not necessary to enter into the details of the controversy between the parties to that suit. Suffice it to say, that it was a suit for inter alia, the relief of possession against Mt. Chandrajota. The suit was decreed by the Court of first instance on 17th March 1930, and possession was delivered to the Collector on 26th May 1930. Chandrajota preferred an appeal to this Court, which reversed the decree of the Court of first instance on 5th September 1933, and dismissed the Collector's suit. Mt. Chandrajota then applied for restitution under Section 144, Civil P.C., praying for delivery of possession of the property which had been taken possession of by the Collector in execution of the decree of the first Court, since reversed by the High Court. She impleaded in her application the present appellants who claimed to be tenants admitted by the Collector in the interval after delivery of possession to him before the decision of the High Court.
2. It is not disputed that the lands now in dispute were originally cultivated by certain tenants who were actually in possession when the Collector took delivery of possession. It is mentioned in the judgment of the learned Sub-Judge that those tenants were dispossessed and the officials of the Court of Wards let the lands to the appellants at lower rents. The learned advocate for the appellants has referred me to the statement of the patwari, who says that the original tenants themselves relinquished the lands in dispute and thereupon the officials of the Court of Wards let the lands to the appellants. In my opinion it makes no appreciable difference if the case is decided on the assumption that the out-going tenants had voluntarily relinquished the land, which was subsequently let to the appellants by the officials of the Court of Wards. The appellants claim that Mr. Chandrajota Kunwar is not entitled to actual possession as against them, as they became statutory tenants under Section 19, Agra Tenancy Act, because they were admitted as tenants by the Collector, who was then in possession as proprietor. The principal question between Mt. Chandrajota and the appellants in the lower Court was whether they were statutory tenants, as claimed by them; if not, Mt. Chandrajota's right to take actual possession can hardly be said to be in doubt.
3. Section 144, Civil P.C., makes it imperative, where a decree passed by the Court of first instance is reversed on appeal that the Court should place the winning party in the position which he or she would have occupied but for such decree. Mt. Chandrajota is entitled to have her land restored to her free from all encumbrances, including any tenancy that might have been created in the meantime by the party who was successful in the first Court but eventually was found to have no title to the land. Restitution under Section 144 can be claimed not only against the opposite party, but also his representatives or persons deriving title from him. The terms of Section 144 present no difficulty to my mind and I have no hesitation in holding that, unless Section 19, Agra Tenancy Act, on which reliance is placed by the learned advocate for the appellants, leads to a different conclusion, Section 141, Civil P.C., in terms applies to the facts of this case.
4. My attention has been drawn to Rajjabali Khan v. Faku Biri 1932 Lab. 29, which is strongly relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellants. The facts of that case are complicated, and it may be that, in the peculiar circumstances thereof, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judges was correct. There are however some observations which, I regret, I am unable to accept. In that case one Rajjabali had instituted a suit for possession against the defendant and obtained an ex parte decree. He executed certain sub-leases in favour of third persons. Subsequently the ex parte decree was set aside, and Rajjabali's suit was eventually dismissed. The successful defendant applied for restitution against the sub-lessees let into possession by Rajjabali. The learned Judges held:
That the sub-leases were created by Kajjabali in favour of the opposite parties Nos. 13 to 23 not under the decree nor as a direct or immediate consequence of it, and, as the said defendants were strangers to the litigation and were in no sense the legal representatives of Rajjabali, no order of restitution should have been made against them.
5. With all respect I am unable to accept the view that the lessees cannot be considered to be the "representatives" of their lessors as against a person who is found to be the real owner of the land and who was temporarily dispossessed by the lessor. The words "legal representatives" have not been used in Section 144, but it casts a duty on the Court to place the parties in the position, which they would have occupied but for the decree subsequently reversed. This cannot be done, unless the lessees introduced after the decree of the first Court be removed from possession. In the case noted above the learned Judges have made some remarks on the use of the words "so far as may be" in Section 144.
6. There might have been difficulty in that case in removing the sub-lessees having regard to the provisions of the tenancy law there in force. I do not see any difficulty in removing the appellants in this case unless they are protected by Section 19, Agra Tenancy Act, which I shall presently consider.
7. Section 19, Agra Tenancy Act, provides that subject to the provisions of Sub-section 3, Section 8 (which need not be considered in this case), every person who is, after the commencement of this act (act no. 3 of 1926), admitted as tenant without a right of occupancy to land other than sir, grove-land, pasture-land, or land covered by water and used for the purpose of growing singhara or other similar produce, shall be called a statutory tenant and, subject to the provisions of this Act, shall be entitled to a life-tenancy of his holding. It is contended that the section does not expressly state as to who is entitled to "admit" to tenancy. It is said that any one for the time being in possession of a proprietary tenure-though he may be subsequently found to have no title to it - has power to admit to tenancy. In my opinion this line of reasoning is untenable. If a trespasser takes forcible possession of land belonging to another, and during the pendency of the suit brought by the owner against the trespasser, the latter admits third persons as tenants, it is, in my opinion, an impossible proposition that the successful plaintiff cannot take actual possession. If the contention put forward before me, be accepted as sound, the person for the time being in possession though a trespasser can saddle the real owner, who is struggling for the recovery of his property with tenants, who may be highly undesirable from his point of view. Such a view is not only opposed to natural justice but, in my opinion, offends against Section 52. T.P. Act, which clearly provides that, during the pendency in any Court of a contentious suit or proceeding in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with. It cannot be reasonably contended that, during the pendency of a suit, in which certain lands are in dispute, admitting tenants to those lands is not "dealing with" the lands. I can make no distinction between a, case in which a person taking forcible possession of land lets it out to tenants during the pendency of the suit brought for its recovery and the case of a person who takes possession of it in execution of a decree passed by the first Court but subsequently reversed on the finding that he has no right to the land erroneously decreed to him. In either case the character of his possession is the same, viz., wrongful. In my opinion, Section 19, Agra Tenancy Act, confers statutory rights upon tenants who are admitted as such by the person having the right to let. A person in wrongful and temporary possession of land has no right to let, and cannot consequently create Statutory rights by admitting others as tenants.
8. It is argued that Mt. Chandrajoti, was entitled to receive rent from the tenants who occupied the lands before the Collector took delivery of possession and that she is entitled to receive it now from the present incumbents, so that she would be practically restored to the position which she occupied, even if the appellants are recognized as statutory tenants. I am unable to accept this view. The amount of rent is not the only consideration which weighs with a landholder. The appellants may be undesirable tenants from her point of view and, in any case, they may not be as good as the tenants who occupied the land when she lost possession. I hold that the position of the appellants as tenants, statutory or otherwise, is not consistent with the position which Mt. Chandrajoti Kunwar occupied when she lost possession.
9. The learned Counsel for the appellants argues that the appellants are, at the worst, persons taking or retaining possession of the lands in dispute without the consent of the landholder under Section 44, Tenancy Act, and that a suit for their ejectment must be brought in the Revenue Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction. It is true that Section 230 provides that all suits and applications of the nature specified in Schedule 4 shall be heard and determined by the Revenue Courts and that in Schedule 4, Group B, suits under Section 44 for ejectment of trespassers are mentioned. If Mt. Chandrajoti Kunwar had instituted suits in a civil Court for recovery of possession against the appellants, treating them as trespassers, the argument would fall to be considered. In the case before me, the position is materially different. The lady is applying for restitution, and in doing so prays for actual possession under Section 144 against the Collector and those claiming title from him. In my opinion Section 230, Tenancy Act, relied on, has no application to the circumstances of the present case.
10. For the reasons stated above, I hold that the lower Court took a correct view of the rights of the parties. These appeals are dismissed under Order 41, Rule 11, Civil P.C.
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