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Adam Ali Taluqdar And Ors. v. The King-Emperor
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a conviction by the Sessions Judge of Barisal, where two appellants, Adam Ali Taluqdar and Sher Gazi, were sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment under the second part of Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The case concerns a dispute over land ownership and possession involving Ekram Ali and Akkel Ali, who each owned an eight annas share of a piece of land. Ekram Ali mortgaged his northern half to Adam Ali, who was in possession. Akkel Ali sold his share to Ekram Ali, who then sought to redeem the mortgage by tendering payment to Adam Ali. On December 25, 1925, Adam Ali, Sher Gazi, and others came to cut the paddy on the northern half, leading to a confrontation in which Mahammad, related to Ekram Ali, was fatally stabbed by the appellants and others. The appellants were convicted for this act. The defence raised was innocence and enmity.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with acts done with common intention, applies to convictions under the second part of Section 304 IPC, which excludes intention to cause death.
- Whether Section 35 IPC, concerning liability of persons joining in a criminal act with varying knowledge or intention, applies to the facts of this case.
- Whether the trial judge erred in not properly instructing the jury on the right of private defence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Section 34 IPC cannot apply to the second part of Section 304 IPC because the latter excludes intention to cause death, while Section 34 requires a common intention.
- The correct section to apply in this case is Section 35 IPC, which assigns liability based on the knowledge or intention of each participant in a criminal act.
- The trial judge failed to properly explain the law on the right of private defence to the jury, which should have been considered given the circumstances.
Court's Response to Arguments
- The court rejected the argument that Section 34 IPC does not apply to Section 304 Part II, explaining that while there may be no intention to cause death, there can still be a common intention to do an act known to be likely to cause death, and such an act is criminal.
- The court acknowledged that Section 35 IPC requires consideration of the knowledge and intention of each person, and found that the trial judge properly charged the jury on these aspects.
- The court held that the right of private defence was not pleaded by the appellants and there was no evidence to suggest it was their case, so the judge was not obliged to instruct the jury on it beyond what was done.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Appeal No. 248 of 1924 (Walmsley, J. and Mookerjee, J.) | Consideration of whether Section 34 IPC applies to the second part of Section 304 IPC | The court viewed the remarks of Walmsley, J. as obiter dicta, noting that the decision did not rest on the interpretation of Section 34, and thus did not preclude its applicability to Section 304 Part II. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the applicability of Section 34 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC, emphasizing that although the latter excludes an intention to cause death, it requires knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. The court reasoned that the common intention required by Section 34 can coexist with the absence of intent to cause death, as the common intention may be to perform an act known to be likely to cause death. The court further explained that Section 35 IPC requires the court or jury to consider the individual knowledge and intention of each participant, a principle that was properly conveyed to the jury by the trial judge. Regarding the right of private defence, the court held that since the appellants did not plead this defence and there was no evidence to suggest it, the trial judge was not obligated to instruct the jury extensively on this issue. The judge’s explanation was deemed adequate. Ultimately, the court found no error in the trial proceedings or summing up that would warrant interference with the conviction or sentence.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is dismissed.
The court upheld the conviction and sentence of the appellants under Section 304 Part II IPC. The decision confirms that Section 34 IPC applies to acts done with common intention even when there is no intention to cause death but knowledge that death is likely. It also clarifies that the right of private defence must be specifically pleaded and supported by evidence to merit jury consideration. This ruling directly affects the parties by requiring the appellants to surrender and serve the remainder of their sentence. No new precedent was established beyond the court’s interpretation and application of existing provisions.
The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—
This is an appeal by two persons Adam Ali Taluqdar and Sher Gazi, who have been, sentenced by the Sessions Judge of Barisal, agreeing with the unanimous verdict of the jury to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment: under the second part of sec. 304, I.P.C
The facts are as follows:— There are two persons Ekram Ali and Akkel Ali who own a piece of land each having an eight annas share in it. By arrangement Ekram Ali possessed the northern half and Akkel Ali the southern half. Akkel Ali is the husband of the sister of Ekram Ali. Ekram Ali mortgaged the land to Adam Ali Taluqdar, one of the Appellants now before us, and Adam Ali was in possession. Then Akkel Ali sold the land to Ekram Aii. Ekram Ali wanted to redeem the mortgage and tendered the money to Adam Ali. There were some disputes about the payment of the money but Ekram Ali cultivated the land. On the 25th December 1925, Adam Ali, Sher Gazi and Abdul Gafur who is the Appellant in a connected appeal and one Tahir Khan brought a number of reapers and proceeded to cut the coarse paddy grown on the northern half of the land, by Ekram Ali and began to cut the paddy. Ekram Ali and his two brothers Adam Ali, Monta Ali and his cousin Mahammad came to the spot. The two parties faced each other and Mahammad flung a spear at Tahir Ali which missed him. Abdul Gafur, called out to the party, to kill some one. Tahir Mahammad then struck Mahammad with his spear in the stomach and Sher Ali and Adam Ali also stabbed him. He fell down and died on the spot.
The defence, was that of innocence and enmity.
Mr. Taluqdar has argued that sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code can have no application, to the second part of sec. 304 under which the Appellants have been convicted. His argument is this:—
The second part of sec. 304 runs as follows:— “Or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years or with fine or with both, if the act is done with the know ledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause the death.” Mr. Taluqdar argues that to apply sec. 34 there must be a common intention and that as there was no common intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death because the definition of sec. 304, Part II, excludes such intention, sec. 34 cannot apply. The simple answer to this contention is this that although to constitute an offence under sec. 304, Part II, there must be no intention of causing death or such injury as the offender knew was likely to cause death, there must still be a common intention to do an act with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death though without the intention of causing death. Each of the assailants may know that the act they are jointly doing is one that is likely to cause death but have no intention of causing death, yet they may certainly have the common intention to do that act. No one will dispute that such an act is a criminal act. Clearly sec. 34 can apply to a case under sec. 304, Part II.
Our attention has been drawn to a decision of Mr. Justice Walmsley and Mr. Justice Mookerjee (Appeal No. 248 of 1924, decided on 19th August 1924). In that case there are the following remarks of Walmsley, J. “There is yet another objection to the charges and verdict. It is that sec. 34 which is based on a common intention cannot possibly be used with the second part of sec. 304 which expressly excludes intention. Personally I do not think that it could be used with the first part either, except possibly in very rare cases. However, the point is that the jury have found the accused guilty of committing culpable homicide by doing an act with the knowledge that they were likely to cause death, but without any such intention, in furtherance of a common intention. It is badly framed charge and the defecting summing up that, have led the jury to their illogical verdict.”
With great respect to the learned Judge I am not quite able to discover whether he did or did not decide the point. He certainly does not discuss it or give any reason for his decision. But it is clear from a perusal of the judgment that the learned Judge decided the case upon other considerations and that the decision of that case did not depend on the interpretation of sec. 34. The learned Judge's remarks therefore on the applicability of sec. 34 to sec. 304, Part II, may therefore be considered as obiter dicta.
Mr. Taluqdar next contends that sec. 35 is the section that really applies. Sec. 35, I.P.C, simply makes it clear that where a number of persons join in an act which is criminal only by reason of its being done with a certain knowledge or intention, each person is liable for the act to the extent of his knowledge or intention; in other words, that the Court or jury have to consider what is the knowledge or intention with which each person joined in the act, i.e, A and B beat C who dies. A intended to murder him and knew that the act would cause death. B only intended to cause grievous hurt and did not know his act would cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to result in death. A is guilty of murder and B of causing grievous hurt. This is no doubt correct and it was no doubt incumbent on the Judge to charge the jury that they must consider with what knowledge or intention each person joined in the act. The learned Judge's summing up is a long and careful one. The law is dealt with by him carefully and at length. In dealing with sec. 34 he points out that the act must be done with the common intention of all which must be gathered from the circumstances of the case. He also explains sec. 304 very carefully and points out that to find them guilty under sec. 304, Part II, there must be the knowledge that the injury is likely to cause death, and although it is not put in so many words, I think it is to be inferred from the charge as a whole that it was put to the jury that they had to consider the knowledge with which each person acted. Mr. Taluqdar next contends that the learned Judge never explained to the jury the law on the subject of the right of private defence. Now it is not for the Judge to explain to the jury questions of law which do not arise on the facts or pleadings of the party. In this case the Appellants themselves never pleaded that they acted in the exercise of the right of private defence. Their plea was a simple denial. It was presumably argued by their counsel that they were acting in the right of private defence. They themselves, however, so far as can be seen never raised it and it cannot therefore be said to have ever been their case. If a person raises the defence that he acted in the exercise of the right of private defence, he must prove it. He must set forth the exact circumstances in which he acted to show that he was justified in what he did. It has no doubt been held that he may plead he was not there and at the same time make out from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that what he did was in the exercise of the right of private defence. But it seems to me that if there is absolutely nothing in the prosecution evidence to suggest that he was so acting, there is nothing to go to the jury. It is very difficult for the Judge to put to the jury what is really a hypothetical and nobody's substantial case. There are so many factors and circumstances which require to be proved to establish a right of private defence that it is difficult to see how it can be successful unless specifically pleaded. The Judge has always this difficulty that he never knows what in each case he has to put and it is very difficult for an Appellate Court to discover what case he was asked to put to the jury on behalf of the accused when they themselves say nothing, or for an Appellate Court to say that the accused's case of the right of private defence was or was not properly put for the simple reason that the Appellate Court does not know what that case was. In the present case, however, the Judge does seem to have explained the right of private defence to the jury and I am not prepared to find on the facts proved or alleged that their explanation was not sufficient. The result is that this appeal must be dismissed and the accused, if on bail, must surrender to serve out the remainder of their sentence.
S.C.M
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