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K. Jagannatha Kone v. Ramachandra Naidu And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Second Appeal)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal arises from a suit challenging the validity of a Court sale executed in satisfaction of a decree for mesne profits in O.S. No. 75 of 1911 before the Additional District Munsif's Court of Madura. O.S. No. 75 of 1911 was instituted by six plaintiffs (one of whom is defendant 5 in the present case) for recovery of possession of lands from certain defendants. During pendency of that suit an application (I.A. No. 235 of 1911) sought appointment of a receiver or security to the value of Rs. 700. By order dated 20 March 1911 defendant 1 was directed to give security for Rs. 700 or a receiver would be appointed. Defendant 1 executed a security bond dated 17 July 1911 in favour of the Court, giving specified properties as security for Rs. 700 and covenanted not to alienate the properties except by Court order.
A decree for possession and mesne profits was passed on 6 December 1911 and confirmed in appeal on 31 March 1913. A second appeal to the High Court was withdrawn on 1 November 1915. After the trial Court decree, by sale deed dated 4 September 1912, the plaintiff's brother purchased the suit property for Rs. 4,650, with Rs. 700 retained in deposit on the condition that the deposit would be applied according to the result of O.S. No. 75 of 1911. Possession passed to the plaintiff's brother and subsequently to the plaintiff. Defendant 5 (former plaintiff 6 in O.S. No. 75) obtained assignment of the decree and sought execution for possession and mesne profits.
Mesne profits were ascertained at Rs. 2,028 and costs Rs. 36 in I.A. No. 128 of 1924, and decree was passed on 2 August 1924 for the total. Defendant 5 moved for execution by sale and purchased the suit property on 23 November 1925; the sale was confirmed on 4 January 1926. When defendant 5 sought delivery of possession, the plaintiff obstructed; the plaintiff petitioned to set aside the execution sale alleging lack of notice and that the sale covered an amount far exceeding the Rs. 700 secured by the security bond. That petition was treated as a suit. The District Munsif decreed for the plaintiff, but the Subordinate Judge reversed, holding the sale valid, no notice necessary because lis pendens precluded the plaintiff from contesting the sale, and that the sale for the entire mesne profits was valid. The present second appeal challenges that reversal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an execution sale effected without notice to the alienee (the purchaser of the property after the security bond) is valid when the property was alienated subsequent to execution of a security bond given in favour of the Court.
- Whether a security bond given in favour of the Court constitutes a mortgage or charge within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act such that the procedures of that Act (including a separate suit under Section 67) must be followed to enforce it.
- Whether the decree-holder could enforce the security bond by sale for the entire ascertained mesne profits (Rs. 2,028 plus costs) or only to the extent of the amount actually secured by the security bond (Rs. 700).
- Whether notice to the alienee is obligatory before bringing the alienated property to sale in execution of the decree founded on the security bond.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The sale was invalid because it was conducted without notice to the plaintiff, and the property had been alienated after the security bond was executed in favour of the Court — specifically, the property passed to the plaintiff's brother and thereafter to the plaintiff.
- By implication, the plaintiff contended that the security limited the enforceable amount to that specified in the bond (Rs. 700) and that sale for a much larger amount was not justified without his participation or notice.
Respondent's (Decree-Holder / Defendant 5 and Lower Court) Arguments
- The Subordinate Judge held that the execution sale was valid and that no notice to the plaintiff was necessary because the plaintiff was precluded from contesting the Court sale by the doctrine of lis pendens.
- The Subordinate Judge also held that the decree-holder could enforce the decree for the entire ascertained mesne profits (the larger sum) by sale of the property despite the security bond specifying Rs. 700.
- The lower Court relied on authority (notably Subramanian Chettiar v. Raja of Ramnad) to support the proposition that if the bond is given by the judgment-debtor, execution by sale under execution procedure is permissible and that the execution order for sale is final where the judgment-debtor was served with notice and did not object.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Raj Raghubar Singh v. Jai Indra Bahadur Singh (1919) 42 All 158 | Held that a security bond given in favour of the Court does not constitute a mortgage within the Transfer of Property Act; the Act's procedural requirements are not attracted. | Applied as controlling authority to conclude that a security bond to the Court is not a mortgage/charge under the T.P. Act and therefore need not be enforced by a separate suit under the T.P. Act; execution proceedings before the court remain available. |
| Subramanian Chettiar v. Raja of Ramnad (1918) 41 Mad 327 | Stated that if the bond is given by the judgment-debtor it can be enforced in execution by sale (falling within Section 47 context). | Distinguished by the Court: relied upon by the lower Court but found inapplicable because in that case there was no alienation subsequent to the security bond and the judgment-debtor still had interest to protect. |
| Jayappa Lokappa v. Shivan Gouda Dhyaman Gouda (1928) 52 Bom 72 | Expressed the view that if a surety assigns his equity of redemption to third parties, enforcement of the security may require a separate suit (i.e., summary execution inappropriate). | Referred to as representative of decisions holding that alienation by surety may necessitate a suit; the Court noted this as contrary authority but rejected it on the facts and reasoning applicable where the bond is to the Court. |
| Guru Shantappa v. Gurava (1926) 50 Bom 339 | Followed views that a suit may be necessary to enforce a charge created by a security bond after alienation. | Noted as part of contrary line of cases; the Court distinguished and did not adopt that approach for security bonds given in favour of the Court. |
| Amir v. Mahadev Prasad (1917) 39 All 225 | Held that a suit under Section 67, T.P. Act would be necessary to enforce the charge created by a security bond; criticized summary enforcement as inconsistent with provisions of the T.P. Act and Code. | Noted and rejected in view of the Privy Council decision in Raj Raghubar Singh, which overruled that view as to security bonds given to the Court. |
| Janaki Kuar v. Sarup Rani (1895) 17 All 99 | Held that property might be sold under earlier Civil P.C. provisions (Section 253, 1882); considered in the context of procedural interpretation. | Quoted with approval by the Privy Council and used by the Court to show earlier authority supporting sale by Court process in cases of security bonds to the Court. |
| Sadasiva v. Ramalinga (1874-75) 2 IA 219 | Explained that security bonds addressed to the civil Court import an obligation enforceable in the suit and bring the property under court proceedings. | Used to support the proposition that a security bond to the Court creates a court-enforceable obligation and brings the property under the Court's jurisdiction, contributing to lis pendens effects. |
| Thirumalai v. Ramayyar (1890) 13 Mad 1 | Explained that a surety's obligation is to fulfill the decree as a matter of record, and a fresh decree against the surety is unnecessary. | Relied on to support the view that the obligation undertaken by the surety is enforceable in the original suit and that separate suit against the surety is not required where the bond is to the Court. |
| Aravamudhu v. Abiramavalli (1934 Mad 353) | Applied the rule of lis pendens to a charge declared by decree for maintenance (analogous application to charges declared by decree). | Referred to as authority for applying lis pendens to cases where a charge is declared by decree, supporting the Court's conclusion that property brought under Court control is bound by the suit's outcome. |
| K.Y. Chettiar Firm v. Jamila Bibi (1930) 7 Rang 734 | Held that it is sufficient if at any subsequent stage of litigation the property is brought under the Court's control for lis pendens to operate. | Applied to show that a charge need not be claimed at suit institution; once the property is under Court control it becomes specifically in question and lis pendens applies. |
| Rajendra Chandra Sarkar v. Bipin Chandra Shaha (1934) 60 Cal 1298 | Held that where a judgment-debtor dies after execution of a security bond the Official Assignee must be made party if the equity of redemption is to be represented. | Referred to as part of Calcutta decisions distinguishing involuntary assignments (insolvency) from voluntary alienations; used to show lis pendens does not automatically bind involuntary assignees like Official Assignee. |
| Kalachand Banerjee v. Jagannath Marvar (1927) 54 Cal 595 | Held that a suit for foreclosure cannot be continued without the Official Receiver being a party when mortgaged property vested in him. | Referred to illustrate that special rules apply to involuntary vestings (insolvency/official assignee) distinct from voluntary alienations. |
| Punithavelu Mudaliar v. Bhashyam Iyengar (1902) 25 Mad 406 | Explained that lis pendens does not bind the Official Assignee appointed in invitum; the party seeking to bind him must join him under Section 372 Civil P.C. | Quoted to emphasize that involuntary assignments are outside ordinary lis pendens operation; supports distinction between voluntary purchasers and official assignees. |
| Payaz Hussain Khan v. Prag Narain (1907) 29 All 339 | Authority referenced in relation to Order 22, Rule 10 (intervention/making oneself party to litigation). | Used to support the Court's observation that the plaintiff, having notice of the security, could have intervened under Order 22, Rule 10 to protect his interests. |
| Wood v. Surr (1854) 19 Beav 551 | Principle that the Official Assignee, being appointed in invitum, is not a voluntary purchaser and lis pendens does not bind him automatically. | Referred to in connection with the treatment of Official Assignees and involuntary vestings and to distinguish such cases from the facts here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in several analytic steps, each grounded in authorities and the facts set out in the record:
- Nature of the security bond: The Court emphasised that the security bond was executed in favour of the Court pursuant to its order and contained a covenant restricting alienation except by Court order. Relying on the Privy Council decision in Raj Raghubar Singh, the Court held that a security bond in favour of the Court does not create a mortgage within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore the procedural scheme of that Act (which would otherwise require suit in certain circumstances) is not attracted.
- Effect of alienation after the bond: The Court considered whether an alienation of the property after execution of the security bond barred the decree-holder from pursuing execution by sale without a separate suit. The Court rejected the view found in some judgments that a suit under Section 67 (or analogous provisions) would be necessary merely because of a subsequent alienation. The Court reasoned that, since the bond was given to the Court and did not create a relation of mortgagor and mortgagee in the statutory sense, the decree-holder could continue execution proceedings even after alienation.
- Operation of lis pendens: The Court analysed the law of lis pendens and concluded the requisites were satisfied: (a) a pending judicial proceeding; (b) the Court had jurisdiction over the property; and (c) the property was specifically described and necessarily affected by the proceeding. Because the bond brought the property under the Court's control (for ascertainment and realization of mesne profits), the rule of lis pendens applied and an assignee who purchased after the bond is bound by the decree subsequently rendered.
- Limits of lis pendens and the extent of the charge: The Court emphasised that lis pendens renders a subsequent conveyance subservient to the rights eventually declared by the Court; it does not annul the conveyance. Therefore a purchaser takes the vendor's interest subject to the rights declared by the decree. The key question became: what was the precise right declared by the decree? The Court examined the security bond and the sale deed conditions and concluded the bond secured only Rs. 700. Consequently, the decree could be enforced against the property only to the extent of that Rs. 700 charge, and not for the entire ascertained mesne profits of Rs. 2,028 (plus costs), which the decree-holder attempted to realize by sale.
- Distinction from contrary authorities: The Court distinguished cases (such as Subramanian Chettiar) where the bond was given by the judgment-debtor and there was no subsequent alienation. Those authorities did not govern where the judgment-debtor had ceased to have interest and the property had been alienated; in the present case the vendor (judgment-debtor) had no incentive to object to a sale, so the absence of the plaintiff at the execution proceedings made those proceedings, to the extent they sought to recover more than Rs. 700, without jurisdiction as against the plaintiff.
- Relief and conditions: Consequently, the Court found that the execution proceedings insofar as they sought to enforce more than Rs. 700 were without jurisdiction and the sale to defendant 5 must be set aside. However, recognising the plaintiff's failure to pay the secured amount when it became due, the Court conditioned setting aside upon the plaintiff depositing Rs. 700 with interest (6% per annum from 2 August 1924 until payment) into Court within three months; if he failed to do so, the suit would be dismissed.
- Procedural observation: The Court also observed that the plaintiff had notice of the security bond and could have intervened under Order 22, Rule 10 to protect his interests; nevertheless, on the merits the decree-holder could not enforce beyond the security actually given.
- Costs and leave: The Court directed that each party bear their own costs in the second appeal and in the lower Court throughout, and refused leave.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Court's core ruling was that the execution sale in favour of defendant 5 is set aside insofar as it was intended to enforce an amount in excess of the sum actually secured by the security bond (Rs. 700). The Court ordered that the sale be set aside subject to the plaintiff depositing Rs. 700 into Court with interest at 6% per annum from 2 August 1924 up to payment within three months; failing such deposit, the suit will be dismissed. Each party is to bear their own costs in this appeal and in the lower Court; leave refused.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The sale to defendant 5 is set aside on condition that the plaintiff pays into Court Rs. 700 plus specified interest within three months; otherwise the plaintiff's suit is dismissed. Each party must bear their own costs in the proceedings mentioned.
- Scope with respect to broader law: The Court applied and followed the Privy Council principle that a security bond given to the Court is not a mortgage under the Transfer of Property Act and hence need not be enforced by a separate suit under that Act; however, the Court limited enforcement to the actual amount specified in the security bond. The opinion does not purport to lay down a further general rule beyond its application to the facts; the decision resolves the parties' rights in this case without announcing a new broader precedent beyond its reading and application of existing authorities.
Note: This summary is strictly limited to the information contained in the provided opinion; no facts or reasoning beyond the text have been added.
1. The suit out of which this second appeal arises has been filed to impeach the validity of a Court sale in execution of a decree for mesne profits in O.S. No. 75 of 1911 on the file of the Additional District Munsif's Court of Madura. O.S. No. 75 of 1911 was filed by six plaintiffs, defendant 5 in this case being plaintiff 6 in that case, for recovery of possession of certain lands from defendants 1 and 2 therein. During the pendency of the suit an application for the appointment of a receiver was made being I. A. No. 235 of 1911 to manage the suit properties or to direct the said defendants to furnish security in the sum of Rs. 700, the probable amount of mesne profits and costs. By an order dated 20th March 1911 it was directed that defendant 1 in the said suit should give security for Rs. 700 within three weeks from the date of the order or in default a receiver should be appointed. In pursuance of the said order the said defendant 1 executed a security bond dated 17th July 1911 in and by which he gave the said property and some other property as security for Rs. 700. He also covenanted that he will not in any way alienate the properties except with the orders of Court. The security bond was in favour of the Court of the Additional District Munsif at Madura. On 6th December 1.911 there was a decree for possession and mesne profits. The said decree was confirmed in appeal by the District Court on 31st March 1913.
2. There was a second appeal to the High Court which was withdrawn on 1st November 1915. Subsequent to the date of the decree in the trial Court, by a deed dated 4th September 1912, the plaintiff's brother purchased the suit property for a sum of Rs. 4,650. A sum of Rs. 700 was retained in deposit with him. The conditions subject to which Rs. 700 was retained is thus stated in the sale deed :
"Rs. 700 retained in deposit with you on condition that if in the suit, O.S. No. 75 of 1911 on the file of the Additional District Munsif of Madura in which No. 1 of us, the defendant, has given the present sale properties and some other properties as security for mesne profits in favour of the plaintiff Ramanuja Nayudu, we succeed, we shall get the sum, and if the plaintiff succeeds, the amount shall be given to him."Possession of the suit properties appears to have been given to the plaintiff's brother and at a subsequent partition between the plaintiff and his brother the plaintiff obtained this property and aver since the date of sale the plaintiff's family and after that the plaintiff has been in possession thereof. Subsequent to the withdrawal of the second appeal in the High Court defendant 5 who was plaintiff 6 in O.S. No 75 of 1911 obtained an assignment of the decree from his co-plaintiffs and sought to execute the decree both for possession and mesne profits.
3. The said mesne profits were ascertained in I. A. No 128 of 1924 in the sum of Rs. 2,028 and Rs. 36 for costs and on 2nd August 1924 a decree was passed for the said sum. Defendant 5 put in an execution application for the recovery of the entire sum by sale of the suit property and in execution thereof purchased the same on 23rd November 1925 and the said sale was confirmed on 4th January 1926, when he proceeded to obtain delivery of possession he was obstructed by the plaintiff and the plaintiff then put in a petition to set aside the execution sale on the ground that no notice was issued to him and that the sale was for an amount far in excess of the amount for which the suit property was given as security. The said petition was directed to be treated as a suit and it was consequently registered and tried as a suit. The learned District Munsif who tried the suit gave a decree in favour of the plaintiff but the learned Subordinate Judge reversed his decision holding inter alia that the sale was valid and no notice was necessary as the plaintiff must be deemed to have been precluded by the doctrine of lis pendens from contesting the Court sale and also that the sale for the entire amount of the mesne profits was valid. It is against this decision that the second appeal is filed. The first point argued by Mr. Rajah Iyer is that the sale having been held without notice to the plaintiff must be deemed to be invalid as the property subsequent to the execution of the security bond was alienated in favour of the plaintiff's brother and on the date of the sale it vested in the plaintiff. It has now been definitely settled by the Privy Council in Raj Raghubar Singh v. Jai Indra Bahadur Singh 1919 42 All 158 that a security bond similar to the one in the present suit given in favour of the Court does not constitute a mortgage within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act so as to attract the procedure laid down in that Act and the consequent necessity of a suit to enforce it.
4. In that case the security bond was given by a third party in favour of the Court. They construed the document as giving only a charge upon the property and held that the property can be brought to sale by an application made in the suit after giving notice to the sureties. They point out that Section 47 would not apply as the bond was not given by the judgment-debtor. In Subramanian Chettiar v. Raja of Ramnad 1918 41 Mad 327 it has been laid down that if the bond is given by the judgment-debtor it can be enforced in. execution by sale of the property as the matter would be covered by Section 47 being one relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. If the matter was confined only between the judgment-debtor or his surety and the decree-holder, no difficulty arises in the application of the principle laid down in the above cases. But the question is, if the property has been alienated subsequent to the giving of the security bond, can such a procedure be still continued and if so, is a notice to the alienee obligatory before bringing the property to sale ? In some of the cases decided subsequent to the decision in Raj Raghubar Singh v. Jai Indra Bahadur Singh 1919 42 All 158 a view has been taken that if the property is alienated by the surety subsequent to. his giving the bond in favour of the Court the procedure cannot be adopted and a suit under Section 67, T.P. Act would be necessary. In Jayappa Lokappa v. Shivan Gouda Dhyaman Gouda 1928 52 Bom 72 at p. 86, Martin, C.J., observes:
Supposing the surety had assigned his equity of redemption to the third parties, then the mortgage security could only be enforced in a separate suit.
citing Guru Shantappa v. Gurava 1926 50 Bom 339, where Macleod, C.J., purported to follow Amir v. Mahadev Prasad 1917 39 All 225. In Amir v. Mahadev Prasad 1917 39 All 225 it was held that a suit under Section 67, T.P. Act would be necessary to enforce the charge created by a security bond. Richards, C.J., gave the reason as follows:
I may point Out the great inconvenience of holding that the section allowed a summary sale of hypothecated property. The persons interested in the property (who might be numerous), would be no parties to the proceedings nor would any portion of redemption be allowed. In fact, the sale of the property in this way would be inconsistent with many of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and of the Code itself relating to the enforcement of mortgages. It was, no doubt, held in Janaki Kuar v Sarup Rani (1895) 17 All 99 that the property might be sold having regard to the provisions of Section 253, Civil P.C. of 1882. In the new Code the word 'personally' has been introduced. The introduction of this word, I think, got rid of any possible ambiguity there might have been under the old section, and I, therefore, think that we are not required to follow a decision which was given under the old section.
5. It will be noticed that the Privy Council expressly overruled this view and approved the decision in Janaki Kuar v Sarup Rani (1895) 17 All 99 wherein their Lordships Edge, C.J., and Benerji, J., observe:
Section 99, T.P. Act has in our opinion no application to the enforcement by a process of the Court of a security bond given to the Court for the performance of its decree.
6. Therefore if the procedure laid down for a suit on a mortgage or a charge is inapplicable, if the matter rests between the decree-holder and judgment debtor or the decree-holder and surety, I do not see how an alienation subsequent to the execution of a security bond could attract it and force the decree-holder to file a suit. As pointed out by the Privy Council, when a bond is given to the Court, there is no relation of mortgagor and mortgagee constituted because there is no person to whom the security is given which is an essential requisite for a mortgage or a charge as defined in the Transfer of Property Act. Hence the procedure was held to be inapplicable and the contention that a suit to enforce the charge is necessary was repelled. I am therefore of opinion that the view taken in some of the above cases that a suit is necessary is not sound and that the property can be proceeded with in execution in spite of the alienation. The next question, is if the property is alienated after the security bond is given, can the proceedings to enforce the charge be taken without notice to the alienee ? In Sadasiva v Ramalinga (1874-75) 2 IA 219 where a security bond was given for the payment of mesne profits subsequent to suit pending the disposal of an appeal from a decree therein, their Lordships of the Privy Council explained the scope and effect of such a bond thus:
They are addressed to the civil Court; they contain an obligation to pay subsequent mesne profits for the years which they respectively cover and point even more plainly to the ascertainment of the amount of such profits when the decree should come to be executed, and to their realization, if not then paid, by the Court. The effect then of each document seems to be an undertaking on the part of the person executing it; and that not by a mere written agreement between the parties, but by an act of the Court that in consideration of his being allowed to remain in possession pending the appeal he will, if the appeal goes against him, account in that suit, and before that Court, for the mesne profits of the year in question, and again at p. 402 they point out:
They are proceedings in Court importing a certain liability to be enforced in the suit against the defendant to that suit.
7. Muttuswami Ayyar, J., explained the nature of the obligation undertaken by a surety in Thirumalai v. Ramayyar (1890) 13 Mad 1 at p. 5 thus:
The obligation which the surety undertakes is an obligation to fulfill the decree which may be passed against the defendant or appellant in the original suit or in appeal, and the obligation is contracted before the Court and is as much a matter of record as the decree undertaken to be fulfilled. There is no apparent reason for directing the successful party to obtain a fresh decree against the surety whilst the very obligation is to fulfil the decree against the defendant or appellant.
8. Thus the property is made the subject matter of litigation and is brought within the jurisdiction of the Court and it follows that one who purchases the same should be bound by the judgment or decree thereafter rendered. In order to constitute lis pendens the following essentials are necessary : (1) There must be a pen. ding judicial proceeding : (2) The Court must have jurisdiction over the person and the property; (3) The property must be specifically described and must be necessarily affected by the termination of the proceedings. All these elements are here present. There was litigation about the mesne profits. The property specified in the security bond was brought under the control of the Court by virtue of the order of the Court directing the security to be given and by the execution of the security bond in pursuance thereof in its favour and the said property would be necessarily affected by the termination of the proceedings as it is liable to be sold by the Court as soon as the liability is declared and the amount of mesne profits ascertained. As stated by Rulum Chand in his work on Res Judicata at p. 723:
The primary object for which the suit is brought is not material, provided the Court has jurisdiction of the property for secondary purposes.
9. He instances suits for alimony and maintenance under the English law where a prayer is made for granting alimony and maintenance out of a particular property analogous to suits for maintenance under Hindu law. So far as suits for maintenance are concerned, when a charge is declared by a decree for maintenance it has been held that the rule of lis pendens applies even from the date of plaint at any rate from the date of the decree. A similar rule has been applied to cases where in suits for decree for money ultimately a decree is passed for payment of the money and also a charge is created as security for the said payment by the decree : vide Aravamudhu v. Abiramavalli 1934 Mad 353. It is not necessary that at the time when the suit was instituted, a charge should have been claimed on the property. It is enough if at any subsequent stage of the litigation the property is brought under the control and jurisdiction of the Court, so that from that time it will be property directly and specifically in question in the suit : vide K.Y. Chettiar Firm v. Jamila Bibi 1930 7 Rang 734, at p. 743. Therefore once the property is brought under the control of the Court so that it is rendered available for any liability to be declared or determined by it and subject to its further orders and directions the rule of lis pendens operates and the main purpose of the rule is to keep the subject-matter of the litigation within the power of the Court until the judgment or decree shall be entered; otherwise by successive alienations its judgment or decree could be rendered abortive by making it impossible for the Court to execute its judgment or decree.
Hence the general proposition that one who purchases of either party to the suit the subject-matter of the litigation after the Court has acquired jurisdiction is bound by the judgment or decree, whether he purchased for a valuable consideration or not, and without any express or implied notice.
10. In this connection it is necessary to refer to the Calcutta eases relied on by Mr. Rajah Ayyar. In Rajendra Chandra Sarkar v. Bipin Chandra Shaha 1934 60 Cal 1298, it has been held that where a judgment-debtor dies after the execution of the security bond the Official Assignee will be a necessary party, otherwise the equity of redemption would not be represented in the execution proceedings. It follows Kalachand Banerjee v. Jagannath Marvar 1927 54 Cal 595, where it was held that a suit for foreclosure cannot be brought or continued without the Official Receiver being a party when the mortgaged property vested in him. The case of the Official Assignee is different. The doctrine of lis pendens is not applied to a case of an involuntary assignment such as insolvency. The rule is thus stated by Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., in Punithavelu Mudaliar v. Bhashyam Iyengar (1902) 25 Mad 406, at p. 423:
The principle of the decision in Wood v. Surr (1854) 19 Beav 551 is that the Official Assignee being one appointed in invitum and not a voluntary purchaser as in the case of a transfer by act of parties or by an 'involuntary sale' in execution of a decree, the doctrine of lis pendens cannot affect him and the party seeking to bind him (the Official Assignee) by the result of the suit, pending which the interest of its subject matter has devolved on him by operation of law, ought to take proceedings to join him as a party to the suit (under Section 372, Civil P.C.) and obtain the decree against him.
11. It seems to me therefore that the doctrine of lis pendens would apply to the present case. Further in this case the plaintiff had notice of the security bond. He could have intervened and made himself a party to the litigation under Order 22, Rule 10, [vide Payaz Hussain Khan v. Prag Narain (1907) 29 All 339. Prima facie therefore the decree-holder was entitled to ignore the alienation in his favour and the sale without notice to him will be valid. But it will have to be considered what is the exact effect of the doctrine of lis pendens on alienations pendente lite? The effect of the rule is that it does not operate to annul the conveyance but only renders it subservient to the rights of the parties to the action as determined by the judgment or decree (vide Hukum Chand's Res Judicata, p. 685, Story on Equity Jurisprudence, Edn. 3, Section 406). Therefore the sale in favour of the plaintiff's brother passes all the interest of the vendor in the property subject to the rights as declared by the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 75 of 1911. Therefore the question is, what is the right declared by the decree ? The decree-holder can enforce the security bond only to the extent of the amount secured thereunder by the sale of the property and other properties specified therein. The amount secured was only a sum of Rs. 700 and in my opinion the decree must be deemed to have charged the property only to the extent of the said sum. The view of the lower Court that the decree-holder can enforce the security bond for the entire amount of mesne profits, namely the sum of Rs. 2,308, is wrong. The plaintiffs in the said suit were content to have the security only for a sum of Rs. 700. It was subject to that liability that the property was sold to the plaintiff's brother under the sale deed dated 4th September 1912. The fact that in the application asking for a security the sum of Rs. 700 was mentioned as the probable amount will not enlarge the obligation actually secured under the security bond. The decree-holder was therefore not entitled to enforce the security for more than Rs. 700.
12. The lower Court relied on Subramanian Chettiar v. Raja of Ramnad 1918 41 Mad 327 for the position that even though the execution was taken for a larger amount the order for sale must be deemed to be final as the judgment-debtor was served with notice and did not object to the same. But in that case there was no alienation subsequent to the security bond. The only person interested in defending the matter was the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor here had ceased to have any interest in the property by reason of the alienation and it was not to his interest to object to the sale of the property. Therefore in my opinion in so far as defendant 5 sought to execute the decree for more than Rs. 700, the proceedings must be held to be without jurisdiction in the absence of the plaintiff and cannot be held to be binding on him. The sale in favour of defendant 5 will therefore have to be set aside. The plaintiff has offered to pay the amount secured under the security bond. It was his duty to have paid the amount into Court on or about 2nd August 1924 when the Court declared the amount due. He failed to do so. I would therefore set aside the sale subject to the plaintiff depositing into Court within three months from this date the said sum of Rs. 700 with interest at 6 per cent per annum from 2nd August 1924 up to date of payment. Else the suit will stand dismissed. I direct each party to bear his own costs in the second' appeal and in the lower Court throughout. Leave refused.
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