- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Niranjan Mukherjee v. Sm. Soudamini Dasi And Ors.
Full Bench Opinion Summary — Partition Allotment and Pre‑existing Permanent Lease
Factual and Procedural Background
The Full Bench considered a reference phrased: whether a person to whom a parcel of land has been allotted by a decree for partition of a Civil Court takes it subject to a permanent lease granted by his former co-owners without his concurrence when the land was the joint property of all the co-sharers.
Facts as stated in the opinion: the Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title owned an undivided 1/5th share in the disputed land; the other co-sharers owned the remaining 4/5th and had granted a permanent lease in respect of their shares to the Defendant's predecessor-in-title prior to partition. The Plaintiff sued for partition in the Civil Court; on partition the disputed land was allotted to the Plaintiff (in his 1/5th share). The Plaintiff then sued for ejectment of the Defendant after service of a notice to quit. The Defendant alleged that the Plaintiff's predecessor had also granted the lease, but the trial finding was against the Defendant. The key procedural posture is a Full Bench reference of the stated question arising from those facts.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a person to whom a parcel of land has been allotted by a decree for partition of a Civil Court takes that parcel subject to a permanent lease granted by his former co-owners without his concurrence when the land was the joint property of all the co-sharers.
- Whether the equitable principle, as stated in Baijnath Lal v. Ramoodeen (concerning mortgages of undivided shares), applies equally to other encumbrances such as permanent leases or tenures created by a co-sharer prior to partition, and whether it applies where partition is effected by a Civil Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Plaintiff)'s Arguments
- The Plaintiff (through his predecessor-in-title) had not granted the permanent lease; the disputed land was allotted to him on partition.
- Because he did not grant the lease, the allotment to him should be treated as unencumbered and the lessee (defendant) must not claim rights against the parcel allotted to the Plaintiff.
Respondent (Defendant)'s Arguments
- The defence included an allegation that the Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title had also granted the lease (an allegation rejected by the trial court).
- It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the Plaintiff should have shown that his interest was affected by the lease on partition — in other words, that the lease had not been taken into account in making the allotments on partition.
- The Bench records the counter-argument (and its treatment): since the Plaintiff had not granted any lease and the land was allotted to him, the burden lay on the Defendant to show equitable circumstances rendering the lease binding upon the Plaintiff.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Baijnath Lal v. Ramoodeen (Baijnath's case) | Established that a co-sharer can pledge or mortgage his undivided share, but such a pledge cannot affect the interests of other co-sharers; the person taking the security takes it subject to the right of other sharers to enforce partition and convert undivided shares into separate parcels. | Used as the foundational equitable principle. The Bench applied its reasoning to say that a co-sharer's dealing (here, encumbering) cannot adversely affect another co-sharer's allotment on partition. |
| Hem Chandra Ghose v. Thako Mani | Applied Baijnath's principle to a case where partition was effected by a Civil Court; held that absent fraud the plaintiff cannot proceed against a portion allotted to other co-sharers. | Relied on to show that Baijnath's equitable principle governs cases of partition by civil decree as well as other forms of partition. |
| Hakim Lal v. Ram Lal | Reiterated that a mortgagee of an undivided share is entitled only to the property allotted to the mortgagor if partition was fair and not vitiated by fraud. | Supported the application of the mortgage principle to partitions under statutory schemes and to partitions by Court decree. |
| Bhup Singh v. Ghedda Singh | Stated it is immaterial who effected the partition (revenue authority, Civil Court, arbitration or private arrangement); a mortgagee cannot follow his security into the hands of a co-sharer who obtained the mortgaged share on partition, except where partition is tainted by fraud or the encumbrance was taken into account. | Used to reinforce that the mortgagee's remedy is limited to the share allotted to the mortgagor and to identify exceptions (fraud or express taking into account of encumbrance). |
| Sharat Ohunder Burman v. Hargovirtd Burman | The Court observed that Baijnath's principle is "applicable to all assignees of any interest whatever", addressing a lease (mokurari lease) created by a co-sharer before partition. | Quoted to show precedent for extending Baijnath's principle beyond mortgages to other assignments or tenures created by a co-sharer. |
| Joy Sankari Gupta v. Bharat Chandra Bardhan (Joy Sankati v. Bharat) | Held, on general equitable principles, that a miras tenure created by a single co-sharer could not affect lands allotted to other co-sharers upon partition by the Collector; the tenure could hold good only with respect to lands allotted to the lessor's share. | Followed by the Bench as an authority supporting the application of the principle to tenures/leases and to partitions under statutory regimes; cited for the proposition that a tenure by one co-sharer should not affect another co-sharer's allotment. |
| Tarini Kanto v. Iswar Chandra | Listed among authorities supporting the proposition that a tenure created by one co-sharer cannot affect other co-sharers' allotments on partition. | Referenced as additional supporting authority for the extension of the Baijnath principle to tenures/leases. |
| Shaikh Khan Ali v. Pestonji Edulji | Held that where undivided co-sharers granted a lease over their undivided shares, the lease covered those undivided shares and a subsequent partition could not affect the lessee's rights; i.e., a contrary view to Baijnath's principle when applied to leases. | The Bench explicitly rejected this reasoning, stating that a co-sharer does not have a "perfect right" to deal with joint property so as to affect other co-sharers' rights; thus Shaikh Khan Ali's approach was not followed. |
| Bainaddi v. Kailash | Followed Shaikh Khan Ali, distinguishing lease from mortgage by observing that a lease followed by possession gives the lessee a complete title while a mortgage does not until security is enforced. | The Bench considered this distinction but concluded it could not accept that mortgages and leases should be treated differently insofar as affecting the rights of co-sharers on partition. |
| Fletcher and Smither (unreported) | An unreported decision arising out of the same partition, which followed Baijnath and held that a purchaser/lessee from co-sharers with undivided interests takes subject to rights of other co-sharers and partition would protect those rights. | Referenced as a directly relevant contemporaneous decision that followed Baijnath and supported the Full Bench's conclusion in the present matter. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began from the established equitable principle, derived from Baijnath Lal v. Ramoodeen, that a co-sharer dealing with his undivided share (for example by mortgage) cannot thereby affect the rights of other co-sharers; any security taken by a third party is subject to the co-sharers' right to an eventual partition which will convert undivided shares into separate allotted parcels.
The Bench reviewed authorities that applied Baijnath's principle both to partitions effected under statutory regimes and to partitions decreed by Civil Courts (Hem Chandra Ghose v. Thako Mani, Bhup Singh v. Ghedda Singh, Hakim Lal v. Ram Lal). These authorities established that the mortgagee's remedy is limited to the portion allotted to the mortgagor on partition unless partition was tainted by fraud or the encumbrance was explicitly taken into account in making the allotment.
There was, however, a divergence in the case law about whether the Baijnath principle extends to leases and other tenures created by a co-sharer prior to partition. The Court examined cases on both sides of that divergence: authorities (e.g., Sharat Ohunder Burman; Joy Sankari Gupta; Tarini Kanto) interpreted the principle so as to encompass tenures and leases, limiting the effect of such instruments to the specific share allotted to the grantor on partition. Conversely, Shaikh Khan Ali and cases following it treated a lease followed by possession as giving the lessee a complete title that a later partition could not upset.
The Bench analyzed the difference between mortgage and lease as articulated by some judges (who emphasized the perfected title of a lessee in possession versus the hypothecatory nature of mortgage). While acknowledging the formal differences between mortgage and lease, the Full Bench concluded—on principle and by analogical application of the equitable rule—that there is no tenable reason to afford a different consequence in regard to the rights of co-sharers when the transaction is a lease rather than a mortgage. The Court relied also on a recognized treatise passage (Ereeman on Co-tenancy and Partition) emphasizing that a conveyance by one co-tenant operates on the grantor's interest in favor of the grantee but cannot impair the rights of other co-tenants and that the grantee risks losing interest in the parcel if it is allotted to another co-tenant on partition.
On the burden of proof the Court observed that because the Plaintiff had not granted any lease and had been allotted the land on partition, the Defendant bore the onus of showing equitable circumstances (such as fraud or that the encumbrance was taken into account in the partition) which would bind the Plaintiff to the pre-existing lease. No such equitable circumstances were established on the facts as presented.
Taking the authorities together and applying the equitable principle consistently, the Full Bench concluded that the person allotted the parcel on partition does not take it subject to a permanent lease granted by his former co-owners without his concurrence, absent the exceptional circumstances recognized in the authorities.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Full Bench answered the referred question in the negative — i.e., a person to whom a parcel is allotted by a Civil Court decree for partition does not take that parcel subject to a permanent lease granted by his former co-owners without his concurrence (absent circumstances such as fraud or express allowance of the encumbrance in making the allotment). The Bench ordered that the appeal be allowed and the decree of the Court of first instance restored.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The allottee (Plaintiff) receives the parcel allotted on partition free of the pre-existing permanent lease granted solely by other co-sharers; the lessee cannot insist that the allottee's parcel remains bound by that lease except where the partition process took the lease into account or partition was vitiated by fraud.
- On legal principle: The Full Bench applied and extended the equitable rule from Baijnath Lal v. Ramoodeen to permanent leases/tenures and to partitions decreed by Civil Courts, treating mortgages and leases similarly for the purpose of protecting co-sharers' rights at partition.
- Precedential note: The decision follows existing equitable authorities (as summarized above) and the Bench stated its reasoning in relation to those authorities. The ruling addresses the specific legal question referred and was applied to the parties' dispute; the Bench did not purport to create a novel departure from the cited equitable principle but affirmed its application to leases and Civil Court partitions.
Judges recorded as concurring: N.R. Chatterjea, A.C.J. (leading judgment), Walmsley, J., Cuming, J., Page, J., and Chakravarti, J. (Chatterjea delivered the operative result: appeal allowed and decree of first instance restored).
The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—
N.R Chatterjea, A.C.J:— The question referred to the Full Bench is:—
“Whether a person to whom a parcel of land has been allotted by a decree for partition of a Civil Court takes it subject to a permanent lease granted by his former co-owners without his concurrence when the land was the joint property of an the co-sharers.”
The Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title had 1/5th share in the land in dispute along with other properties. His co-sharers who owned the remaining 4/5th share granted a permanent lease in respect of their shares to the Defendant's predecessor-in-title. The Plaintiff brought a suit for partition in the Civil Court, and the disputed land was allotted to him in his share on partition. He then brought a suit for ejecting the Defendant after service of notice to quit. The defence was that the Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title also had granted the lease, but the finding is against the Defendant. It is not disputed that the Plaintiff is entitled to joint possession in respect of 1/5th share and the question for consideration as stated above is, whether the land is subject to the permanent lease granted by the co-sharers downing the 4/5th share before the partition.
The general principle is that a co-sharer in joint property cannot by dealing with such property affect the interest of the other sharers therein. In the case of Baijnath Lal v. Ramodeen , there was a mortgage of an undivided moiety in some villages forming a joint and undivided estate. Their Lordships observed: “It is therefore clear that the mortgagor had power to pledge his own undivided share in these villages; but it is also clear that he could not by so doing affect the interest of the other sharers in them, and that the person who took the security took it subject to the right of those sharers to enforce a partition and thereby to convert what was an undivided share of the whole into a defined portion held in severalty.” It is true that in that case it was the mortgagee who was seeking to enforce his remedy not against the property mortgaged to him, but against property which had been allotted to the mortgagor on partition in substitution of the mortgaged property. But their Lordships held not only “that he has a right to do so, but that in the circumstances of the case it was his sole right, and that he could not successfully have sought to charge any other parcel of the estate in the hands of the former co-sharers.”
The principle of Baijnath's case has been applied to a number of cases relating to mortgage. The partition in Baijnath's case was under Beg. XIX of 1814, but the equitable principle enunciated has been applied to a case in which the partition was made by a Civil Court. See Hem Chandra Ghose v. Thako Mani . The learned Judges in that case observed: “In the absence therefore of any fraud in effecting the partition the Plaintiff has no right to proceed against that portion of the undivided mortgaged property which on partition was allotted to the Appellants, but he can proceed against that portion of the undivided property which was allotted to the mortgagor Defendants in substitution of their undivided share in the portion mortgaged.” A similar view was taken by Mookerjee and Holm wood, JJ., in Hakim Lal v. Ram Lal . The partiton in that case was under the Estates Partition Act, but the learned Judges observed: “It is well-settled, as was laid down by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Baijnath v. Ramoodeen , that the mortgagee of an undivided share in joint property is entitled only to property allotted on partition to the mortgagor if the partition was fair and equal and is not vitiated by fraud.”
In Bhup Singh v. Ghedda Singh the learned Judges referring to Baijnath's case observed: “It is immaterial whether the partition was made by the revenue authorities, or by the Civil Court, or by arbitration or by private arrangement, and it is not necessary that the mortgagee should have been a party to the partition. It is one of the incidents of a mortgage of an undivided share that the mortgagee cannot follow his security into the hands of a co-sharer of the mortgagor who has obtained the mortgaged share upon partition. Of course, if the partition is tainted with fraud or if in making the partition the encumbrance was taken into account and the partition was made subject to the encumbrance, the result will be different; but in the absence of fraud or the circumstance mentioned above the mortgagee's remedy is against the share or property which the mortgagor was obtained under the partition.”
It is unnecessary to consider the effect of a private partition, but it appears to be well-settled that the principle of Baijnath's case applies to cases of mortgages whether the partition is under the Partition Act, or by a decree of the Civil Court. There is, however, a divergence of opinion as to whether the principle applies to a case of lease. In Sharat Ohunder Burman v. Hargovirtd Burman , the Court had to consider the case of a lease (mokurari lease) granted by a co-sharer before partition, ‘lhe partition was under the Partition Act but the learned Judges (Hitter and Mac-lean, JJ.) observed that the principle [in Baijnath's case ] “is applicable to all assignees of any interest whatever.” In Joy Sankari Gupta v. Bharat Chandra Bardhan the partition was effected under the Estates Partition Act but Maclean, C.J and Banerji, J., said (at page 439): “But even if sec. 128 of Bengal Act of 1876 be not applicable to the case, still we think that, according to the general principles of equity, the miras tenure in question, if it was created by Defendant No. 7 alone, could not affect the lands allotted to the share of any other co-sharer upon a partition by the Collector, but could hold good only in respect of lands allotted to the lessor's share.” See also Tarini Kanto v. Iswar Chandra .
A contrary view, however, was taken in the case of Shaikh Khan Ali v. Pestonji Edulji . There, a lease was granted in respect of one-third share of certain property pending a suit for partition. Pethe-ram, C.J and Rampini, J., observed: “At the time when this lease was granted by undivided co-sharers, they had a perfect right to grant the lease which would cover their undivided shares, and these shares were their shares in the piece of land included in the lease. I quite fail to see how any sub-sequent dealing with the property by partition, subsequent to the creation of the estate by a lease and by a person who had a perfect right to create it could have affected the right of the lessee.”
With great respect for the opinion of the learned Judges I think that a cosharer has not a “perfect right” in dealing with joint property in so far as it affects the rights of the other co-sharers. The opinion of the learned Judges is opposed to the principle laid down by the Judicial Committee in Baijnath's case , viz., that a co-sharer cannot by pledging his share affect the interest of the other sharers in them.
The case of Shaikh Khan Ali v. Pestonji Edulji was followed in Bainaddi v. Kailash , where the learned Judges (Richardson and Cuming, JJ.) observed that “the difference between the lease and the mortgage is this, that in the case of a lease followed by possession of the property demised the title of the lessee is complete, while in the case of a mortgage, the land is merely hypothecated and no title thereto is perfected until the security is enforced. See Baijnath Lal v. Ramoodeen .” There is no doubt a difference between the interest of a mortgagee and a lessee as pointed out by the learned Judges, but we are unable to hold that there is any difference between a mortgage and a lease so far as rights of the cosharers are concerned.
In Ereeman on Co-tenancy and Partition. 2nd Edition, sec. 199, the principle is stated as follows:—“A lease or deed by one tenant in common to a stranger of a portion of the joint estate, although voidable by the co-tenants who do not join therein, is valid between the parties and against all persons unless so avoided. If the title of the co-tenant entitled to disaffirm the conveyance becomes vested in the one by whom it was executed, the newly acquired title of this lessor or grantor will enure by estoppel to the benefit of the lessee or grantee. Such a conveyance is undoubtedly void so far as it undertakes to impair any of the rights of the other co-tenants. It will not justify the grantee in taking exclusive possession of the part described in his deed. It will not deprive the other co-tenants of the right to enjoy every part and parcel of the real estate; nor can it, to any extent, prejudice or vary their right to a partition of the common property. The grantee is liable to lose all his interest in the parcel conveyed to him, by its being set off to some other of the co-tenants upon partition. But although the deed does not impair the rights of the other co-tenants, it by no means follows that they may treat it as void, or entirely disregard it. While falling short of what it professes to be, it nevertheless operates on the interest of the grantor, by transferring it to the grantee.”
The principle laid down by the author is similar to that enunciated by Baijnath's case .
I may refer to the decision of Fletcher and Smither, JJ., in the unreported case. That case arose out of the very same partition with which we are dealing in the present case, and the question to be considered was to what extent, if at all, the Plaintiff was bound by the lease granted by the other four co-sharers. The learned Judges following Baijnath's case held that “a person taking an interest from persons who have an undivided interest in the property takes subject to the rights of the other cosharers who are not bound by the transaction, namely, that if the property comes to be partitioned, the rights of the other co-sharers not bound by the lease, as it is in the present case, would not be affected by the grant of the lease.”
It is contended on behalf of the Respondents that it was for the Plaintiff (Appellant), to show that his interest had been affected, in other words, that the lease had not been taken into account in making the allotments on partition. But the Plaintiff was allotted the disputed land on partition: he had not granted any lease. It was therefore for the Defendant to show any equitable circumstances which would render the lease binding upon the Plaintiff.
I would accordingly answer the question referred to the Full Bench in the negative.
Walmsley, J.:— I agree.
Cuming, J.:— I also agree.
Page, J.:— I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of the learned Acting Chief Justice, and I agree that a negative answer should be given to the question referred to the Full Bench.
Chakravarti, J.:— The question referred to the Full Bench runs as follows:—
“Whether a person to whom a parcel of land has been allotted by a decree for partition of a Civil Court takes it subject to a permanent lease granted by his former co-owners without his concurrence, when the land was the joint property of all the co-sharers.”
The principle that the interest of a co-sharer in a joint property is not affected by a mortgage created by another cosharer and the charge so created on partition falls upon the land exclusively allotted to the share of the co-sharer who created such charge has been laid down by the Judicial Committee in the case of Baijnath v. Ramoodeen and the question here is, does the same principle apply to other encumbrances created by a co-sharer, namely, a grant of a permanent tenure by him. On principle there seems to be no distinction. The principle laid down in the case above cited has been recognised by the Legislature in sec. 99 of the Estates Partition Act, so far as under-tenures are concerned. The incumbrance so created is transferred to the lands which fall on a partition to the grantor of such tenures.
In my opinion whether the partition is effected by the Collector or the Civil Court, the same equitable principles are applicable.
The co-sharer who granted no permanent tenure parts with his unencumbered rights in the lands which fall into the exclusive allotment of his co-sharer who granted the lease and it is only just that the lands which fall to him in entirety should be lands unencumbered as was his share when the lands were joint. The grantee of such a tenure cannot justly complain of such transfer because he took the tenure subject to the right of the other co-sharer to a just and equitable partition. I have no hesitation therefore in following the case of Joy Sankati v. Bharat and I therefore answer the question referred to the Full Bench in the negative.
Chatterjea, A.C.J:— The result is that the appeal is allowed and the decree of the Court of first instance restored.
N.G
Alert