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Mahabir Prasad v. Siri Narayan

Patna High Court
Apr 16, 1918
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Judgment Summary — Mullick, J. (concurred by Thornhill, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arises out of a series of transactions relating to a zurpeshgi mortgage and an associated mokurrari (lease/rent). In 1868 Moni Lal granted a mokurrari pattah to Macdonald at an annual rent of Rs. 303. In 1869 Moni Lal executed a zurpeshgi mortgage in favour of Macdonald for Rs. 5,050, with the mortgagee to retain the mokurrari rent as interest. The mokurrari later came into the possession of Basudeo (the mokurraridar). The zurpeshgidar's interest passed by sale to Gulam Hosain and then (in 1897) to Debi Prasad, Koshilanand and Gulab Chand. In 1899 Debi Prasad and his cosharers sold the zurpeshgi to the plaintiffs' father for Rs. 5,000, representing that they had been collecting Rs. 335 per year (an enhanced rent recorded by Survey & Settlement), and executing an ekrarnamah to indemnify the purchaser for the difference between Rs. 335 and Rs. 303 if the purchaser could not recover it from the mokurraridar.

The mokurraridar refused to pay the enhancement. In 1903 a suit by the purchaser to realise the enhancement failed: the mokurraridar's plea that his rent was Rs. 303 succeeded. In 1917 the plaintiffs (as legal representatives of their father) sued the defendants (the sons and grandsons of the vendors) for Rs. 32 per year for 1911–1917, abandoning claims for earlier years as barred by limitation. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that, under Mitakshara law, the defendants were not liable to pay out of ancestral property and that no other vendor property was in their hands. The plaintiffs sought revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the contract (the ekrarnamah / indemnity given by the vendors' father) was a contract of suretyship (guarantee) or a contract of indemnity.
  2. If the contract was suretyship, whether under Mitakshara Hindu law the sons/grandsons are liable to pay their father's liability out of ancestral (joint family) property.
  3. Whether, even if not technically a suretyship, the indemnity created by the father is enforceable against his descendants as a pious obligation (vyavaharika), i.e., whether the act was lawful, usual or customary so as to render the sons liable out of ancestral property.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs / Creditor (learned vakil for the creditor)

  • Contended that the contract created a suretyship for payment of money and relied on precedents (Maharaja of Benares v. Ram Kumar Misr and Rasik Lal Mandal v. Singheshwar Roy) to show that a Hindu son or grandson governed by Mitakshara law is liable for such debts of his father or grandfather.
  • Advanced a broader proposition that under Mitakshara law wherever the father contracted a liability the son is bound by a pious obligation to discharge it out of ancestral property unless the liability was illegal or immoral; submitted that it did not matter whether the transaction benefited the joint family.
  • Also contended the indemnity formed part of the consideration for the purchase-money so that failure of that consideration entitles the plaintiffs to a partial refund.

Defendants (sons and grandsons of the vendors)

  • The Subordinate Judge found the defendants, governed by Mitakshara law, were not liable out of ancestral property and that no other property of the vendors was in the defendants' hands; accordingly the suit was dismissed below.
  • Contended that the liability was not a debt payable by them under Hindu law (Section 53, CPC), arguing that the indemnity did not render them liable and that an indemnity cannot create a debt enforceable against descendants (this contention was addressed by the Court but not fully expanded in the opinion).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maharaja of Benares v. Ram Kumar Misr Authority relied upon to support the proposition that under Mitakshara law a Hindu son or grandson is liable for the father's suretyship debts. The Court records this authority as part of the body of High Court decisions supporting liability of sons for father's surety debts, but distinguishes the present case because it finds the contract here to be one of indemnity rather than suretyship.
Rasik Lal Mandal v. Singheshwar Roy Similarly cited to support the liability of sons/grandsons for the father's surety debts under Mitakshara law. Recognised along with Maharaja of Benares as supporting the view that sons may be liable for suretyship debts; not applied to impose liability because the Court concluded the instrument was an indemnity, not a suretyship.
Hiralal Marwari v. Chandrabali Haldarin Represents a contrary view (i.e., opposing the proposition that sons are liable for fathers' surety debts). The Court notes this contrary decision but indicates that the weight of opinion in several High Courts supports the opposite view; nevertheless the present case is resolved on the ground that the contract was not a suretyship.
Harburg India Rubber Comb Co. v. Martin (and Guild v. Conrad quoting Davey, L.J.) Used to distinguish between a contract of surety (promise to pay creditor if principal defaults) and a contract of indemnity (original liability between promisor and promisee), illustrating objective distinctions adopted in English law and reflected in the Indian Contract Act. The Court adopts the analytical distinction from these authorities to determine that the vendors' undertaking was an indemnity (an original obligation between parties) rather than a suretyship; quotes Davey, L.J. to highlight the distinction.
Chakouri Mahton v. Ganga Proshad Review by Mookerjee, J. summarising that a contractual liability will be enforceable against sons if the transaction is neither illegal nor immoral and comes within "Vyavaharika" (lawful, usual or customary). The Court adopts the Calcutta Court's test (whether the act was lawful, usual or customary) to decide whether the indemnity is enforceable as a pious obligation against ancestral property; applies this standard to the facts and rejects enforceability here.
Durbar Khachar v. Khachar Husur Held that a decree against a father for damages caused by erection of a dam was not enforceable against sons as a pious obligation. Used to illustrate limits on enforcing paternal liabilities against sons; supports the Court's approach to apply a restrictive test (vyavaharika) rather than a broad pious-obligation rule.
Khalilur Rahman v. Gobind Pershad Held that mere imprudence or unreasonableness is not sufficient to render a liability unenforceable (i.e., imprudence alone will not necessarily absolve descendants). Referred to for the proposition that imprudence is not by itself decisive; used as a counterbalance in considering whether the indemnity was an ordinary incident of ownership or otherwise non-vyavaharika.
Pareman Dass v. Bhattu Mahton Engaged with the question whether a right to damages (e.g., for theft) might create a debt. The Court notes that the learned Judges in that case did not dissent from the view that a right to damages could create a debt, supporting the proposition that a contractual liability to pay money on contingency can be a debt.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in a sequence of legal determinations tightly tied to the facts as found below:

  1. Character of the Contract — suretyship vs indemnity:
    • The Court applies principles from the Indian Contract Act (Sections 124, 126, 132 referenced) and English authorities (Harburg India Rubber Comb Co. v. Martin; Guild v. Conrad) to state the analytical distinction: a surety involves a creditor, a principal debtor and a guarantor who secures the principal debtor's liability; an indemnity creates an original liability between the promisor and promisee.
    • Applying that distinction to the present facts, the Court finds the primary object of the vendors' undertaking was to induce the purchaser to buy the zurpeshgi (an additional inducement to the purchaser) and not primarily to answer for the lessee's debt. Thus the undertaking is characterized as a contract of indemnity rather than suretyship.
  2. Effect of Mitakshara law on liability of descendants:
    • The Court accepts that, where a contract is properly one of suretyship, a Hindu son or grandson governed by Mitakshara law can be liable for the father's surety debts (relying on a body of High Court authority), but that principle only applies where the instrument is a suretyship.
    • Because the present instrument is held to be an indemnity, the more specific rule for suretyship liability does not directly make the defendants liable.
  3. Whether the indemnity is enforceable against ancestral property as a "pious obligation" (vyavaharika):
    • The Court adopts the Calcutta formulation (Mookerjee, J., in Chakouri Mahton v. Ganga Proshad) that descendants are liable for a father's contractual liabilities only if the transaction was neither illegal nor immoral and falls within "Vyavaharika" — lawful, usual or customary.
    • On the facts, the Court observes that the Subordinate Judge did not expressly find the vendor's representation (that he had been collecting Rs. 335) to be false. The appellate Court, however, finds it difficult to believe the representation was true: the purchaser's later failure to realize the enhanced rate in suit and the fact that the predecessor zurpeshgi had been created on the footing of Rs. 303 but was purchased for only Rs. 5,000 despite the representation of Rs. 335 suggest the representation was not honestly believed by the purchaser and probably false.
    • If the representation was intentionally false and deceived the purchaser, the indemnity would be immoral (potentially amounting to cheating) and thus unenforceable against descendants. If the representation was not intentionally false, the Court holds the indemnity was not usual or customary (not a transaction an ordinary vendor would be expected to give) and therefore not enforceable as a pious obligation against ancestral property.
    • The Court further rejects the plaintiffs' argument that the indemnity formed part of the sale consideration and that failure of consideration entitles a refund; the Court finds on the facts that the indemnity was not part of the purchase consideration.
  4. On whether an indemnity can create a debt:
    • The Court notes it is unnecessary to discuss at length the defendants' contention that an indemnity cannot create a debt, but affirms that the indemnity here created a contractual liability to pay money on contingency and that it is immaterial that the sum may be unascertained.
    • The Court cites Pareman Dass v. Bhattu Mahton as authority that rights to damages or other contingent liabilities can constitute debts.
  5. Conclusion of analysis:
    • Having applied these legal principles to the facts, the Court concludes the indemnity is not enforceable against the defendants out of ancestral property: if intentionally false it is immoral; if not intentionally false it was not usual/customary (vyavaharika); in neither event do the defendants incur liability to satisfy the indemnity from ancestral property.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application is dismissed. The Court holds that the defendants are not liable to pay the debt created by the indemnity out of the ancestral property to which they have succeeded. Because the Subordinate Judge found no other property of the promiser in the defendants' hands, it would be futile to grant a decree for execution against other property. The application is therefore dismissed with costs; hearing fee Rs. 80.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the plaintiffs obtain no relief against the defendants: the claim for Rs. 32 per year for 1911–1917 fails and the application for revision is dismissed.
  • The Court distinguishes suretyship from indemnity and applies the "vyavaharika" test (lawful, usual or customary) when considering whether a father's contractual liability can be enforced against descendants as a pious obligation under Mitakshara law. In this case the indemnity fails that test on the facts presented.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel general rule superseding prior authority; it applies existing authorities and confines relief to the specific factual and legal conclusions reached. No broader, new precedent beyond the application of established tests is articulated as a separate holding.

Disposition:

Application dismissed. (Mullick, J.: judgment summarized above. Thornhill, J. concurred.)

(End of summarized opinion.)

Show all summary ...

Mullick, J.:— In this case one Moni Lal was the proprietor of 101 bighas of land. In 1868 he gave a mokurrari pattah for this land to a gentleman named Macdonald at an annual rent of Rs. 303. In 1869 he executed a zurpeshgi mortgage in favour of the same gentleman for a principal sum of Rs. 5,050, it being stipulated that the mortgagee was to retain the whole of the mokurrari rent as interest. The mokurrari is now in the hands of one Basudeo Das. The zurpeshgidar's interest passed by sale first to one Gulam Hosain and then in 1897 to three persons named Debi Prasad, Koshilanand and Gulab Chand. In 1899 Debi Prasad and his cosharers sold the zurpeshgi to the father of the plaintiffs before us for a sum of Rs. 5,000. In the meantime the Survey and Settlement authorities had recorded the rent payable by the mokurraridar Basudeo as Rs. 335 instead of Re. 303. The vendors, when selling the zurpeshgi to the father of the plaintiffs, represented that they had been collecting at the rate of Rs. 335 from the mokurraridar and executed an ekrarnamah in which they agreed to indemnify the purchaser for the difference between Rs. 335 and Rs. 303 in the event of his failing to realise it from the mokurraridar. The mokurraridar refused to pay the enhancement and the purchaser was obliged to sue. In 1903 the mokurraridar's plea that his rent was Rs. 303 succeeded and the suit of the purchaser was dismissed. In 1917 the plaintiffs brought the present suit for the amount due to them from the defendants as the legal representatives of their father for the default of the mokurraridar at Rs. 32 per year in respect of the years 1911-1917. The claim for previous years was given up as barred by limitation.

2. The Subordinate Judge finds that the defendants who, are the sons and grandsons of the vendors, being governed by the law of the Mitakshara, are not liable to pay the claim out of the ancestral property and as there is no other property belonging to the vendors in their hands be has dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs accordingly ask us to exercise on revisional powers under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. It is clear that the contract made by the defendant father is not one that dies with the promiser and that it is enforceable against his legal representatives. The defendants are the promiser's legal representatives in respect of his self acquired property inherited by them but the finding of the Subordinate Judge is that there is no such property. In regard to ancestral property in their possession the defendants are under Section 53 of the CPC, the promiser's legal representatives only for debts payable by them under the Hindu law. It is either admitted or found that there was neither antecedent debt nor legal necessity to render the contract enforceable against the defendants. The learned vakil for the creditor, however contends that the contract created a suretyship for the payment of money and he relies on the Maharaja of Benares v. Ram Kumar Misr(1) and Rasik Lal Mandal v. Singheshwar Roy(2). In my opinion although a contrary view was taken in Hiralal Marwari v. Chandrabali Haldarin(3), a Hindu son or grandson governed by the Mitakshara law is liable for the debt of his father o; grandfather due on account of a surety ship for the payment of money. The weight of opinion in the High Courts of Bombay, Allahabad, Madras and Calcutta is to this effect.

3. The first question to be decided there fore is whether the contract in the casa now before us was really one of suretyship. Now the principles applied to cases under the law of contract for determining the difference between a contract of surety and a contract of indemnity appear to me to be of general application and although the English cases are more particularly concerned with the question whether a particular contract falls within S. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, still it seems to me that the conditions required by the English law and by the Indian Contract Act for a contract of suretyship are also required for such a contract in Hindu law. There must be a creditor, a principal debtor and a guarantor or surety, who makes himself liable for the liability of the principal debtor. The relationship may be established by an agreement between the principal debtor and the surety to which the creditor is a party. This it the relationship contemplated by Section 126 of the Contract Act. It may also be established by an agreement to which the creditor is not a party, where there is a collateral contract between the surety and the principal debtor that one of them shall be liable on the default of the other. This is the contract contemplated under Section 132 of the Contract Act. But where the contract between the surety and the creditor is not a collateral undertaking but creates an original liability as between these two parties, then the contract is not one of surety bub one of indemnity within the meaning of Section 124 of the Contract Act. The distinction was discussed in Harburg India Rubber Comb Co. v. Martin(4) and in that case Vaughan Williams, L.J, cited with approval the following observations of Davey, L.J, in Guild v. Conrad(5):

“In my opinion there is a plain distinction between a promise to pay the creditor if the principal debtor makes default in payment and a promise to keep a person who has entered or is shout to enter into a contract of liability indemnified against that liability independently of the question whether a third person makes default or not.”

4. Now what was the object of the guarantee in the present case? The mokurrari tenancy purchased by Basdeo was created long before the guarantee. The father of the plaintiffs was not in any way induced to do anything or to forbear from doing anything in connexion with the giving of that lease. That lease formed no part of the consideration of the assignment of the zurpeshgi between the vendor and the vendee. The guarantee; was given not with the object of benefiting the lessee, and securing payment of the rent due from him, but for providing an additional inducement to the vendee for purchasing the zarpeshgi. Incidentally the result of the guarantee may have been to benefit the lessee, but the primary object of the contract was not to answer for his debt or default. In my opinion therefore the contract in this case was not a contract of surety at all but a contract of indemnity. In a sense every contract of indemnity is a contract of guarantee. But, in my opinion, when the Hindu law enforces liability for the suretyship debts of the father, it contemplates suretyship of the same kind as the Contract Act. The argument therefore that the contrast being one made by the promiser as surety for the payment of money his sons and grandsons are liable in Hindu law, fails.

5. The learned vakil for the creditor however relies upon a much wider proposition, which is that under the Mitakshara law wherever the father has contracted a liability the son is bound by a pious obligation to discharge that liability out of the ancestral property in his hands, unless he can show that the liability was illegal or immoral. He contends that in the present case, unless it can be shown that the indemnity was illegal or immoral the plaintiffs are entitled to succeed and that it is wholly immaterial whether or not the transaction was for the benefit of the joint family. In my opinion this proposition is stated in too wide terms. The cases relating to the liability of a Hindu son have been reviewed by Mookerjee, J., in Chakouri Mahton v. Ganga Proshad(6). It has been held that the actual receipt of money by the father is not necessary. A contractual liability to pay money will constitute a debt which is enforceable against the son provided the transaction is neither illegal nor immoral and comes within the meaning of the term “Vyavaharika,” which has been, translated as lawful, usual or customary. Indeed the cases have gone so far as to hold that if the father is made liable for damages for breach of civil duty, then upon a decree made against the father the sons are liable to the extent of the ancestral property.

6. In the present case the indemnity given by the father would undoubtedly be enforceable against himself. If a decree upon it had been obtained against the father during his lifetime then it would be enforceable against the sons after his death provided it came within the list compiled by Mookerjee, J., in the abovementioned case. Here the liability will depend upon whether the act was lawful, usual or customary. The Subordinate Judge has not in terms said that the representation of the father that he had been collecting Rs. 335 per year from the lessee was false. If it was intentionally false and if it deceived the purchaser it might have rendered the father liable to prosecution for the offence of cheating. For myself, having regard to all the circumstances, I find it difficult to believe that it was true. The purchaser's failure to realize the enhanced rate by suit is strong evidence that the representation was not true and the view I take is that the purchaser did not honestly believe that the representation was true. Both parties knew that the true rent was Rs. 303. The purchaser was in no way deceived but intended to gamble on the chance of being able to realize the enhancement recorded by the Survey and Settlement Authorities. This conclusion is supported by the fact that while the original zurpeshgi was created in favour of Macdonald for a principal of Rs. 5,050 on the footing that the mokurrari rent was Rs. 303, the predecessor of the plaintiffs paid only Rs. 5,000 for it in spite of the rent being represented to be Rs. 335. I hold therefore that if the representation was intentionally false the liability created by the indemnity was immoral; if it was not intentionally false, the liability was not usual or customary and therefore not enforceable against the sons as a pious obligation, I agree that a mare error of judgment on the part of the father would not save the sons if the indemnity was in ordinary incident in the ownership of property. In Durbar Khachar v. Khachar Husur(7) it was held that a decree against the father for damages caused by the erection of a dam was not enforcible against the sons as a pious obligation. On the other hand in Khalilur Rahman v. Gobind Pershad(8) it was held that mere imprudence or unreasonableness will not be Sufficient.

7. As this would also seem to be the view taken by Mookerjee, J., in Chakouri Mahton v. Ganga Proshad, I think we must follow the Calcutta Court and judge the indemnity here by the test whether it was usual, that is to say whether it was one which an ordinary vendor might have been expected to give. Having regard to the state of the knowledge of parties and to the fact that the liability was indefinite and practically perpetual, my answer is in the negative. It might be urged that the liability was limited to the duration of the zurpeshgi but having regard to the fact that the zurpeshgi was created in 1869 and has not yet been redeemed, it may be regarded as practically perpetual. It is contended by the learned vakil for the plaintiffs that the indemnity was part of the consideration for the purchase-money and that as there has been failure of that consideration, the sons are liable to pay the present claim by way of partial refund of consideration money. The reply to this is that upon the facts I do not hold that the indemnity was any part of the consideration for the sale. In the view that I take it is not necessary to discuss at any length the contention of the defendants that an indemnity cannot create a debt. The indemnity in this case created a contractual liability to pay money on certain contingency. It is immaterial that the sum to be paid was not an ascertained sum but depended upon the extent of the moknrraridar's failure. In Pareman Dass v. Bhattu Mahton(9) the learned Judges did not dissent from the view that a right to damages for theft might create a debt. In my opinion such a right does create a debt whether the liability is based on a decree of Court or upon a contract.

8. But for the reasons given I am of opinion that the defendants are not liable to pay out of the ancestral property to which they have succeeded by survivor ship the debt created by the indemnity in the present case.

9. It is useless to give the plaintiffs a decree for execution against any other property, because the Subordinate Judge finds that there is no other property belonging to the promiser in the hands of the defendants. The application is therefore dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 80.

10. Thornhill, J.:— I concur.

V.S/R.K

11. Application dismissed.