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Upendra Nath Ghose v. Baikuntha Nath Ghose
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiffs sued for reliefs concerning an ancestral deity (a Saligram Bigraha) described by the Plaintiffs as “Dayal” (the Defendants called it “Sridhar”). The Plaintiffs alleged that the deity had been installed by their ancestors — three brothers (Raj Krishna Ghose; Sriballav Ghose; and Kali Charan Ghose is identified as a great-grandfather of a defendant) — and that worship was performed daily and on special occasions in shares said to be equal. The Plaintiffs claimed that, following certain events, only they, the principal Defendants and a person referred to as Ramanath (later Rudranath) Ghose remained interested in the deity, that the Plaintiffs had exercised worship rights until Baishak 1327 when the principal Defendants denied those rights, and that the deity should be treated as a movable chattel capable of ownership and partition.
The trial Court (the learned Munsif) decreed the suit, declaring the Plaintiffs' title (the drawn decree stated a one-third proprietary title), granted liberty to bring the deity to the Plaintiffs' new house on specified ceremonial occasions, and issued a perpetual injunction restraining principal Defendants from interfering with Plaintiffs' worship as indicated. Defendant No. 1 alone contested at trial and appealed; Plaintiffs cross-appealed. The Subordinate Judge dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, affirming the decree. Defendants Nos. 1–3 then preferred a second appeal to this Court and the Plaintiffs filed a memorandum of cross-objection.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit was maintainable in the absence of the deity being represented and in the absence of female members of the family as parties (relying on Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick).
- Whether a suit or a prayer that treats a deity as movable property (and seeks partition or proprietary declarations) is maintainable.
- Whether, on the facts found by the Courts below, the Plaintiffs had any subsisting right or interest in the deity entitling them to relief.
- Whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to a decree allowing removal of the deity from its installed place to the Plaintiffs' new house on occasions.
- Whether the trial Court's form of decree — specifically declaring a one-third proprietary share in the deity — was appropriate in this suit.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments
- The suit is not maintainable because the deity was not properly represented and female members of the family (who might be interested) were not made parties; reliance placed on Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick.
- The plaint and the prayers (treating the deity as movable/property and claiming proprietary shares) are not maintainable.
- On the facts found by the Courts below, the Plaintiffs have no subsisting right or interest in the deity and therefore cannot obtain a declaration or relief.
- Even if some right existed, the Plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree permitting removal of the deity to their new house.
- The form of the decree (declaring a one-third proprietary share in the deity) is inappropriate for a suit of this nature.
Plaintiffs' (Respondents') Case as Presented in the Opinion
- The Plaintiffs asserted ancestral installation and shared worship rights in the deity and sought to have the deity treated as moveable property and partitioned according to shares; alternatively they sought a declaration of their right to worship and arrangements as to turns of worship (the latter was not pressed ultimately).
- The Plaintiffs claimed a right to bring the deity to their new house on festivals and ceremonial occasions, pursuant to an alleged historical arrangement made when they removed to their new homestead in 1305.
- In their cross-objection the Plaintiffs sought modification of the decree to remove certain conditions favourable to the Defendants (the Court declined to accede to that request).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick | The Judicial Committee observed that where an idol has a fixed abode and a fund is created (for worship), the idol's interests might be vitally affected by litigation and female members' interests might require special protection; their Lordships recommended that the idol be represented by a disinterested next-friend appointed by the Court, female members be joined, and a scheme be framed for regulation of worship. | The Court distinguished that authority: it found the present case materially different (no outside interest and the dispute is essentially between family parties over their own rights), and held that the Mullick observations did not mandate dismissal for want of representation here. The Court noted female members not made parties would not be bound by the result, but that did not render the suit non-maintainable between the parties before the Court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed the Defendants' five grounds sequentially and explained its reasoning grounded in the facts found by the Courts below and legal principles:
- Representation and joinder of female members: The Court considered the Mullick decision relied upon by the Defendants but emphasized factual distinctions. In Mullick there was an idol with a fixed abode and an associated fund created by will such that the idol's interests and female members' interests might be vitally affected. Here, by contrast, the pleading and findings showed the deity had been installed by ancestors who were members of the same family and no outside interest was suggested. The suit concerned adjustment of rights among those family members; therefore Mullick did not compel non-maintainability. The Court also observed that the objection was not taken below.
- Maintainability of the plaint/prayer that treated the deity as movable property: The Court acknowledged that if the plaint were read literally it contained “extremely unhappy” expressions treating the deity as movable chattel, which would be objectionable. However, the Subordinate Judge had correctly identified the substance of the Plaintiffs' claim as a request for (a) a declaration of their right to worship (a valuable right) and (b) a permanent injunction restraining the principal Defendants from interfering with that right. Because of this substantive characterization, the objection that the prayer was not maintainable was overruled.
- Existence of any subsisting right in the Plaintiffs: The Court summarised the concurrent findings below: the deity was installed by the ancestors of both sides; the ancestors of the Plaintiffs, the principal Defendants and Rudranath (or Ramanath) Ghose became the sole worshippers long ago and exercised the right, giving rise to a presumption of right by grant or mutual arrangement; when the Plaintiffs removed to a new house in 1305 there was an arrangement (involving some female members) that the Plaintiffs would leave the deity at the ancestral house but retained liberty to bring the deity to their new house as necessary; the Plaintiffs exercised this liberty until Baishak 1327 when their right was denied. Given those findings, the Court found it difficult to hold that the Plaintiffs had no subsisting right; this ground failed.
- Entitlement to remove the deity: The Court held that the Defendants' objection ignored the arrangement found by the lower Courts. Because the arrangement expressly reserved to the Plaintiffs the competence to remove the deity on occasions when removal was necessary, the Plaintiffs were entitled to relief permitting such removal on those occasions.
- Form of the decree (declaration of one-third proprietary share): The Court criticised the propriety of a declaration that the Plaintiffs had a one-third proprietary title in a suit of this nature. It noted that the Plaintiffs had not pursued a claim as to turns of worship (which might justify a fractional declaration). The proper declaration, the Court held, should be that the Plaintiffs are entitled to worship the deity. Other operative provisions of the decree (liberty to bring the deity on certain occasions; injunction against interference) were to remain. The Court accepted that the precise practical effect of the original declarations was hard to comprehend, but limited itself to substituting the operative declaration of entitlement to worship.
The Court also recorded that the Plaintiffs' cross-objection seeking removal of certain conditions favouring the Defendants was not allowed. There was no other order as to costs in the appeal or cross-objection.
Justice Garlick concurred with the reasons and result.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal and the Plaintiffs' cross-objection were both dismissed. The Court ordered that the phrase in the decree reading “that the Plaintiffs' proprietary right to one-third share in the deity be declared” be substituted with the words “it be declared that the Plaintiffs are entitled to worship the deity.” There was no other order as to costs in the appeal or the cross-objection.
Implications
- Direct effect on the parties: The Plaintiffs retain a court-declared right to worship the deity and the other operative declarations of the trial Court's decree (liberty to bring the deity on certain ceremonial occasions and a perpetual injunction restraining interference by the principal Defendants) remain in place, subject to the substituted wording. The Plaintiffs' attempt to obtain a decree framed as a proprietary one-third share was not upheld by this Court.
- Joinder and representation consequences: The Court held that absence of the deity's separate representation or absence of female family members as parties did not render the suit non-maintainable in the particular factual context of a dispute among family members who claim competing rights to worship; however, the Court noted that absent female members would not be bound by the result.
- Precedential effect: The opinion distinguishes the Mullick authority on its facts and does not treat Mullick as directly controlling here. The Court did not formulate a new broad rule changing precedents; its decision is based on the factual distinctions and the particular relief sought. No broader precedent was declared by this judgment beyond the application to the facts of this case.
This summary is based exclusively on the reasoning and statements contained in the provided opinion.
The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—
Mukerji, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit which was instituted by the Plaintiffs for certain reliefs which are of a somewhat unusual character. The Plaintiffs' case shortly stated was that their grand-father, Raj Krishna Ghose and Sriballav Ghose, the grand-father of the Defendants Nos. 1 to 8 and Kali Charan Ghose who was the great grandfather of the Defendant No. 10 and grand-father of the husband of the Defendant No. 9, were three brothers whose ancestor had installed a deity in their ancestral dwelling-house, and the deity according to the Plaintiffs went by the name of “Dayal” and according to the Defendants “Sridhar,” that the deity is a Saligram Bigraha and there is daily worship of the deity at the place where it was installed and that the said three brothers used to worship the deity every day as well as on special occasions, according to their shares which were equal. The Plaintiffs alleged that in consequence of certain events that took place, it is they and the principal Defendants and one Ramanath Ghose who are now solely interested in the said “Deity” and that they exercised their right of worship of the deity down to 1327 when the principal Defendants denied their right and interfered with the exercise thereof. The prayers that were made in the plaint were very unusual in their character and purported to treat the deity as a moveable chattel—in the nature of property which is capable of being owned and possessed by them and also of being partitioned in accordance With their respective shares. There was a prayer which was of a more reasonable character, namely, for a declaration of the Plaintiff's right to worship the deity and for an arrangement being made as regards the turns of worship as between the different co-sharers so that the right of worship might be exercised in accordance with such turns. This prayer, however, appears not to have been pressed eventually and the relief that was claimed by the Plaintiffs was confined more or less to the deity being treated as moveable property. The Defendant No. 1 who was the only contesting Defendant in the trial Court denied the Plaintiffs' right altogether.
The trial Court decreed the suit in the following terms: “That the suit be decreed with costs and future interest at 6 per cent per annum: Plaintiffs' title to the disputed deity as stated in the plaint be declared, and they be free to bring the deity to their new bari on the occasions of annual parbas and ceremonies such as Puspa Jatras, Puskarni Pratistas, sradhs, marriages, Kali Pujas, Mansha Pujas, Radhastamis, Durga Pujas, Tulashi offerings in the month of Kartick, Nabannas in Agrahayan, Uttarayan Sankrantis, Sri Panchamis, Basanti Pujas, Dhaja Divadasis, Sasthi Pujas, Annaprasans and Griha Prabeshas without interfering with the worship of the deity by the principal Defendants and performance of ceremonies at their (meaning the Defendants') bari: that a perpetual injunction be issued on the principal Defendants not to interfere with Plaintiffs' right to worship the deity as indicated above.” The above is an extract from the ordering portion of the judgment; but in the decree that was drawn up it was clearly stated that the Plaintiffs' title to the disputed deity was one-third. There was an appeal preferred by the Defendant No. 1 from the decree as passed by the trial Court and the Plaintiffs also preferred a cross-appeal. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the appeal and the cross-appeal and affirmed the decree of the trial Court. The Defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3, have thereupon preferred a second appeal to this Court and the Plaintiffs have preferred a memorandum of cross-objection.
The appeal of the Defendants is pressed upon five distinct grounds. The first of these grounds is to the effect that the decree should be set aside as the suit was not maintainable without the deity being properly represented therein and because the female members of the family who were also interested in the deity were not made parties to the said suit. In support of this ground reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick . Now the facts of the present case are that the deity was, upon the allegations of the parties, installed by some ancestors of the parties themselves but it is not suggested that anybody else, other than the members of the family to which the parties belonged, is interested in the deity or that there is any property of the deity which is likely to be interfered with by the arrangement which is asked to be made. The suit in its essence appears to be one for adjustment of the rights as between the parties themselves in relation to the deity. In that way the case seems to be entirely distinguishable from the case of Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick . In that case there was an installation of the deity with a fixed abode; and for the idol so established as well as for the other idols ancestral, a fund was created by a Will for performing their worship. In such a case their Lordships of the Judicial Committee pronounced the opinion that if the idol was not otherwise represented in the proceedings, a result might ensue which might, conceivably, vitally affect its interests and also that the interest of the female members of the family might need special protection. Upon these considerations their Lordships observed that it would be in the interests of all concerned that the idol should appear by a disinterested next-friend appointed by the Court and that the female members of the family should also be joined and a scheme should be framed for the regulation of the worship of the idol. The scope of that suit was entirely different from the scope of the present one. In the present case it is really and substantially a case of dispute between two contesting parties, one claiming to have a right jointly with the other to perform the worship of the deity and to have the possession of the deity for the performance of such worship and the other party claiming an exclusive possession of the deity with a denial of a right of the former to perform any worship at all. I am of opinion that the observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee cannot be said to apply to a case of the present nature and they are not to be treated as authority for the purpose of holding that in the absence of the deity or of the female members of the family the present suit is not maintainable. The female members, who may be interested in the deity and are not parties to the suit, will not be bound by the result of the present litigation. That, however, is quite a different matter; but in so far as the parties who are parties to the suit are concerned it cannot be contended that the suit is not maintainable. This ground, therefore, in my opinion, fails. It may be noted also that this objection does not appear to have been taken on behalf of the Defendants in any of the Courts below.
The next ground is to the effect that a suit of this character or rather a prayer of this character is not maintainable. The objection is unquestionably correct and well-founded if the wording of the plaint is taken at its face-value. As I have already stated, the Plaintiffs appear to have entertained a very curious conception of the deity but the learned Subordinate Judge has pointed out in his judgment that although many of the expressions used in the plaint are extremely unhappy, what in substance is asked for on behalf of the Plaintiffs is a declaration of their right of worship which is a very valuable right and a permanent injunction restraining the principal Defendants from interfering with the exercise of that right by and on the part of the Plaintiffs. The second ground, therefore, must also be overruled.
It is urged in the next place that upon the facts found by the Courts below it should be held that the Plaintiffs have got no subsisting right or interest in the deity, in respect of which he can possibly get any declaration or relief from, the Court. As regards this matter the findings at which the Courts below have arrived, more or less concurrently, seems to be these: that the deity was installed by the ancestors of the Plaintiffs as well as of the contesting Defendants, that after certain incidents, into the details of which it is not necessary to enter, the ancestors of the Plaintiffs and the principal Defendants and Rudranath Ghose became the sole worshippers of the deity quite a long time ago and that they all along exercised the said right, giving rise to the presumption that they had acquired the sole right to worship the deity either on a grant or by mutual arrangement: that in 1305 when the Plaintiffs removed to their new house in which there was already installed another deity of the name of Lakshminarayan there was an arrangement between the father of the Defendant No. 1 and the Plaintiffs in which the females of the family or at any rate some of them also took part, and the arrangement was that the Plaintiffs would leave the deity at their ancestral house, namely, the homestead of the Defendants, liberty being reserved to them to bring the deity to their new homestead according to necessity; that the Plaintiffs used occasionally to exercise their right of worship of the deity and to bring the deity to their new house on festive and ceremonial occasions and that they continued to do so till Baishak 1327 after which date their right to worship the deity was denied. On these findings it seems somewhat difficult to conceive how it can reasonably be said that the Plaintiffs had no longer any subsisting right or interest in the deity. This contention must also be overruled.
The next contention is to the effect that in any event the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a decree entitling them to remove the deity from the place where it is to their new house. This contention overlooks the terms of the arrangement which have been found by both the Courts below, the arrangement being that the Plaintiffs would be competent to remove the deity on occasions on which such removal would be necessary.
The last ground urged on behalf of the Appellants relates to the form of the decree that was passed by the trial Court and has been upheld on appeal by the learned Subordinate Judge. The trial Court, as I have already stated, has declared the Plaintiffs' right to the extent of a third share in the deity. Such a declaration is one that can scarcely be passed in a suit of this nature. One could have understood if any question as to turns of worship had arisen in the suit and a declaration limiting the right of the Plaintiffs to a certain fraction of the entire worship had been made by the Court. But the Courts below, as appears from the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge, did not deal with any question of the turn of the worship at all, the Plaintiffs having given up the claim they had made on that footing. The declaration which the Plaintiffs should get as regards their right in connection with the deity would be to the effect that their right to worship the deity will be declared. The other declarations that have been made in the decree of the learned Munsif will stand. What the practical effect of these declarations will be is a matter which it is somewhat difficult to comprehend, but with that we are not concerned so long as the Plaintiffs would care to have the decree passed in their favour. The Plaintiffs no doubt have in their cross-objection sought to get a decree free from certain conditions which appear in favour of the Defendants, but we are not inclined to accede to the Plaintiffs' request in this connection.
The result is that the appeal and the cross-objection both fail and they are both dismissed, subject only to this that in lieu of the words in the decree that has been passed in this suit “that the Plaintiffs' proprietary right to one-third share in the deity be declared” the words “it be declared that the Plaintiffs are entitled to worship the deity” be substituted. There will be no other order as to costs either in the appeal or in the cross-objection.
Garlick, J.:— I agree.
P.C
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