Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Kamalakant Gopalji v. Madhavji Meghji

Bombay High Court
Nov 26, 1934
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — B.J. Wadia, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued to recover two sums (Rs. 52,747-8-0 and Rs. 8,158-9-0) due under two promissory notes dated 29 July 1929, which had been passed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff's father, Gopalji Ramji. Gopalji died intestate at Bombay on or about 3 June 1931. The plaintiff is alleged to be Gopalji's only son and claimed the amounts in two alternative capacities: (a) as sole surviving coparcener of a joint and undivided Hindu family of which he and his father were members, and (b) alternatively, as the sole heir and legal representative of his father. The plaintiff had not obtained representation to his father's estate; at the commencement of the hearing his counsel stated that he claimed only as a coparcener.

The promissory notes arose after a partnership between the plaintiff's father and the defendant (they were colour merchants) was dissolved between 1922 and 1924; on making up accounts, moneys were found due and were represented by the promissory notes, which were renewed from time to time, the last renewal being on 29 July 1929. The suit was filed on 9 September 1932 and appeared on the face of the record to be time-barred; the plaintiff relied on the defendant’s absence from British India in 1932 to avoid the bar of limitation. The defendant denied that the plaintiff could maintain the suit as a surviving coparcener and questioned whether the plaintiff was the proper person to sue on negotiable instruments payable to Gopalji Ramji or order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff, claiming as sole surviving coparcener, can maintain a suit on promissory notes payable to his deceased father (payable to "Gopalji Ramji or order") — i.e., whether survivorship alone makes him a "holder" entitled to sue on negotiable instruments.
  2. Whether the plaintiff could have joined or alternatively pleaded title as heir/legal representative without having obtained representation to the estate, and what effect such representation (or its absence) has on the present suit.
  3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation on its face and whether the defendant's absence from British India in 1932 affects the limitation defence (raised by the parties, though the principal decision turned on the pleading and title issue).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff claimed the sums principally as sole surviving coparcener of a joint Hindu family and argued that by operation of law the property in the promissory notes passed to him on his father's death.
  • The plaintiff also relied on the defendant's absence from British India in 1932 to ward off the bar of limitation.
  • At one point in closing submissions counsel indicated that, if necessary, he would apply for a succession certificate, but at the commencement of the hearing the plaintiff had expressly rested his claim on his status as coparcener and had not obtained representation to his father's estate.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant contended that the plaintiff could not sue on the promissory notes as a surviving coparcener because the notes were payable to Gopalji Ramji or order and the plaintiff was not a "holder" who could give a valid and proper discharge to the maker.
  • The defendant alleged uncertainty as to whether the plaintiff was in fact the only son and heir, and argued that the plaintiff could not file suit as legal representative without first obtaining representation to the estate (i.e., succession certificate or similar).
  • The defendant also disputed that the plaintiff and his father were members of a joint and undivided Hindu family (denying the coparcenary status pleaded by the plaintiff).
  • The defendant relied on limitation as a bar, subject to the exception argued by the plaintiff (absence from British India).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Whitworth v. Darbishire Illustration that alternative claims cannot be joined so as to circumvent procedural rules (cited in relation to Order II, rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code). Used to support the statement that the plaintiff could not join the two alternative claims (coparcener and heir) in the one plaint under Order II, rule 5.
Raichand v. Jivraj Authority for the proposition that a court cannot pass a decree in favour of a plaintiff claiming as legal representative until he had obtained representation to the estate. Cited to explain that, although a plaintiff may file as heir/representative, a decree cannot be entered until representation is obtained; but this was not determinative because the plaintiff proceeded as coparcener.
Harkishore Barna v. Gura Mia Chaudhuri Held that no one could maintain a suit on a promissory note except the holder thereof. Relied on by the court to support the narrow view that suits on promissory notes are generally maintainable only by holders.
Brojo Lal Saha Banikya v. Budh Nath Pyarilal & Co. Held that not only the holder but the true owner of a promissory note could also sue (an earlier contrary view). Cited as an earlier conflicting authority; the court noted that this view was dissented from in Harkishore Barna; the distinction was explained on the ground that the earlier suit also relied on the consideration, not solely the instrument.
Subba Narayana Vathiyar v. Ramaswami Aiyar Interpreted the words "in his own name" in section 8 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as preventing benami claims to the position of holder. Used to support the narrow statutory meaning of "holder" and to show legislative intent to restrict who may claim to be holder.
Muthar Sahib Maraikar v. Kadir Sahib Maraikar Authority that an assignee of a promissory note can sue in his own name (though the assignor is often joined for caution). Noted by the court to show that assignees (properly assigned) may sue in their own names, distinguishing assignment from survivorship as a ground for suing.
Vithalrao v. Vithalrao Held that members of a joint family were not liable in a suit on a promissory note signed by one of them as manager; distinction between suit on note and suit on debt. Applied to illustrate that liability under a promissory note is restricted to the person whose name appears on it; other coparceners could be sued only on the debt, not on the instrument.
Sharanbasappa v. Rachappa Held that a promissory note signed by one partner in his own name (not in the firm's name) binds that partner alone. Used to reinforce the proposition that the signatory alone is bound on the instrument and that liability is not automatically extended to others.
Sitaram Krishna v. Chimandas Fatehchand Held that in an action on a promissory note the signatory whose name appeared on it would not be permitted to show he was an agent for an undisclosed principal. Cited to support the restricted approach to who may sue or be sued on negotiable instruments.
Pichhappa v. Chokalingam (Privy Council) Held that a manager of a joint family becoming a partner with a stranger does not ipso facto make other family members partners. Applied to demonstrate the trend of decisions limiting the extension of liability or rights under instruments to those expressly identified.
Bank of Bombay v. Ambalal Sarabhai Illustrates that beneficial interest by survivorship does not necessarily carry with it legal title enabling one to sue on negotiable instruments; survivorship gives beneficial interest but not legal capacity to discharge maker. Relied upon to support the court's conclusion that a coparcener obtains beneficial interest by survivorship but does not thereby acquire the legal capacity of a "holder" to sue on an instrument payable to the deceased or order.
Sadusuk Janki Das v. Kishan Pershad Held that the person whose name appears in a promissory note as signatory is alone liable on the note. Referred to as authority supporting the proposition that the face of the instrument determines who may sue or be sued on it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined the factual question whether the plaintiff and his father were members of a joint and undivided Hindu family. Although the evidence was described as not detailed, the statements of the plaintiff and his uncle (Shivji Ramji) were not disproved, and the court inferred that the plaintiff and his father were joint in food, worship and estate (i.e., coparceners).

The decisive legal issue was whether the plaintiff, as a coparcener by survivorship, could sue on promissory notes payable to his deceased father's name (payable to "Gopalji Ramji or order"). The court undertook a statutory and precedential analysis:

  • The court cited the definition of "holder" in section 8 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (person entitled in his own name to possess and recover the amount) and the statutory rules under sections 32 and 78 governing payment and discharge (payment to the holder discharges the maker).
  • On the authorities, the court noted the strong line of decisions restricting suits on promissory notes to the person whose name appears on the instrument (the holder) or to properly assigned assignees; earlier contradictory authority (allowing the true owner to sue) had been dissented from in later decisions when the earlier suits had relied on the consideration as well as the instrument.
  • The court explained the distinction between transfer by endorsement (or delivery) of negotiable instruments and assignment as a chose in action (Transfer of Property Act, section 130). It noted that negotiable instruments are excepted from certain provisions of the Transfer of Property Act (section 137) because assignments are regulated by the Negotiable Instruments Act, and that assignments require writing and execution.
  • Relying on cases such as Vithalrao v. Vithalrao and Sharanbasappa v. Rachappa, the court emphasised the distinction between a suit on the negotiable instrument (which is limited to the signatory/holder) and a suit on the underlying debt (which may lie against the estate or other members). The trend of authorities, including Privy Council authority, was held to restrict liability and entitlement under promissory notes to the person named on the instrument or a properly assigned holder.
  • The court rejected the argument that survivorship (a coparcener acquiring beneficial interest immediately by operation of law) converts the coparcener into a "holder" able to give a valid discharge to the maker. The court relied on Bank of Bombay v. Ambalal Sarabhai to show that beneficial interest does not automatically carry legal title sufficient to treat the survivor as holder of a negotiable instrument.
  • The court noted that the legal representative (when appointed) does represent the estate under section 2(11) of the Civil Procedure Code and can sue as representative; but the plaintiff had expressly not pursued his claim as representative and the plaint was framed in his personal name as coparcener throughout the hearing. The court therefore declined to permit a change of cause of action at that stage by permitting the plaintiff to rely on a succession certificate so as to transform the suit into one by the legal representative.

On this analysis the court concluded that the plaintiff could not be treated as a "holder" of the promissory notes by virtue of survivorship alone and therefore could not maintain a suit on the promissory notes in his personal capacity as coparcener.

Holding and Implications

Holding: For the reasons stated, the court held that the plaintiff cannot maintain this suit on his title as a coparcener and the suit was dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The plaintiff's suit to recover amounts due under promissory notes payable to his deceased father or order, brought in his personal capacity as coparcener, failed and was dismissed with costs.
  • Legal principle reinforced: Survivorship giving beneficial interest to a coparcener does not by itself confer the legal status of "holder" of negotiable instruments payable to the deceased so as to enable the survivor to sue on the instrument or to give a legally effective discharge to the maker.
  • No broader constitutional or novel precedent was expressly announced beyond the application and reinforcement of existing authorities limiting suits on negotiable instruments to holders and properly assigned persons; the judgment turned on established statutory definitions and case law distinctions between suits on an instrument and suits on the underlying debt.

Other Information from the Opinion

Attorneys for plaintiffs: Messrs Nagindas, Hooseinally & Co.

Attorneys for defendants: Messrs Khandwala and Chhotalal.

Disposition: Suit dismissed.

Show all summary ...

B.J Wadia, J.:—

The plaintiff has filed this suit to recover from the defendant two sums of Rs. 52,747-8-0 and Rs. 8,158-9-0 under two promissory notes dated July 29, 1929, which were passed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff's father Gopalji Ramji. Gopalji Ramji died intestate at Bombay on or about June 3, 1931. Plaintiff is his only son, and claims the two sums as the sole surviving coparcener of a joint and undivided Hindu family of which he and his father were members, or, in the alternative, as the sole heir and legal representative of his father. Plaintiff has not obtained representation to the estate of his father, and at the commencement of the hearing his counsel said that he claimed only as a coparcener. It is clear that the two claims cannot be joined together under the terms of Order II, rule 5, of the Civil Procedure Code. It makes no difference that the second claim is in the alternative to the first: see Whitworth v. Darbishire. Plaintiff's father and the defendant did business in partnership as colour merchants. The partnership was dissolved some time between 1922 and 1924, and on making up the accounts moneys were found due for which the defendant passed the two promissory notes in suit in favour of the plaintiff's father. The promissory notes were renewed from time to time, the last renewal being on July 29, 1929.

The suit was filed on September 9, 1932, and on the face of it the claim is time-barred. Plaintiff, however, relies on the absence of the defendant from British India in 1932 to save the bar of limitation. Defendant also contends that the plaintiff cannot maintain this suit on the promissory notes as a surviving coparcener, assuming that he was one, as the promissory notes are payable to Gopalji Ramji or order. The plaintiff, it was contended, is not a holder who can give a valid and proper discharge to the defendant. In his written statement the defendant alleges that he is not aware that plaintiff is the only son and heir or legal representative of his father, and that even if he is, he cannot file this suit without obtaining representation to his father's estate. There was, however, nothing to prevent the plaintiff from filing the suit as the sole heir of his father if he was so minded, and all that has been held in Raichand v. Jivraj is that the Court cannot pass a decree until he had obtained such representation. That question, however, does not now arise, as the plaintiff claims the two amounts of the promissory notes as the sole surviving coparcener.

I will deal with the latter contention first. Defendant denies that the plaintiff and his father Gopalji were members of a joint and undivided Hindu family. Plaintiff is the only son of Gopalji by a predeceased wife. Gopalji also left a widow, his second wife, and a daughter by her. They all lived together until Gopalji's death. Presumably the father and the son were joint in food and worship, but there is no presumption that they held joint family property. It is for the plaintiff to show that the family possessed some joint or ancestral property from which the presumption could be drawn that all the property possessed by the family was joint family property. There were three brothers, Purshottam, Ramji and Naranji, who were the sons of Ebji. Ramji had three sons, Gopalji, Vallabhdas and Shivji. Plaintiff was six or seven years old when his grandfather Ramji died. He could not state whether Ramji left any particular ancestral property except that according to his information and belief there was some ancestral property at Kamatipura and Madanpura. He, however, frankly admitted that he had no documents to prove his statement, but he was supported by his uncle Shivji Ramji, who would certainly be in a better position by reason of his age to know the real state of affairs. Shivji also frankly stated that the condition of the family was poor, but Gopalji got some ancestral property from Ramji when he separated, and whatever was left came to him. According to him Gopalji also speculated, earned money, and did business in partnership with the defendant. Both he and the plaintiff stated that there never was any partition or separation between father and son. This is all the evidence, and I must say that it might have been a little fuller in detail. But I think the Court can still draw the inference from these statements which have not been disproved that the plaintiff and his father were members of a joint and undivided Hindu family, i.e, joint in food, worship and estate.

The important question still remains, whether the plaintiff can sue to recover the amounts of the promissory notes in his right as a coparcener. Defendant's counsel contended that he could not, as the property in the promissory notes which are negotiable instruments vested in the holder, and the plaintiff could not be said to be the holder of those instruments. On the other hand plaintiff's counsel argued that the property in the promissory notes was transferred to the plaintiff by operation of the law by which the parties to the instruments were governed. Wherever there is a promissory note, the suit is prima facie based upon it, unless there are circumstances to indicate that it is based on a cause of action independent of the promissory notes. Here it is conceded that the suit is principally and solely based on the promissory notes, and not on the debt which formed the consideration for them. The real contract between the parties to a negotiable instrument is one which appears on the face of the instrument. The promissory notes are payable to Gopalji Ramji or order, and Gopalji was therefore the holder of the notes. A holder is defined in section 8 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as the person entitled in his own name to the possession thereof and to receive or recover the amount due thereon from the party liable. Section 32 of the Act makes it obligatory on the maker of a promissory note to pay the amount thereof according to the apparent tenor of the instrument, i.e, primarily to the holder, and under section 78 of the Act payment must be made to the holder in order to discharge the maker. The question, therefore, is whether the plaintiff can claim the two amounts of the promissory notes in his own right. It was held in Harkishore Barna v. Gura Mia Chaudhuri that no one could maintain a suit on a promissory note except the holder thereof. In an earlier case, Brojo Lal Saha Banikya v. Budh Nath Pyarilal & Co., it was held that it was not the holder who alone could sue on a promissory note, but whoever was the true owner of the note could also sue. That judgment was dissented from in the later decision in Harkishore Barna's case, which I have already referred to, and it is there pointed out that the earlier suit was based not only on the promissory note but also on the consideration for the same. It has been stated in Subba Narayana Vathiyar v. Ramaswami Aiyar(3) that the words “in his own name” appearing in section 8 of the Act were inserted by the Legislature to prevent anyone from claiming to be the holder of an instrument on the ground that the ostensible holder was merely a benamidar for the true holder. A holder of an instrument is entitled to recover if he is either the payee named in the instrument or the endorsee thereof; if the instrument is payable to a person or bearer, the person to whom it is delivered can recover. An assignee of a promissory note can sue in his own name: see Muthar Sahib Maraikar v. Kadir Sahib Maraikar,(4) though usually the assignor is joined as a co-plaintiff with the assignee for the sake of caution. Under section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act an assignee of a chose in action can sue in his own name. Under section 137 of that act negotiable instruments are exempted from the operation of the sections of the Chapter of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with transfers of chose in action, because such assignments are regulated by the Negotiable Instruments Act. The usual mode of transfer of a negotiable instrument is by endorsement or by delivery. At the same time negotiable instruments are also choses in action, and as such may be transferred by assignment. All that the exemption in section 137 means is that a negotiable instrument need not only be transferred by an assignment like other choses in action, as their transfer is also governed by the specific provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The only difference between a transfer by endorsement and a transfer by assignment of a negotiable instrument is that under an assignment the assignee acquires only the right, title and interest of the assignor, whereas the endorsee may have all the rights and advantages of a holder in due course. In any event, the assignment must be in writing and duly executed before the assignee of a chose in action can sue upon it.

Can the plaintiff be said to be a holder of the promissory notes as a coparcener? He could only be a holder if he was entitled in his own name to the possession of the promissory notes and could give a valid discharge to the maker, namely, the defendant. Plaintiff is not the payee under the promissory notes. Plaintiff is not the endorsee nor the assignee thereof. He cannot negotiate the promissory notes. They are drawn in favour of Gopalji individually, or order, and the property vested in him. Plaintiff's counsel, however, contended that the property passed to the plaintiff by operation of law, but no authority directly bearing on the point has been cited in Court. It has been held that a person whose name appears in a promissory note as the signatory thereto is alone liable on the note: see Sadusuk Janki Das v. Kishan Pershad. It was argued by counsel for the defendant that conversely the person whose name appeared as the holder on the instrument alone could sue on it; the assignee also could sue, it the assignment was in writing and duly executed. In Vithalrao v. Vithalrao it was held that the members of a joint and undivided Hindu family were not liable in a suit on a promissory note signed by one of them as manager, though a suit could lie to recover the debt as against all the members of the family. The distinction there drawn is between a suit on the promissory note and a suit on the debt. The manager who signed it is certainly liable on the promissory note, but the other members who did not sign the note could be sued only for the debt. A suit, therefore, on a promissory note must be filed against the executing party only, and the other coparceners cannot be joined in the suit although the loan might be binding on the estate. If, however, the loan and the promissory note are simultaneous and constitute one transaction, then there is no separate cause of action on the debt. In Sharanbasappa v. Rachappa it was held that a promissory note signed by one partner in his own name, and not in the name of the firm, was binding on that partner alone. In an earlier decision of the Appeal Court in Sitaram Krishna v. Chimandas Fatehchand it was held that in an action on a promissory note the signatory whose name appeared on it would not show that he was an agent for an undisclosed principal. Recently the Privy Council has held in Pichhappa v. Chokalingam that the fact of a manager of a joint family becoming a partner with a stranger does not ipso facto make the other members of the family partners along with him. The trend of all these decisions seems to be to restrict the liability under a promissory note to the person whose name appears on the face of the instrument. Conversely, it was argued that the meaning of the word “holder” should not be so enlarged as to include in that designation persons other than those who are primarily entitled to sue. It was also pointed out that if a testator bequeathed the amount due under a promissory note to a legatee, the legatee could not maintain an action on the promissory note in his own name, even if the executor had obtained probate according to the law, unless the executor had endorsed it in his favour. A coparcener also who becomes entitled by survivorship to the joint family property of the family to which he belonged cannot sue on a negotiable instrument payable to the deceased or order, for he cannot give a valid and proper discharge to the maker, by reason merely of the operation of the law. It cannot be assumed that because the beneficial interest has survived to him, the legal title must follow suit: see Bank of Bombay v. Ambalal Sarabhai. The analogy of the Official Assignee suing on a promissory note passed in favour of an insolvent is not correct, because under the statute the property of the insolvent vests in the Official Assignee, and he represents the estate of the insolvent and holds it for the benefit of the creditors generally. A legal representative of a deceased person can sue as a representative, as he is by the very terms of the definition of a legal representative in section 2(11) of the Civil Procedure Code a person who in law represents the estate of the deceased person. The coparcener does not represent the estate of the deceased member of the joint family. He gets the property by survivorship in his own right, and not as a representative of the deceased.

I might mention here that plaintiff's counsel said in his closing address that, if necessary, he would apply even now for a succession certificate, and that the Court might adjourn the suit before finally passing a decree in his favour. This would, in my opinion, alter the cause of action. The plaintiff is before me as a coparcener suing in his own right. The plaint is filed in his name personally and not as a representative. He rests his title, and has rested it throughout the hearing, on his position as coparcener in law, and I do not think I can now allow him to rest it on a succession certificate as an heir and legal representative. If he is a coparcener, he cannot be entitled to a decree merely on obtaining representation at this stage, because it would have the effect of turning a suit by him personally into a suit by him as the representative of his father, which position his counsel abandoned at the commencement of the hearing. Counsel referred to the practice prevailing in the Prothonotary's office to grant succession certificates even to coparceners. That is sometimes done at the instance of the coparcener himself, after giving due notice to all other interested parties, if he has to give a discharge which would be considered valid by the debtor.

For the reasons I have discussed before I hold that the plaintiff cannot maintain this suit on his title as a coparcener.

[The rest of the judgment is not material to this report.]

In the result, the suit must be dismissed with costs.

Attorneys for plaintiffs: Messrs Nagindas, Hooseinally & Co.

Attorneys for defendants: Messrs Khandwala and Chhotalal.

Suit dismissed.
B.K.D