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Poosa Thorai Alias V... v. O.L.K.K.N.K.E Kannap...

Madras High Court
Oct 3, 1916

This is an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council against a judgment of this Court reversing the judgment of the Court of First instance. It is contended on behalf of the 1st respondent that the value of the subject matter of the suit is less than Rs. 10,000. The suit is one for cancellation of a deed of sale and the plaintiff paid Court-fee on the valuation which he put up on the property for the purpose of determining the Court in which the suit would be filed at Rs. 5,250. In a suit of this character, the Court Fees Act, VII of 1870, gives the plaintiff the right to value his claim as he thinks fit. But under Sect. 110 of the Civil Procedure Code which corresponds to Sect. 596 of the Code of 1882, the value of the subject matter is the real market value of the property as held by a Full Bench of this Court in Pichayee v. Sivagami. What is argued is that since the plaintiff in the exercise of the option given to him by the Court Fees Act has chosen to value his claim at a certain amount, he ought not to be allowed to say for the purpose of appealing to the Privy Council that the value of the subject-matter of the suit is more than that amount. But if under Sect. 110 the value of the subject-matter of the suit is the real market value of the property involved, as it undoubtedly is according to the ruling in Pichayee v. Sivagami the fact that for the purpose of the stamp duty payable, the plaintiff valued it at less than the proper value, cannot deprive him of his right to appeal. In Hari Mohan Misser v. Surendra Narain Singh, the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court took a similar view with respect to a suit for an injunction. There is however an older decision of that Court In the matter of Lekh raj Roy v. Kanhya Singh and others, in which Mr. Justice Markby following a previous ruling of Mr. Justice Louis Jackson held that where the plaintiff is given the option to value his claim and he has valued it at a particular amount, he should not be allowed to say afterwards that the value of the property in dispute is more than that amount. Mr. Justice Mark by himself doubted the correctness of that ruling, and in any case the interpretation put forward by a Full Bench of this Court upon Sect. 506 of the Old Code which was substantially in the same terms as Sect. 110 of the present Code is binding upon us. The market value of the property is admittedly much more than Rs. 10,000. We think that this is a fit case for appeal to His Majesty in Council and certify accordingly.

M. R.Certificate granted.