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Trailokyanath Das And Others v. Emperor Opposite Party.
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from a criminal trial in which a jury returned mixed verdicts: by a majority of 4 to 1 they found all appellants guilty under Section 143, Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.); by a majority of 3 to 2 they found the three Das appellants guilty under Section 379 read with Section 109, I.P.C.; and they unanimously found all appellants not guilty under Section 436 read with Section 109, I.P.C. The trial judge accepted the majority verdicts and sentenced all appellants to rigorous imprisonment for three months under Section 143, and the Das appellants to rigorous imprisonment for one year each under Section 379/109, I.P.C., the sentences to run concurrently.
The prosecution's factual case was that Jnanada (P.W.10) had purchased the tenant-rights in 1920 and held through bhag tenants; at the time of the incident the bhag tenant in actual possession was Rakhal, who had cultivated the paddy. On 28 November 1929, before a Section 144 order (made 23 November 1929) could be served, approximately 150 men associated with the accused appeared on the land, drove Rakhal and his men away, forcibly cut and removed paddy over about 7–8 days, looted Rakhal's house and burned it down. The common object alleged under Section 143 was to assert a supposed right by criminal force and to drive Rakhal from his house.
The defence case asserted that the holding had been sold in execution of a rent decree (decreed ex parte on 27 March 1928), was sold on 9 July 1928 and possession delivered through the Court on 19 September 1928; therefore, since the sale and delivery of possession, neither Jnanada nor any bhag tenant of his had been in possession.
After trial and conviction, the appellants appealed. The court considered several points of law and fact on the appeal and, after directing a summary inquiry by the District Magistrate as to values for possible compensation, disposed of the appeal by dismissing it.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial judge misdirected the jury in relation to the evidence of P.W.6 (Sukchand), who had been declared hostile by the prosecution.
- Whether the trial judge misdirected the jury by permitting them to consider findings of fact in prior civil proceedings (the rent suits and execution sale) as evidence of possession, i.e., whether civil court decisions on possession are binding in a subsequent criminal trial.
- Whether the convictions under Section 379 read with Section 109, I.P.C., against the Das appellants were incorrect in view of their asserted proprietorship of the land.
- What sentencing approach should be adopted given the appellants' claimed right (suggesting leniency) and the gravity of their conduct (suggesting severity), and whether compensation ought to be ordered as part of sentence reconsideration.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Mr. Chatterji) Arguments
- Contended that the learned trial judge misdirected the jury about the evidence of P.W.6 (Sukchand), a witness declared hostile by the prosecution.
- Contended that the learned judge misdirected the jury by allowing them to consider the findings of prior civil proceedings (rent suits and the execution sale) and that the jury should have been told they were bound by the civil courts' findings as to possession.
- Argued that convictions under Section 379/109, I.P.C. were wrong because the Das appellants were the proprietors of the paddy land in question.
Prosecution's Case
- Prosecution put forward the primary factual case: Rakhal was in actual physical possession and was the cultivator; the accused party forcibly entered, drove Rakhal away, cut and removed paddy over several days, and looted and burnt Rakhal's house.
- Prosecution relied on evidence including the witness testimony and sought to establish the offences of unlawful assembly (S.143) and theft (S.379) with abetment/attempt (S.109) as charged.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court reviewed the contentions raised on appeal and explained its reasoning step by step:
- On P.W.6 (Sukchand): The court found no misdirection. The trial judge had specifically warned the jury to be careful in accepting the testimony of a witness declared hostile and left it to the jury to decide how far that evidence was safe to accept. The appellate court saw no fault with leaving the matter to the jury with that caution.
-
On the effect of prior civil judgments about possession: The court rejected the contention that the jury was bound by the civil courts' decisions. It emphasized the fundamental principle that in a criminal trial the court (or jury) must determine guilt on the evidence in the criminal trial itself. The opinion illustrated that a prior judgment (whether civil or criminal) is not automatically conclusive of the underlying facts in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Examples used:
- A prior criminal conviction in another trial is not binding evidence in a separate individual's trial to establish that the criminal act occurred or was committed by the other person.
- A civil court's finding (for example, of forgery) does not obviate the need to independently determine the fact in a criminal prosecution for that offence; the criminal court must decide upon the criminal evidence before it.
- On how the trial judge treated the civil judgments: The appellate court approved the trial judge's approach. The judge had told the jury the effect of the civil judgments and correctly stated that the reasoning in those judgments is not part of evidence, then left it optional for the jury to accept or reject those judgments as evidence. The appellate court held that this was a proper direction and not a misdirection.
- On the conviction under Section 379/109, I.P.C. against the Das appellants: The court rejected the contention that proprietorship meant the Das appellants could not be convicted. The prosecution's case was that the Das appellants were not in possession; Rakhal was in actual physical possession and the accused forcibly removed paddy. The appellate court observed that the jury apparently believed the prosecution evidence on the alleged theft and found no substance in the contention that proprietorship alone precluded the theft conviction.
- On sentencing and compensation: The court balanced two considerations: that the appellants' claim of right suggested some entitlement to leniency, but that their high-handed conduct warranted severity. The court indicated that payment of compensation to the party in possession was appropriate. Because the value of the paddy (and the house burnt down) was uncertain and counsel could not agree on figures, the court directed that the record be remitted to the District Magistrate of 24-Parganas for a summary inquiry and report as to the value of the paddy taken away and not recovered and the value of the burnt house. The report was to be submitted within one month of the record's arrival in the lower court. Pending final orders, the accused remained on the same bail.
- The appellate court concluded that the jury had been properly charged and that the convictions should stand.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court affirmed the convictions and dismissed the appeal. The appellate court found no misdirection by the trial judge regarding the hostile witness or the use of civil judgments, upheld the convictions under Sections 143 and 379 read with 109, I.P.C., and directed a limited procedural step regarding sentencing.
Implications and immediate effects:
- The convictions entered at trial are sustained and the appeal is dismissed.
- The sentences as imposed by the trial judge remain in place subject to reconsideration conditioned on payment of compensation: the court directed a summary inquiry by the District Magistrate of 24-Parganas to determine the value of the paddy not recovered and the value of the house burnt down. The outcome of that inquiry may lead to reconsideration of imprisonment in light of compensation.
- No broader legal rule was newly established; the court applied existing principles governing the limited evidentiary effect of prior judgments and the duty of the criminal tribunal to determine guilt from the criminal evidence before it.
Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Appeal dismissed."
S.K Ghose, J.:— In this case, the jury, by a majority of 4 to 1, found all the appellants guilty under S. 143, I.P.C, and, by a majority of 3 to 2, they found the three Das appellants guilty under S. 379 read with S. 109, I.P.C, and they unanimously found all the appellants not guilty of the charges under S. 436 read with S. 109, I.P.C The learned Judge accepting the majority verdict, sentenced all the appellants to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months under S. 143 and the Das appellants to undergo rigorous imprisonment of one year each under S. 379/109, I.P.C, the sentences running concurrently.
2. The prosecution case is briefly this; Jnanada, P.W 10, purchased the rights of a tenant in respect of 82 bighas odd of paddy land, the landlords being the Dases. Prom the time of his purchase in 1920, Jnanada has been in possession through bhag tenants. At the time of the occurrence, the bhag tenant in possession was one Rakhal and it was he who had cultivated the land and grown the paddy. There was trouble going on between him and the landlords, who were of the accused party. On 23rd November 1929, the Sub-divisional Magistrate passed an order under Section 144 of the Cr PC, restraining the appellant Trailokya and others from exercising any act of possession on the land in question, but before that order could be served, the occurrence complained of took place on 28th November 1929. On that date the appellants and others, numbering about 150 men, variously armed, came upon the land when Rakhal and his men had started cutting the paddy. The accused party drove away Rakhal and his men and forcibly cut and removed the paddy. This operation lasted for about 7 or 8 days continuously. On the date of the occurrence, it is further alleged that the accused party looted Rakhal's house and burnt it down. On these alleged facts, the appellants were put upon their trial in respect of the offences above mentioned. The common object set out in the charge under S. 143 was to assert the supposed right of the accused by a show of criminal force and by driving away Rakhal from his house. The defence case mainly was that the holding of Jnanada was sold in auction in execution of a rent decree in 1928 and the auction-purchaser took possession through Court on 19th September 1928, and that since then neither Jnanada nor any bhag tenant of his had been in possession.
3. Mr. Chatterji in arguing the appeal has contended that the learned Judge misdirected the jury as regards the evidence of P.W 6, Sukchand, who was declared hostile by the prosecution. I do not see however that there was any misdirection. The learned Judge properly warned the jury that they should be careful in accepting the evidence of such a witness in support of the prosecution case and he told them that it was for them to say if it was at all safe to accept that evidence. With that caution the evidence was left to the jury and nothing can be said against it.
4. Mr. Chatterji's chief argument in this appeal however is that the learned Judge misdirected the jury in dealing with the evidence as to a civil litigation between the parties. It is contended that the civil Courts had found that the auction-purchaser, after taking delivery of possession through Court, was actually in possession of the land by realizing bhag crops from the tenants and that the learned Judge should have told the jury that they were bound by the decision of the civil Courts. It appears that evidence was given to the effect that the landlords instituted four rent suits, the fourth one being decreed ex parte on 27th March 1928. In execution of that decree, the holding was sold on 9th July 1928, as possession was delivered through Court on 19th September 1928. Jnanada's case was that all this was a mere paper transaction, and he applied before the Munsif to have the ex parte decree and the sale set aside. The application however was dismissed by the Munsif and his decision was upheld by the lower appellate Court. These judgments Exs. D and E, were put in evidence in this case. The learned Judge pointed out that both the judgments were passed some months after the date of the occurrence. He told the jury what was actually held by those judgments and then he said as follows:
“The reason given in those judgments are no part of evidence. What has actually been decided in those judgments is certainly evidence; and like any other evidence it is optional with you either to accept or to reject it. You are not bound by those judgments. If you accept these two judgments as the best evidence, then the prosecution case must be seriously affected.”
5. Then he went on to point out that the whole case for the prosecution must fail if Rakhal's story of possession should fail, and that it did happen that, even after taking formal delivery of possession, the auction-purchaser might not disturb the actual cultivator.
6. Mr. Chatterji has contended that the learned Judge should have told the jury that it was not open to them to go into the question of possession at all, that question having been already decided in the aforesaid civil actions. He has strenuously contended that the civil Court's decision on a question of fact is binding in a criminal trial. This argument overlooks the elementary position that, in a criminal trial, it is for the Court to determine the question of the guilt of the accused, and it must do this upon the evidence before it. Suppose that it is alleged that A and B have committed a criminal offence and A is first tried and convicted, next B is put upon his trial and his defence is that the act alleged was not committed at all. In that case, the judgment of the previous trial will not be binding on the jury as showing that in fact the criminal offence was committed, nor even that it was committed by A. Mr. Chatterji has argued that the position would be different in the case of a judgment inter parties where there was first a decision in a civil suit, and then a trial for a criminal offence. In reply to this also I may give an illustration.
7. Where a civil Court gives a decree upon the finding that a party has forged a document and then proceeds to prosecute that party under Section 476 of the Cr PC, even then in the resultant criminal trial the factum of forgery is not to be taken for granted, but it has to be determined independently upon the evidence that is adduced in the criminal case. The fact that the parties in both the proceedings are the same, makes no difference. These two instances, which are of ordinary occurrence in criminal trials, are sufficient to show the fallacy of Mr. Chatterji's argument. I may however point out that the law of evidence does not make a judgment or a decree admissible in all cases as a matter of course. In the Evidence Act, the limitations are prescribed by Ss. 41 to 43. S. 43 provides that judgments, decrees, etc., other than those mentioned in the three previous sections, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, decree, etc., is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provisions of the Act. Generally speaking, a judgment is only admissible to show its date and legal consequences. If a party indicted for any offence has been acquitted and he sues the prosecutor for malicious prosecution the judgment is conclusive evidence of the fact of the acquittal, but it is not evidence that the defendant was the prosecutor, and the defendant is still at liberty to prove the guilt of the plaintiff. Similarly, a judgment against a master for the negligence of his servant is conclusive evidence that the master was compelled to pay the amount of damages awarded, but it is not evidence of the fact upon which it was founded, namely, the negligence. If authority be needed for these propositions, one may find the cases quoted in the notes to Section 43 of the Evidence Act, Woodroffe and Ameer Ali's edition.
8. In the present case, the learned Judge appears to have discussed the evidence properly and has left it to the jury to decide what weight they should give to that evidence. He pointed out that if the jury should feel disposed to accept the decisions in the other proceedings as the best evidence in the case, then the prosecution case would be seriously weakened. I do not think that any exception can be taken to this part of the learned Judge's charge. Mr. Chatterji has next contended that the conviction under S. 379/109, I.P.C, is wrong in view of the fact that the Das appellants are the proprietors of the paddy land in question. But this argument overlooks the prosecution case that these appellants were not in possession of the paddy land. The complainant Rakhal was in actual physical possession and the accused party came and forcibly took the paddy away. The whole of the prosecution case was before the jury and, so far as the alleged theft of the paddy and the household goods are concerned, apparently the jury have chosen to believe the evidence. There is therefore no substance in this contention. On the whole we consider that the jury were properly charged and the convictions are correct.
9. As regards the sentence, it is pointed out that, in view of the alleged claim of right, the appellants are entitled to leniency. On the other hand, they undoubtedly acted in a very high-handed manner and they deserve a severe sentence. At the same time, so far as the party in possession is concerned, it must be conceded that payment of compensation is indicated. We are therefore prepared in this case to reconsider the question of sentence of imprisonment, if the appellants be in a position to pay adequate compensation to the other side. This will turn on the question of the value of the paddy that was taken away and not recovered. Learned counsel on either side has not been able to give us anything like a correct estimate of the value. Figures varying from Rs. 3,000 to Rs. 400 were mentioned. We therefore think that the best course would be to send the record down to the District Magistrate of 24-Parganas for a summary inquiry and report as to the value of the paddy which was taken away and not recovered, and also the value of the house that was burnt down. This report should be submitted to us with the record within a month from the date of the arrival of the record in the Court below. Pending final orders the accused will remain on the same bail.
Lort-Williams, J.:— I agree.
R.M/R.K
10. Appeal dismissed.
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