Ram Ranbijay Prasad Singh v. Mt. Bachia Kuari

Wort, A.C.J:— This is an appeal by the defendant arising out of an action in which the legal representative of one Ganga (deceased) sued for the return of a sum of money deposited by Ganga with the defendant, his employer, as security for good conduct. Ganga died in the year 1923. It is clear therefore that unless Article 145, Limitation Act, applied the action was barred by limitation. It may very well be that Article 145 when speaks of the depositee and pawnee recovering moveable property deposited or pawned that may include money or coin. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in 28 IA 2271 have held that the words “moveable property” in Article 89 was sufficiently wide to cover money. But even assuming that construction can be placed upon Article 145 the point is one which seems to be fatal to the plaintiff's case. The period from which limitation runs under Article 145 is the date of the deposit or pawn. That means be say that, although no cause of action arose in this particular case at the date of the deposit, yet time was running against the plaintiff or his legal representative. That makes the application of Article 145 impossible as a general principle. Now the Limitation Act provides for time running only after the cause of action has arisen, and think it may be taken as quite certain that if any other construction than that is to be placed upon a particular Article, it will be clear the Legislature never intended that Article should apply to the facts of such a case as this.

2. There is yet another thing which is fatal be the plaintiff's case. Section 214 of the Succession Act, provides that “no Court shall pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debt be a person claiming on succession be entitled to the effects of the deceased person or be any pat there of except on the production of the succession certificate.” I have repeated merely the relevant words of that Section.

3. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent that the defendant was not the debtor of Ganga. That is an impossible contention when Ganga left his employment or died (as in this case) the defendant was obliged to return the sum of money deposited with him; in other words, he became the debtor either to Ganga or to his estate. The appeal succeeds and is allowed and the plaintiff's action dismissed with costs throughout.

Manohar Lall, J.:— I agree.

D.B/R.K

4. Appeal allowed.