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Dundappa Mallappa Sigandhi v. Secretary Of State

Bombay High Court
Feb 23, 1916
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Judgment Summary — Appeal Concerning Vyasantol Processions (Belgaum District, Government Resolution of 6 May 1911)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs, suing as representatives of the Lingayat community of the town of Athni, sought a declaration of their right to exhibit in public their religious emblem called the Vyasantol. The District Court (learned District Judge) dismissed the suit, upholding the validity of a Government Resolution of 6th May 1911 (the text refers to the resolution variously as No. 2568 and No. 2658). The plaintiffs appealed. The only point before the appellate court was whether the Government Resolution was valid and intra vires the powers conferred by the Bombay District Police Act (referred to in the opinion as the District Police Act / Bombay Act 4 of 1890).

Procedural posture: appeal by plaintiffs from decree dismissing their suit; the appellate court was asked to decide solely the validity of the Government Resolution upheld by the trial court. The District Judge had found the resolution within the powers of the Government under the District Police Act; the appellants challenge that conclusion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Government Resolution of 6th May 1911 (forbidding Vyasantol processions) is illegal and ultra vires the powers conferred by the District Police Act.
  2. Whether the Government can lawfully issue, or validate by direction, an order that effectively prohibits the exhibition of a religious emblem (Vyasantol) throughout an entire district for all time, in light of the limitations contained in Sections 42 and 44 of the District Police Act.
  3. Whether the Government Resolution can be supported by recourse to Section 50 read with Section 13(2) of the Act (i.e., by treating Government directions as making Magistrates' powers binding), and if so, whether that confers authority to prohibit processions beyond the spatial and temporal limits in Sections 42 and 44.
  4. Whether the Resolution should be treated as nugatory (a mere direction to the District Magistrate not amounting to an absolute prohibition) or as an effective prohibition operative throughout the Belgaum District without limitation of time.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Plaintiffs — Lingayat representatives)

  • The plaintiffs asserted a right to exhibit the Vyasantol in public processions; they sought a declaratory judgment recognizing that right and preventing enforcement of the Government Resolution as a bar to such processions.
  • They relied upon the general principle (as stated in earlier authorities) that members of the public and religious sects have a right to use streets lawfully, and that limitations on that right must be shown to exist by law or custom.

Respondents / Government (as represented by Advocate-General and trial court)

  • It was argued in defence that the validity of the Government Resolution could not be questioned in a civil court (the trial court relied on this point in part, though the appellate opinion indicates limits on that contention).
  • The Advocate-General conceded that Section 38 of the District Police Act (and Section 144 of the CrPC read with Section 38) did not save the Resolution for the Government.
  • The Government attempted to sustain the Resolution by ascribing it to powers under Section 44(1) (as recorded in the resolution itself), and alternatively by relying on Section 50 read with Section 13(2) to contend that Government directions could bind the District Magistrate and thus stand in place of orders that a Magistrate could lawfully make under Sections 42 or 44.
  • As a further attempt, the Advocate-General suggested the Resolution might be merely nugatory or a direction to the District Magistrate not amounting to an absolute prohibition (i.e., that it did not in itself prohibit processions for all time throughout the District).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sadagopachariar v. Rama Rao Affirms the general/common-law principle that all members of the public and every sect have a right to use the streets in a lawful manner; those who would restrain them must show some law or custom having the force of law to deprive them of that privilege. The court relied on this principle to frame the burden on the Government to show statutory authority for any restriction; it underpinned the conclusion that a blanket prohibition must be justified by statute.
Baslingappa v. Dharmappa Followed the principle in Sadagopachariar v. Rama Rao concerning the right to use public streets and the burden on those who would restrain such use. The court cited this decision as a supporting precedent confirming that plaintiffs are entitled to hold processions unless a lawful order under appropriate statutory provisions forbids them; it reinforced the analysis of statutory limits on Government authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court's reasoning proceeds in two closely aligned opinions (Batchelor, J. and Shah, J.), both addressing whether the Government Resolution could be sustained under the District Police Act.

1. Character and effect of the Resolution:

  • Both judges read the Resolution as intending and having the effect of prohibiting Vyasantol processions throughout the whole Belgaum District without limitation as to time (Batchelor J. rejects the suggestion it is nugatory; Shah J. explicitly holds it was intended to prohibit throughout the District for all time).

2. Ascription to Section 44(1):

  • Batchelor, J. finds the resolution's ascription to S.44(1) to be an obvious mistake because S.44(1) deals with regulation of religious ceremonials which are not prohibited, i.e., measures to maintain public order at religious exhibitions, rather than an outright prohibition of processions.
  • Shah, J. similarly holds that S.44 cannot justify an unqualified, district-wide, time-unlimited prohibition — S.44(1) contemplates measures as to conduct in a particular town or place and S.44(2) preserves the ability of a competent court to modify orders inconsistent with legal rights.

3. Reliance on Section 42 and limits of that section:

  • Both judges analyze Section 42: it empowers the District Magistrate to prohibit the exhibition of symbols "whenever and for such time as it shall appear necessary" but the prohibition is limited to a particular town or village or the vicinity thereof (i.e., spatial and temporal limitations are explicit in the statute).
  • Batchelor, J. emphasizes that the statute limits the Magistrate's power both in time and place, whereas the Government Resolution purports to operate "for all time" and throughout the entire district — beyond the statutory scope.
  • Shah, J. likewise reiterates that S.42's contemplated prohibitions are limited as to time and space and that the Government order transgresses those limits.

4. Argument invoking Sections 50 and 13(2) to transfer Magistrate's powers to Government:

  • Both judges address, but do not finally endorse, the contention that Government might exercise the Magistrate's powers via Section 50 read with Section 13(2). Batchelor, J. expresses doubt about conceding that the Government could validly exercise those powers but, even if that were permitted, he holds the orders would still have to be lawful as if issued by the Magistrate and therefore compliant with the limits in S.42 and S.44.
  • Shah, J. explicitly assumes without deciding that Government could make orders under S.13(2) binding on Magistrates under S.50, but holds that even in that event the orders must be justified under the enabling provisions (Ss. 42 and 44) and cannot transgress the limitations those sections impose.

5. Nugatory/direction contention:

  • Both judges reject the argument that the Resolution is merely a direction (nugatory) and conclude it is an effective prohibition. Batchelor, J. says he cannot read the resolution as nugatory; Shah, J. similarly concludes the resolution was intended to prohibit Vyasantol processions across the district without time limit.

6. Consequence: ultra vires

  • On the combined analysis, the court concludes the Government Resolution is beyond the powers conferred by the District Police Act: it does not fall within the spatial and temporal limits of S.42 or the regulatory scope of S.44, and it cannot be sustained merely by reference to S.50 read with S.13(2) if it transgresses those sections' limits. Accordingly, the resolution is illegal and ultra vires insofar as it prohibits Vyasantol processions throughout the District without limitation of time.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The appellate court reversed the decree of the District Judge which had upheld the Government Resolution, holding that the Government Resolution of 6th May 1911 is illegal and ultra vires in so far as it prohibits Vyasantol processions throughout the Belgaum District without limitation as to time. The cause is remanded to the District Court to be heard and decided on the other issues; costs are to be costs in the suit.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Government Resolution (as interpreted by the court to be a district-wide, time-unlimited prohibition) cannot be relied upon to bar the plaintiffs' suit; the District Judge's decree is reversed and the matter is remanded for further adjudication on other issues in the suit.
  • Broader legal consequence: The decision enforces statutory limits in Sections 42 and 44 of the District Police Act on prohibitory or regulatory measures affecting religious processions — i.e., such measures must conform to the time and place limitations set out in the statute. The opinion applies existing authority (Sadagopachariar v. Rama Rao and Baslingappa v. Dharmappa) reaffirming the public right to use streets lawfully and the burden on those who would restrict that right to show statutory authority. The court did not purport to create a novel precedent beyond applying these principles and construing the statutory sections; the ruling declares the particular resolution ultra vires and has the direct effect stated above.

Final notation from the opinion: "Appeal allowed." Costs to be costs in the suit. The suit is remanded to the District Judge for determination of the remaining issues.

Show all summary ...

Batchelor, J.:— This appeal is brought by the plaintiffs in the suit. They sued as representatives of the Lingayat community of the town of Athni, and the object of their suit was to obtain a declaration of their right to exhibit in public their religious emblem known as the Vyasantol.

2. The learned District Judge has decided against them because he has upheld the validity of a certain contested order of Government, viz., Government Resolution, Judicial Department, No. 2568 of 6th May 1911.* Upon that point only the plaintiffs failed in the trial Court, and that point only is the subject for, our decision in this appeal. Now the proposition with which we start, in a consideration of this subject, is the well-known principle that all members of the public and every sect have a right to use the streets in a lawful manner, and it lies on those who would restrain them in its exercise to show some law or custom having the force of law depriving them of the privilege: see Sadagopachariar v. Rama Rao (1), which was followed by a Bench of this Court in Baslingappa v. Dharmappa (2). These general or Common law rights may be restricted by Statute: in this instance by the Bombay District Police Act. But the restrictions imposed must, it is manifest, be justified by the Act. The question therefore is whether the Government Resolution, which I have quoted, as justified under the District Police Act. For, it is admitted by the learned Advocate-General that the Resolution is not to be saved by reference to Section 144 of the Cr PC, read with Section 38 of the District Police Act. The learned District Judge, commenting upon the terms of the Resolution, observes that the order is not drafted with legal precision and does not suggest that legal advice was taken. The want of precision to which the Judge here alluded adds some difficulty to our task. But the question is, whether, without pressing technicalities, the substantial requirments of the District Police Act have been complied with. In my opinion, the answer is in the negative. The authority issuing the order ascribes it to S. 44, sub-S. 1. That ascription however is, I think I may say, obviously a mistake. For whereas the resolution under notice purports to prohibit this Vyasantol procession, S. 44(1) deals not with the prohibition of religious ceremonials, but with the maintaining of public order at religious ceremonials which are not prohibited. That notwithstanding, the resolution may, of course, still be valid if it can be attributed to powers vested in the Government by any other sections of the Act, and the only section to which recourse has been had for this purpose is S. 42.

3. That section also, in my opinion, fails to serve the turn of the respondents. For, in the first place, the authority empowered under S. 42 is not the Government, but the local Magistrate of the District, and the words “whenever and for such time as it shall appear necessary” appear to me in the context to mean “appear necessary to that Magistrate.” It was suggested that the powers thus vested in the District Magistrate might be capable of legal exercise by the Government by reason of the provisions of S. 50 read with S. 13, sub-S. 2 of the Act. It is not at present necessary to pronounce upon this argument, and I will only say that I am doubtful whether it should be conceded. Assuming however that the argument is sound, it goes no further than this that the present orders, though issued by Government, have the same validity as if they had been issued by the District Magistrate. The question therefore is whether these orders, if issued by the District Magistrate, would be lawful orders under S. 42. I think they would not. For S. 42 enables the Magistrate to issue these orders only whenever and for such time as it shall appear necessary and the orders are to operate only in such town or village or the vicinity thereof as may be directed; in other words, the powers of prohibition conferred upon the Magistrate are by the Statute expressly limited both in time and in place, the limitation of place being to a particular town or village or the vicinity thereof. This particular order, as I understand it, is to operate for all time, and instead of being limited to any town or village or the vicinity thereof is to prevail throughout the whole of the Belgaum District. On these grounds therefore I think that the Resolution in question is beyond the powers conferred by the Act.

4. The learned Advocate-General, as a last effort to sustain the resolution, suggested that it might be upheld if it were regarded as being nugatory. I am unable however to read it in that sense. From what I have already said, it is manifest that we must attend not so much to the words as to the plain meaning of this resolution, and of the meaning of it I have not been able to entertain any doubt. As I read the resolution, its meaning and effect is, and was intended to be, the prohibition of the Vyasantol processioh throughout the Belgaum District for all time. For the reasons which I have given I am of opinion that no such orders could lawfully be issued under the Bombay District Police Act. Therefore the point upon which the judgment of the Court below has gone against the appellants must now be decided in their favour, the decree of the District Judge must be reversed and the suit must be remanded to his Court to be heard and decided on the other issues. Costs to be costs in the suit.

Shah, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the Lingayat plaintiffs in the District Court of Belgaum, for a declaration that the Lingayats have a right to exhibit Vyasantol, their religious symbol, in procession on religious and other occasions, and that the Government Resolution No. 2658 (Judicial Department) of 6th May 1911 is illegal and ultra vires in so far as it forbids the exhibition of the symbol entirely for all time and throughout the District. Among other things, it was urged by way of defence that the validity of the Government Resolution could not be questioned in a civil Court. The material issues were decided by the lower Court against the plaintiffs, principally on the ground that the Government Resolution was within the powers conferred by the District Police Act (Bombay Act 4 of 1890) on the Government, and that its validity could not be questioned in a civil Court except so far as S. 81 of the act permitted it. The result was that the plaintiff's suit was dismissed with costs.

5. In this appeal against the decree of the District Court, the only point argued is whether the Government Resolution of 6th May 1911 is illegal and ultra vires.

6. At the outset it will be convenient to deal with the point, which has been raised by the learned Advocate General, that the resolution does not prohibit anything and is merely a direction to the District Magistrate that permission should not be given in future to hold Vyasantol processions in the Belgaum District. Taking the resolution as a whole, I have no doubt that it was intended to prohibit, and has clearly the effect of prohibiting, Vyasantol processions in the District of Belgaum without any limitation as to time, so far as the Government are concerned. The resolution cannot therefore be treated as merely nugatory as suggested by the Advocate General. As regards the validity of the resolution, it is conceded, and in my opinion, rightly conceded, by the Advocate General that Section 38 of the District Police Act has no application to the present case. No reliance was placed on behalf of the defendants on S. 81 of the Act in the course of the argument; and it is clear that the section can have no application, unless the order contained in the resolution is made by the Government under an authority conferred by the Act. The question therefore arises, whether the order in dispute can be referred to any authority conferred by the District Police Act on the Government. It is argued that the requisite authority is conferred by S. 50 read with S. 13, Cl. 2. Under S. 50 orders made by the Magistrate of the District under Chap. 4 are subject to the provisions of S. 13(2); and S. 13, Cl. (2), provides that in exercising authority under the preceding sub-section the Magistrate of the District shall be governed by such orders as Government may from time to time make in this behalf. Assuming, without deciding that the Government have the power under S. 13(2) of making such discretionary orders, as the Distract Magistrate is empowered to make under Ss. 42 and 44, so as to make them binding on the District Magistrate under S. 50, it is clear that the orders to be made must be justified under sections 42 and 44. If they transgress the provisions of Ss. 42 and 44, they would be ultra vires to that extent. S. 13, Cl. (2) does not confer any unlimited power on the Government to prohibit processions.

7. Having regard to the decisions in Baslingappa v. Dharmappa and Sadagoppehariar v. Rama Rao , it is clear that the plaintiffs have a right to use the public streets in a lawful manner and it lies on those who would restrain them to show some law or custom abrogating the privilege, and that subject to the lawful orders that may be passed under any provisions of law such as Section 144 of the Cr PC, or Sections 42 and 44 of the District Police Act, they would be entitled to hold the vyasantol processions in any public street. As I have already pointed out, the Government by their Resolution prohibit the vyasantol processions in the whole District of Belgaum, without any limit as to time. The prohibition, that Section 42 of the District Police Act, contemplates, is limited as to time and space. It provides that the Magistrate of the District may, whenever and for such time as it shall appear necessary, prohibit in a town or village or the vicinity thereof the exhibition of symbols, which, in the opinion of the Magistrate, may probably inflame religious animosity between different classes. The order of the Government is not confined to any town or village, but extends to the whole District, and it is not limited in any manner as to time. I feel clear that it is outside the ambit of S. 42.

8. Under S. 44, it is still more difficult to justify the order of the Government. Under that section, when it appears to the District Magistrate that a dispute exists which is likely to lead to grave disturbance of the peace, he can give such orders, with reference to any religious exhibition or procession, as to the conduct of the persons concerned towards each other and towards the public as he shall deem necessary and reasonable under the circumstances. Such orders apparently are to have operation in a particular town or place. The present order of the Government does not appear to me to fall within the scope of S. 44, as it involves an unqualified prohibition of the vyasantol processions in the whole District, and pays no regard to the apparent legal rights of the persons interested. Further, under S. 44(2), any order made under S. 44(1) is subject to a decree of a competent Court and is liable to be recalled or altered if it is inconsistent with a decree that may be passed in a suit, filed by an interested person, as to the rights and duties of the persons affected by the order. This sub-section would save the present suit even if the order of the Government were within the scope of S. 44(1), because no order made under para. 1 is to be inconsistent with the legal rights of the parties as determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction. But, in my opinion, the order of the Government is clearly outside the scope of Ss. 42 and 44; and it is not possible to treat it as having been made under an authority conferred by the Act. I am unable to agree with the learned District Judge in his opinion that:

“It is within the competence of Government in the exercise of their power of control to give a general direction to the District Magistrate.”

9. No authority has been cited in support of this view, and on the proper construction of the sections of the Act I cannot hold that the Act confers upon the Government an unlimited power of prohibiting religious processions in the whole of any District. On these grounds I am of opinion that the Government. Resolution is illegal and ultra vires in so far as it prohibits the vyasantol processions in the whole District without any limit as to time, and that it is no bar to the plaintiffs' suit. I therefore concur in the order proposed by my learned brother.

G.P/R.K

10. Appeal allowed.