- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Hemanta Kumar Banerjee v. Satish Chandra Banerjee
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute arises between cosharers who inherited joint properties from a common ancestor, Ram Ratan Banerjee. Ram Ratan's son Shib Narayan (whose heirs are defendants 1 to 3) held title in his name to a plot at Chetla (No. 3, Chetla Hat Road) which was partly acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act. The award (dated 21 July 1930) in the land-acquisition proceedings was made in the name of Shib Narayan's heirs alone and, after a reference, the compensation payable to these claimants (less costs) totaled Rs. 7,857-6-8.
In 1931 plaintiff Hemanta Kumar (one of the heirs of Pitambar) sued his cosharers for declaration of joint ownership and specific shares; the trial Court decreed that suit on 16 September 1932 and the decree was not appealed. After that decree, Hemanta Kumar and other heirs sought payment of their proportionate shares of the award from the Land Acquisition Court but were refused on the ground that their remedy lay under Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. A revision rule to this Court was discharged on 22 July 1936.
On 8 August 1936, defendants 1 and 2 withdrew half of the compensation money; defendant 3, a Hindu widow, had the other half invested in Government promissory notes under Section 32 because she was treated as a limited owner. On 22 February 1938 Hemanta Kumar filed the present suit (later joined by other heirs as co-plaintiffs) seeking: (1) declaration of their shares in the compensation money; (2) recovery of amounts withdrawn by defendants 1 and 2; and (3) insertion of their names as claimants in the land-acquisition proceedings. The trial Court declared joint ownership and the plaintiffs' specific shares but refused recovery and insertion orders. The Additional District Judge affirmed. The present second appeal challenges that appellate decree. Civil Revision No. 1815 of 1940 challenges the Land Acquisition Court's refusal to pay the plaintiffs their shares of the moiety invested in the name of the widow.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Courts below were correct in law to refuse the plaintiffs a decree for recovery of their shares in the compensation money withdrawn by defendants 1 and 2 on the ground that granting such relief would amount to a prohibited partial partition of the joint estate.
- Whether Section 32 (relating to investment of compensation where the award is made in favour of a person who has no power to alienate) of the Land Acquisition Act applied so as to permit payment of the plaintiffs' shares in the moiety invested in the name of the widow, and relatedly whether the Land Acquisition Court erred in refusing to pay those shares.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The plaintiffs asserted that the acquired property was joint property and that they were entitled to specific shares of the compensation money. The trial Court so declared.
- They treated their claim as a money suit falling within the scope of Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act and relied on the proviso to Section 31(2) recognizing the liability of a person who receives compensation to pay it to the person lawfully entitled.
- With respect to the moiety invested in the name of the widow, the plaintiffs applied to the Land Acquisition Court for payment of their shares; that application was rejected and brought as Civil Revision No. 1815 of 1940.
Defendants' Arguments
- In their written statement defendants 1 and 2 initially denied joint ownership of the property and asserted exclusive title to the compensation money, though they abandoned that plea at trial and admitted joint title and the plaintiffs' shares.
- They contended that the plaintiffs could not sue for recovery of their shares in the compensation money alone and that to do so would amount to a partial partition; any adjustment of the withdrawn money should await final accounts in a full partition suit.
- Dr. Basak (for the defendants) further argued that plaintiffs had realized profits from the joint estate in excess of their shares, and therefore defendants were entitled to set off or raise that matter as an equitable defence, implying that a comprehensive partition suit would permit full adjustment.
Other Counsel's Contentions
- Mr. Mukherjee (arguing on the question of the invested moiety) conceded Section 32 might not apply but maintained his clients should not be without a remedy; he was unable to cite a specific provision of the Land Acquisition Act under which the Land Acquisition Judge could have granted the requested relief.
- He argued the proviso to Section 31(2) contemplates civil suits for recovery and that the Land Acquisition Court might, in a proper case, be bound to respect a civil Court decision and could exercise inherent powers (Section 151, Civil P.C.).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rajendra Kumar v. Brojendra Kumar ('23) 10 AIR 1923 Cal 501 | The rule that partial partition is not allowed may be relaxed where circumstances or interests of justice so require. | The Court relied on this principle to hold that, even if the present suit were treated as one for partition, the rule against partial partition could be relaxed and the plaintiffs could recover their shares in the compensation item alone. |
| Kali Charan v. Kiranbala Debi ('19) 6 AIR 1919 Cal 243 | Same principle: exceptions to the prohibition on partial partition where circumstances justify relaxation. | Used together with other authorities to support the proposition that the relief sought in respect of one converted item of the joint estate could be granted without requiring a full partition of all joint properties. |
| Tarini Charan v. Debendra Lal ('35) 39 CWN 1044 | Same principle concerning relaxation of the rule against partial partition in suitable cases. | The Court applied this authority to justify allowing adjustment of rights with respect to the single item of compensation money converted into cash, without causing multiplicity of litigation or prejudicing the parties' rights in other joint properties. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two strands of reasoning corresponding to the principal contested questions.
First, regarding recovery of the sums withdrawn by defendants 1 and 2, the Court held that the present action was in form and substance a money suit contemplated by Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act rather than a suit for partition. The Court noted (and treated as undisputed) that the plaintiffs were joint owners of the acquired property; had the award been made in their joint names, each cosharer could have withdrawn his proportionate share. Because defendants 1 and 2 had illegally withdrawn the plaintiffs' shares, they were under a duty to refund those sums — a liability expressly recognized by the proviso to Section 31(2).
The Court rejected the lower Courts' reasoning that granting recovery would amount to a forbidden partial partition. It explained that applying the lower Courts' view would undermine the effectiveness of the Land Acquisition Act: if every joint award could be treated as requiring a full partition suit before distribution, the Collector or Land Acquisition Judge could not properly pay proportionate shares, and Section 32 investment powers could not be exercised where necessary for limited owners (e.g., widows).
Second, the Court considered the possibility that the suit was, in substance, a partition action. It emphasized that the rule against partial partition is not absolute and may be relaxed where circumstances or the interests of justice require — relying on cited precedents. The Court found that granting relief limited to the compensation item would not produce multiplicity of litigation, would not prejudice co-owners' rights in other properties, and would effectively adjust the parties' rights in respect of the converted asset.
The Court also addressed the defendants' equitable defence that plaintiffs had previously realized profits in excess of their shares, concluding this defence was unsound on the facts. The Court found that defendants 1 and 2 had appropriated the entire corpus of one item of the joint estate in denial of plaintiffs' rights, and that family practice of taking periodic accounts meant any excesses received by the plaintiffs from other joint properties could be adjusted without a partition suit.
With respect to the moiety invested under Section 32 (in the name of the widow), the Court agreed with the Land Acquisition Judge that Section 32(2) (or Section 32(1)(b)(ii) as discussed) did not apply. Section 32 applies where the land belonged to a person without power to alienate and contemplates an order of investment in the name of that limited owner with the deposit remaining until the disability ceases or the estate vests absolutely. The Court held that Section 32 could not be invoked where the award and deposit were, in truth, not in favour of the person in whose name the money lay deposited but belonged to some other person not party to the award.
The Court recognized Mr. Mukherjee's contention that the plaintiffs should not be left remediless but observed that no specific statutory provision in the Land Acquisition Act was pointed out that would permit the Land Acquisition Judge to make the requested payment in this factual matrix. The Court noted that the proviso to Section 31(2) appears to contemplate civil proceedings for recovery, and that it was unnecessary to decide whether a Hindu widow, in whose favour the money is invested, could be regarded as a person who has "received the money" within that proviso.
Consequently, while the Court allowed recovery from defendants 1 and 2 by civil decree, it declined to make orders directing distribution of the sums invested in the Land Acquisition Court and discharged the rule in the revision petition relating to that deposit, leaving open the plaintiffs' alternative remedies (civil suit, review application, or application to the Land Acquisition Court).
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Court's principal operative rulings are:
- The second appeal succeeds; the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are varied so that, in addition to the reliefs previously granted by the lower appellate Court, there will be a decree for Rs. 2,447-18-0 against defendants 1 and 2, with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the suit until realization. The plaintiffs are entitled to their costs in all Courts.
- The rule in Civil Revision No. 1815 of 1940 (challenging the Land Acquisition Judge's refusal to pay the plaintiffs their shares in the moiety invested in the name of the widow) is discharged; the Court held Section 32 was inapplicable on the facts and declined to make orders directing distribution of the invested moiety. No order as to costs was made in that rule.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the plaintiffs obtain a substantive money decree against defendants 1 and 2 for the sum specifically awarded, with interest and costs, thereby enabling recovery of the plaintiffs' shares that had been withdrawn by those defendants.
- The Court affirmed that a claim to recover a co-sharer's wrongful appropriation of the corpus of a single item of a joint estate (here, compensation money converted into cash) can be pursued without instituting a partition suit in respect of the entire joint estate: the rule against partial partition is subject to relaxation when justice and the circumstances warrant it (as supported by cited precedents).
- On the invested moiety held in the name of a limited owner (the widow), the Court declined to order its distribution on revision, concluding Section 32 did not properly apply; the plaintiffs remain able to pursue alternative remedies (civil suit or review) as indicated by the Court, but no direction was given by this Court to the Land Acquisition Court.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general rule beyond applying established authorities; it resolves the dispute on the facts and statutory construction presented and indicates available procedural remedies rather than creating a novel doctrine.
Judge(s): The main opinion is delivered (signed "Biswas, J.") with agreement noted ("I agree.").
1. The facts giving rise to this second appeal and the connected civil Revision Case No. 1815 of 1940 may be shortly stated as follows: The plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit, out of which this appeal arises, are cosharers in respect of certain joint properties which they inherited from their common ancestor, one Earn Ratan Banerjee. Ram Ratan died leaving behind him his three sons, namely Shib Narayan, Pitambar and Gopal. Defendants 1 to 3 are the heirs of Shibnarayan while the plaintiffs and the pro forma defendants are the heirs of the other two brothers Pitambar and Gopal. Amongst the properties, which belonged to the descendants of Ram Ratan, there was a plot of land at Chetla in the district of 24-Parganas, being premises No. 3, Chetla Hat Road, a portion of which was acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act. This property which was owned by all the parties, stood in the name of Shib Narayan alone and consequently defendants 1 to 3, who are the heirs of Shib Narayan figured as the only claimants in the land acquisition proceedings and the award was made exclusively in their names. The date of the award is 21st July 1930. There was a reference thereafter at the instance of defendants 1 to 3 under Section 18, Land Acquisition Act, which was unsuccessful, and the compensation money awarded to these three claimants, after deducting all costs, stood at Rs. 7857-6-8.
2. In 1931 plaintiff 1, Hemanta Kumar, filed a suit in the Court of the first Subordinate Judge at Alipur against all his cosharers praying for a declaration that the acquired property (which was item 5 in the plaint schedule) as well as certain other properties belonged jointly to all the cosharers. There was a further prayer for declaration of specific shares of the parties in the joint lands. This suit was decreed by the trial Court on 16th September 1932 and the decision was not challenged by way of appeal by any of the defendants. Thereafter Hemanta Kumar, plaintiff 1, in the present suit, together with the other heirs of Pitambar and Gopal applied to the Land Acquisition Court for payment of their proportionate shares in the compensation money on the basis of the decree made in the title suit mentioned above. The Land Acquisition Court refused this application, holding that the proper remedy of the applicants lay in a suit under Section 31 (2), Land Acquisition Act. Thereafter a petition of revision was presented to this Court against this order, under Section 115, Civil P. C, and a rule was obtained which was eventually discharged on 22nd July 1936. On 8th August 1936, defendants 1 to 3 applied to the Land Acquisition Court for payment of the entire compensation money awarded to them. In this application it was stated that defendants 1 and 2 were entitled to a moiety share of the compensation money, while the other half was payable to defendant 3, who was a Hindu widow. This application was allowed; half of the total amount awarded as compensation was paid to defendants 1 and 2, while the other half, which was payable to defendant 3 was invested in Government promissory notes under the provisions of Section 32, Land Acquisition Act, she being a limited owner with restricted powers of alienation.
3. On 22nd February 1938 the present suit was instituted by Hemanta Kumar alone against defendants 1 to 3, and the claim related to his own share in the compensation money amounting to Rs. 384 odd annas. The other heirs of Pitambar and Gopal were made pro forma defendants in the suit. The pro forma defendants 4 to 8 later on applied to be made co-plaintiffs. Their prayer was allowed, and the claim of the original and added defendants having exceeded the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court of the Munsif, the suit was tried by the Subordinate Judge, First Court, Alipur. The reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs were of a three-fold character: In the first place, they prayed for a declaration of their right to certain shares in the compensation money that was allowed in the land acquisition proceedings including the amount that was withdrawn by defendants 1 and 2. In the second place, they prayed for recovery of half of the amounts payable in their shares from defendants 1 and 2 who had withdrawn half of the compensation money. The third prayer was that the plaintiffs might be regarded as claimants in the apportionment ease and their names might be inserted as parties in the said proceedings.
4. The suit was contested by defendants 1 and 2 only. In the written statement filed by them they denied that the property acquired was the joint property of the parties and asserted their exclusive title to the compensation money. This plea, however, was abandoned at the time of the trial, and during the hearing of the suit the defendants admitted the plaintiff's joint title to the property acquired as well as their shares in the compensation money that was award-ed. They contended, however, that as the compensation money represented only one of the items of the joint property, the plain. tiffs could not sue for recovery of their shares in that item alone without instituting a suit for partition in respect of the en-Lire joint estate. It was said that the money which was received by defendants 1 and 2 could be debited against them when accounts would be finally taken in the partition suit. This contention found favour with the trial Court who decreed the plaintiff's suit in part. The plaintiffs were held to be joint owners of the property acquired along with the defendants, and the specific shares claimed by them in the compensation money were declared. Their prayer for refund of the money withdrawn by defendants 1 and 2, as well as the prayer for insertion of their names in the land acquisition proceedings were refused. On appeal this decision was affirmed by the Additional District Judge of 24-Parganas. It is against this appellate decree that the present second appeal has been taken.
5. As has been said already, the other half of the compensation money which was warded to defendant 3 was invested in Government promissory notes under Section 32 (2) of the Act. The plaintiffs made no prayer in the plaint for recovery of any portion of this amount. All that they prayed for was a declaration of their right to certain shares in this money. After they got this declaration from the trial Judge, they presented an application to the Land Acquisition Court for payment of their shares in the money that remained deposited in the Land Acquisition Court in the name of defendant 3. This application was rejected by the Land Acquisition Court on 17th August 1910 and it is against his order that civil Revision No. 1815 of 1940 was obtained. By an order made by this Court, the rule and the appeal have been heard together. The only question for determination in this appeal is as to whether the Courts below were right in law in refusing the plaintiffs a decree for recovery of their shares in the compensation money which was withdrawn by defendants 1 and 2, on the ground that to grant such relief would be, in effect, to allow a partial partition, which the law prohibits.
6. On hearing the learned advocates on both sides we are of opinion that the view taken by the Courts below is not right and cannot be supported. We do not think that the present suit is either in form or in substance a suit for partition. It is a money suit which is contemplated by Section 31 (2), Land Acquisition Act. It is not disputed that the plaintiffs were the joint owners, with the defendants, of the property which was the subject-matter of the land acquisition proceedings, and if an award had been made in their joint names, there is no doubt that each one of the cosharers would have been able to withdraw a portion of the compensation money according to his share, even though there was no question of partition of their other joint properties. In the present case, the amount of compensation money to which the plaintiffs were legally entitled had been illegally withdrawn by 'defendants 1 and 2, and consequently they are under a liability to pay the money back to the plaintiffs and this liability is expressly recognized by the proviso to Section 31 (2), Land Acquisition Act. If the view taken by the Courts below was right, then in every case when there is a joint award in favour of two or more persons, a case of partial partition will arise and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act itself would be rendered nugatory. It would then not be proper for the Collector or the Land Acquisition Judge to pay a proportionate amount of compensation money to one of the cosharers unless they were satisfied that there were no other properties jointly owned by them nor could any power of investment or purchase be exercised under Section 32, Land Acquisition Act, if one of the undivided co-owners happened to be a widow or any-other limited owner. It is true that the compensation money stands as a substitute for the property itself. In law all the co-sharers are entitled to enjoy and possess the common property jointly, and if one of them asserts an exclusive title to any portion of such property and ousts his cosharers from enjoyment or possession of the same, the latter can certainly institute a suit for recovery of joint possession in respect of this particular item without being obliged to sue for partition of the entire joint estate. When a joint property is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, the enjoyment, which the co-owners are entitled to under the Act, is to get proportionate share of the compensation money that is given by the award. If one cosharer receives anything in excess of his share, he should be bound to refund it to the true owners, and this is a right, which as I have said above, is recognized by the proviso to Section 31 (2), Land Acquisition Act.
7. But even assuming that the present suit, in substance, is one for partition, I do not think that it should fail on the ground that it did not embrace all the joint properties of the parties. The rule that there cannot be a partial partition of a joint estate is not an inelastic rule which admits of no exception. It has been held that the application of this rule may be relaxed, if the circumstances of a particular case or the interests of justice so require : vide Rajendra Kumar v. Brojendra Kumar ('23) 10 AIR 1923 Cal 501, Kali Charan v. Kiranbala Debi ('19) 6 AIR 1919 Cal 243 and Tarini Charan v. Debendra Lal ('35) 39 CWN 1044. The rule is aimed at preventing multiplicity of litigation which would result if separate suits for partition could be instituted in respect of fragments of a joint estate. It is certainly advantageous to file one suit in respect of all the joint properties where all questions relating to equitable distribution and adjustment of accounts can be finally determined. In the present case, however, no such mischievous consequences are likely to result. The rights of the parties can be effectively adjusted with regard to this one item of the joint estate which was the subject-matter of the land acquisition proceedings, and which now being converted into money has practically ceased to exist; and this can be done without affecting in the least the rights of the parties to the other joint properties. None of the co-owners will be inconvenienced or prejudiced in any way and no multiplicity of litigation is likely to arise.
8. It is argued by Dr. Basak that as the plaintiffs themselves have realized profits out of the joint estate far in excess of their legitimate shares, all these matters could be adjusted if only a comprehensive suit for partition was instituted; and defendants 1 to 3 are entitled to take this plea by way of an equitable defence. We do not think that this contention of Dr. Basak is sound. In the first place, in withdrawing the compensation money defendants 1 and 2 could not be said to have realized profits of the joint estate which might or might not be in excess of their shares. They have appropriated the entire corpus of one item of the joint estate and this they have done in clear denial of the plaintiffs rights. In the second place, it transpires from evidence and as has been found as a fact by the Courts below, that there is a practice in this family according to which periodical accounts are taken and receipts by one individual cosharer out of the joint estate, if they are in excess of his share, are taken into consideration and accounts are adjusted accordingly. If the plaintiffs had received anything in excess of their shares from other joint properties, this could undoubtedly be the subject-matter of periodical adjustment of accounts and it is not necessary for that purpose to institute a suit for partition. We are satisfied that the defence which was put forward by the defendants is neither equitable nor just and we would not be justified in countenancing this plea at all.
9. The result therefore is that the appeal succeeds, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are varied and it is directed that in addition to the reliefs given by the lower appellate Court, there will be a decree for a sum of Rs. 2447-18-0 against defendants 1 and 2. This amount will carry interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from the date of the suit till the date of realization. The plaintiffs will be entitled to their costs in all the Courts.
Civil Revision Case No. 1815 of 1940.
10. We now come to the rule which was obtained by the plaintiffs against the order of the Land Acquisition Judge dismissing their application for payment of their shares in the other moiety of the compensation money which was invested in Government promissory notes in the name of Rajo Bala under Section 32, Land Acquisition Act. In our opinion the Land Acquisition Judge was quite right in holding that Section 32 (2) (section 32 (1) (b) (ii)?), Land Acquisition Act, had no application to the facts of the present ease. Under Section 32, Land Acquisition Act, when the land in respect whereof any compensation money is awarded belonged to a person who had no power to alienate the same, the Land Acquisition Court has got, in the first place, to make an order of investment and the money is to be invested either in the purchase of other lands to be held under the like title and conditions of ownership, or if such purchase cannot be effected forthwith then in such Government or other approved securities as the Court shall think fit. In case it is invested in Government securities, it remains in deposit in Court until the same is applied either in the purchase of lands or in payment to the person or persons becoming absolutely entitled thereto. The last clause, in our opinion, contemplates a case where the disability has ceased or the estate vests absolutely in a full owner after the termination of the limited estate. It presupposes a valid deposit under Sub-section (1) and. cannot have any reference to a case like the present where the property is found not to belong either wholly or in part to the person in whose favour the award is made and in whose name the money lies deposited; but is found to belong to some other person who is not a party to the award at all.
11. Mr. Mukherjee, who has argued the case with great ability and thoroughness, has contended before us that even if Section 32 is not applicable to the facts of the present case his clients should not be without a remedy. He has however not been able to draw our attention to any specific section of the Land Acquisition Act under which a relief of this character can be had by an application to the Land Acquisition Judge. Section 31 (2), (proviso 3?) of the Act, lays down that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto. This apparently contemplates a civil suit, and it is not clear whether a Hindu widow or other limited owner in whose favour the money is invested under the provisions of section 32, cannot be said to be a person who has 'received the money' within the meaning of this proviso. It would rather seem unjust that while the legal owner would have the right to recover the compensation money if it was unjustly withdrawn by another person, yet he would have no rights whatsoever if this other person happened to be a limited owner with restricted powers to alienate the property. It is further to be pointed out, that the right to get a refund of the money is not created by the proviso to Section 31 (2). That proviso simply recognizes] the right which exists independently of the section. It is however not necessary for us] to decide this point in the present case, as in the suit, which was instituted by the plaintiffs, they did not pray for actual recovery of the amount that remained in deposit in the Land Acquisition Court; and it is also not necessary for us to discuss as to whether or not a civil Court has any authority to give any directions to the Land Acquisition Court regarding the distribution or disposal of such money, when apparently no such question was raised in the suit itself. It is conceded that there is no specific provision in the Land Acquisition Act, providing for a case like this. It has been argued by Mr. Mukherjee that the Land Acquisition Court is bound to pay respect to a decision of a civil Court and in a proper case it can exercise its inherent powers under Section 151, Civil P.C. It is not proper for us sitting as a Court of revision to express any definite opinion on this point. The petitioners would certainly be entitled to institute a civil suit for further and appropriate reliefs with regard to the money that is lying in deposit in the Land Acquisition Court; and they may also, if so advised, apply for a review of the award or for exercise of its inherent powers by the Land Acquisition Court. But having regard to the view we are taking, viz. that Section 32 (2), (Section 32 (1) (b) (ii)?), of the Act, has no application to the facts of the present case, we do not think that we should be justified in giving any such directions ourselves. The result therefore is that the rule is discharged. We make no order as to costs.
Biswas, J.
12. I agree.
Alert