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Ramanjulu Naidu v. Aramudu Iyengar And Anr.

Madras High Court
Nov 15, 1909
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff is the Receiver of the Tanjore palace estate. Two original holders, Ramu Iyengar and Srinivasaragava Iyengar, executed separate muchilikas (conveyances) for separate moieties of certain lands in favour of the previous receiver, promising to pay rent. The 1st and 2nd defendants purchased respectively the interests of those two persons under separate sale-deeds.

The present suit sought recovery of rent for six Faslis (years) from 1310 to 1315. The District Munsif dismissed the suit. On appeal the Subordinate Judge decreed recovery of a moiety of rent due for Fasli 1311 but held that (a) the claim as regards Faslis 1310 and 1311 in relation to the share originally belonging to Srinivasaragava Iyengar, and (b) the claim for rent up to 15 December 1901 as regards the moiety originally owned by Ramu Iyengar, were barred under Section 43 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), Act XIV of 1882.

The plaintiff had earlier instituted two Small Cause Suits — No. 15 of 1902 and No. 598 of 1903 — in respect of each moiety against the first defendant and recovered judgment. At the time each Small Cause Suit was instituted the relevant rents (for Faslis 1310–1311 as to Srinivasaragava's moiety, and up to 15 December 1901 as to Ramu's moiety) had accrued but had been omitted from those suits. The matter under review concerned (i) whether Section 43 CPC barred recovery against the first defendant for the omitted rents, and (ii) whether the second defendant should be held liable for the rents of Faslis 1310 and 1311 in respect of both moieties.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, by reason of earlier Small Cause judgments and Section 43 of the Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiff is barred from suing the first defendant for rents omitted from those earlier suits.
  2. Whether a judgment recovered against one joint promissor (or one of two co-obligors) operates as a bar to a subsequent suit against the co-promissor under the rule in King v. Hoare (1844) and related authorities, and whether that rule applies to the mofussil (provincial) context in India.
  3. Whether, in the circumstances of joint or joint-and-several liability, a cause of action (specifically rents not sued for in prior proceedings) merges into a prior judgment so as to prevent a subsequent action against a co-promissor.
  4. Whether the civil-law/statutory provisions in India — notably Section 43 and Section 44 of the Indian Contract Act — alter the English substantive rule so as to permit a subsequent suit against a co-promissor.

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments Addressed to the Court

  • It was assumed in argument by both sides that the second defendant was a member of the joint family with the first defendant and thereby liable with him to pay the rent.
  • It was contended that the rule in King v. Hoare (1844) — that a joint promissor is not liable in a subsequent suit when judgment has been previously recovered against the co-promissor — is not applicable to the mofussil in India.
  • Alternatively it was argued that even if the English rule applied, the liability of the defendants was joint and several (by reason of Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act), such that the rule would not preclude a subsequent suit against the co-promissor.
  • It was further argued that because the Small Cause Suits did not refer to the rents of Faslis 1310 and 1311, the cause of action in respect of those rents had not merged into the judgments in the Small Cause Suits and therefore the judgments could not operate as a bar to the present suit against the second defendant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
King v. Hoare (1844) 13 M. & W. 494 The rule that a joint promissor is not liable in a subsequent suit when judgment had been previously recovered against the co-promissor (merger of cause of action in judgment). The opinion treats this as the principal English authority for the rule; the Court considered its foundation (merger) and noted reluctance to reject the rule for India without Full Bench reference, but did not finally apply it to bar the present suit against the second defendant.
Kendall v. Hamilton (1877) 4 A.C. 504 Authority for retention of the English rule as substantive law (majority view in Lords). Cited as part of English authorities upholding the merger-based rule; used to contrast English law with the Indian statutory position under the Indian Contract Act.
In re Hodgson Becket v. Ramsdale (1886) 31 Ch. D. 177 English case cited among authorities concerning joint promissors and related substantive rules. Listed among English authorities showing retention of the substantive rule in English law; relied on for comparative purposes.
Hammond v. Schofield (1891) 1 Q.B. 453 English authority cited regarding consequences of prior judgments between joint promissors. Cited as one of the English decisions reinforcing the substantive rule that a prior judgment may bar a subsequent suit.
Hooare v. Niblett (1891) 1 Q.B. 781 English authority on the non-liability of a joint promissor in certain subsequent suits. Cited among English cases illustrating the rule; used for comparative analysis.
Meheod v. Power (1898) 2 Ch. 295 Addressed plaintiff's rights after obtaining judgment in default against one of two joint defendants. Quoted to show that obtaining judgment in default against one joint defendant does not prevent proceeding against the other; cited in support of flexibility in English law.
Kendall v. Hamilton (majority Lords) reference (1877) 4 A.C. 504 See above — merger as foundation of the English rule. Used with Baron Parke's statement in King v. Hoare to explain the doctrinal foundation (merger) relied on by English courts.
Muhammad Askari v. Radhe Ram Singh 22 A. 307 Indian case holding that judgment remaining unsatisfied ought not in British India to be held a bar to a subsequent action against other promissors. Relied upon by the Court as supporting the view that the Indian Contract Act (Section 43) should be given its natural effect in making joint liabilities joint and several and that a prior unsatisfied judgment should not bar subsequent suits in India.
Gurusami v. Chinnamannar; Gurusami Chetti v. Sadasiva Chetti 5 M. 37 Presidency decisions referring to the English rule with apparent assent. Noted by the Court as early local cases that accepted or hesitantly accepted an English approach; their reasoning was considered but not treated as decisive against the statutory view.
Chockalinga Mudali v. Subbaraya Mudali 5 M. 133 Decision with reference to the mofussil cited in support of the English rule. Cited but the Court notes this decision was overruled in Ramakrishna v. Namasivaya (7 M. 225) on specific grounds (liability of sons not joint under Hindu law).
Umamakheswara v. Singaperumal 8 M. 376 Presidency case referring to the English rule. Referenced as part of the body of local decisions that had followed the English approach; not treated as controlling where statute indicates otherwise.
Narayana Chetty v. Lakshmana Chetty 21 M. 256 Presidency case referencing the English rule. Listed among local precedents; the Court observed that many such cases merely referred to King v. Hoare without deciding applicability in mofussil context in face of Section 43 Indian Contract Act.
Chinnappa Rowthen v. Robert Fischer 30 M. 495 Presidency authority that referred to the English rule. Noted as part of the corpus of cases that did not conclusively resolve the conflict between English rule and Indian statutory provisions.
Himendra Coomar Mullick v. Ragen Lall Moonshee 3 C. 353 Discussed by Mr. Justice Markby with some doubt about extension of King v. Hoare to India. Cited to illustrate judicial hesitation about extending the English rule to Indian circumstances; relied on to show lack of unanimity in local jurisprudence.
Ramakrishna v. Namasivaya 7 M. 225 Overruled Chockalinga (on the ground that sons' liability was not joint with father's under Hindu law). Used to show that some earlier authorities were corrected where the underlying facts or legal bases (e.g., Hindu law distinctions) required it.
Ittappan v. Manavikrama 21 M. 153 Observation (Sheppard J.) about applicability of Section 43 CPC even where first suit was dismissed. Relied upon to show that Section 43 CPC's operation depends on the frame of the suit rather than the result, supporting the Court's view about the scope of the bar under Section 43 CPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in a few linked steps grounded in statutory interpretation and comparative authority:

  1. Section 43 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) operates to bar a subsequent suit against the same defendant for relief omitted to be claimed in a prior suit; the provision makes the omitted liability "deemed to be at an end" as against the same defendant. Applying that provision, the liability of the first defendant for rents omitted from the earlier Small Cause Suits is barred and the decree against the first defendant was therefore correct.
  2. The separate question was whether the second defendant could be held liable for the rents of Faslis 1310 and 1311 in respect of both moieties. The parties and counsel addressed the English rule (King v. Hoare) that a joint promissor is not liable in a subsequent suit when judgment has been recovered against a co-promissor, and disputed whether that rule applied in the mofussil in India.
  3. The Court examined the interaction between the English substantive rule and Indian statutory provisions. It observed that Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act declares the liability of joint promissors to be joint and several, and commentators (Pollock) and some Indian judgments (Muhammad Askari v. Radhe Ram Singh) incline to the view that, in British India, an unsatisfied judgment against one promissor should not bar a subsequent action against the other promissor(s).
  4. The Court reviewed local Presidency and other decisions: some accepted the English rule with assent, some were doubted or overruled for particular reasons (e.g., Ramakrishna v. Namasivaya). The Court also noted statutory and jurisprudential modifications in England (statute 19 & 20 Vict. c.97 and other devices) and divergent treatment in the United States.
  5. Although the Court recognized arguments against extending King v. Hoare to India, it felt it was not justified to reject that English rule without reference to a Full Bench and therefore did not express a final opinion on the general question.
  6. The Court then turned to the closely related question of merger: the English authorities (Baron Parke in King v. Hoare and Kendall v. Hamilton) treat the foundation of the rule as merger of the cause of action into the judgment. The Court reasoned that no merger can occur where the rents had not been sued for at all in the prior proceedings.
  7. Distinguishing the two doctrines, the Court explained that the bar under Section 43 CPC is by force of a special statutory rule — that relief not claimed shall not be claimed in a subsequent action — and is not founded on the principle of merger in a recovered judgment. Section 43 CPC's applicability depends on the frame of the prior suit and operates even where the prior suit was dismissed (per Ittappan v. Manavikrama).
  8. Applying these principles to the facts, because the rents for Faslis 1310 and 1311 had not been sued for in the earlier Small Cause Suits, there was no merger of those claims into the prior judgments. Consequently, the statutory bar under Section 43 CPC applied only as to the first defendant (whose earlier suits had omitted those rents) and did not prevent recovery from the second defendant.
  9. On that basis the Court modified the decree of the lower appellate Court to require the second defendant to pay the amount claimed for Faslis 1310 and 1311 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the decree.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court modified the Subordinate Judge's decree so as to require the second defendant to pay the sum claimed for Faslis 1310 and 1311 (Rs. 314-1-6) with further interest at 6% per annum from the date of the decree. The decree as against the first defendant — insofar as rents had been omitted from earlier Small Cause Suits and are therefore barred by Section 43 CPC — was held to be correct.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the first defendant remains barred from being sued for the omitted rents by virtue of Section 43 CPC (those claims having been omitted from earlier Small Cause Suits), while the second defendant is ordered to pay the omitted rents for Faslis 1310 and 1311 with interest.
  • The Court considered the broader conflict between English substantive rules (King v. Hoare) and Indian statutory provisions (Sections 43 and 44 of the Indian Contract Act) but declined to pronounce a final, general ruling reversing the English rule without a Full Bench reference. Thus, no new, sweeping precedent was declared on that wider question in this opinion; the decision is limited to the application of Section 43 CPC and the specific facts before the Court.

Concurring Opinion: Benson, J. expressly concurred in the reasoning and in the proposed modification of the Subordinate Judge's decree.

Show all summary ...

1. The plaintiff is the Receiver of the Tanjore palace estate. Ramu Iyengar and Srinivasaragava Iyengar executed muchilikas each for a separate moiety of certain lands in favour of the previous receiver promising to pay rent. The 1st and 2nd defendants purchased the interests of the said two persons in respect of each moiety under a separate sale-deed executed by each. The present suit is instituted for the recovery of rent for 6 Faslis from 1310 to 1315. The District Munsif dismissed the suit. The Subordinate Judge on appeal has passed a decree for a moiety of rent due for Fasli 1311, holding the claim as regards Faslis 1310 and 1311 in relation to the share which had belonged originally to Srinivasaragava Iyengar and likewise the claim for rent up to the 15th of December 1901, as regards the moiety that was originally owned by Ramu Iyengar barred under Section 43 of the Civil Procedure Code, Act XIV of 1882. The plaintiff had instituted two Small Cause Suits Nos. 15 of 1902 and 598 of 1903 in respect of each moiety against the first defendant and recovered judgment. At the time of the institution of Small Cause Suit No. 598 of 1903, the claim for rent for Faslis 1310 and 1311, as to Srinivasaragava Iyengar's moiety has accrued but was not included in the suit. At the time of the institution of Small Cause Suit No. 15 of 1902, the claim for rent up to the 15th December 1901 as to Ramu Iyengar's moiety has also accrued, but was omitted to be included in the suit. There can be no doubt that under Section 43 of the Civil Procedure Code, the liability of the first defendant for the rent omitted to be claimed in the former suits must be deemed to be at an end, for, that section provides that the plaintiff shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion omitted. The decree, therefore, as against the first defendant is right. But the question is raised that the second defendant ought to have been made liable for the rent of Faslis 1310 and 1311 in respect of both the moieties. It is true that Section 43 of the Civil Procedure Code does not bar the claim against the second defendant. It was assumed in the argument addressed to us on both sides that the 2nd defendant was a member of the joint family along with the first defendant and liable with him to pay the rent. It was, however, argued firstly that the rule in King v. Hoare (1844) 13 M. and W. 494. according to which a joint promissor is not liable in a subsequent suit when judgment had been previously recovered against the co-promissor is not applicable to the mofussil in India, secondly that even if it is the liability of the first and second defendants was joint and several and, therefore, the rule itself had no bearing thereby. That the Small Cause Suits not having any reference to the rents of the Faslis 1310 and 1311, the cause of action for those rents had not merged into the judgment so as to operate as a bar to the present suit against the second defendant. As regards the first and second contentions, the agreement is based on Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act, IX of 1872, which makes the liability of joint promissors joint and several. Although an action upon a joint promise against one only of the joint promissors was met by a plea in abatement before the Judicature Acts and that plea has been abolished by Order XXI, Rule 20, the rule of non-liability of the joint promissor in the second suit is still retained as a rule of substantive law and not as a rule as procedure. See Kendall v. Hamilton (1877) 4 A.C. 504 : 48 L.J.C.P. 705 : 41 L.J. 418 : 28 W.R. 97, In re Hodgson Becket v. Ramsdale (1886) 31 Ch. D. 177, Hammond v. Schofield (1891) 60 L.J.Q.B. 539 : 1 Q.B. 453, Hooare v. Niblett (1891) 1 Q.B. 781 : 60 L.J.Q.B. 565 : 64 L.T. 659 : 39 W.R. 491 : 55 J.P. 664. But it is clear law in England that the foundation of the, rule is that the liability of the joint promissor is joint and that the cause of action which is one and indivisible transit in Bern judicature and is, therefore, not available for a subsequent suit against a co-promissor. The question arises whether Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act lays down a mere rule of Procedure or makes the liability of each co-promissor joint and several. Sir Frederick Pollock observes in his notes to Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act, as far as the liability under a contract is concerned, it appears to make all joint contracts joint and several. See Pollock and Mulla on the Indian Contract Act, 1905, p. 185. And after referring to the difference of opinion among the Indian High Courts as to the effect of the judgment against one of the joint promissors as regards the other he adds:

"We think it the better opinion that the enactment should be carried out to its natural consequences and that notwithstanding the English authorities founded on a different substantive rule, such a judgment remaining unsatisfied ought not in British India to be held a bar to a subsequent action against the other promissor or promissors"
(p. 186) Muhammad Askari v. Radhe Ram Singh 22 A. 307, upon a full revision of all the Indian cases, Chief Justice Strachey and Banerji, J., have taken the same view. Also Section 44 of the Indian Contract Act departing from the English Law lays down an analogous principle that the release of a joint-debtor does not operate as a discharge of the co-promissors. It must, however, be admitted as pointed out by Strachey, C.J., himself, in Muhammad Askari v. Radhe Ram Singh 22 A. 307 that the contrary opinion was expressed in many cases and often assumed in others. So far as this Presidency is concerned we may refer to the following cases. Gurusami v. Chinnamannar and Gurusami Chetti v. Sadasiva Cheiti 5 M. 37, Chockalinga Mudali v. Subbaraya Mudali 5 M. 133, Umamakheswara v. Singaperumal 8 M. 376, Narayana Chetty v. Lakshmana Chetty 21 M. 256 and Chinnappa Rowthen v. Robert Fischer 30 M. 495 : 17 M.L.J. 411 : 3 M.L.T. 22. The first of these cases came up from the Original side of the Court to which rules of the English law were deemed applicable. The second case was a decision with reference to the mofussil but has itself been overruled in Ramakrishna v. Namasivaya 7 M. 225, on the ground that the liability of the sons was not joint with that of the father under the Hindu law but several. The other cases simply refer to the rule in King v. Hoare ( 1844) 13 M. and W. 494 with apparent assent and do not involve the decision of the question whether it applies to the mofussil in India in the face of Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act. It must also be pointed out that Mr. Justice Muthusami Iyer gave his assent to the applicability of the rule. In a hesitating manner see Gurusami v. Chinnamannar and Gurusami v. Sadasiva 5 M. 37 and that Mr. Justice Markby in Himendra Coomar Mullick v. Ragen Lall Moonshee 3 C. 353 at pp. 361 & 362, which was followed in Gurusami v. Chinnamannar and Gurusami v. Sadasiva 5 M. 37 expressed himself in somewhat doubtful language as regards the extension of King v. Hoare ( 1844) 13 M. and W. 494 to India. The rule itself has been modified in England to some extent by the Statute 19 and 20, Vict. Ch. 97, which enacts that a creditor shall not be barred in a subsequent suit against certain of the joint promissors, who were beyond the seas at the time of the former suit against the co-promissor; see Hukamchand's Civil Procedure Code, p. 554. Against a plaintiff who obtains judgment in default of appearance against one of two joint defendants does not abandon his right to proceed to judgment against the other defendant Meheod v. Power ( 1898) 2 Ch. 295 at p. 300. It was also pointed out by Mr. Justice Muthusami Iyer and by Mr. Justice Markby in the case already referred to that a rule similar to that in King v. Hoare ( 1844) 13 M. and W. 494 which obtained originally under the Roman Law was afterwards abolished. See Sandar's Institutes of Justinian XI Edition p. 338. Says Hunter in his Roman Law II Edition p. 560. The liability of a correal or joint obligation to be extinguished by litis contestatio, is like acceptilation an incident of Stipulatio, and not correality. Even in the case of Stipulatio, the contract might be so framed as to avoid that inconvenient result. Finally Justinian enacted that even in the case of Stipulatio abtis contestatio should have no effect upon the objection, see also p. 562 Hunter's Roman Law II Edition. It is true there is a general consensus of opinion in favour of the rule in King v. Hoare ( 1844) 13 M. and W. 494 in the States of America. But the various devices adopted by means of special statutes and otherwise to relax the severity of the rule, are a clear indication of the inconvenience felt in a strict adherence to it. See Black on Judgment Sections 770 to 772. Although, therefore, there is much to be said against the extension of the rule in King v. Hoare ( 1844) 13 M. and W. 494 to India, I do not feel justified in rejecting it without a reference to the Full Bench. And it is not necessary to express a final opinion on the question in this case. It was argued that the rents for Faslis 1310 and 1311 were not the subject of the former action and, therefore, the cause of action with respect to them had not merged into the judgments in the Small Cause suits so as to open the door for the rule in King v. Hoare ( 1844) 13 M. and W. 494 This involves the consideration of the question of the foundation of that rule. Baron Parke in King v. Hoare ( 1844) 13 M. and W. 494 and the majority of Lords in Kendall v. Hamilton ( 1877) 4 A.C. 504 : 48 L.J.C.P. 705 : 41 L.J. 418 : 28 W.R. 97 stated it to be the merger of the cause of action in the judgment. There can be no such merger where the rents had not been sued for at all. Although under Section 43 of the Civil Procedure Code, a subsequent suit against the same defendant is barred for rents which had accrued due it is by the force of a special rule that relief not claimed in respect of a cause of action shall not be claimed in a subsequent action and not on the principle of merger in a judgment recovered. Section 43 of the Civil Procedure Code operates to bar the second suit even where the first was dismissed and not decreed for its applicability depends upon the frame of the suit instituted and not upon the result. See Hukam Chand's Civil Procedure Code page 551 and the observation of Sheppard J. in Ittappan v. Manavikrama 21 M. 153 at p. 157. It seems, therefore, to follow there being no merger of the claim of the rents of Faslis 1310 and 1311 in the judgment in the Small Cause suits and the bar under Section 43 of the Civil Procedure Code only applying to the present claim against the first defendant it is not open to exception. In modification of the decree of the lower appellate Court I would direct the second ' defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of Rs. 314-1-6 being the amount claimed for Faslis 1310 and 1311 with further interest at 6 per cent, per annum from the date of this decree.

Benson, J.

2. I concur in the consideration of my learned brother and in the modification of the Sub-Judge's decree which he proposes.